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Abstract  
This thesis offers an exploratory study of certain aspects of the psychological status 
of the senses of four polysemous words, over, under, above and below, using three 
sets of sentence-sorting experiments. The thesis assumes that word senses are 
examples of linguistic categories; therefore, it is further assumed that categorisation 
tasks will offer insights into their nature as categories, and that effects predicted by 
existing models of categorisation can be tested. The first set of experiments 
questions the representativity of linguists’ intuitions about the senses of these words. 
The results indicate that expert and naïve speakers’ intuitions do not reliably 
coincide. This is consistent with existing research into the representativity of expert 
intuitions in syntax (e.g., Schütze, 1996). The possibility that this is due to individual 
differences is the subject of the second experiment. The data gathered suggest that 
there may be individual differences in word senses, consistent with observations of 
individual differences in other areas of language (e.g., Bates et al., 1995; Street and 
Dąbrowska, 2014). It is noted that lack of consensus may be a product of the task 
design, and that the scale of the task may have caused fatigue, forgetting, or semantic 
satiation. This was remedied in the final set of experiments. Further evidence of 
individual variation in word senses was found. In addition, the versatility of the 
methodology was exploited to test whether word senses are stored in memory, and in 
a manner compatible with the Generalised Context Model of Classification, or 
exemplar model (Nosofsky, 1986). Participants sorted the same stimuli twice, 
divided by a period of two months. In general, participants reached better consensus 
with themselves than with others. This indicates that word senses may have some 
form of mental representation. Effects of selective attention, a central prediction of 
the exemplar model, were observed in sorting behaviour. Four original contributions 
to knowledge are made: (1) there appear to be individual differences in word senses; 
(2) expert intuitions about what the senses of a given polysemous word are do not 
correspond to those of other speakers; (3) word senses do appear to have some form 
of mental representation, but not in the fixed form previously suggested (e.g., Tyler 
and Evans, 2001); and (4) selective attention effects are observed in this example of 
linguistic categorisation. The findings indicate that the exemplar model can account 
for the representation of word senses. This allows the conclusion that we may 
understand word senses as potential categories of exemplars. 
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		 Windowsill 
Area where one might paint 
Chapter 1 Introduction 		
Part 1 
1.1 Polysemy and word senses 
Polysemy, the phenomenon in which a word – indeed, most words (Murphy 2004; 
Clark 1983) – has a number of distinct, but arguably related senses, does not appear 
to present any particular problems to successful communication. What is 
troublesome about polysemy, instead, is how we go about explaining it – for 
example, the way in which we access a particular sense, the degree of 
interrelatedness of senses, and the representational status of senses remain open 
questions. For this reason, polysemy is the focus of intense and extended study in 
linguistics generally, and in cognitive linguistics in particular. This thesis aims to 
create new knowledge about polysemy, operating within the cognitive linguistic 
theoretical framework. I focus in particular on word senses, and certain aspects of 
their psychological status.  
 
The overarching purpose of the thesis is to answer some questions that arise from 
consideration of some examples of polysemous words. In the tradition of cognitive 
linguistic research, this thesis examines the word over, along with under, above, and 
below. Let us consider some examples of below: 
 
1. The sales value is well below target 
2. Don’t paint below the windowsill 	
I would predict that you, my reader, would 
agree that below exemplifies a different sense 
in each sentence. In my view, below in 
example 1 has a metaphorical sense and 
describes a position on a numerical scale. In 
contrast, example 2 locates a point in space. But what of example 3? 
 
Figure 1 Schematic representation of 
Don't paint below the windowsill 
  2 
3. Your mates are down below, watching you. 
 
The difference between metaphorical and spatial senses of below is fairly obvious. 
Where the line between senses within these two broad categories should be drawn, 
however, is less clear. In this case, I would argue that examples 2 and 3 represent 
different senses; example 2 describes a two-
dimensional relationship between two 
objects, which is illustrated in Figure 1, 
while example 3 represents a three-
dimensional configuration in which the 
relative locations of the mates and you is 
on a diagonal, rather than vertical, axis, as illustrated in Figure 2.		
This chapter introduces the overarching aims of the thesis, the approach taken to 
achieving those aims, fleshes out the concepts of polysemy and word senses, and 
introduces two theoretical accounts of categorisation. The chapter is divided into two 
parts, as follows. In part 1, following this brief introduction to the topic, I set out the 
aims of the thesis, and the research questions that are used to achieve those aims. I 
then describe the approach I take to answering those questions, and acknowledge the 
assumptions I make in taking this approach. This part of the chapter closes with a 
summary of the purpose of each of the following chapters, and how they interrelate. 
In the second part, I briefly describe the cognitive linguistic framework and the 
particular principle therein that guides this research. I then provide a brief evaluative 
summary of research in polysemy and word senses. This summary frames polysemy 
as a case of linguistic categorisation, and before this chapter closes, I introduce the 
two main theories of categorisation that have been invoked to account for linguistic 
categorisation: prototype theory, and exemplar theory.  
1.2 Aims 
In this thesis I aim to address four questions about word senses, which I answer with 
original data:  
 
First, I ask whether the sense distinctions that I, as a scholar of the meanings of these 
four words, find meaningful coincide with those found meaningful by other native 
speakers of English. The answer to this question will create new knowledge about 
	 	
	
You	
Mates 	
You 
Figure 2 Schematic representation of Your 
mates are down below, watching you 
  3 
the status of expert intuitions in the study of word meaning, and will contribute to a 
literature, principally concerned with intuitions about syntax (e.g., Dąbrowska, 2010; 
Schütze, 1996), about how representative expert intuitions about linguistic 
phenomena are. 
 
Second, I ask whether native speakers of English agree with each other about 
whether a set of examples of a particular polysemous word use the same or different 
senses of that word. In this way, I aim to establish whether there are individual 
differences in word senses. The answer to this question will create new knowledge 
about individual differences in word senses, and will contribute to a large literature 
on individual differences in other aspects of language, such as grammatical 
attainment (e.g., Street and Dąbrowska, 2010), language acquisition (e.g., Bates, 
Dale, and Thal, 1995) and metaphor interpretation (Duffy 2015). 
 
Third, I ask whether there is evidence that word senses are stored in memory. The 
outcome to this line of investigation will create new knowledge about the 
representation of word senses and will contribute to the unresolved debate over 
whether polysemous words are disambiguated by using context to “flesh out” a 
highly abstract meaning, à la the monosemy position (Ruhl 1989), or by accessing a 
sense stored in memory, as has been proposed by polysemy advocates such as Tyler 
and Evans (2001). 
 
Following on from this third question, I ask whether the representation of word 
senses can be explained in terms of the (Generalised) Context Model of 
Classification (Medin and Schaffer, 1978; Nosofsky, 1986), which is frequently 
referred to by cognitive linguists as the exemplar model of categorisation. I assess 
this by testing a central prediction of the GCM, namely the effect of selective 
attention in making categorisation decisions1. In answering this question, I will 
contribute to existing exemplar-theoretic models of polysemy, building on work by 
scholars such as Gries and Divjak (2009). To date, linguistic applications of the 
model have typically shied away from addressing this aspect of the theory, or have 
                                                
1 Given the complex nature of selective attention, I offer a full explanation of the concept of selective 
attention in chapter 4.   
  4 
implied that it may not be present in linguistic categories (Bybee, 2006, p. 716). 
While a limited number of scholars have predicted – and, where they have tested for 
them, indeed found – selective attention effects in language (Ellis, 2006; Francis and 
Nusbaum, 2002; Kalyan, 2012; Lively, Logan, and Pisoni, 1993), to my knowledge 
this effect has not been studied in polysemy. 
 
If we return to the three examples of below presented earlier, I can offer a simplified 
summary of these four questions as follows: 
 
1. Do you, my reader, and I agree about whether or not those examples exemplify 
different senses of below? 
2. Do you and another reader agree with each other? 
3. If asked to make the same judgment again in two months’ time, would you reach 
the same conclusion? 
4. Did my presentation of example 1 affect your judgment about whether examples 2 
and 3 exemplify a different sense of below? 
1.3 Approach and assumptions 
Now that I have set out the aims of this research, I now outline my approach to 
answering these research questions, and specify the assumptions I make.  
 
I assume that the senses of polysemous words are examples of linguistic categories. 
For that reason, I further assume that category members (i.e., examples of those 
senses) will behave in a manner consistent with how members of non-linguistic 
categories will behave. Principally, I assume that it is possible to organise stimuli 
into groups according to a given categorisation criterion; in this case, the meaning of 
a particular polysemous word, or target word, in context. I therefore assume that 
native speakers of English, acting as research participants, will be able to identify 
commonalities in meaning represented by uses of below, for example, and be able to 
organise into a single group all sentences in which the meaning of below is the same. 
Likewise, I assume that they will be able to identify differences in meaning, and that 
examples in which the meaning of below is different will be organised into separate 
groups. 
 
  5 
Making that assumption, in this research I therefore adopt a categorisation task, 
operationalized as a sentence-sorting task. I use two variations of a sentence-sorting 
task. I use a closed-sort task to study whether the sense distinctions that I find 
meaningful are also found meaningful by other native speakers. I use open-sort tasks 
to study whether there are individual differences in word senses, whether they are 
stored in memory, and whether word sense disambiguation displays selective 
attention effects. In a closed-sort task, participants are presented with stimuli, in this 
case sentences, and predetermined groups, in this case what I judge to be different 
senses of the target word. They must categorise all sentences into one or more sense 
groups. In an open-sort task, participants are presented with sentences as stimuli, but 
do not receive predetermined categories. Instead, they must create their own 
categories to capture sentences in which the meaning of the target word is the same. 
 
Sentence-sorting approaches have a firm foundation in the study of human word 
sense disambiguation and cognitive linguistic studies of polysemy (e.g., Cuyckens, 
Sandra, and Rice, 1997; Sandra and Rice, 1995). In the present research, I exploit the 
versatility of sentence-sorting tasks and combine them with uncommon statistical 
analyses to create a novel methodology for studying a number of aspects of the 
psychological status of word senses. In this way, I aim to not only contribute to 
knowledge about the status of word senses, but offer a novel tool for understanding 
certain aspects of their nature. 
1.4 Summary of chapters 
This thesis describes an exploratory and empirical study of particular aspects of word 
senses, in which each experiment builds upon the findings of its predecessor. It is 
comprised of five chapters, the purpose of which is summarised below. 
 
Chapter 1. Introduction 
I use this chapter to introduce the topic of the thesis, specify the aims, approach and 
assumptions. It then provides an introduction to the cognitive linguistic framework 
and its principles that guide this research, before fleshing out the concepts of 
polysemy and word senses in more detail. The chapter then presents the theoretical 
background underpinning the thesis by introducing and comparing two major 
theories of categorisation. 
  6 
 
Chapter 2. Experiment 1: A closed sentence-sorting study to test the 
representativity of linguists’ intuitions about word senses 
I describe in this chapter the first of three sets of experiments concerned with 
particular aspects of word senses. Specifically, I report a study challenging the 
representativity of expert intuitions about word senses, by testing whether my 
intuitions about whether a particular example of a polysemous word is an example of 
a particular sense of that word are shared with other native speakers of English. The 
chapter consists of two parts: in the first part I provide a critical review of existing 
research on the role and status of expert intuitions in the study of linguistic 
phenomena in generally, and in polysemy in particular. In the second part I describe 
a closed sentence-sorting task completed by 298 native speakers of English. Before 
closing, I identify a line of further inquiry that is needed to substantiate my 
interpretation of the data. 
 
Chapter 3. Experiment 2: An open sentence-sorting task to test for individual 
differences in word senses 
In this chapter I report the second of three experiments. It is the purpose of this 
experiment to follow up on a finding made in the first experiment. Specifically, it 
tests whether the outcome of the first experiment can be explained on the grounds 
that individuals have different senses of the polysemous words over, under, above 
and below. Again, this chapter comprises two parts. The first part consists of a 
critical review of existing research on individual differences in language generally, 
and in word senses in particular. The second part describes a large-scale open 
sentence-sorting task completed by 44 native speakers of English. I close the chapter 
with some comments concerning impact the design of the experiment may have had 
on the way participants completed them, and identify how the experiment may be 
improved. 
 
Chapter 4. Experiment 3: Testing an exemplar model of word senses 
In this chapter I report the final experiment, which builds upon the approach taken in 
Experiment 2. In light of my comments concerning the impact of the experiment 
design on participants’ responses, and with the aim of gathering more reliable data, I 
report an iteration of the open sentence-sorting task used in Chapter 3. In this study, 
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the task is significantly smaller in scale. The experiments reported follow on from 
the findings of Chapter 3 in that they too investigate the possibility of individual 
differences in word senses. The versatility of the methodology is exploited further in 
this chapter, and the experiments are also used to shed light on the question of 
whether word senses are stored in memory or created ad hoc, and, if they are stored, 
whether their storage is compatible with a central prediction of the (Generalised) 
Context Model (Nosofsky 1986; Medin & Schaffer 1978), also known as the 
exemplar model. Specifically, I test whether participants’ responses in these 
linguistic categorisation experiments are subject to selective attention effects. The 
chapter again comprises two parts. The first part provides a critical review of 
literature on categorisation in general, and the application of psychological models of 
categorisation to account for linguistic categories. The second part comprises a 
report on a series of open sentence-sorting tasks completed by 205 native English 
speakers.  
 
Chapter 5. General discussion and conclusions 
This final chapter serves to bring the thesis to a close. I summarise the principal 
findings of the three sets of experiments, and discuss their theoretical and 
methodological implications.  I confirm that the aims of the thesis have been met, 
and present the four primary original contributions to knowledge. I acknowledge the 
limitations of the research, and set out some suggestions for future investigation.  
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Part 2 
This part of the chapter situates the research in a broader theoretical context, 
identifying both the theoretical framework in which this research operates, and the 
theoretical explanations given to account for polysemy to date, and presents a 
concise overview of polysemy and word senses. 
1.5 Cognitive linguistics: the generalisation and cognitive 
commitments 
This research operates in the theoretical framework of cognitive linguistics. This 
framework is relatively young, yet aims to provide cognitively realistic explanations 
of all linguistic phenomena. Contrary to traditional linguistic theory, cognitive 
linguistics argues that language is not a modular function distinct from other 
cognitive domains. Instead, cognitive linguistics claims that language is just one of a 
number of interrelated cognitive functions. For that reason, theorists in the field 
argue that language is processed, accessed, stored, and so on, in the same way as 
other cognitive phenomena. This entails that cognitive linguists aim to explain 
linguistic phenomena in a manner consistent with what is already known about the 
mind more generally. This entailment was described by Lakoff as the cognitive 
commitment, which requires that we should “make [our] account of human language 
accord with what is generally known about the mind and the brain, and from other 
disciplines as well as our own” (1990, p. 40). This thesis aims to adhere to this 
commitment. Lakoff advocated an additional commitment, the generalisation 
commitment, which recommends that cognitive linguists should aim to characterize 
the “general principles” which underlie all human languages (p. 40).  
 
Of these two commitments, it is the cognitive commitment which is of particular 
relevance to this project. Indeed, this commitment underpins most research on 
polysemy and word senses in cognitive linguistics, for this work often considers 
polysemous words to be examples of linguistic categories (e.g., Brugman and 
Lakoff, 2006 [1988]; Brugman, 1981; Klein and Murphy, 2002; Rice, 1993; Taylor, 
2003; Tyler and Evans, 2001). For this reason, accounts of the representation of 
polysemous words and their senses draw heavily on research from cognitive 
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psychological models of categorisation. Specifically, cognitive linguists have 
traditionally favoured prototype-based categories developed by Rosch and her 
colleagues (Rosch and Mervis, 1975; Rosch, 1973), and have drawn on this model 
when positing prototypical senses and the organisation of word senses. That said, 
exemplar-theoretic models of word meaning are growing in currency, in keeping 
with work in other areas of cognitive linguistics that advocates for exemplar theory-
compatible representations. These models will be discussed in more detail later in 
this thesis. The cognitive commitment should also entail that we study language 
using tools and methodologies borrowed from cognitive science. As I will discuss 
later in this thesis, this is not always the case, and expert intuitions remain key 
features of the cognitive linguist’s toolkit. 
1.6 Polysemy 
Polysemy is a major concern within cognitive linguistics. Cuyckens and Zawada 
(2001, p. xv) note that polysemy is described as being “rampant” in the field, with 
researchers claiming that infinitely fine-grained senses are related to a central sense.  
A polysemous word is one that has a number of different, but related, senses.  
Polysemy and homonymy (the phenomenon whereby words which share the same 
form have unrelated meanings) therefore contrast, for example: 
 
4. a. The house rests on the foundation. 
b. He lives on a pension. 
5. a. They put the dog in the pound. 
b. John has lost one pound this week. 
 
In example 4, taken from Beitel, Gibbs, and Sanders (1997), the two uses of on share 
some common characteristics.  While example 4a relates to a specifically spatial 
configuration, one in which the house (figure) and foundation (ground) have a 
vertical relationship with contact between them, with the ground providing physical 
and structural support to the figure, the use of on in example 4b is more abstract in 
nature. According to Beitel et al., though, the function of the foundation in 4a 
corresponds with the function of the pension in example 4b; while the foundations 
provide physical support, the pension provides financial support. The use of pound 
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in examples 5a and 5b, in contrast, share no commonality; the nature of an official 
enclosure for dogs has no relationship with the nature of a unit of mass. 
 
A theory of word meaning that argues in favour of polysemy therefore rejects the 
monosemy hypothesis developed by Ruhl (1989). Ruhl claims that “a word has a 
single general meaning,” (p. 234); moreover, he argues that “a word should always 
be assumed to contribute as little meaning as possible to its context” (p. 8). Meaning, 
therefore, results from the interaction between collections of these underspecified 
units in sentential context, and between these units and extra-linguistic information. 
The monosemy theory therefore rejects any notion of distinct senses represented in 
memory. 
1.7 Senses of polysemous words 
In polysemy literature, senses of polysemous words contrast with meanings of 
homonyms; whereas meanings of homonyms are distinct from one another, senses of 
polysemous words are distinct, but are argued to be related2 (e.g., Tyler & Evans, 
2001). There is, though, more to be said about the nature of this phenomenon. 
According to Hanks (2000), senses (and indeed meanings of homonyms) are nothing 
more than meaning potentials: a bundle of components that are activated in isolation 
or combination according to the surrounding context. A dictionary, on this basis, is 
therefore an inventory of meaning potentials associated with each form. Though this 
might sound a little like the monosemy hypothesis described by Ruhl (1989), it is 
important to note that where proponents of the monosemy hypothesis claim that 
most words have a single, general and very abstract sense which is substantiated by 
context, Hanks does not suggest here that words have a core meaning but instead 
have a set of components that are available for contextual activation. In these terms, 
then, a sense of a polysemous word can be understood as a particular component or 
combination of components. In dictionaries, the example given under a sense is 
therefore an example of the context that might activate the component(s) associated 
with that sense. This account is consistent with other descriptions of polysemous 
word senses; where Hanks refers to the component(s) underlying each sense, 
                                                
2 Though Klein and Murphy (2002) find that senses of some polysemous words may share very little 
common meaning. 
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Brugman and Lakoff (2006 [1988]) and Tyler and Evans (2001) refer to the meaning 
components – such as verticality and contact – associated with each sense. 
  
Kilgarriff argues that “an individual’s history of hearing a word dictates his or her 
understanding of that word” (2007, p. 37–8). Such an argument allows the 
conclusion that if two individuals’ histories of hearing a word are different, their 
understanding – and therefore their senses – of that word are also likely to be 
different. This prediction is consistent with the cognitive linguistic conception of 
language as a usage-based phenomenon (Barlow and Kemmer, 2000). Such a 
conclusion explains why subjects completing word sense disambiguation (WSD) 
tasks often fail to reach complete agreement (e.g., Passonneau, Salleb-Aoussi, 
Bhardwaj, and Ide, 2010). The possibility that individuals may disagree over what 
sense of a polysemous word a given example exemplifies has not been explored in 
detail by cognitive linguists, and seminal work on the topic, such as that by Brugman 
and Lakoff (2006 [1988]) and Tyler and Evans (2001), implicitly assumes no 
individual variation in word senses.  	
As noted above, the representational status of word senses is uncertain. On the one 
hand, scholars such as Ruhl would contend that, since words are disambiguated 
using sentential and environmental context, the meaning of a given word in context 
is not stored in memory. On the other, polysemy scholars such as Tyler and Evans 
(e.g., 2001) argue that at least some senses are stored in memory. 
1.8 Polysemy as a case of linguistic categorisation 
Within the cognitive linguistic framework, polysemous words are typically held up 
as examples of linguistic categories (e.g., Taylor, 2003). This account works 
particularly well for scholars advocating a system of senses organised around a 
prototypical sense, such as that which has been proposed by Brugman and Lakoff 
(2006 [1988]) and Tyler and Evans (2001). For example, Tyler and Evans state that 
scholars “have argued that lexical items constitute natural categories of related 
senses organised with respect to a primary sense and thus form semantic or 
polysemy networks.” (2001, p. 726). Canonical analyses of polysemous words, such 
as those offered by the authors just mentioned, draw on the prototype model of 
categorisation (e.g., Rosch and Mervis, 1975; Rosch, 1978) when describing the 
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organisation of the senses of polysemous words. Their accounts are not true copies 
of the prototype model; the prototype model states that the category can be 
represented by a prototype, which itself is an abstraction of the characteristics of all 
category members. In contrast, the models proposed by Brugman and Lakoff and 
Tyler and Evans assume an abstract but meaningful prototypical sense which, when 
combined with cognitive principles such as reconceptualization, derive a set of 
related senses. More recently, accounts of polysemy that are more aligned with the 
exemplar theory of categorisation have been put forth (Gries 2006; Gries 2015). 	
Whichever theoretical model is used to account for polysemy, it remains that 
polysemous words are generally understood in the cognitive linguistic framework as 
linguistic categories, and senses as members of those categories. It is unclear why 
the possibility that word senses may instead be categories, and example sentences 
members of those categories, has not been explored. If this were the case, in the 
context of this set of experiments we would expect to see categorisation effects 
taking place at the level of senses. Chapter 4 of this thesis sets out to establish 
whether this is indeed the case, and whether a particular categorisation effect, 
specifically that of selective attention, is observed in the sense categories that 
participants make. 
 
Given the proposition made by cognitive linguists – and indeed this thesis – that 
polysemous words, or their senses, are examples of linguistic categories, in the 
following section I step back and introduce categorisation as a more broad concept 
and present two competing theories of categorisation, both of which have been 
invoked to account for polysemy.  
1.9 Theories of categorisation 
Human beings are immersed in an environment saturated by potential stimuli; we are 
capable of attending to inordinate volumes of tastes, motor experiences, sounds, 
visual information and smells. It is essential that we are able to make sense of these 
stimuli in order that we can make assumptions about them and, where appropriate, 
modulate our behaviour around them. For example, if we were to encounter the 
creature in Figure 3, our ability to accuractely recognise it as a DOG means that we 
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can confidently assume that they will require food and water, they may shed fur on 
furniture, and that we should think carefully before introducing it to a cat. 
 
Figure 3 Labrador (Wikipedia, 2008) 
 
Despite the scale of this sensory overload, it does not appear that humans struggle to 
manage it. It is proposed that humans make sense of their surroundings by means of 
categorisation. The traditional, Aristotelian account of categorisation proposed that 
categories can be defined in terms of an object having a set of individually necessary 
and jointly sufficient attributes. An object must feature all necessary and sufficient 
characteristics in order to achieve category membership; membership is therefore an 
all-or-nothing affair. A number of problems with the classical model have been 
raised. First, the empirical reality of typicality effects problematizes the proposition 
that all category members meet necessary and sufficient criteria. If that is so, then all 
members must be equal. It has been observed that category membership is subject to 
subjective gradation, with particular examples being judged as more typical than 
others (Rosch et al., 1976). Second, some categories are difficult to define. A famous 
example is that of the category GAME (Wittgenstein 1958). Football, chess, solitaire 
and hopscotch are all games, but which features unite and therefore define them? 
Third, there is the issue of variability in judgments of category membership, such as 
whether a tomato is a fruit or a vegetable. 
 
Contemporary theories of categorisation aim to address the inadequacies of the 
classical model, and the rest of this chapter is dedicated to introducing two of them: 
prototype theory, and exemplar theory.  
1.9.1 Prototype theory 
Prototype theory, developed by Rosch and her colleagues (Rosch et al., 1976; Rosch 
& Mervis, 1975; Rosch, Simpson, & Miller, 1976; Rosch, 1973, 1978), offered a 
response to the above-mentioned problems with the classical account of 
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categorisation. Their account divided categorisation into two dimensions: the vertical 
dimension, representing category inclusivity, and the horizontal dimension, 
representing category distinctiveness. The two sections that follow outline these two 
dimensions. 
1.9.1.1 The	vertical	dimension:	inclusion	
Rosch (1978) proposes that categories are organised in a vertical dimension of 
inclusivity. The category at the top of this structure – the superordinate category – is 
that which is the most inclusive, and which offers a generic term that can be applied 
to all categories that it encompasses. While it is the most inclusive level, in feature 
terms it shares little in common with the categories under it; as Rosch and Mervis 
(1975) note, the features that superordinate categories share with its basic and 
subordinate level categories are typically abstract. For example, across the entire 
category members of the superordinate category FURNITURE shares the attributes of 
being physical objects, and being objects that are found inside buildings, on the 
whole they will share little else. Beneath the superordinate level is the basic level; in 
contrast with the superordinate level, category members at the basic level have a 
high degree of featural overlap. For example, members of a basic level category such 
as TABLE will share many features, such as having legs, and a flat surface. Beneath 
the basic level exists the subordinate level, comprising more specified versions of 
basic level categories, such as COFFEE TABLE, and DINING TABLE. Rosch and Mervis 
propose that basic level categories have highest cue validity as a result of their 
simultaneous high degree of featural overlap within members of the category (absent 
in superordinate categories) and low degree of featural overlap across categories 
(present in subordinate level categories). Basic level categories therefore have 
maximal between-category heterogeneity and maximal within-category 
homogeneity. 
 
While one might intuitively predict that the most generic and inclusive level – i.e., 
the superordinate level – is most basic, empirical evidence indicates that this is not 
the case. Evidence for the priority of the basic level has been drawn from the studies 
of first language acquisition, motor programs associated with objects at each level of 
abstraction, object recognition, object naming, and linguistic evolution (Rosch et al., 
1976). 
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While it is proposed that taxonomic categorisation is universal, membership at each 
level is subject to some degree of individual variation as a consequence of varying 
subjective experiences and interactions with the world around us. This variation 
exists both within and between linguistic communities. One of the subjects involved 
in Rosch et al.'s (1976) investigation into basic level categories had particular 
technical expertise, experience and familiarity with aeroplanes. It was argued that it 
was this extra-developed understanding of the aeroplane category that produced 
results indicating that aeroplane was, for this subject, a superordinate category 
instead of a basic category; basic categories were instead specific instances of 
aeroplanes. Offering a cross-linguistic insight into taxonomic categories, Berlin, 
Breedlove and Raven (1974) reveal that for speakers of Tzeltal in the Tenejapa 
region of Mexico, basic level categories exist at the GENUS-level of a folk-
classification taxonomy (genus examples include oak trees and maple trees), whereas 
basic-level categories in the minds of Britons are likely to be closer to the LIFE 
FORM-level (tree, for example), an interesting observation that becomes more 
exciting when one considers that the GENUS- and LIFE FORM-levels are, for Tzeltal 
speakers, separated by a further, INTERMEDIATE level (which includes leaf-bearing 
and needle-bearing trees). 
 
Cognitive economy is, according to Rosch, maximised by this approach to category 
organisation. Priority of the basic-level category is maximally informative in a way 
that might be compared with the Goldilocks fairy tale. The superordinate level is 
highly abstracted, and provides very little information about the category. The 
subordinate level, in contrast, is over-specified and provides excessive information 
typically relevant to only a small subset of the category. At the basic level, the level 
of detail about the category is just right: enough information is provided to 
distinguish it from other basic level members of other categories, and enough 
information is provided to allow subordinate category members to be associated with 
it. 
1.9.1.2 The	horizontal	dimension:	differences	and	prototypes	
As Rosch (1978) observes, the world as humans perceive it “is not an unstructured 
total set of equiprobable cooccuring attributes.” (p. 4). Instead, there exists 
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correlational structure in object attributes; to use the frequently-used example, 
feathers co-occur with more frequency than they do fur, which allows us to judge 
that if a creature has fur, it is unlikely to have wings. Correlational structure 
therefore affords contrast that can be used to categorise a novel object; if a novel 
object has feathers and we do not have time to establish anything more than that, we 
can categorise that object with a reasonable degree of confidence as a BIRD. This 
dimension of difference is most effective where it intersects the basic level of the 
vertical dimension. At the basic level, the extent of informativeness maximises 
differences between categories; for example, the characteristics of the basic level 
category CUP differentiate it from another basic level category such as CAR. At the 
subordinate level, this dimension still allows differentiation, but to a lesser degree; a 
TEA-CUP is less different to a MUG than a CUP is to a CAR. 
 
This dimension of difference between categories licenses category prototypes, which 
are typically – though as I will come to, not universally – understood as an 
abstraction of the features of category members; in this way, it captures a ‘summary 
representation’ of the category.  
1.9.1.3 The	nature	and	purpose	of	prototypes	
Rosch proposes that categorisation is achieved by means of comparing a novel 
stimulus to the prototype of a candidate category. Just what a prototype is, however, 
is the topic of debate between authors, and even within single publications. For 
example, Rosch and Mervis (1975, p. 575) indicate that a category prototype is a 
representation consisting of average features of category members (“we view 
semantic categories as networks of overlapping attributes” - my emphasis). It seems 
likely that it is this statement that Murphy (2004, p. 41-2) refers to when he says that 
Rosch and Mervis “explicitly deny” the interpretation that “every category is 
represented by a single prototype or best example”. However, since Rosch and 
Mervis state on the same page that prototypes can be more broadly defined as “those 
category members to which subjects compare items when judging category 
membership,” (my emphasis) it seems unsurprising that some readers have 
understood prototypes as being a particular member of the category.  Indeed, this is 
the view taken by Croft and Cruse (2004, p. 77) when they describe prototypes or 
prototypical members as “best examples of categories”. They do, however, later (p. 
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81-2) state that two versions of prototypes exist, one which posits an average of 
category features, and one which posits a specific member as the prototype; they 
note that linguists have been guilty of failing to distinguish between the two 
versions. Taylor (2003) makes similar comments, this time arguing that as well as 
the average features and specific item (in his words, “exemplar”) accounts of 
prototypes, a third exists, which posits that certain types of category members can be 
prototypes. He later states that he adopts the individual exemplar view of prototypes 
in the remainder of his monograph on linguistic categorisation (p. 69). In keeping 
with the interpretation most prevalent in the literature, this thesis operates on the 
understanding that prototype-based models assume that the category is represented 
by a summary representation of all members of that category, and that that is the 
category (Murphy 2004, p. 42). 
 
As mentioned, categorisation is achieved by comparison of a novel stimulus to a 
category prototype. However, not all characteristics or features of the prototype have 
equal status. Instead, some features are weighted, with this weighting capturing the 
frequency with which a given feature is associated with members of the category, 
and the distribution of those features across contrasting categories (Rosch and 
Mervis, 1975). Features which are most frequent across members of the category are 
most highly weighted, and those which are least frequent have low weighting. 
Likewise, features that are more frequent in contrasting categories will have lower 
weighting than those that are less frequent. Assignation of a novel stimulus to a 
given category is most likely when that stimulus possesses the category prototype’s 
high-weighted features (Murphy 2004). 
1.9.1.4 Family	resemblances	
As we have seen, differences in the distribution of features distinguish the 
categorisation levels on the vertical dimension. Likewise, differences in the 
distribution of features are what distinguish prototypes on the horizontal dimension. 
In this way, differences in feature distribution determine the structures underpinning 
categories at a general level. However, Rosch and Mervis (1975) also propose that 
differences in the distribution of features determine the structure of categories at a 
more specific level. Specifically, they propose that such differences explain why 
some members of a category are judged to be more typical of the category than 
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others. The term family resemblance is used to describe degrees of featural overlap 
in category members; category members that share more common features will have 
closer family resemblance than those that share fewer common features. Moreover, 
those that have stronger family resemblance to all other members of the category 
will be considered more prototypical than others. Degrees of prototypicality are also 
affected by the category member’s degree of family resemblance with members of 
other categories: the lower the featural overlap and degree of family resemblance 
with members of contrasting categories, the more prototypical of the category the 
member will be. Rosch and Mervis propose that these varying degrees of family 
resemblance, resulting in varying degrees of prototypicality, can be understood 
spatially. In a spatial representation, centrality represents prototypicality, and 
increased family resemblance with other category members results in increased 
proximity to the category centre.  
1.9.1.5 Prototype	categories:	summary	
Rosch and her colleagues’ work represented a step change from classical accounts of 
categorisation, providing a framework that could account for gradation in category 
membership, that could explain why both solitaire and hopscotch are games, despite 
their limited featural overlap, and that could account for variation in judgments of 
category membership. At the centre of this account is the prototype, which acts as 
the category representation, and the point of comparison called for when categorising 
a novel stimulus. Typicality effects, which were a snagging point in the classical 
account, are accounted for by prototype theory by the proposition that category 
members can be measured for their family resemblance to other category members. 
Those that share most features with other category members will be considered more 
typical – and in spatial terms, more central – than those that share few features with 
other members. These members will, in spatial terms, be more peripheral members 
of the category. 
1.9.2 Exemplar theory 
While prototype theory proposes that a category is represented by a prototype 
capturing a summary representation of all members of the category, exemplar 
theorists propose that categories comprise tokens of previously encountered 
exemplars. In this way, prototype and exemplar theories occupy opposing ends of a 
continuum of category abstractness; while prototype theory endorses a highly 
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abstract category representation, exemplar theory claims that the category has no 
abstraction. Categories comprise exemplars that are similar to each other; in 
exemplar theory, similarity is modelled in terms of spatial proximity. Exemplars that 
are highly similar to each other are positioned closely together, while exemplars that 
are highly distinct from each other are positioned far apart. Categories therefore 
comprise exemplars that are in close proximity. In this theory, exemplars are 
understood to occupy a multidimensional psychological space (MDS), in which 
dimensions correspond to features. The exact location of an exemplar in the MDS is 
determined by the value of the exemplar on each feature dimension. 
 
An early and influential account of exemplar theory was proposed by Medin and 
Schaffer (1978) in their Context Theory of Classification Learning, and was later 
generalised by Nosofsky (1986). This model, according to Murphy (2004, p. 89), has 
served as the basis of most popular models of exemplar-based categorisation. In their 
paper, Medin and Schaffer specify a number of assumptions about the model, 
including the assumption that a novel item i is categorised to a category j on the 
basis of similarity between i and exemplars of j, and between i and all exemplars. As 
noted above, exemplars are positioned in a multidimensional space, with their 
precise location corresponding to the value of each variable dimension. Importantly, 
the dimensions of this space – and therefore the (potential) categories within it – are 
flexible. In an exemplar-based account of categorisation, Medin and Schaffer, and 
Nosofsky propose that in a categorisation task, the categoriser selectively attends to a 
particular (set of) characteristic(s). Given that this concept of selective attention is 
central to this study, I provide in section 1.9.2.1 an example of two categorisation 
scenarios, and afterwards explain how the exemplar model explains the different 
approaches to categorisation taken in each. Following this, I move to discuss a 
second, more implicit prediction of exemplar theory: individual differences. 
1.9.2.1 Selective	attention	
Imagine that an individual is sorting clean cutlery with different coloured handles 
into a drawer. In this case, accurate categorisation – i.e., assignation of an exemplar 
cutlery to the right area in the cutlery drawer – will depend on the individual 
correctly distinguishing the items based on particular characteristics. Of primary 
importance in a typical cutlery sorting activity is likely to be the shape of each 
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exemplar, with size (to distinguish between different types of spoons) and sharpness 
(to distinguish between steak knives and table knives, for example) being secondary 
concerns. Accordingly, the individual will selectively attend to these characteristics, 
and will overlook other characteristics, such as handle colour. Let us say that this 
individual later buys a replacement set of cutlery. Imagine a scenario in which her 
old cutlery is on the draining board, having been washed previously, and she is 
washing the new set before it is used for the first time. She does not intend to 
continue to use the old set on a regular basis, and she wants to keep it separate from 
the new set. The old set will be put at the back of the drawer. She then needs to 
implement an additional, primary classification criterion: old versus new. In this 
scenario, at the first stage, only this criterion is of interest, and therefore – at this 
stage – she no longer categorises the cutlery into different types. Those differences 
still exist, but are no longer relevant in the task of dividing the old and new cutlery.  
 
An exemplar-theoretic account of this person’s categorisation decisions posits that 
dimensions in a multidimensional psychological space (Medin and Schaffer, 1978; 
Nosofsky, 1986) represent the cutlery’s characteristics, such as their shape, 
sharpness, handle colour, etc. Crucially, it is claimed that these dimensions shrink 
and stretch according to the goal of the categorisation task (Nosofsky, 1986, p.41), 
therefore changing the relative position of an exemplar in the space. In other words, 
categorisation under the exemplar model is inherently task-based, and categories are 
dynamic, unfixed entities. Specifically, the dimension of interest, i.e., that which is 
of most importance in the categorisation task, stretches, and irrelevant dimensions 
shrink. As noted above, similarity of exemplars is modelled in terms of spatial 
proximity, meaning that when a dimension stretches, the similarity of exemplars 
along that dimension effectively decreases; this has the effect of making distinctions 
between the items along that dimension being more apparent, which facilitates easier 
categorisation. When a dimension shrinks, similarity of exemplars along that 
dimension effectively increases, making the status of that feature in each of the 
exemplars less apparent. In the first cutlery-sorting scenario, the individual 
selectively attends to shape, size and sharpness. She does not attend to the colour of 
the handle, making this an irrelevant dimension. The dimensions of the relevant 
characteristics, namely shape, size and sharpness, will expand to reveal finer 
distinctions between the exemplars along these dimensions. The stretching of the 
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size dimension, for example, will therefore accentuate differences in spoon size. The 
dimension associated with the irrelevant characteristic, the colour of the handle, 
shrinks, making the different colours effectively less distinct. In the second scenario, 
the distinctions amongst the old cutlery still exist – there remain observable 
differences in shape, size and sharpness – but at this time, for categorisation to be 
accurate the individual need only attend to the age of the exemplars. Accordingly, 
this dimension of age expands revealing distinctions between the old and new 
cutlery, and the dimensions associated with shape, size and sharpness shrink. It is 
this stretching of relevant dimensions, which highlights differences, and shrinking of 
irrelevant dimensions, which obscures differences, that optimises categorisation 
accuracy. 
1.9.2.2 Selective	attention	and	contextual	modulation	
While the idea that category membership is dynamic is central to exemplar theory, it 
does not form part of the primary prototype theory literature. However, contextual 
modulation, in which category membership varies according to the context of the 
categorisation scenario, has been incorporated into later literature grounded in 
prototype theory. For example, Labov (1978) reports a series of experiments in 
which a single vessel could be alternatively called a cup or bowl depending on 
whether or not it contained mashed potato. Figure 5 shows the frequency with which 
the cups in Figure 4 are called cup or bowl in a neutral context (when empty), and in 
the food context (when filled with mashed potato). Figure 5 shows that vessel 4, for 
example, was always referred to as a cup regardless of context. In contrast, while in 
the neutral context vessel 2 was referred to as a cup around 85% of the time, and as a 
bowl around 15% of the time, when shown in the food context, the same vessel was 
referred to as a cup around 30% of the time, but as a bowl around 65% of the time. 
These findings suggest that the context in which a given vessel is seen plays some 
role in determining what it is labelled.  
 
Figure 4 Vessels used in cup / bowl experiments (Labov, 1978, p. 222) 
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Figure 5 Consistency profiles for cup and bowl in neutral and food contexts (Labov, 1978, p.224) 
 
In alignment with prototype theory, Labov proposes that the features of a stimulus – 
in this case, the size of the vessel, presence or absence of a handle, what it contains, 
and so on – are weighted. Where Labov progresses from prototype theory, however, 
is in his articulation of the interdependence of the features; the contribution a 
particular feature makes to the categorisation decision can vary according to the 
nature of other features. In Labov’s example, regardless of the context his 
experiment participants encountered vessel 2, it had identical physical 
characteristics, each with the same weighting. However, when placed in the food 
context, the presence of mashed potato in the vessel adjusted the weighting of the 
features that would, in the neutral context, result in it more reliably being called a 
cup. The result is that more than half of the participants called the vessel a bowl.  
 
For research that is grounded in prototype theory, it is surprising that Labov 
proposes that the weighting of a given feature can change. As noted above, prototype 
theory proposes that feature weighting is a function of the frequency with which a 
given feature occurs in members of the category, and of the distribution of that 
features across members of other categories. In this way, feature weighting can 
change, but only as a result of exposure to more members of the category, and to 
members of other categories. In this respect, Labov’s proposal that weighting is 
dynamic is perhaps more closely aligned with exemplar theory, of which feature 
weighting adjustment forms an integral part. 
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1.9.2.3 Individual	differences	
While selective attention is a central component and testable prediction of the 
exemplar model, individual differences in categorisation is a more implicit 
prediction. It is implicit in that it is a logical outcome of selective attention, and the 
proposal that categories comprise memory traces of tokens of previously-
encountered exemplars.  
 
Selective attention entails that categories are created in response to a task demand. In 
a simple example, if one was required to categorise a set of differently-coloured 
blocks of a range of sizes by colour, one could attend to the colour of the blocks at 
the expense of differences in shape. Individual differences may be observed in the 
exact outcomes; for example, one participant may sort a turquoise block with blue 
blocks, while another may sort them with green blocks, while a third may set them 
apart from both green and blue blocks. In a more complex example, related to the 
present research, when asked to decide whether two uses of over to describe spatial 
scenes are the same or different, one could attend to a larger number of dimensions. 
For example, in the sentences They keep slinging their towels over the bedroom door 
and I go over the handlebars, one may attend to the arc-like trajectory captured in 
both sentences. An individual only concerned with attending to the arc-like trajectory 
might be satisfied that both sentences exemplify the same sense of over. A different 
individual, concerned with the ultimate position of the figure following completion 
of that arc-like trajectory, may consider them exemplars of different senses; one 
which describes the arc-like trajectory of a figure relative to a ground, and one which 
captures an arc-like shape of a figure at the end of the motion. These two examples, 
of varying complexity, serve to demonstrate that categorisation decisions (including 
linguistic categorisation decisions), as they are made on the basis of a categorisation 
criterion which may vary across individuals, are subject to individual differences. 
 
The notion that categories comprise memory traces of previously-encountered 
exemplars also motivates the prediction that categories are subject to individual 
differences. Take jackfruit, for example. A British individual who has not 
encountered a jackfruit before, if required to establish what it is likely to be and 
make predictions about it (e.g., what kind of meal it would be eaten as; what would it 
would taste like) might compare it with other foods that feature the word fruit, or 
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indeed other members of a general FRUIT category. On that basis, they might assign 
it to the FRUIT category, predict that it will be sweet, and could be eaten as dessert. 
However, another British individual, this time one who follows a vegan diet, may 
have been encountered and eaten a jackfruit and assign it to a MEAT REPLACEMENT 
PRODUCT category, and know that it could be eaten as part of a savoury dish. A third 
individual, this time one from a location in which jackfruits are eaten regularly, such 
as Indonesia, may assign it to the same category as the first British individual 
(FRUIT), because they have eaten it in a way that other fruits are consumed. This 
example demonstrates that categorisation decisions, as well as being determined by 
individual decisions, are also influenced by experience with the category. In this 
way, exemplar theory implicitly predicts that categorisation decisions can differ 
systematically between individuals on a large scale. 
1.9.3 Multiple categorisation processes 
While research on categorisation typically contrasts the explanatory power of one 
model over another, a growing body of work exists which investigates how multiple 
models can be combined to explain observations about categorisation. For example. 
Smith and Sloman (1994) found that subjects categorised common objects based on 
rules and similarities. These findings were supported by later work by Sloman and 
Rips (1998). Elsewhere, it has been argued that a single model can accommodate the 
characteristics of the prototype and exemplar models, which respectively propose 
total abstraction and no abstraction. Vanpaemel and Storms (2008) propose that the 
Varying Abstraction Model can be used to accommodate not only exemplars and 
prototypes, but also intermediary representations, consisting of category members 
clustering to form subprototypes. According to this account, an intermediate 
representation has goldilocks characteristics: it is neither too sparse and lacking in 
useful detail, but nor is it too detailed and cognitively uneconomical. Only in 
extreme and necessary cases are full abstractions or exemplars represented in 
memory. This account can therefore be characterised as an abstraction continuum: at 
some point in category development, total abstraction is necessary, at others no 
abstraction is needed, and at others still only partial abstraction is needed. Baetu and 
Shultz's (2010) investigation of the processes underlying concept learning, while not 
acknowledging an intermediate representation, offers further insights on this theory. 
Their results suggest that, in cases where the concepts being learned do not possess 
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defining features, abstraction is initially used to form a concept prototype, against 
which novel items are compared. Over time, this tendency changes, and the model 
instead comes to rely upon comparison between old trained items and the novel item. 
The authors speculate that this can be explained by virtue of the fact that as time 
passes and experience with category members increases, trained examples are better 
remembered, and there is a consequential reduction on the reliance on comparison 
with a prototype. In effect, then, the model must reach a tipping point; before this, it 
abstracts information from novel items to form a prototype. At some point the model 
is sufficiently familiar with trained items that it becomes more efficient to compare 
novel items with items already experienced. The authors do not speculate about 
when that tipping point might occur, but nevertheless present an appealing proposal 
of how different levels of abstraction are used at different points of concept learning. 
Divjak and Arppe (2013) present further evidence supporting the integration of 
exemplar- and prototype-based models of categorisation. Using Russian and Finnish 
corpus data, they propose that repeated exposure to exemplary exemplars (that is, 
exemplars with strong association with a particular property in the mental lexicon) 
results in the abstraction of a prototype core. As such, the authors argue for a varied 
abstraction model, which does not prioritise one degree of abstraction (for example 
total, in the case of a prototype) over another.  
1.10 Categorisation and polysemy: some areas for 
investigation 
Sections 1.8 and 1.9 have served to set out the assumption that polysemy is an 
example of linguistic categorisation, and to describe the variability of the 
categorisation theory landscape. This landscape features two poles: to one side exists 
a theory that proposes highly abstract categories comprising a summary 
representation of its members; to the other, categories are proposed to comprise 
tokens of previously encountered exemplars. Between these two poles is an 
intermediate account that allows for abstraction and individual exemplars. 
 
As already noted in section 1.8, canonical accounts of polysemy have attempted to 
explain the phenomenon in prototype-theoretic terms; while there is not an exact 
match between the prototype theory proposed to account for semantic categories and 
the version used to account for polysemy, there are clear overlaps, for example in the 
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invocation of prototypes and the degree of abstraction in the category. While more 
recent work on polysemy has explored the potential that exemplar theory might have 
in accounting for polysemy, it forms a small literature, and certain predictions of the 
model have not been tested.  
 
While prototype and exemplar theories have overlaps – both acknowledge the reality 
of varying degrees of typicality within categories, for example – they diverge in a 
way that allows one to test whether the predictions of either model are observed in 
this case of linguistic categorisation. Of particular interest are the predictions made 
by exemplar theory; the implicit prediction that polysemy, like other types of 
categorisation, will be subject to individual differences; and the explicit prediction 
that categorisation decisions are task-specific, and that categories emerge in response 
to a categorisation criterion. While prototype-theoretic research by Labov (1978) has 
explored contextual modulation in categorisation decisions, his explanation of how 
such modulation occurs – that the weighting of a given attribute varies according to 
context – runs contrary to prototype theory proper, which does not propose varying 
feature weighting. This aspect of his work is more closely aligned with exemplar 
theory, of which the idea that feature weighting varies by context is a central 
component. While prototype-theoretic research has briefly explored variation in 
categorisation, it has explained such variation on the basis of cultural differences 
(e.g., differences in cuisines), and differences in degree of knowledge (e.g., 
differences in extent of familiarity with category members, resulting in differences in 
what type of members exist at the superordinate, basic and subordinate category 
levels). Such an explanation would have limited power should individual differences 
be the norm in the categorisation decisions of a large number of people who are 
expected to be largely homogenous in terms of their cultural background and the 
levels at which particular category members are found. As these two predictions 
serve to distinguish prototype and exemplar theories, these are the lines of enquiry 
that this thesis will pick up.  
 
 
 
  27 
 
Chapter 2 Experiment 1: A closed sentence-
sorting study to test the representativity of 
linguists’ intuitions about word senses 			
When linguists talk and write about polysemy, they tend to offer examples of 
polysemous words in action. Without such examples, an individual unfamiliar with 
polysemy might find the notion too abstract. The examples linguists offer might be 
constructed by the linguist themselves, or taken from a corpus. To demonstrate 
polysemy, i.e., to highlight the idea that words have distinct but related senses, 
linguists will offer examples of different senses. I did just that in Chapter 1. A 
linguist concerned with using examples to simply demonstrate the principle of 
polysemy need not necessarily trouble themselves with offering an explanation of 
how they determined that the examples they gave do indeed represent different 
senses. However, most academic treatments of polysemy are not concerned with 
offering a mere demonstration of the phenomenon, but are instead tasked with 
offering an account of some aspect of polysemy, or of a particular polysemous word. 
For example, a scholar might wish to observe the acquisition of the senses of a 
polysemous word (e.g., Rice, 2003), or they might want to study the processing of 
different senses (e.g., Foraker and Murphy, 2012). They may even wish to tackle the 
polysemy of a particular word head on, and offer an account of what the senses of 
that word are (e.g., Tyler and Evans, 2001; Brugman, 1981; Brugman and Lakoff, 
2006 [1988]; of course, dictionaries are tasked with that objective also). In these 
cases, when we wish to offer an account of polysemy in any depth, and when that 
account depends upon proposing a set of senses for observation in acquisition, 
processing, and so on, we might wonder exactly how those senses were identified. 
This does, of course, question the integrity of the linguist’s intuitions. Given their 
linguistics expertise in general, and likely expertise in meaning in particular, such 
questioning might be considered unfair. But the question remains: just how good are 
linguists’ intuitions when it comes to word meaning?  
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This chapter aims to answer that question empirically. As stated in Chapter 1, and in 
line with current thinking in cognitive linguistics, this thesis assumes that polysemy 
is a case of linguistic categorisation. It is assumed in the field that polysemous words 
themselves are categories. At this point, I take an agnostic position on this issue, and 
do not reject the notion that it may be senses that are categories. In any case, it is 
assumed that, given their status as linguistic categories, polysemous words (or their 
senses) will behave like categories; i.e., it will be possible to organise examples of 
polysemous words into groups according to some categorisation criterion. In this 
case, the criterion of interest is the meaning of the polysemous word. Exploiting this 
assumption, I therefore use a categorisation task, operationalized as a sentence-
sorting task, to assess whether the way I semantically categorise examples of the 
polysemous words over, under, above and below is systematically different from, or 
similar to the way these examples are categorised by other English speakers. If 
participants and I categorise the sentences in a similar way, we might conclude that 
this constitutes evidence that, in this case, expert intuitions about the senses of 
polysemous words do correspond to those held by other speakers. If it is not the case, 
it will cast doubt on the representativity of expert intuitions about word senses. 
 
This study is situated in a broader literature that has interrogated the representativity 
and utility of expert intuitions about linguistic – and primary syntactic – phenomena. 
With that in mind, this chapter will open with an overview of relevant literature on 
the status of expert intuitions in linguistics in general, and in word senses and word 
meaning in particular. Following this literature review, I describe a set of closed 
sentence-sorting tasks carried out with a large group of predominantly naïve 
participants, which is designed to assess whether my intuitions about word senses 
correspond to theirs. The chapter closes with some concluding remarks on the 
implications of the findings, and identifies areas for further investigation. 
Part 1: Literature review 
This section will address the problematic status of expert intuitions in linguistic 
analysis. It will open by addressing the problem in general, before digging deeper to 
study the place of expert intuitions in the study of polysemy in particular. It will then 
discuss research which has moved away from reliance on intuitions, and identify 
some empirical approaches to studying polysemy and word senses. 
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2.1 Introspection as a methodology 
Linguistic introspection, in which “conscious attention [is] directed by a language 
user to particular aspects of language as manifest in her own cognition” (Talmy, 
2007, p. xii), is explicitly acknowledged as occupying a privileged position in the 
methodologies of choice in linguistics (Talmy 2007; Willems 2012; Schwarz-Friesel 
2012). It is, for example, acknowledged that the development of syntactic theories 
depends heavily upon the use of introspection.  As observed by Bradac, Martin, 
Elliott, and Tardy (1980), the traditional means for assessing whether a string is 
grammatical is simply a case of the researcher making a judgment. They argue that 
this method makes two rather shaky assumptions: that the researcher’s stock of 
intuitions is the same as that held by all other native speakers of the language of 
interest, and that to judge a sentence is simply a case of checking one’s intuitions and 
making a decision (p. 968). The first assumption seems reasonable when considering 
Spencer's (1973) observation that “a shared language is an important means of 
communication among members of a human society” (p. 83). This statement 
assumes that the grammar held by members of a given language community should 
be more or less the same. Accordingly, judgments about whether or not a sentence is 
grammatical can be given by any member of that community, since their shared 
grammar should result in convergent judgments. Since it has been demonstrated that 
different members of a language community do not necessarily acquire the same 
grammar (see section 3.1, where this issue is discussed in more detail), this 
assumption is unsound. Indeed, as Schütze (1996, p. 9) points out, these variations in 
interspeaker grammar may prove to be the source of interesting facts. Reliance on 
introspection as a methodology therefore rules out possibilities for discovering 
interesting findings about inter-speaker variation. 
  
When we consider the use of syntacticians’ (and, indeed, linguists in other fields) 
intuitions when developing theories, we must address the issue of their expert status. 
On the one hand, their training and intense engagement with particular elements of 
syntax as both an individual working with it, and as a reader of literature about it, 
could be argued to render them best qualified to judge whether or not a particular 
sentence is grammatical. But on the other hand, is this extreme familiarity with a 
given construction, for example, a problem? Snyder (2000) and Spencer (1973) 
argue that it might be, and that an example of a particular construction initially 
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deemed ungrammatical might, with exposure (which Snyder has observed need not 
be prolonged), come to be judged to be acceptable. Accordingly, a syntactician 
whose research is concerned with a particular construction might ultimately decide 
that a particular example is acceptable when someone unfamiliar with the 
construction – for example, a naïve speaker – might deem it ungrammatical.  
 
In an energetic debate, studies have found evidence indicating divergence between 
predictions of syntactic theory or linguists’ grammaticality judgments and non-
linguists’ grammaticality judgments (Bradac et al., 1980; Dąbrowska, 2010; Gordon 
and Hendrick, 1997; Ross, 1979; Schütze, 1996; Spencer, 1973); elsewhere, 
evidence is offered indicating that where there is divergence, it is on a minute scale 
(Sprouse and Almeida, 2012; Sprouse, Schütze, and Almeida, 2013). Given that 
some studies show that naïve subjects are found to disagree with linguists’ 
acceptability judgments, and given that the task of asking a sample of non-linguists 
to contribute their own judgments is not an onerous one (Gibson and Fedorenko, 
2013), it seems reasonable to recommend that theories are grounded in data collected 
from a much larger and more representative sample of speakers than the author 
and/or a handful of his colleagues or students. On the grounds that research has 
revealed divergences between linguists’ and non-linguists’ judgments – discoveries 
that are not necessarily undermined by independent data to the contrary – it seems 
that Labov was correct when he argued “that linguists cannot ... produce theory and 
data at the same time” (1972, p. 199). Further, since contributions from non-linguists 
are easily gathered, acquiring unbiased data to check a theory is an inexpensive but 
highly valuable enterprise. 
 
The use of introspection and reliance on an author’s own intuitions as the sole 
methodology underpinning a particular part of research has a number of important 
flaws, and it is important that any study adopting this methodology acknowledges its 
limitations. As we have already seen, the use of introspection to describe a particular 
linguistic phenomenon has been demonstrated to be problematic, with the author’s 
intuitions not reliably coinciding with those of non-linguists. The situation for 
introspection is no better when the goal of a particular research project is to explain a 
particular phenomenon. As has been noted by Gibbs (2006), Schwarz-Friesel (2012), 
and Talmy (2007), conscious access to the unconscious processes understood to 
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constitute language is not possible. This conclusion is analogous to Miller's (1962, p. 
56) argument that “[i]t is the result of thinking, not the process of thinking, that 
appears spontaneously in consciousness” and is therefore available for introspective 
analysis. Gibbs suggests that our inability to access the mental processes that 
underpin language is due to inconsistencies in the characteristics of consciousness 
and unconsciousness. As Talmy (2007) observes in a chapter that gives rather a lot 
of credence to introspection as a methodology, the scope of outputs generated by a 
trawl of one’s own intuitions does not necessarily reflect the possible range of 
outputs. To take his example, and one which is relevant to this research, an 
introspective investigation into the senses of a polysemous word does not yield “a 
full connected set [...] though it does reveal a few [senses]” (p. xiv). This admission 
undermines exclusively intuition-based analyses of polysemous words. 
 
An additional issue that should concern those basing conclusions on intuitions is the 
possibility that an author’s bias may have distorted the intuitions that were reported. 
Bias in this context has two forms: theoretical bias, and bias towards or away from 
particular “data”. Dąbrowska's (2010) study of grammaticality judgments of 
questions with long-distance dependencies explicitly examined, in addition to 
(dis)agreement between linguist and naïve judges, the extent to which linguists with 
different theoretical persuasions agreed with one another. On the whole linguists 
identifying as cognitive-functionalists and generativists tended to reach fairly similar 
decisions, with only one significant exception. Generally, though, the former group’s 
responses were closer to the judgments made by non-linguists. Dąbrowska concludes 
that more research is necessary to understand the relationship between theoretical 
commitments and grammaticality judgments.  
2.2 Introspection, intuitions and polysemy 
2.2.1 The status of introspection in the study of polysemous words 
The second type of bias relevant in critiques of introspection as a methodology, and 
which is particularly relevant to the present study, is an author’s bias towards or 
against particular “data” generated by a sweep of one’s store of linguistic 
phenomena. For example, in a mental search for examples of a polysemous word one 
wishes to examine, an author may be inclined towards examples which provide 
“evidence” in support of a particular sense. An author may similarly be disinclined to 
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acknowledge more troublesome examples that would be difficult to ascribe to a 
particular sense. A credible means of acquiring examples of a particular sense is 
through extraction of corpus hits. Concordance lines extracted at random from the 
hits generated in a search of a particular word frequently reveal examples of senses 
one would expect, but they have the perfectly reasonable but nonetheless frustrating 
habit of either giving you lots of examples of a small set of senses, or a few 
examples that prove resistant to easy categorisation. The analysis of concordance 
lines therefore represents a significant improvement over the reliance on an author’s 
set of auto-generated “examples”, simply because they reveal the truth about how a 
particular word is used, whether that truth is convenient or not.  
 
Of particular relevance to the study of polysemy is the problematic effect of 
semantic satiation, as crystallised by James (1962) and studied extensively since. 
Semantic satiation is, briefly, that strange effect in which repeated visual or aural 
exposure to a word results in its temporary loss of meaning. Studies of polysemy 
tend to focus on a single or at most a small number of words. While this has the 
benefit of providing focus on the nuances of a particular word or a small selection 
thereof, the degree of focus required to fully explore these nuances puts the author at 
risk of falling victim to semantic satiation. It has been my own experience, in the 
course of this study, that I find myself wondering exactly what above means: there 
have been moments when all I see is a string of letters. When an author has 
committed his or herself to the task of teasing out the senses of a particular word, he 
or she must fight the effects of semantic satiation to produce a credible analysis. This 
presents a problem to any author investigating a polysemous word, but it is 
reasonable to speculate that it will be particularly problematic to authors attempting 
to discern sense boundaries in a set of examples of the target word.  
 
It must be acknowledged that this particular issue – of semantic satiation when faced 
with a set of instance of a given word – may affect the individuals participating in 
the present research. This, coupled with Stefanowitsch's (2011) concerns over 
whether or not the collection of intuitions from naive subjects is any clearer than the 
traditional introspection methodology, problematises the approach to identifying 
sense distinctions that this study takes. However, the approach is justified on two 
bases. First, in response to possible criticism over the possible effects of semantic 
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satiation on the participating subjects, the studies reported here has been designed to 
mitigate these effects, by presenting subjects with only a limited number of example 
sentences. This decision was made on the basis of recommendations from authors 
such as Miller (1971), who proposes that sorting a set of 100 stimuli is a manageable 
task – though others, such as Baker (1999) have used considerably more. It is not the 
aim of this study to identify all of the senses of the target words, but instead to 
understand certain aspects of their psychological status. For this reason, presentation 
of a limited number of sentences is defensible. Second, while Stefanowitsch’s 
concerns are valid, and should be acknowledged in any study with a methodology 
similar to the one described here, as Tuggy (1999, p. 358) notes, “[i]f many speakers 
of a language coincide in an intuition regarding meaning (e.g., that a particular U1 
and U2 can be distinguished, or that they are the same meaning, or both), that 
intuition should be accorded a high degree of credence.” Further, Tuggy argues that 
when intersubjective consensus differs from the authors’ own intuitions, “it has a 
very strong claim to be objective” (p. 358). Labov (1972, p. 106) also acknowledges 
the importance of seeking intersubject agreement with an author’s intuitions. While 
the analysis of a large sample of speakers’ intuitions can serve to check an authors’ 
intuitions, they are also useful when not compared against an author’s own 
impressions: as Gibbs (2006) observes, they can be used to uncover general patterns, 
and to identify individual quirks and differences. Moreover, results of categorisation 
tasks – which have significant precedent in the study of word meaning in and beyond 
cognitive linguistics – suggest decisions which are taken as indications of word 
senses. In this way, they allow the researcher to gather implicit, and so perhaps more 
reliable, conclusions. 
 
Talmy (2007) presents a defence of the role of introspection in the study of meaning. 
He goes as far as to say that “introspection has the advantage over other 
methodologies in seemingly being the only one able to access [meaning] directly” (p. 
xiii). He argues that this bold statement is justified on the basis that meaning and 
introspection are both consciousness phenomena. Without offering any evidence for 
either of these claims, it is difficult to judge whether this is a logical conclusion. A 
number of questions arise out of Talmy’s claims. If meaning is a consciousness 
phenomenon, and is open to the conscious process of introspection, is the 
comprehensive meaning potential of a word available at once? In other words, are all 
  34 
senses/exemplars of a given word available for simultaneous introspective analysis? 
Given his later comment that not all senses of a particular word come to mind under 
an introspective analysis, it seems that the answer to this question is likely to be no. 
If the answer is no, how can one commit to describing the full range of senses of a 
polysemous word on the basis of introspection alone? There is certainly a role to be 
played by introspection in the study of language, such as in the formulation of 
hypotheses to be tested, and research questions to be answered. However, his 
statement attesting that introspection is the best means of understanding meaning 
overplays its power, and overlooks its weaknesses. Amidst his bold statements can 
be found a more balanced account of the role of introspection, and he acknowledges 
its limited application to other aspects of linguistic research. It is fortunate that we 
find ourselves in a period in which the power and necessity of experimental and 
other empirical work is being acknowledged and embraced (Arppe & Järvikivi 
2007).  
2.2.2 Intuitions in use: Cognitive linguistics 
Problems surrounding authors’ reliance on introspection and intuitions in the 
development of theories about and observations of polysemy have been 
acknowledged. For example, Sandra and Rice (1995) detail a number of issues 
including the lack of a “clear-cut methodology … for making distinctions between 
prepositional usages” [p. 90] for identifying which senses are real and constitute 
meaningful distinctions, and raise concerns regarding the granularity of sense 
distinctions proposed. Despite this, introspection as a methodology persists in 
polysemy research. In a proposal which was intended to respond to Sandra and 
Rice’s criticisms over the lack of rigorous principles underpinning sense 
identification, Tyler and Evans (2001) put forward the Principled Polysemy model, 
which aims to provide a principled methodology for identifying the senses of a given 
word, and for identifying which of those senses is the “protosense” from which all 
other senses extend. While a principled and well-articulated approach to sense 
distinction is welcome, and while publishing the criteria for making these 
discoveries in principle allows a particular study to be replicated by other 
researchers, since the majority of the criteria require mental processing by the 
individual researcher, this proposal remains lodged in the introspective tradition. To 
date, no research in which a different scholar replicates a Principled Polysemy study 
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of a word already studied under this protocol has been undertaken. For that reason, 
Tyler and Evans’ claim as to the replicability of the procedure (2001, p. 731) remains 
that – a claim – rather than a tested reality.  
 
Since publication of Tyler and Evans’ seminal piece on over, other studies have 
continued to use the introspective methodology. Mahpeykar and Tyler (2015) have 
used the Principled Polysemy method in an analysis of the phrasal verbs with, up and 
out, and in an earlier study of the Farsi preposition be (Mahpeykar and Tyler, 2011). 
The results of Tyler and Evans’ (2001) study of over is used in Ostermann's (2014) 
efforts to build a dictionary entry for the same word that captures the relations 
between its senses, and Masi's (2010) study of over and its Italian counterpart sopra. 
The Principled Polysemy method was used again by Evans and Tyler (2004) to 
distinguish between the senses of the preposition in. Beyond research adopting 
Principled Polysemy, Kishner and Gibbs' (1996) study of just studies eight senses of 
this word, six of which were identified by another author, and two which they 
identified. No explanation was given for how these senses were identified, 
suggesting that they were distinguished on the basis of their intuitions. 
2.2.3 Intuitions in use: Computational linguistics 
Expert intuitions are at the heart of efforts to develop productive automated word 
sense disambiguation (WSD) algorithms. These algorithms make use of sense-
tagged corpora of the target language. Those senses are traditionally matched to 
instances of each word by trained lexicographers – which I will, following 
convention, refer to here and in other sections concerning WSD as annotators – 
using a resource such as a dictionary or WordNet. At least two annotators tag each 
word, following their intuitions, and their decisions are checked for agreement. 
Sense-tagged datasets are used as “gold standards” against which the performance of 
a WSD system can be evaluated. Kilgarriff (1998) describes the necessity of a gold 
standard dataset, and the difficulties inherent in creating one. He notes that “The 
pervasive worry in preparing the dataset [for a gold standard] is that it will not meet 
adequate standards of replicability: that is, if two people tag the same text, they will 
all too frequently assign different tags to the corpus instance." (p. 16). Indeed, it has 
been demonstrated that even trained annotators do not necessarily reach consensus 
with each other (Passonneau et al. 2010).  
  36 
2.2.4 Empirical approaches to identifying word senses 
A range of empirical approaches to the study of polysemy and sense distinction are 
being taken, such as behavioral profiles (Gries and Divjak, 2009; cf. Berez and 
Gries, 2008; Gries, 2006), in which concordance lines are analysed for a vast range 
of linguistic features and, using statistical analyses such as clustering, groups of 
usages that share similar features are isolated, which are taken suggest distinct 
senses. In addition, Srinivasan and Rabagliati (2015) have used tests to see whether 
patterns of polysemy, such as container for contents (e.g., bowl), and object for 
representational content (e.g., book), which result in what the authors argue to be 
distinct senses of English words, are evident in other languages. Durkin and 
Manning (1989) identified the senses of polysemous words by asking speakers to 
assign a meaning of their choosing to a stimulus ambiguous (either homonymous or 
polysemous) word.  Rather than presenting subjects with the stimulus word being 
used in a particular manner, subjects were asked to provide a single statement of the 
meaning of the target word presented in isolation, specifically the first that came to 
mind. While there was some crossover in the meanings given by different subjects, 
and while a particular meaning of a given word was provided more frequently than 
others, at least two different senses were identified for all 175 stimulus words.  
  
In his examination of polysemous word senses, Baker (1999) uses four 
psycholinguistic investigations of subjects’ responses to the word see: an open 
sentence-sorting task, a closed sentence-sorting task, a lexical decision task and a 
categorical judgment task. An open sorting task allows researchers to understand 
what distinctions subjects make when not constrained or distracted by the provision 
of pre-set categories. Subjects sorted examples of see extracted from corpora, and a 
small number that had been constructed by the author. Over the course of three sets 
of experiments, subjects sorted sentences reflecting, in the eyes of the author, 23 
senses. Instructed to attend solely to the meaning of the target word, subjects were 
asked to sort the examples into groups according to common meaning and, at the 
end, either give each group a short definition (in the case of experiment one), or, in 
the case of experiments two and three, identify which example in the pile was most 
representative of the meaning reflected in that pile. Baker’s closed sorting tasks 
entail presenting subjects with a series of sentences and categories consisting of the 
senses of see that the author had identified, and asking them to allocate each stimulus 
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sentence to one of the given senses. Lexical decision and categorical judgment tasks 
were used to understand how responses vary between off-line and on-line tasks. In 
the lexical decision task, after being shown an example sentence seen previously in 
the sorting tasks, subjects heard a probe (non-)word, and were asked to decide 
whether or not it was a word. In the categorical judgment task, the same protocol 
was used, but subjects were asked to decide whether or not the probe word was an 
instance of the sense primed by the example sentence. 
  
Baker’s comprehensive approach to understanding polysemous word senses is rather 
unusual in the literature on polysemy. While the studies mentioned here, in addition 
to those using measures such as sorting and timed tasks (cf. Rice, Sandra, and 
Vanrespaille, 1999; Rice, 1996; Sandra and Rice, 1995), suggest that interest in 
testing our intuitions about polysemy and word senses is growing, the scale of 
Baker’s investigation is exceptional. This particular work was, however, concerned 
with establishing exactly what the senses of see are, and so we might attribute this 
unusual degree of conscientiousness to the study’s ultimate goal. Indeed, while 
Baker noted that there was variation in how well participants agreed with his sense 
distinctions (p. 147), he does not proceed to discuss this interesting outcome in any 
detail.  
2.3 Expert intuitions about word senses: conclusions 
This section has demonstrated a conflict between approaches to linguistics research: 
on the one hand, there is a growing argument that linguists’ intuitions in isolation 
should not be understood as data, or as evidence in support of any particular 
conclusion. On the other hand, and in spite of methodological advancements 
demonstrating that intuitions need not be the sole or main source of data, intuition-
led approaches to the study of polysemy occupy privileged positions in the cognitive 
linguistic canon. While principled approaches to the delineation of word senses have 
been put forward (Tyler and Evans, 2001), and while this approach adopts an explicit 
methodology, it remains a subjective approach that has thus far not been repeated by 
another author in any published analysis of over, the word Tyler and Evans studied. 
The extent to whether their decision principles produce replicable outcomes is 
therefore unknown.  
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Arriving at a set of sense distinctions in an objective manner is highly desirable. If 
we are able to isolate the senses of a given word, we may then begin the theoretically 
interesting pursuit of an account of whether, and how, those senses are related to 
each other. At a practical level, identifying the senses of a given word is a necessary 
step in dictionary writing and when developing sense inventories used to train word 
sense disambiguation algorithms. It is vital that the steps taken to achieve these 
objectives can be replicated by other researchers in a way that produces the same 
results. Evidence about whether or not linguists’ intuitions about the senses of a 
given polysemous word correspond to those of other speakers is lacking. In the face 
of evidence of divergence between expert and naïve intuitions about other linguistic 
phenomena (Bradac et al., 1980; Dąbrowska, 2010; Gordon and Hendrick, 1997; 
Ross, 1979; Schütze, 1996; Spencer, 1973), it is necessary to ask how representative 
– and consequently how useful – expert intuitions about word meaning are. 
Part 2: Investigation 
The second part of this chapter describes a closed sentence-sorting task that aims to 
establish whether the senses that I, as a trained linguist, find meaningful are 
meaningful in the minds of other speakers. The structure of this part of the chapter is 
as follows. Based on the literature review presented above, I identify the gaps in 
knowledge that I wish to address, and specify the aims of the study. I then present 
some of the senses of the words over, under, above and below that I have identified, 
guided by my intuitions. I then move to report the results of a sentence-sorting task, 
analogous to categorisation experiments used in non-linguistic categorisation 
research and WSD tagging exercises. I first undertake a qualitative analysis of how 
participants as a group tended to categorise sentences, to assess whether any patterns 
emerge. Afterwards, I use Cohen’s kappa to statistically measure how well 
individual participants and I agree about how the stimuli should be sorted.  This part 
of the chapter closes with some concluding remarks on the implications of the 
findings, and how they can be tested further. 
2.4 Aims 
The literature review in Part 1 of this chapter revealed that, in spite of growing 
awareness that a linguist’s intuitions about a particular linguistic phenomenon may 
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not correspond to those held by other speakers, intuitions continue to occupy a 
privileged position in the methodology of choice in the study of polysemy. While 
experimental research on the representativity of linguists’ intuitions about syntactic 
phenomena has been widely reported, equivalent interrogation of the status of 
linguists’ intuitions about word senses has not.  
 
I therefore aim to offer an original contribution to knowledge intended to fill this 
gap. Specifically, I aim to carry out an empirical investigation of how well naïve 
speakers’ and other linguists’ intuitions about word senses correspond to my own. 
The findings of this study are intended to shed further light on the utility of expert 
intuitions, and therefore add to existing literature on this issue to expand the focus 
beyond syntax and into semantics. 
2.5 The senses of over, under, above and below: A 
linguist’s view 
The flexibility of use of these four polysemous words presents a considerable 
challenge to the linguist tasked with disentangling their uses, and classifying them 
into sense groups. This is particularly the case when these uses are drawn from 
corpora; as Berez and Gries (2008) observe, corpus outputs can be surprising, 
returning a diverse sample that may be trickier to categorise than examples 
constructed by a linguist. Constructed examples may be produced to support the 
proposition that a particular sense exists, thus rendering that sense a self-fulfilling 
prophecy. The diverse sample that can be collected from a corpus of real usage 
allows the linguist to establish objectively how a particular word is used, and may 
well reveal uses that an introspective trawl of examples of the target word would not 
have returned. While using corpora as the basis of a usage classification task is 
therefore rather more challenging than using constructed examples, it is a more 
rigorous – not to mention replicable – procedure that may indeed return more 
interesting results than introspection can.  
  
Tables 1 to 4 below show the sense categorisation decisions I made when sorting 
examples of the four target words. Following the tables, the sense that I judge to be 
used in each group is described. 
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Table 1 Stimuli for over sorting task, categorised into senses according to my intuitions 
Sentence Group label Sense 
There was a wrangle OVER a proposal to adopt a law. They spent two weeks squabbling OVER the issue. ABOUT 
I puzzled OVER this. They spent two weeks squabbling OVER the issue. 
Let's not fight OVER it. They spent two weeks squabbling OVER the issue. 
Clashes also occurred OVER trapping rights. They spent two weeks squabbling OVER the issue. 
We had some discussions OVER where to place the boundaries. They spent two weeks squabbling OVER the issue. 
We'd fall out OVER stupid things and not speak to each other. They spent two weeks squabbling OVER the issue. 
Can you just run it OVER the road? He sped up as he drove OVER the bridge. A-B MOVEMENT (NO ARC) 
The cops pulled me OVER. He sped up as he drove OVER the bridge. 
I ran OVER the bridge. He sped up as he drove OVER the bridge. 
Sarah's come OVER the road Daddy. He sped up as he drove OVER the bridge. 
The plane flew OVER the city. He sped up as he drove OVER the bridge. 
He walked slowly OVER the zebra-crossing. He sped up as he drove OVER the bridge. 
Jump OVER the other one. John was shot as he climbed OVER the Wall. ARC 
Herons seem to be incapable of stepping OVER the deterrent. John was shot as he climbed OVER the Wall. 
I go OVER the handlebars. John was shot as he climbed OVER the Wall. 
The quick brown fox jumped OVER the lazy dog. John was shot as he climbed OVER the Wall. 
He refused to return the balls kicked OVER his fence. John was shot as he climbed OVER the Wall. 
They keep slinging their towels OVER the bedroom door. John was shot as he climbed OVER the Wall. 
He is handing OVER his presidency. Meridian TV are taking OVER from TVS. TRANSFER 
That's half the reason that Brian Tolbrook took OVER at Tettron. Meridian TV are taking OVER from TVS. 
He took OVER the printing business. Meridian TV are taking OVER from TVS. 
I'll take OVER the primary agenda. Meridian TV are taking OVER from TVS. 
I can't hand OVER a long barrelled weapon to that officer. Meridian TV are taking OVER from TVS. 
The plaintiff handed OVER to Samuel Revill the first note. Meridian TV are taking OVER from TVS. 
I rushed out before the show was OVER. She agreed to meet Tessa when the visit was OVER. COMPLETION 
I can't believe the weekend is OVER already! She agreed to meet Tessa when the visit was OVER. 
His wrestling days are not OVER yet. She agreed to meet Tessa when the visit was OVER. 
They think it's all OVER…it is now! She agreed to meet Tessa when the visit was OVER. 
She wished the party was OVER. She agreed to meet Tessa when the visit was OVER. 
We hope Sunderland will go up once the game is OVER. She agreed to meet Tessa when the visit was OVER. 
Bring pelmet fabric OVER, and press with an iron to bond together. He turned OVER the pages of the notebook. FLIP 
I turn it OVER. He turned OVER the pages of the notebook. 
The printed sheets are turned OVER on the long axis. He turned OVER the pages of the notebook. 
Turn that steak OVER, it's burning! He turned OVER the pages of the notebook. 
Yeah can you turn that OVER please. He turned OVER the pages of the notebook. 
He saw a car flip OVER and land upside down in a hedge. He turned OVER the pages of the notebook. 
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Table 2 Stimuli for under sorting task, categorised into senses according to my intuitions 
	
Sentence Group label Sense 
I'm wearing a vest UNDER this shirt. He's wearing pyjamas UNDER his jacket HORIZONTAL RELATIONSHIP 
I'm a bit hot UNDER the collar. He's wearing pyjamas UNDER his jacket 
Should I wear a jumper UNDER this coat? He's wearing pyjamas UNDER his jacket 
They got UNDER cover of the walls of the fortresses. He's wearing pyjamas UNDER his jacket 
Rinse the dish UNDER running water. He's wearing pyjamas UNDER his jacket 
They found more wallpaper UNDER the layer they'd removed. He's wearing pyjamas UNDER his jacket 
You can emigrate to Britain UNDER limited criteria. It's allowed UNDER the terms of the policy. ACCORDING TO 
He will be committed UNDER the mental health act. It's allowed UNDER the terms of the policy. 
It will be contested UNDER the Corrupt Practices Act. It's allowed UNDER the terms of the policy. 
They will file an explanation UNDER Article 51 of the UN Charter. It's allowed UNDER the terms of the policy. 
UNDER the new regulations, the students must sign in each week. It's allowed UNDER the terms of the policy. 
The fridge can be exchanged UNDER the returns policy. It's allowed UNDER the terms of the policy. 
Remember their hospital is UNDER threat. We kept the place UNDER observation. SUBJECT TO 
This is something which is very much UNDER attack. We kept the place UNDER observation. 
They deny they were UNDER any duty to offer any advice. We kept the place UNDER observation. 
We're UNDER real pressure at the moment. We kept the place UNDER observation. 
Your application is now UNDER review. We kept the place UNDER observation. 
The question of intercommunion is UNDER discussion. We kept the place UNDER observation. 
I'm frying the bread UNDER there. He's standing UNDER the mistletoe. VERTICAL RELATIONSHIP, NO 
CONTACT I'm hiding UNDER your bed. He's standing UNDER the mistletoe. 
The Troll seldom came out from UNDER the bridge. He's standing UNDER the mistletoe. 
She kicked him UNDER the table. He's standing UNDER the mistletoe. 
They lay UNDER the stars. He's standing UNDER the mistletoe. 
Cover dark circles UNDER your eyes with concealer. He's standing UNDER the mistletoe. 
I'm sleeping UNDER my cover. I hid the crumbs UNDER the rug VERTICAL RELATIONSHIP WITH 
CONTACT  The growing roots UNDER the path had cracked the tarmac. I hid the crumbs UNDER the rug 
They put material UNDER the carpet to make it more comfortable. I hid the crumbs UNDER the rug 
They looked where others wouldn't think to - UNDER dark leaves. I hid the crumbs UNDER the rug 
They'd been hiding people UNDER the floorboards. I hid the crumbs UNDER the rug 
He felt warm UNDER the blanket. I hid the crumbs UNDER the rug 
We'll be taxed UNDER the Conservatives. We're UNDER new management. UNDER THE CONTROL OR 
AUTHORITY OF I'm working UNDER the direction of the area manager. We're UNDER new management. 
250 Garrimperos work UNDER him. We're UNDER new management. 
She's got a whole team working UNDER her now. We're UNDER new management. 
He served in 102 Battalion UNDER the South Africans. We're UNDER new management. 
The Act was introduced UNDER the last President. We're UNDER new management. 
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Table 3 Stimuli for above sorting task, categorised into senses according to my intuitions 
Sentence Group label Sense 
They think they're ABOVE work like this. Working conditions are ABOVE average. BETTER THAN  
Are they good, ABOVE average, or below average? Working conditions are ABOVE average. 
It was either ABOVE average or below average. Working conditions are ABOVE average. 
The Renault 5 was just ABOVE banger status. Working conditions are ABOVE average. 
She's not ABOVE silly gossip. Working conditions are ABOVE average. 
I'm ABOVE all that petty business. Working conditions are ABOVE average. 
Anything ABOVE zero degrees and the ice will melt You should bid ABOVE the asking price. MORE THAN 
He has a surplus of votes over and ABOVE the quota. You should bid ABOVE the asking price. 
It was 40% ABOVE £150. You should bid ABOVE the asking price. 
The new estimate is 95,000 ABOVE the original estimate. You should bid ABOVE the asking price. 
The price of fuel has jumped ABOVE $4 a gallon. You should bid ABOVE the asking price. 
Train fares have risen ABOVE inflation. You should bid ABOVE the asking price. 
There was a faint bruise ABOVE her eyebrow. They live in the flat ABOVE the shop. VERTICAL RELATIONSHIP 
I've hung some mistletoe ABOVE the doorway. They live in the flat ABOVE the shop. 
The dictionaries are ABOVE the history books. They live in the flat ABOVE the shop. 
The plane was cruising ABOVE the clouds. They live in the flat ABOVE the shop. 
The shelf is fixed to the wall ABOVE the radiator. They live in the flat ABOVE the shop. 
The stars ABOVE were partly obscured by clouds. They live in the flat ABOVE the shop. 
The comments (listed ABOVE) are worrying. There are several issues, as listed ABOVE. TEXT USES 
As described ABOVE, this uses a new operating system. There are several issues, as listed ABOVE. 
It was refused for the ABOVE reasons. There are several issues, as listed ABOVE. 
The process, described ABOVE, is clear to all. There are several issues, as listed ABOVE. 
All of the ABOVE laws have been passed in the last ten years. There are several issues, as listed ABOVE. 
The ABOVE constraints are not seen as insurmountable. There are several issues, as listed ABOVE. 
This site is elevated ABOVE the road. We camped ABOVE the valley floor. VANTAGE  
Glastonbury Tor towers ABOVE the Somerset Levels. We camped ABOVE the valley floor. 
It was built on the hill, just ABOVE the station. We camped ABOVE the valley floor. 
We had a great view from the cliff ABOVE the cove. We camped ABOVE the valley floor. 
The town is 200m ABOVE sea-level. We camped ABOVE the valley floor. 
We were observed from the window ABOVE. We camped ABOVE the valley floor. 
I used to be his boss, but he works ABOVE me now. There's nobody ABOVE them in the hierarchy HIERARCHY 
Now that I work ABOVE her, we don't talk so much. There's nobody ABOVE them in the hierarchy 
The orders came from ABOVE. There's nobody ABOVE them in the hierarchy 
There is a level of executives ABOVE the vice president level. There's nobody ABOVE them in the hierarchy 
ABOVE private soldiers there are three types of officer. There's nobody ABOVE them in the hierarchy 
We're under serious pressure from ABOVE to get the job done. There's nobody ABOVE them in the hierarchy 
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Table 4 Stimuli for below task, categorised into senses according to my intuitions 
Sentence Group label Sense 
Congress is somewhere BELOW cockroaches and traffic jams in Americans' esteem. They were of BELOW average ability. WORSE THAN 
We must set standards of achievement BELOW which they must not fall. They were of BELOW average ability. 
You wouldn't be doing the job if you were BELOW that level. They were of BELOW average ability. 
Paul had performed BELOW expectation. They were of BELOW average ability. 
He performed BELOW par last time. They were of BELOW average ability. 
He is an unenthusiastic and BELOW average soldier. They were of BELOW average ability. 
Tabith stood BELOW, watching him. From the window I saw the field BELOW. VANTAGE 
BELOW the front windows the extension was divided into two sections. From the window I saw the field BELOW. 
They established an iron foundry in the valley BELOW the church in 1790. From the window I saw the field BELOW. 
The walk provides wonderful views of Mallerstand BELOW. From the window I saw the field BELOW. 
Your mates are down BELOW, watching you. From the window I saw the field BELOW. 
I called out to the people on the beach BELOW, but they didn't hear me. From the window I saw the field BELOW. 
The people in the flat BELOW wouldn't stop shouting. Hundreds of pipes run BELOW the city. UNDERNEATH (3D) 
Instead of being up high the box was down BELOW. Hundreds of pipes run BELOW the city. 
We dredged BELOW the mud at the bottom of the river. Hundreds of pipes run BELOW the city. 
When we got BELOW the next layer the concentrations became stronger. Hundreds of pipes run BELOW the city. 
The campus was shrinking BELOW me into a collection of children's play houses. Hundreds of pipes run BELOW the city. 
The crocodile sank BELOW the surface. Hundreds of pipes run BELOW the city. 
She had a mole just BELOW her right eye. There was a large scratch BELOW the driver's window. LOWER THAN (2D) 
Don't paint BELOW the windowsill. There was a large scratch BELOW the driver's window. 
BELOW the crags a well-built tunnel could be seen. There was a large scratch BELOW the driver's window. 
I pinned my name badge BELOW the logo on my tshirt. There was a large scratch BELOW the driver's window. 
There are two iron rings on the wall BELOW the painting. There was a large scratch BELOW the driver's window. 
The sleeves gradually get tighter and end BELOW the elbow. There was a large scratch BELOW the driver's window. 
The loss is a little BELOW £3,200. The group has been trading BELOW budgeted levels. LESS THAN 
There's no level BELOW which the wages may not fall. The group has been trading BELOW budgeted levels. 
We brought in forty million pounds BELOW the target amount. The group has been trading BELOW budgeted levels. 
He set a price BELOW the existing supplier's 1994 prices. The group has been trading BELOW budgeted levels. 
There is a £20 surcharge on orders BELOW £50. The group has been trading BELOW budgeted levels. 
The sales value was well BELOW target. The group has been trading BELOW budgeted levels. 
Fill in BELOW all the tasks that you do in a typical day. Tickets are available by completing the form BELOW. TEXT USES 
Look at the sentence BELOW, what does it say? Tickets are available by completing the form BELOW. 
Give us your fun verdict by dialling the numbers BELOW. Tickets are available by completing the form BELOW. 
Serve with Sharp sauce (see BELOW). Tickets are available by completing the form BELOW. 
In the situations listed BELOW identify what your information needs would be. Tickets are available by completing the form BELOW. 
It will be argued BELOW that economic reconstruction was a success.  Tickets are available by completing the form BELOW. 
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2.5.1 Distinction procedure 
I followed an intuition-based approach to distinguishing between the example 
sentences in the four tables above, classifying examples according to whether I 
judged that they used the same or a different sense of the target word. A large, 
random sample was extracted and each was annotated to describe, or paraphrase, 
what I judged to be the underlying sense used in that context. Once annotated, the 
sample was sorted according to the description/paraphrase, thus revealing initial 
groups of sentences. By comparing these grouped sentences alongside each other, I 
was able to verify whether each did indeed capture the same sense of the target word, 
whether any had been mis-annotated, or whether I judged that there was a 
sufficiently meaningful distinction within the group to license splitting it further. Six 
examples of six senses of each word were selected to be included in the tasks. This 
was a conscious decision: it ensured that the task was of a manageable scale, which 
should maximise task completion, while minimising fatigue and semantic satiation 
effects. The senses are defined in the following sections. 
2.5.2 Over  
2.5.2.1 ABOUT	
Each of these sentences describes the effect of a triggering stimulus. The group does 
not distinguish between the physicality of the action that takes place as a 
consequence, and therefore captures physical action, as in Let’s not fight over it, and 
non-physical action, as in I puzzled over this. The figure (i.e., in these examples, this 
and it) in each sentence thus acts as both the trigger for the action and consequently 
the object of the action. 
2.5.2.2 A-B	MOVEMENT	(NO	ARC)	
Each sentence in this group describes the movement of an object or person from one 
location to another. The majority of the stimuli capture a path from a side of one 
location to another. For example, Sarah’s come over the road Daddy describes the 
movement by Sarah from one side of the street to the side on which the speaker is 
located. The group does not specify for degree of contact or distance between figure 
and ground, as indicated by the presence of the sentences The plane flew over the 
city, and He walked slowly over the zebra-crossing. Further, it does not specify that 
exemplars must describe a horizontal path as in Figure 6.  
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As inclusion of the example The cops pulled me over suggests, the group 
accommodates paths which can be diagonal or otherwise non-horizontal in nature, as 
illustrated in Figure 7 and Figure 8. 
 
2.5.2.3 ARC	
Whereas the previous group collectively described relatively flat motion from one 
point to another, the sentences in the ARC category are further specified to describe 
the movement from A to B in which the figure moves up and over an obstacle of 
varying height; from a lazy dog to a fence; in brief, the trajectory is arc-shaped. 
Perhaps the least exemplary of the six sentences is They keep slinging their towels 
over the bedroom door. In this case, the sentence describes the movement of one part 
of the figure (towels) over an obstacle (the bedroom door), finishing on the other 
side of the obstacle (point B). However, whereas in the other examples the entire 
figure ends up at point B, parts of the figure in this sentence remain at points A and 
B. In this case, the shape of the figure at the end of the motion matches the shape of 
the trajectory of the figures in the other sentences.  
2.5.2.4 TRANSFER	
Each sentence in this group captures the transfer of ownership or responsibility for a 
physical or abstract entity from one person to another. The group does not make a 
distinction between physical transfer, such as that captured by The plaintiff handed 
over to Samuel Revill the first note and abstract transfer, as exemplified by I’ll take 
over the primary agenda. 
Figure 6 Horizontal, linear path 
Figure 8 Non-linear path Figure 7 Diagonal, linear path 
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2.5.2.5 COMPLETION	
This group of non-spatial examples of over collectively capture a temporal sense. 
Specifically, they describe the end of some temporal event: a weekend, a show, or an 
unspecified event as in They think it’s all over…it is now!. 
2.5.2.6 FLIP	
These spatial sentences describe the inversion movement of a figure. Figure 9 
illustrates this and is discussed afterwards. 
 
Figure 9 Schematic representation of FLIP, in which the path of the edge of the figure object 
corresponds to the shape of the trajectory underlying the ARC sense 
 
As the illustration suggests, the sentences describe the inversion of an object such 
that what was its top part at an earlier point in time is located at the bottom at a later 
point in time. 
2.5.3 Under 
2.5.3.1 HORIZONTAL	RELATIONSHIP	
The sentences in this group capture a non-canonical spatial configuration, in which 
the figure is located adjacent to the ground on a horizontal axis. It therefore departs 
from the vertical axis that is understood to characterise the underlying meaning of 
most spatial uses – and indeed some non-spatial uses – of under. This distinction is 
illustrated in Figure 10 and Figure 11. 
  
 
 
 
 
 
 Figure 10 Horizontal relationship 
between figure and ground 
Figure 11 Canonical vertical relationship 
between figure and ground 
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While the configuration described by the sentences is a 90 degree rotation of the 
canonical under configuration, it does not lose the functional consequences 
associated with the canonical orientation, namely covering. The example Rinse the 
dish under running water perhaps exemplifies this most weakly, with the ground 
(water) unlikely to be covering the ground (the dish) in its entirety. Further, other 
speakers may challenge my judgment that I’m a bit hot under the collar and They got 
under cover of the walls of the fortresses should be categorised into this group, due 
to the idiomatic nature of the first sentence, and the collocation under cover in the 
second. These issues aside, the spatial configuration that underlies both sentences is 
the same as that which underlies the other members of the group. 
2.5.3.2 ACCORDING	TO	
This set of non-spatial uses of under collectively capture a sense in which an action 
is permitted by a rule. The rule therefore exercises control over a particular action, in 
a way that we might liken to the control that a figure located immediately underneath 
a ground in a spatial configuration is subject to. 
2.5.3.3 SUBJECT	TO	
This set of sentences each describes the exertion of force by an abstract ground on an 
abstract or physical figure. Just as I observed a relationship between the ACCORDING 
TO sense with the functional consequence of control inherent in the vertical 
configuration canonically associated with under, there is a relationship with that 
configuration here also. In this case, an abstract extension of the functional 
consequence of force exerted by a ground onto a figure is evident in these sentences. 
The force described by these sentences, for example in Remember their hospital is 
under threat, is typically negative. That said, I do not find that the distinction 
between negative and neutral forces, such as that exemplified by the sentence The 
question of intercommunion is under discussion, is sufficiently meaningful to license 
assigning this stimulus to a separate group. 
2.5.3.4 VERTICAL	RELATIONSHIP,	NO	CONTACT	
This is the first of two groups in the stimuli that capture what is considered to be the 
canonical configuration that underpins under: a vertical relationship between a figure 
and ground, in which the figure is located in a position inferior to that of the ground. 
In this case, the group is further specified to capture only those examples in which 
the figure and ground are not in contact. 
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2.5.3.5 VERTICAL	RELATIONSHIP,	WITH	CONTACT	
These sentences capture a similar spatial configuration to those described by the 
sentences in the previous group, but are distinguished from those in that group due to 
the presence of contact between figure and ground. The sentences therefore not only 
describe a vertical configuration, but one which is also layer-like. 
2.5.3.6 UNDER	THE	CONTROL	OR	AUTHORITY	OF	
The final non-spatial group in the stimuli captures a sense of under that describes the 
exertion of control by a human, or group thereof. In each case, the figure is 
positioned on an abstract vertical schema in a position inferior to the ground. The 
group is similar in meaning to the sentences in the ACCORDING TO and SUBJECT TO 
groups, which also capture an abstract extension of the functional consequence of the 
spatial configuration canonically associated with under.  
2.5.3.7 A	note	on	ACCORDING	TO,	SUBJECT	TO	and	UNDER	THE	CONTROL/AUTHORITY	OF		
While I argue that these three non-spatial groups should be distinguished from one 
another, they do have something in common. Specifically, each of the three groups is 
characterised by abstract control or force exerted by one entity on another. For 
example, You can emigrate to Britain under limited criteria (ACCORDING TO) 
describes the force exerted by a set of rules on an individual. We’re under real 
pressure at the moment (SUBJECT TO) describes an abstract force being applied to a 
figure. Finally, We’ll be taxed under the Conservatives (UNDER THE CONTROL OR 
AUTHORITY OF) describes an impending force to be exercised upon a figure by a 
named individual or collective animate ground. Further, the ground can be 
understood to occupy a particular position in a type of hierarchy; specifically, one 
that is superior to that of the figure.  
2.5.4 Above 
2.5.4.1 BETTER	THAN	
These sentences capture a qualitative sense of above, divided into sentences in which 
one person measures something against a qualitative scale, or a person measures 
themselves against such a scale. I believe that it is based on spatial configuration 
canonically associated with above, in which a figure is located in a higher position 
than a ground. Further, I argue that it is an elaboration of the MORE THAN sense 
discussed below that is extended to describe qualitative scales. 
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2.5.4.2 MORE	THAN	
The sentences in this group describe the position on a quantitative scale; specifically, 
figures which are of higher value than a ground value. Like the sentences in the 
BETTER THAN group, I judge that this sense is semantically related to the spatial 
configuration typically associated with above.  In their study of over, Tyler and 
Evans (2001) noted a correlation between vertical scales and quantity. This can be 
exemplified by considering what happens when a £1 coin is stacked upon another, 
and then another is added, then another, and so on. With each addition, the number 
of coins increases in correlation with the height of the stack. The same correlation is 
true of above, too. Due to the similarity of the spatial configurations that these words 
are typically associated with, both words can be used to describe numerical scales.  
2.5.4.3 VERTICAL	RELATIONSHIP	
This set of sentences represents the spatial relationship canonically associated with 
above, in which a figure is positioned superior to a ground, and in which there is a 
vertical relationship between the two objects. The group does not specify for degree 
of distance between figure and ground, and includes sentences that describe close 
proximity, as in There was a faint bruise above her eyebrow, and those which 
describe great distance, as in The stars above were partly obscured by clouds. 
2.5.4.4 TEXT	USES	
While the other five groups of stimuli in this task can be easily judged as 
representing either spatial or non-spatial uses of above, the sentences in the group I 
will label TEXT USES are trickier to judge. They elude single categorisation into one 
or the other domain: The comments (listed above) are worrying describes the 
position of comments both in space, in that they direct the reader to a location in a 
document, but also in time, in that they refer to a point in the past, at which the 
reader initially encountered them. For this reason, and the fact that they are typically 
encountered in a specific medium – written English – I anticipate that participants 
will agree that the sentences in this group are highly distinct from other stimuli.  
2.5.4.5 VANTAGE	
I judge that this set of examples describe an elaboration of the canonical spatial 
relationship underpinning above; while the figure is located in a position superior to 
the ground, the relationship is on a diagonal, rather than vertical, axis. In each case, 
the ground is an extended, three-dimensional space of which the figure has a vantage 
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perspective. This configuration is illustrated in Figure 12, in which the grey dashed 
lined indicate the range of perspective held by figure over ground. 
 
 
Figure 12 Schematic representation of VANTAGE.  
2.5.4.6 HIERARCHY	
Each sentence in this group describes the position of one person or post in a 
hierarchy in relation to another. In this case, the ground is positioned higher than the 
figure on an abstract vertical schema. 
2.5.5 Below 
2.5.5.1 WORSE	THAN	
This group of sentences describe opposite positions to those described in the BETTER 
THAN group in the above task. In this case, an entity – concrete or otherwise – is 
compared against a qualitative scale, and is found to be in an inferior position to a 
ground on that scale.  
2.5.5.2 VANTAGE	
While the sentences in the VANTAGE group in the above task described the superior 
position of a figure relative to a group, albeit on a diagonal axis, the opposite is true 
of the sentences in the VANTAGE group for below. In this case, the figure is located 
lower than the ground, as illustrated in Figure 13. Figures specified in these 
examples occupy extended three-dimensional spaces. 
 
 
Figure 13 Schematic representation of VANTAGE. Dashed lines represent perspective of ground 
held by figure  
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2.5.5.3 UNDERNEATH	(3D)	
The sentences in this group describe a three-dimensional configuration in which a 
ground occupies an extended space underneath the figure. I make the distinction 
between the three spatial groups in the orientation of the figure and ground in each 
sentence. In this category, the figure and ground are oriented along a vertical axis, 
whereas sentences in the VANTAGE category describe a diagonal relationship. This 
relationship is illustrated in Figure 14. 
 
 
 
Figure 14 Schematic representation of UNDERNEATH  
2.5.5.4 LOWER	THAN	(2D)	
The members of this group contrast with those of the two other spatial groups, 
VANTAGE and UNDERNEATH in their dimensions: unlike those groups, the sentences 
in this group describe two-dimensional relationships between figures and grounds. 
This configuration is diagrammed in Figure 15. 
 
Figure 15 Schematic representation of LOWER THAN  
2.5.5.5 LESS	THAN	
The members of this group are direct opposites of the members of the MORE THAN 
group in the above stimuli. Like that group, the sentences in the LESS THAN group 
describe a position on a quantitative scale in which the figure is of a lesser value than 
a ground value. I judge that, just as the MORE THAN sentences are related to the 
BETTER THAN sentences, the overarching meaning captured by this group is related to 
– but distinct from – that of the WORSE THAN group. This group does not require that 
the exact value of the ground is specified, but only that some position on a 
quantitative scale is identified. It is coincidental that all of the stimuli in this group 
describe positions on specifically financial scales, and I would judge that sentences 
that describe a lesser position on a more generic quantitative scale, such as His share 
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of the popular vote fell to below 50% in the provincial election of 1995 would be an 
equally good member of the group. 
2.5.5.6 TEXT	USES	
We can compare the members of this group with those of the TEXT USES group in the 
above stimuli. In this case, the sentences refer to the position of figure on a page. 
While the examples in this group typically describe the position of text, the example 
Fill in below all the tasks that you do in a typical day seems an equally good match 
for the group, describing the intended position of some writing. As noted in my 
description of the TEXT USE group in section 2.5.4.4, this group defies easy 
categorisation as describing either a spatial configuration or metaphorical 
arrangement of figure and ground. They describe the lower spatial position of a 
figure relative to a ground, as well as the relative temporal relationship between 
figure and ground. Assuming that the document is read in a canonical, linear fashion, 
the figure text will be encountered at some point in the future. As noted earlier, the 
opposite is true of TEXT USES of above. 
2.6 Data collection 
In this section, I outline the approach I took to gathering data to answer the question 
of whether the senses that I find meaningful are meaningful in the minds of other 
speakers. In brief, it firstly introduces the methodology used. It then provides 
relevant information about the participants who completed the tasks. Thirdly, details 
of the stimuli used are provided, followed by detailed information about the task 
procedure. Finally, it introduces the statistical model used to measure the degree to 
which individual participants and I agreed about how the stimuli should be sorted.  
2.6.1 Methodology: Sentence-sorting tasks 
Sentence-sorting tasks offer the chance to observe the categories people make when 
they are asked to sort stimulus sentences according to a particular criterion. In the 
case of this research, participants are asked to sort them on the basis of the meaning 
of the capitalised target word, either over, under, above or below. In this study it is 
assumed that the categories people make are indicators of (some of) the senses they 
find meaningful. The task is straightforward, easy to understand, and participants 
report they find the tasks interesting and stimulating. The task is also very easy to 
publish online, which allows large and diverse samples of participants to be 
recruited. The results generated are relatively straightforward to make sense of: 
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between them, agreement statistics and data visualisation tools allow for powerful 
insights into how well individuals agree with each other, whether there are senses 
that are common to many speakers, and, if there are, whether or not these senses are 
related. Sentence-sorting tasks can be administered in two ways: participants may be 
given a set of sentences and asked to categorise them into groups of their own 
making. This is known as an open-sort task. A closed-sort task, in contrast, sees 
participants categorising sentences into predetermined categories. The closed-sort 
task method is adopted in this study and is described in section 2.6.1.1, below.  
 
Sentence-sorting tasks have an established place in the study of word meaning. In 
work led by Rice to understand the polysemy of the words at, on and in, she and her 
colleagues carried out several open sort tasks. In each case, every participant sorted 
examples of each word (20 examples for each word in Sandra and Rice, 1995; and 
50 each in Rice, 1996, and Rice, Sandra, and Vanrespaille, 1999). Divjak and Gries 
(2008) used a smaller task in their study of near-synonymous Russian verbs; in that 
case, each participant sorted nine sentences, representing examples of different near-
synonymous verbs. The participants were initially asked to sort them into as many 
groups as they wished; in a second experiment, the same participants sorted the same 
sentences into up to three groups; and in the final experiment, the same sentences 
were sorted by the same participants into three groups, in which each group must 
comprise three different verbs. Hong and Baker (2011), in a WSD study, carried out 
a closed sort task comprising 18 sentences using one of two senses of justify. 
Participants were asked to review each sentence and allocate them to one of the two 
sense categories provided. In a very large task, Baker (1999) recruited participants to 
sort up to 244 examples of see in an open sort task. His closed sort task saw 
participants sorting 99 sentences into either 19 (experiment 1) or seven (experiment 
2) sense groups. 
 
Sentence sorting tasks have a clear overlap with the methodology frequently adopted 
in human word sense disambiguation (WSD) research. In those studies, trained or 
naïve annotators are presented with one example of a given word at a time, and 
asked to judge which of a set of predetermined sense tags best matches the sense of 
the target word. In some cases, annotators are permitted to use multiple tags (e.g., 
Véronis, 1998). Clearly there is some difference in the delivery of these tasks, in that 
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the tasks used here present every stimulus sentence at once, but the underlying 
principle remains the same. 
2.6.1.1 Closed-sort	tasks	
In a closed-sort task, participants are presented with a set of stimuli and a number of 
preset categories. They are asked to sort the stimuli into the categories according to a 
given rule. In this research, participants are given a set of sentences, each of which 
uses a target word in a particular sense. The categories they are asked to sort the 
sentences into are labelled with a sentence that also features the target word being 
used in a particular sense. Each category represents a different sense of the same 
target word. Participants are asked to judge what the capitalised target word means in 
each sentence, and sort it into a category with the corresponding meaning. The 
intended final result is that each category should consist of a set of sentences in 
which the sense of the target word is the same, and which is the same as the sense of 
the target word in the category label. 
 
The purpose of this type of closed-sort task is to understand how similar participants 
and I are in our judgments of which sentence belongs in each group: it allows me to 
measure how well each participant and I agree that a particular sentence should be 
assigned to a particular category. It is, therefore, a good means of testing how well 
my intuitions about word senses match those of others. A weakness of the task, 
however, is that because the task is very structured, and because the category label 
sentences provide some guidance about which sentences each category should 
contain and are contrasted against labels of other categories, participants may sort 
the sentences in a way that indicates high agreement with my word senses. Without 
these guides, they may sort them differently. There are two obvious ways of 
overcoming this weakness. First, distractor sense categories can be provided. They 
would be labelled with sentences which use a sense of the target word judged by the 
experimenter to be absent in the set of stimulus sentences. Alternatively, participants 
could be given a set of sense categories without distractors, but informed that they 
may use as many or as few as they wish. The latter approach is taken in this research. 
 
The categories given to participants reflected what I considered to be six distinct 
senses of each of the target words represented in the stimulus sentences. Each sense, 
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in my view, was used in six stimulus sentences. The six sentences corresponding to 
each category will be henceforth called target sentences, and the category to which I 
believe they belong will be referred to as the target category. Accordingly, each 
participant was asked to sort a total of 36 sentences – each examples of one of over, 
above, under or below – into at least one of the six predetermined groups. The task is 
consequently highly structured: stimuli have been selected specifically to represent 
what I judge to be a particular sense, and there are an equal number of exemplars of 
each sense. The stimuli and categories are shown in Table 1 to Table 4. 
2.6.2 Participants 
A total of 298 native English-speaking participants completed the tasks. Participants 
were primarily recruited online using the Reddit Sample Size website. Sample Size 
is a forum in which researchers can recruit participants for experiments, surveys and 
other research projects. A small number of participants were recruited by emailing 
students in the Faculty of Arts, Design and Social Sciences at Northumbria 
University, and through personal contacts. Participants were not rewarded for taking 
part.  
 
Given that the purpose of this study is to understand the extent to which the sense 
distinctions that I – as a linguist – find meaningful correspond to those meaningful in 
the minds of other speakers, I was also interested in understanding how similar they 
were to the intuitions of other linguists. For this reason, I sought participants who 
had experience of studying linguistics. In this study, participants who have either 
completed a PhD in linguistics or are currently working on a PhD in linguistics are 
classified here as linguists. Information about the participants is summarised in 
Table 5. 
Table 5 Experiment 1 Participants 
 Total 
number 
participants 
Non-
linguists 
Linguists UK 
participants 
Non-UK 
participants 
Over 79 76 3 14 65 
Under 62 59 3 14 48 
Above 91 88 3 10 81 
Below 66 60 6 13 53 
 
Participants had a range of educational backgrounds. All had completed or were in 
the process of completing at least a high school qualification, and the highest level of 
  56 
education was a doctoral degree. Non-student participants represented a wide array 
of job types.  
2.6.3 Stimuli 
Stimuli consisted of 36 examples of one of over, under, above or below. Sentences 
were extracted from the internet and from the spoken and written sections of the 
British National Corpus, edited to make the examples well-formed sentences. Where 
appropriate, the sentences were edited to reduce their length. This decision was made 
to ensure that as many sentences were visible on the computer screen at a time.  
 
The sense categories were labelled with a sentence, also an edited corpus or internet 
extraction, exemplifying each particular sense. 
2.6.4 Procedure 
Participants recruited online completed the sorting task using an online virtual card 
sorting tool called OptimalSort. Participants recruited in person completed the task 
using a set of cards, and some were also asked to describe the meaning captured by 
each group. Due to time constraints it was not possible to elicit this further data from 
all participants who completed the task in person. The procedures for these two test 
conditions are described fully in sections 2.6.4.1 and 2.6.4.2. 
2.6.4.1 Online	sorting	task	
Prior to starting the task, information about the task and how participants’ responses 
would be stored was presented on the screen. Participants were required to read this 
and confirm that they understood it, and provide their informed consent to participate 
in the research. After consent had been received, participants were shown written 
instructions about how to complete the task (see appendix 1 for a copy of these 
instructions). Briefly, participants were instructed to sort a set of sentences into one 
or more of a set of predetermined groups. They were explicitly instructed to sort 
sentences on the basis of what the target word – which was capitalised – meant. It 
was made clear that the goal of the task was to sort all of the sentences into groups in 
which the meaning of the capitalised target word was the same in each member of 
the group. The instructions disappeared when the participant moved the first 
sentence, but could be recalled at any time. 
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After being presented with the task instructions, the task was revealed on the screen. 
Stimulus sentences were presented in a column on the left side of the screen, with the 
predetermined categories positioned in a larger sorting pane to the centre and right of 
the screen, as shown in Figure 16. 
 
Figure 16 Screenshot showing online sorting task before any sentences have been sorted 
 
Participants were advised to read through all of the stimulus sentences and the 
sentences used to label the six categories, considering carefully what the target word, 
which was shown in full capitals, meant in each case. Afterwards, they should move 
each sentence into a category which used the same sense of the word. Sentences 
were moved by dragging each one and dropping it onto the category label in the 
sorting pane, as shown in Figure 17, below. Sentences could be moved into a 
different category by dragging and dropping it into a new category.  
 
Figure 17 Screenshot showing online sorting task after some sentences have been sorted 
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Sentences could be moved in and out of categories until the participant was satisfied 
with their sorting decisions. Once they were satisfied with their groups, they clicked 
a button to indicate that they had finished the tasks. The results were then stored and 
accessible in the back end of the programme. Participants were required to sort all of 
the stimuli before they could submit their responses. 
2.6.4.2 Face-to-face	sorting	task	
Printed information about the task which matched that given to participants who 
completed the task online, was given to participants prior to starting the task. Their 
informed consent was collected, and then participants were given printed 
instructions. The instructions concerning the sorting task were identical to those 
provided to participants who completed the task online; however, a subset of seven 
participants received instructions that also included an instruction to describe the 
meaning of each group at the end of the task.  
 
While participants read the instructions, six sheets of white A4 paper, at the top of 
which were printed one of each of the six category label sentences, were laid out in a 
random order in front of a participant. A set of cards, on which the stimulus 
sentences were printed, were shuffled and set in a stack face down in front of the 
participant. The participant was asked to read the instructions in full and ask any 
questions they wished. Participants were able to ask questions while completing the 
task, but no guidance as to how the cards could or should be sorted was given. 
 
Participants were instructed to place each printed card onto one of the six A4 sheets. 
They were able to move the cards in and out of different groups until they confirmed 
that they were happy with their decisions. A subset of seven participants were then 
asked to tell me what they considered to be the underlying meaning of each group. 
Their responses were typed as close to verbatim as possible.  
 
Once the participant had completed the task, their responses were recorded on an 
Excel spread sheet and later input into the OptimalSort programme so they could be 
included with data gathered online. 
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2.6.5 Statistical analysis 
The present study uses Cohen’s kappa to measure agreement between each 
participant and me. The statistic calculates how well individual participants agreed 
with the sentence categorisations I make as shown in Table 1 to 4. Cohen’s kappa is a 
well-established means of calculating pairwise agreement of nominal categorisation, 
returning values from -1.0, representing total disagreement, through 0, representing 
agreement that would be expected by chance, to 1.0, representing perfect agreement. 
Cohen’s kappa shows the magnitude of agreement, and does not return significance 
values. 
 
Cohen’s kappa is considered to be the “most widely accepted measure of inter-rater 
reliability … especially in the medical literature” (Sun, 2011, p. 146), and has 
particular use in diagnosis. A meta-analysis of the use of kappa in the classification 
of pressure ulcers in 15 studies showed that kappa values in these studies ranged 
from 0.15 to 0.97 (p. 152-3), indicating “significant heterogeneity across studies” (p. 
156). It is a versatile measure, though, and has been used in other fields including the 
study of the strength of differentiation of well-formed and not well-formed usages of 
an artificial grammar by marmosets and macaques (Wilson et al., 2013); this study 
returned values of 0.67 for the coding of degree of differentiation by macaques, and 
0.39 for the degree of differentiation by marmosets. A study of iris colour judgments 
based on photographs by Seddon et al. (1990, p. 1597) returned an agreement value 
of 0.76.  
 
What constitutes an acceptable level of agreement is the subject of disagreement – an 
irony that appears to be lost on those who posit acceptability ranges. Interpretation of 
kappa values is typically based on the scales proposed by Landis and Koch (1977, p. 
165), who propose that a kappa value of 0.41-0.6 reflects moderate agreement, 0.61-
0.8 reflects substantial agreement, and 0.81-.1.0 reflects almost perfect agreement. 
However, the authors acknowledge the arbitrary nature of these classifications. In 
computational linguistics literature Artstein and Poesio (2008) have described the 
interpretation of agreement scores as “little more than a black art” (p. 576). They 
note that agreement scores in computational linguistics research tend to follow the 
interpretation conventions adopted in content analysis, in which values of 0.8 or 
higher constitute good agreement, and in which tentative conclusions may be drawn 
  60 
from values between 0.67 and 0.8. However, they observe that other authors propose 
more stringent interpretations; Neuendorf (2002, p. 3) recommends considering 
values of 0.9 or more as acceptable all in situations, 0.8 to 0.9 as acceptable in most 
situations, and scores less than 0.8 constituting great disagreement.  
 
The importance of agreement is clearly relative; it is important that a pair of 
diagnosticians charged with assessing what investigations a patient needs based on 
initial presentation at hospital reach a very high level of agreement, thus 
necessitating that the lower bound of acceptable agreement is set high. In situations 
where poor agreement would have less serious consequences, the boundaries of what 
constitutes an acceptable level of agreement are perhaps more flexible. Artstein and 
Poesio (2008) recommend that rather than a single cut-off point is used, agreement 
values are considered for their acceptability in terms of the goal of the task. They 
describe, for example, an annotation study in which the quality of annotation was 
only useful where agreement was in excess of 0.8. 
 
It is not the goal of this project to identify the senses of over, under, above and below 
for practical application, but is instead interested in studying inter-speaker variation 
for its own sake. For that reason, identifying an acceptable level of agreement is not 
completely necessary. Of course, I am interested in establishing whether individual 
participants and I have very high agreement, or very poor agreement, and it is 
therefore useful to have a scale that captures what constitutes poor, good and 
excellent agreement is. However, the availability of agreement scores in and of 
themselves offer a scale that I can interpret; for example, comparing two pairs of 
participants’ scores, one of 0.8 and one of 0.4, I will be able to say with confidence 
that the first participant and I have more similar intuitions about the senses of the 
relevant target word than the second participant and I do. 
 
In summary, Cohen’s kappa is used for categorical data collected from two 
independent participants. It has been shown to return a broad range of values in 
research across disciplines, and a tentative interpretation of values is that a kappa of 
approximately 0.8 or greater is acceptable.  
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2.7 Results and discussion 
This section presents statistical and qualitative analyses performed on the sentence-
sorting data. It begins by presenting agreement values, showing how well 
participants and I agreed with each other. It then addresses the possibility that the 
two experimental settings used – face-to-face and online – might have affected how 
participants “performed” in the task, which might be reflected in the degree to which 
we agreed with each other. It then moves to a more qualitative analysis, and 
discusses popular placement matrices produced for each task. 
 
The kappa values returned, the averages of which are at least close to the 
“acceptable” value of 0.8 (Neuendorf 2002), as well as the popular placement 
matrices shown later in this chapter, indicate that participants sorted the sentences in 
systematic ways. This indicates these participants are sensitive to meaningful 
distinctions in the way the words over, above, under and below are used. This 
complements findings by Rice and her colleagues suggesting that participants can 
categorise examples of polysemous words based on their meaning (Cuyckens et al., 
1997; Rice et al., 1999; Sandra and Rice, 1995).  
 
In the following sections, I will discuss observations that are of most relevance to the 
aim of this chapter. I will open by presenting and interpreting kappa values showing 
how well individual participants and I agreed about how examples of these four 
words should be categorised. I will then consider in detail the ways in which 
examples of each of the four words were sorted, paying particular attention to 
convergence and divergence between my own sense distinctions and those of the 
participants. I will then discuss observations made across all four tasks about 
differences in lumping and splitting tendencies. I will close by discussing the 
contribution the study makes to our knowledge about and the debate over the role of 
linguists’ intuitions. 
2.7.1 How well do participants and I agree about how the sentences should be 
sorted? 
Participants’ responses were coded to specify which category each sentence had 
been sorted into. Individual participants’ data, each individually paired for 
comparison with my sense distinctions, were run through R using a script featuring 
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the cohen.kappa function in the psych package (Revelle 2015). The kappa values 
returned are summarised in Tables 6, 7, and 8. 
Table 6 Summary statistics of pairwise Cohen’s kappas for all participants, to 2 significant 
figures. 
 Mean SD Range Min. Max. 
Over 0.88 0.08 0.40 0.60 1.0 
Under 0.72 0.15 0.73 0.20 0.93 
Above 0.76 0.10 0.50 0.47 0.97 
Below 0.75 0.11 0.50 0.40 0.90 
	
Table 7 Summary statistics of pairwise Cohen’s kappas for non-linguist participants, to 2 
significant figures. 
 Mean SD Range Min. Max. 
Over 0.88 0.08 0.40 0.60 1.0 
Under 0.72 0.15 0.73 0.20 0.93 
Above 0.76 0.10 0.50 0.47 0.97 
Below 0.75 0.11 0.50 0.40 0.90 
	
Table 8 Summary statistics of pairwise Cohen’s kappas for linguist participants, to 2 significant 
figures. 
 Mean SD Range Min. Max. 
Over 0.87 0.04 0.07 0.83 0.90 
Under 0.69 0.21 0.40 0.53 0.93 
Above 0.72 0.17 0.34 0.53 0.87 
Below 0.78 0.09 0.20 0.67 0.87 
 
Three patterns of variation in agreement values are observed in these tables: 
variation in agreement across the four words, between the four words, and across 
participants. Each will be addressed in turn, and will focus specifically on the results 
presented in Table 6, which capture agreement values for all participants. 
 
First, there is variation across the four words. If we compare the mean values in the 
grey-shaded column for each word, we can see variation in average agreement 
values across the four tasks. While examples over tend to have been sorted in ways 
that are broadly similar to the way I would classify them, as reflected by a mean 
agreement value of 0.88, examples of under are, on the whole, sorted rather 
differently, as reflected by a mean agreement value of 0.72. 
 
Next, there is variation in agreement within words. If we consider the ‘Max.’ column 
and over row in Table 6, we observe an agreement value of 1.0, demonstrating that at 
least one participant who completed the over task reached complete agreement with 
me about how the stimuli should be sorted. In contrast, if we consider the ‘Min.’ 
column for the same word, we can see that one participant and I achieved an 
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agreement score of 0.6, indicating some disagreement about how we should 
categorise the sentences. The same pattern is seen in the rest of the table: there are 
instances of both high and low agreement values generated in all four tasks.  
 
Finally, by considering the values ‘Range’, ‘Min.’ and ‘Max.’ columns in Table 6, 
Table 7 and Table 8, we can observe variation across participants; i.e., there is variation 
in the extent to which individual participants and I agree about how the stimuli 
should be sorted. For example, if we look at the cell highlighted in red in Table 6, we 
can see that one participant and I achieved an agreement score of 0.20, 
demonstrating that we sorted the stimuli very differently. In contrast, the cell 
highlighted in green shows that a participant in the same task and I agreed with each 
other very well, achieving an agreement score of 0.93. Likewise, the ‘Range’ column 
shows how much variation there was in my agreement with all participants.  
 
The fact that perfect agreement was rare, and that average agreement was typically in 
the mid 0.7s, suggests that there are differences in the way participants and I 
categorise examples of these words, therefore indicating that participants and I differ 
in which sense we believe each sentence to exemplify. Put simply, the lack of robust 
agreement in the data suggest that the senses presented to participants, i.e., those 
which I find to be meaningful, do not always align with those of other native 
speakers of English.  
 
Let’s now move to compare how well linguist participants and I agreed with my 
agreement with non-linguists. As shown in the ‘Mean’ columns in Tables 7 (non-
linguists) and 8 (linguists), with the exception of the below task, on the whole I 
reached a higher level of agreement with non-linguists than I did with linguists. This 
is a somewhat surprising outcome; if we were to expect any group of participants to 
agree with an expert’s intuitions, it would be a group of experts, rather than a group 
of laypeople.  
2.7.1.1 Did	using	two	different	experimental	settings	affect	participants’	
performance?	
While the fundamental procedure used in both test conditions was the same, using 
two different approaches to data collection introduces the possibility that participants 
in the two conditions performed the tasks in different ways. Participants who 
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completed the task in front of me may have been inclined to take the task more 
seriously than those who completed the task online, as the face-to-face condition has 
a more performative quality. In contrast, those who completed the task online were 
not under the same pressure to “perform” in this way. Moreover, since some 
participants in the face-to-face setting were told that they would be asked to describe 
the meaning of each group, they may have considered their sorting decisions more 
carefully than those who completed the task online, as they were aware that they 
would be required to defend their categorisations. While using two different test 
settings does introduce the possibility of a confounding variable, I judged that the 
benefit of using two experimental settings outweighed the risk of a confound. 
Specifically, expanding the data collection to recruit participants online allowed me 
to recruit a very large number of participants representing a diverse demographic, 
which would not have been possible had I recruited all participants to complete the 
task in person. Using a face-to-face approach also opened up the opportunity for 
studying participants’ thought processes used when completing the task. 
Accordingly, the think aloud protocol was used to record verbalisations of the 
decision processes participants used, and to record whether they and I had similar 
intuitions about what each group meant. This data is not presented here as the 
content was highly predictable, and provided no significant additional insights into 
how well participants’ sorting decisions converged with, or diverged from my own. 
When participants and I tended to agree on how a particular set of sentences should 
be sorted, we tended to describe the meaning in similar ways. Equally, when we 
disagreed over how some sentences should be sorted, we also disagreed about the 
meaning captured by that group. 
 
To establish whether the use of two experimental setting conditions affected 
participants’ agreement scores, the Wilcoxon-Mann Whitney test was used to 
compare Cohen’s kappa scores across the two groups of participants. This test 
indicates that there are no significant differences in the extent to which participants 
in the two setting conditions agreed with me (U(296) = 2386.5, W(296) = 2596.5, Z 
= -1.062, p = 0.288). 
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2.7.1.2 The	effect	of	task	structure	
In a sorting task, one would expect some degree of disagreement due to a range of 
factors including fatigue, error, and failure to use the sorting variable instructed. 
What we see here appears to go beyond that, however: there are cases in which 
agreement, while above chance, is really rather low. In the context of this study, the 
degree of such poor agreement is rather surprising. The task is on a relatively small-
scale, and has a great degree of structure, as described in section 2.6.1. Firstly, 
participants must use pre-determined classification groups which collectively hint at 
six distinctions that I judge to be present in the examples of the target words being 
sorted. Secondly, each predetermined category reflects a sense which I judge to be 
used in six of the stimulus sentences. If a participant observed that a particularly 
clear sense distinction – the TEXT USE sense of above and below, for example – 
corresponded to six stimulus sentences, it would not be a mean feat to ponder 
whether, given that each task consists of 36 stimulus sentences and six categories, 
each category should end up with six members. This would be a feat that becomes 
much more straightforward if a participant found two sense categories to be very 
distinct and easily accommodate six stimulus sentences apiece. Despite the 
structured nature of the task, there remains some disagreement with my 
categorisation decisions. This indicates that although the structured nature of the task 
should have helped participants to produce a sorting solution compatible with mine, 
it does not appear to have done. This strongly suggests a mismatch between my 
intuitions and those of the participants. 
2.7.2 How were examples of each word sorted? 
2.7.2.1 How	data	were	analysed	
This section is based upon analysis of popular placement matrices generated by the 
OptimalSort programme. These matrices show the percentage frequency with which 
the participants as a group assigned each stimulus sentence to each category. The 
matrices are constructed using OptimalSort’s proprietary algorithm and groups 
together sentences which are sorted into the same category with highest frequency. 
An annotated example is given in Figure 18. Groups of sentences that the algorithm 
has calculated to have been sorted together and into a particular category with 
highest frequency are highlighted in blue.  The purple box shows sentences that have 
been sorted together with a high degree of agreement, with the red boxes in and 
around it highlighting the infrequency with which sentences in this category are 
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sorted into other groups. This is an example of what I shall describe as a discrete 
group. The yellow box shows sentences which have been sorted into groups with 
varying degrees of agreement across the participants. These groups show what I will 
describe as a high degree of overlap. Overlap is meant here to describe the fact that 
members of the strongest categories identified by the OptimalSort grouping 
algorithm (shaded in blue in the matrix) are judged by some participants to be 
members of other categories. This is shown in the percentage values outside of each 
blue box. 
 
Figure 18 Annotated popular placement matrix for the over task.  
 
Analysis of the popular placement matrix allows a quantitative approach by 
considering the frequency with which particular sentences were assigned to 
particular groups, as well as a qualitative approach by studying which sentences 
were allocated to each category and discussing why particular sorting decisions may 
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have been made. This analysis serves to inform and elucidate the kappa values 
presented in Table 6. Kappa values provide meaningful and useful information, and 
the following close analysis is intended to explain those values. Jointly, it is hoped 
that they will provide an informative examination of the decisions the participants 
made. The focus of this chapter and the following analysis is on a comparison of 
participants’ sorting decisions and my intuitions about how the stimuli should be 
sorted. However, given that the matrices show the way sentences were sorted by 
participants as a group, the analysis will consequently also consider sorting 
tendencies across the participant groups. 
 
Popular placement matrices are available in full in Appendix 2, and, where the 
written analysis may benefit from illustration, snapshots of relevant sections of the 
matrices are presented in the body of the text. 
2.7.2.2 Over	
As reflected in the relatively small range of agreement values shown in Table 6, the 
way in which examples of over were sorted is fairly consistent across individuals, 
manifesting as reasonably discrete groups in line with my sense distinctions.  
 
There is, however, a limited degree overlap between two of the spatial groups – 
those describing arc-like trajectories, and those describing what I judge to be arc-less 
movement from one place to another. While this tendency is limited, it merits 
discussion. This overlap suggests that while participants tend to agree with my 
intuition that there is a salient distinction between these two trajectories, some do 
not. Where participants do not share this intuition, their sorting decisions 
systematically differ from mine. Specifically, when they do not categorise a target 
sentence to the target category, with the exception of The cops pulled me over, they 
almost always assign the target sentence to the other category. In other words, when 
the sentence The plane flew over the city isn’t assigned to the target A-B MOVEMENT 
(NO ARC) category, it is typically assigned to the ARC category. This suggests that the 
ARC sense may be a special case of the sense that I have labelled A-B MOVEMENT (NO 
ARC). This is illustrated in the snapshot of the similarity matrix shown in Figure 19. 
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Figure 19 Snapshot of popular placement matrix for over showing percentage frequencies with 
A-B MOVEMENT (NO ARC) and ARC sentences were sorted into their respective target categories 
 
This overlap may be attributed to the fundamental similarity in these trajectories: 
both feature the movement of an object from one position to another, as illustrated 
below:  
 
Figure 20 Motion configuration underlying the A-B MOVEMENT (NO ARC) sense of over 
 
Figure 21 Motion configuration underlying the ARC sense of over 
 
Figure 20 illustrates the linear movement from one point, A, to a second point, B. 
Figure 21 shares this start- and finish-point, but the shape of the trajectory is an 
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elaboration of that in Figure 20, taking into consideration an obstacle – in the target 
sentences, obstacles include handlebars and a fence. The target sentence They keep 
slinging their towels over the bedroom door is one which is perhaps least exemplary 
of the six sentences; while in the other sentences an object moves location from one 
place to another, passing over an obstacle in doing so, part of the objects named in 
this sentence – the towels – move only in part: one end of the towel will remain on 
one side of the obstacle – the door – while the other will move to the opposite side. 
This is illustrated in Figure 22. It is interesting to note that the final position of the 
figure in this sentence corresponds to the paths described by the other members of 
the group. 
 
 
Figure 22  Motion configuration underlying the example They keep slinging their towels over the 
bedroom door 
 
Evidence in support of the interpretation that the ARC sense is an special case of the 
sense that I have labelled A-B MOVEMENT (NO ARC) comes from the frequency with 
which the sentences The quick brown fox jumped over the lazy dog and Herons seem 
to be incapable of stepping over the deterrent are moved into the non-target A-B 
MOVEMENT (NO ARC) category, instead of the target ARC category (13% and 14% of 
participants, respectively). These sentences contrast with the other target sentences in 
that they describe movement over much flatter obstacles than those described in the 
other four sentences. It seems that, as the relative flatness of the obstacle increases, 
the tendency to sort the sentences into a category describing linear, horizontal 
movement increases also. Further complementary evidence in support of this 
interpretation is the greater tendency for participants to allocate the sentence They 
keep slinging their towels over the bedroom door to the target ARC category rather 
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than the non-target A-B MOVEMENT (NO ARC) category. In the case of the sentences 
describing the quick brown fox and the herons, the movement described is more 
similar to that which is described by the other ARC target sentences, such as I go over 
the handlebars, than the movement described in the towels sentence is to the other 
target ARC sentences. But while the sentences Herons seem to be incapable of 
stepping over the deterrent and The quick brown fox jumped over the lazy dog have 
more in common with the other target sentences in the movement they describe, the 
sentence They keep slinging their towels over the bathroom door refers to a ground 
and steeper arc that is more similar to the other target sentences; it is this which 
presumably licenses its membership in the ARC category. It seems, therefore, that the 
ARC category is a special case of the category that I have labelled A-B MOVEMENT 
(NO ARC): where movement is over a flatter obstacle, if it isn’t assigned to the target 
category, it is assigned to the A-B MOVEMENT (NO ARC) category. Where movement 
is over a steeper obstacle, it is assigned to the ARC category. In the minds of the 
participants who adopted this sorting strategy, we might conclude that they have an 
overarching A-B MOVEMENT sense in which the arc of the movement is unspecified, 
and that the ARC sense is a sub-type of this sense. 
 
Also worthy of attention is the range in agreement over where some target sentences 
from the TRANSFER category should be sorted. The popular placements matrix, a 
snapshot of which is shown in Figure 23, shows that the first four examples (He took 
over the printing business, That's half the reason that Brian Tolbrook took over at 
Tettron, I'll take over the primary agenda, and He is handing over his presidency) 
have very high levels of agreement that they belong in this category. This indicates 
that my intuitions about the meaning captured by these particular sentences are very 
similar to those of most of the participants. The final two examples, The plaintiff 
handed over to Samuel Revill the first note, and I can't hand over a long barrelled 
weapon to that officer have lower levels of agreement, and there is evidence that 
some participants believe they are more exemplary of the FLIP category.  
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Figure 23 Snapshot of popular placement matrix for over showing categorisation of TRANSFER 
target sentences into the FLIP category 
 
There is a division between the first four and last two examples in the objects that 
they describe as being transferred: while the first four examples describe the transfer 
of an abstract entity (a presidency, for example), the latter two describe the transfer 
of a physical object. While most participants agree that all six examples belong in 
the same group, and in a group that describes the transfer of an object that is 
underspecified in its concreteness, a small minority divide the group and allocate 
examples describing the transfer of a physical item to the FLIP category. Fifteen 
participants sorted at least one of these items into the FLIP category; twelve being 
American. This demographic information might explain this unexpected sorting 
pattern. A random sample of 100 examples from the British National Corpus (BNC) 
and Corpus of Contemporary American (COCA) reveals a marked distinction in the 
way a synonym of flip, namely turn over, is used. The BNC sample featured 11 
examples of turn over used to describe a transfer, such as The faster US troops 
can turn over responsibility for keeping the peace to Panamanian forces, officials 
said, the better, versus 55 describing a flipping manoeuvre, as in Now turn over the 
cards so that their backs are showing, in addition to 33 examples of the phrase being 
used in other senses, for example if you just would be so kind turn over to number 
three so I can have a look at some adverts. In contrast, the COCA sample featured 
58 examples used to describe transfer, as in He was sent there to turn over the keys 
to the family car, versus 20 to describe a flip, for example As you cook, turn over the 
slices a few times, and a further 21 used in other senses, such as The neighbor down 
the street finally got his car to turn over.  In summary, while turn over is more 
frequently used to describe a flipping manoeuvre in British English, it is used more 
often to describe a transfer of a physical or abstract entity in American English. This 
finding suggests that in these particular cases, where participants and I do disagree 
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about how the sentences should be sorted, this may be the result of differences in the 
varieties of English participants and I speak. 
 
In summary, there is some overlap across two of the spatial sense categories, 
reflecting disagreement – between individual participants and I, and between 
participants themselves – about which stimulus sentences constitute examples of 
each sense. There is interesting variation in the sorting of some non-spatial sentences 
that seems to be related to the variety of English the participant speaks. On the 
whole, there are discrete groups suggesting that the semantic boundaries represented 
by the preset sense categories are clear and distinct to other speakers. The matrix 
complements the generally high kappa values observed in Table 6. Collectively these 
analyses encourage the interpretation that participants’ and my intuitions about the 
senses of over captured by these sentences are well aligned. 
2.7.2.3 Under		
The popular placements matrix on the following page shows that there is a large 
degree of overlap, with sentences being allocated to target- and non-target categories 
by large numbers of participants. These values show that while a number of 
relatively strong groups do exist, there are some sentences that a good proportion of 
participants think belong in another group. Take, for example, the sentence He felt 
warm under the blanket. This was sorted with highest frequency into the VERTICAL 
RELATIONSHIP, WITH CONTACT group, but 32% of participants assigned it to the 
HORIZONTAL RELATIONSHIP category, and 13% to the VERTICAL RELATIONSHIP, 
WITHOUT CONTACT category. This suggests that there is a large degree of uncertainty 
over which category some stimuli should be sorted into. This outcome corresponds 
to the generally rather poor agreement values shown in Table 6, and the wide range 
of agreement values. This outcome suggests that participants not only disagree with 
me on where some sentences should be sorted, and therefore what sense of under 
they use, but they also disagree with each other. 
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Figure 24 Popular placement matrix for under.  
 
The popular placement matrix reveals a large amount of overlap between the groups 
describing spatial configurations. In particular, as shown in the box marked 1, target 
sentences for the VERTICAL RELATIONSHIP, NO CONTACT (hereafter NO CONTACT) 
category are frequently sorted into the VERTICAL RELATIONSHIP, WITH CONTACT 
(hereafter, CONTACT) category. Some participants sort target sentences from the 
CONTACT category into the NO CONTACT category, but this is less frequent. This 
suggests that there is disagreement between me and individual participants, and 
between the participants as a whole, over whether the distinction between vertical 
relationships with and without contact is a meaningful one.  
 
Perhaps more interestingly, the higher frequency with which NO CONTACT target 
sentences are sorted into the CONTACT category suggests that vertical relationships 
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with contact between a figure and ground may be more basic than those without 
contact. This further suggests that a sense of under describing a vertical relationship 
without contact is simply an elaboration of one with contact – and one that speakers 
do not always find necessary to disambiguate (cf. Ide and Wilks 2007, p. 66, who 
discuss the necessity of fine-grained senses in human word sense disambiguation). 
We can compare this conclusion with Evans and Tyler's (2005) diagram of what they 
propose to be the protoscene underlying the basic spatial meaning of under, 
replicated here in Figure 25: 
 
 
Figure 25 Protoscene for under (Evans and Tyler, 2005, p. 37) 
 
Based on their proposal, it is reasonable to predict that the basic spatial sense of 
under is characterised by a vertical configuration in which figure and ground are not 
in contact. These findings challenge that prediction.  
 
There is evidence of further uncertainty around which category the example They got 
under cover of the walls of the fortresses fits into. A small number of participants 
(13%) allocated it to the target category HORIZONTAL RELATIONSHIP, but most (43%) 
allocated it to a non-spatial category, specifically SUBJECT TO. It seems that while 
this example describes a spatial configuration equivalent to those described in the 
other sentences in the target category, namely, a horizontal covering relationship, the 
functional consequences of this particular scene – protection by virtue of being 
covered – appear to be judged to be of more importance, manifesting as being sorted 
most often with examples of figures being subject to the force of something else. In 
this case, the wall exerts a protecting force. However, the fact that there is a 
reasonably large group of participants (38%) who sorted the sentence into other non-
target, but nonetheless spatial categories indicates that spatial nature of the sentence 
is a salient feature. This indicates that disagreement between participants as a group, 
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and between individual participants and I might be explained on the basis that we 
attend to different features of the configuration when judging what under means in 
this particular sentence. 
 
The matrix as shown in Figure 24 shows that my and participants’ intuitions diverge 
over where sentences should be sorted, regardless of whether the stimuli describes a 
spatial configuration or uses a non-spatial sense. Uses of under to describe non-
spatial relationships are also subject to disagreement, with almost every non-spatial 
sentence being sorted into a non-target category by at least one participant. 
 
To summarise, we have observed divergence in the way participants and I think that 
examples of under should be sorted. This suggests that there is divergence in 
participants’ and my intuitions about what under means in each sentence. This 
disagreement is not limited to particular meaning domains: there is disagreement 
amongst both spatial and non-spatial sense categories. This observation is consistent 
with the generally low kappa values presented in Table 6. There is, however, 
evidence of some agreement with my senses. This is evident in the popular 
placements matrix, which shows that almost all of the sentences tended to be sorted 
into the target categories by at least half of the participants. There are, though, some 
exceptions, in which sentences are allocated to a non-target category more often than 
they are to the target category. For example, They deny they were under any duty to 
offer advice is allocated to the target category by only 37% of participants. 
 
It is unclear what is behind the lack of consensus over where stimuli should be 
sorted. It may be explained on the basis that participants did not find the preset 
groups available to be particularly good matches for all of the stimuli, suggesting 
incompatibility between my intuitions about the senses used in these examples and 
those of other speakers. The possibility that the stimuli were not judged to match 
particularly well with a particular group further indicates that some examples are 
non-exemplary exemplars of particular categories. Returning to the sentence They 
deny they were under any duty to offer advice, it is not the case that participants 
simply allocated this stimulus to a particular non-target category. Instead, it is 
allocated to one non-target category (ACCORDING TO) by 40% of the participants, and 
to another non-target category (UNDER THE AUTHORITY/AUTHORITY OF) by 24% of 
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participants. The lack of decisiveness amongst this group of participants suggests 
that no one of these preset groups is a particularly good match. It may be the case 
that my intuitions about what sense this example represents simply doesn’t match 
that of other speakers, who collectively share the same intuition about what sense it 
exemplifies.  
2.7.2.4 Above	
High values in the popular placement matrix show that there are pockets of good 
agreement with my sense distinctions across the participants. In particular, the TEXT 
USES of above constitute a very discrete group in near total agreement with my 
intuitions, with allocation of non-target sentences into the category, and allocation of 
target sentences to other categories, being an exceptionally rare occurrence. This is 
shown in the snapshot of the popular placement matrix in Figure 26. The same is 
true of the HIERARCHY target sentences. 
 
Figure 26 Snapshot of TEXT USE target sentences that have been sorted with a high degree of 
agreement into the target category. 
 
While the TEXT USE group is very discrete, the picture is somewhat murkier 
elsewhere. The matrix shows that participants disagree with me and with each other 
about where certain sentences should be sorted.  This is shown in the percentage 
values displayed outside of the blue-shaded boxes. Recall that these shaded boxes 
are the groups which have the highest level of agreement as calculated by the 
OptimalSort grouping algorithm. So while the algorithm has been able to produce 
discrete groups, some participants sorted members of those groups into other groups.  
 
Participants and I disagree most when deciding which spatial examples share the 
same meaning of above. It is not the case that participants tend to use only one 
category to encompass all spatial uses, as is evidenced by above-chance values in 
both of the spatial categories in the popular placement matrix, as shown in Figure 27. 
This shows disagreement between me and participants, and amongst participants, 
over how distinctly spatial examples should be categorised. 
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Figure 27 Snapshot of popular placement matrix for above, with spatial examples in red boxes 
 
Instead, some participants and I simply differ in our judgments of what sense of 
above each sentence captures. In particular, there is disagreement about how 
sentences which I judge to be examples of the VANTAGE category should be sorted, 
with many participants sorting them into the more generic VERTICAL RELATIONSHIP 
category.  While these sorting “errors” are bidirectional, in that target sentences from 
each are sorted into the other category, there is a greater tendency for target 
sentences from the VANTAGE category to be sorted into the VERTICAL RELATIONSHIP 
category than vice versa. This outcome hints at the possibility that while I find the 
distinction meaningful, not all participants do. Specifically, some seem content that 
the sentences in the VANTAGE category are not meaningfully distinct from those in 
the generic VERTICAL RELATIONSHIP category. However, since true lumping, i.e. 
assigning all spatial examples to one group, is so uncommon (it is done by just six 
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participants), this disagreement cannot simply be chalked up to my predilection for 
splitting. 
 
Just as we can observe a bidirectional overlap in the two major spatial categories, 
there is an overlap in the membership of the non-spatial categories, as shown in the 
snapshot of the popular placements matrix in Figure 28. 
 
Figure 28 Snapshot highlights tendency for sentences describing quantitative scales 
 
Specifically, this section of the matrix indicates an overlap between examples of 
above to describe qualitative and quantitative scales. Many participants sorted target 
sentences from the MORE THAN (i.e., quantitatively more than) category into the 
BETTER THAN (i.e., qualitatively more than) category; the reverse was also true but to 
a more limited extent. This seems surprising, since if there was to be an overlap 
between these two groups, I had expected it to operate in the opposite direction. That 
is, if participants allocated target sentences to the other category, I would have 
expected examples of above that described qualitative scales to be sorted into the 
category describing quantitative scales, on the basis that it seems more intuitive that 
qualitative scales are a metaphorical extension of quantitative scales. This finding 
indicates that some participants and I not only disagree about the meaning of above 
underlying certain senses, but that we also diverge in the way we judge the sentences 
to be related. Whereas my intuition is that qualitative uses of above are an extension 
of a quantitative sense, the sorting decisions observed here suggest that some 
participants consider a qualitative sense to be sufficiently generic to also encompass 
sentences describing quantitative scales, and not vice versa.  
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There is further overlap between the BETTER THAN and HIERARCHY categories, as 
shown in the final three rows in the popular placements matrix in Figure 29. While a 
large minority of participants allocate these final three stimuli to the target BETTER 
THAN category, most allocate them to the HIERARCHY group. While my classification 
of these stimuli is different, these participants’ decisions are nonetheless cogent and 
understandable. There is an obvious relationship between superiority in a hierarchy 
and an individual’s sense of personal superiority. For example, the manager of a 
bank would perhaps be justified in thinking that he is “above work like this”, if that 
work was filing papers. I classify all of the BETTER THAN target sentences together, 
but more than half of the participants separated them and allocated some to a related 
but distinct category. This clearly suggests a difference between the sense boundaries 
that I find meaningful and the distinctions made by other native English speakers.  
 
Figure 29 Snapshot of popular placement matrix for above, showing overlap between BETTER 
THAN and HIERARCHY categories 
 
In summary, there are pockets of agreement alongside pockets of murkier, less 
consistent sorting. That reduction in consistency is not limited to consistency with 
my sense distinctions, but also reflects poor agreement amongst the participants 
themselves. The fair kappa values are consistent with this finding.  
2.7.2.5 Below	
There is widespread overlap in the composition of groups created by participants in 
this task. This is particularly the case amongst spatial sentences, but there is a lack of 
clear, discrete grouping amongst non-spatial sentences too. Disagreement over how 
spatial examples of below should be sorted manifests in target sentences being sorted 
into non-target categories. Figure 30 illustrates the way distinctly spatial examples 
were sorted, with the green box indicating where these sentences were frequently 
sorted. The matrix shows that there is considerable disagreement over where 
distinctly spatial examples of below should be sorted. Further, it shows that while 
there are some distinct groups, the level of agreement that each sentence belongs in 
each group is variant. 
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Figure 30 Snapshot of popular placement matrix for below 
 
While there are three reasonably distinct groups of spatial sentences evident in the 
popular placements matrix, there is a considerable degree of overlap across them. 
This is especially the case with the sentences that are judged by participants to fit 
best into the UNDERNEATH (3D) category. With the exception of the final example in 
the group, Below the crags a well-built tunnel could be seen (which I judge to be an 
example of the LOWER THAN (2D) category), the sentences are sorted into the group 
at least more often than would be expected by chance and, in general, with a good 
degree of consistency. In the case of this sentence, this data suggests that it is a poor 
example of any of the three spatial categories given, and that participants may think 
it should be classified into a different category not provided here. However, across 
the members of the UNDERNEATH (3D) group, some participants sort the target 
sentences of this category into another group, and specifically into one of the other 
two overtly spatial groups.  Amongst the other two groups that emerge in the popular 
placements matrix (VANTAGE and LOWER THAN (2D)) there is further disagreement 
over where constituent sentences should be sorted, but to a lesser degree. This 
outcome indicates a considerable divergence between my categorisation decisions 
and those of the participants and, in addition, amongst the participants as a group. 
My intuitions about the meaning captured by each sentence, and whether it is 
equivalent to the meanings underlying the other uses, fail to correspond with all of 
the participants’ intuitions. However, this non-alignment of our intuitions is a matter 
of degree: there are some instances, for example, The walk provides wonderful views 
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of Mallerstand below, about which participants and I overwhelmingly agree about its 
meaning. 
 
As we saw in the analysis of the popular placements matrix created for above, there 
is an overlap across the LESS THAN (i.e., quantitatively less than) and WORSE THAN 
(i.e., qualitatively less than) categories, as shown in Figure 31. 
 
Figure 31 Snapshot of popular placement matrix for below showing overlap across LESS THAN 
and WORSE THAN categories 
 
In this case, though, when participants allocated target sentences from one of these 
categories into the other, they tended to do this with sentences that were intended to 
belong to the qualitatively less than category. In other words, if participants did not 
assign it to the target category, they were more likely to sort sentences describing a 
position on a qualitative scale into a group capturing positions on quantitative scales 
than vice versa. This is the opposite of what happened in the above sorting task. It 
seems, then, that the direction of the relationship between qualitative and 
quantitative scales varies across the two words. This finding indicates that while 
some participants and I disagree on the meaning captured by these twelve sentences, 
we do seem to agree on how quantitative and qualitative senses of below are related. 
Although some participants and I disagree about how exactly these stimuli should be 
sorted, we do agree that quantitative uses are more basic than qualitative uses, as 
evidenced by the use of the quantitative category to encompass both sense types. 
 
Finally, moving onto the TEXT USE examples of below, the matrix reveals that these 
examples are organised into a fairly discrete group, but there is some overlap with 
other groups and their constituent sentences. This is illustrated in the final six rows 
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of the popular placements matrix, which show that target sentences from this 
category were sorted into other categories by a small number of participants, and in 
the final column, which shows that non-target sentences were sorted into this group. 
It is noteworthy that there is a tendency for target sentences, when allocated to non-
target categories, to be allocated to groups describing spatial configurations. 
Similarly, there is a greater tendency for non-target spatial uses of below to be sorted 
into the group than non-spatial uses3. This indicates that some participants judge 
these uses to have a spatial, rather than non-spatial (e.g., temporal) meaning. 
However, on the whole there was a great degree of consensus about how these 
particular examples should be sorted, in line with my own intuitions. This discrete 
grouping indicates that my intuitions about the meaning of below in these sentences 
maps very closely onto those of the participants.  
 
In summary, we have again observed rather a lot of disagreement in how examples 
of below describing both spatial and non-spatial domains are sorted. That said, the 
groups that do emerge, however tentatively, do seem to align with my intuitions 
about the senses of below. There are exceptions, though. For example, two stimuli, 
We dredged below the mud at the bottom of the river and Below the front windows 
the extension was divided into two sections, were classified more frequently into a 
non-target group than the target group. This provides a clear indication that some 
participants and I have different intuitions about what constitute examples of 
particular senses of below. An open sort task will reveal whether this is the result of 
individual differences in word senses. 
2.8 General discussion 
In this section I provide a summary of the principal findings of this study. I then 
address the implications of the findings for our knowledge about word senses, and in 
particular the practical implications for the role of expert intuitions in the study of 
polysemy. I then identify some areas of uncertainty that have been raised in this 
chapter, and close with some concluding remarks. 
                                                
3 The example It will be argued below that economic reconstruction was a success was sorted into the 
LESS THAN category by 8% of participants. I speculate that this is due not to participants believing that 
below in this example is used to describe a position on a quantitative scale. Instead, I argue that it is 
because participants have focused more on the presence of “economic success”, which invokes 
notions of finance and consequently quantitative scales, and less on the meaning of below. 
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2.8.1 Summary 
I aimed to conduct an empirical investigation of how well naïve speakers’ and other 
linguists’ intuitions about word senses correspond to my own. I acted on the 
assumption that polysemous words (or their senses) are linguistic categories. 
Accordingly, I assumed that polysemous words (or their senses) would behave like 
categories; i.e., it would be possible to sort examples of polysemous words into 
categories according to some categorisation criterion. In this case, the criterion used 
was the meaning of the polysemous word. I therefore used a categorisation task, 
operationalized as a sentence-sorting task, to assess whether the way I categorise 
examples of the polysemous words over, under, above and below was systematically 
different from or similar to the way these examples are categorised by other English 
speakers. If participants and I categorise the sentences in a similar way, we might 
conclude that in this case, expert intuitions about the senses of polysemous words do 
correspond to those held by other speakers. If it is not the case, it will cast doubt on 
the representativity of expert intuitions about word senses. 
 
A set of four closed sentence-sorting experiments, each completed by native English 
speakers, was used to answer this question. The magnitude of agreement between me 
and each participant was calculated statistically using Cohen’s kappa. This 
quantitative analysis reveals that agreement between me and each participant varies 
across participants. For example, the data suggest that within participants who sorted 
examples of over, some participants and I reached identical conclusions about how 
the stimuli should be categorised. In contrast, some participants and I reached much 
weaker consensus. Further variation was observed across the four words. Of the four 
words studied, participants in the over task reached the strongest degree of 
agreement with me, whereas participants who sorted examples of under reached 
weakest agreement with me. Further still, variation in agreement with how particular 
sentences should be categorised was observed. For example, as noted in section 
2.7.2.5, analysis of the popular placement matrices showed that there were pockets 
of good agreement, resulting in clearly delineated categories. However, these were 
interspersed with pockets of poor agreement, reflecting disagreement not only with 
how I classify the sentences, but with how other participants classify them. 
Differences in the way participants and I categorise examples of these words indicate 
that we differ in what sense we judge each sentence to exemplify. A qualitative 
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analysis complemented this quantitative analysis, and identified particular example 
sentences that participants and I sorted in markedly similar or different ways.  
 
One of the most interesting outcomes of this study is that agreement with my sense 
distinctions was not a binary affair; instead, agreement was really quite variant. This 
is interesting because it suggests that some participants, with whom I had high 
agreement levels, may agree with me about what the senses of these words are, 
whereas others, with whom I had low agreement level, may have different senses to 
mine. Within those two extremes, agreement values varied. The fact that some 
participants and I may share senses, whereas some may have different senses to me, 
is an early indication of individual differences in word senses. 
2.8.2 The role of linguists’ intuitions in the study of polysemy 
Despite the highly structured nature of these tasks, we observe a range of agreement 
values across individuals. These findings suggest that the representativity of the 
senses I find meaningful in the selection of examples of each target word in the 
minds of other speakers is a matter of degree; it is neither the case that participants 
and I completely agree about what senses the example sentences represent, nor is it 
the case that my intuitions about the boundaries of the senses of these words do not 
map onto those held by other speakers at all. This finding – quantified through 
statistical analysis – adds an extra detail to the literature on the compatibility of 
expert and naïve speakers’ intuitions about linguistic phenomena. Specifically, it 
complements research in syntax which has also found conflict between expert and 
naïve intuitions. The qualitative analyses provide additional information about where 
my intuitions converge and diverge with those of a large sample of native speakers 
of English. 
 
It is interesting that of the four words, over is the one in which participants and I 
reached highest levels of agreement. This is despite the fact that over is one of the 
most closely-studied words in the cognitive linguistic literature. While my study of 
the four words is likely to be fairly evenly distributed, it is reasonable to expect that 
my exposure to theoretical studies of over and the sense distinctions posited in 
publications may have skewed and distorted my “true” sense distinctions. Under, 
above and below have received far less attention (Evans and Tyler, 2005 present a 
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limited exploration of these prepositions and over, but I am aware of no other 
published study of the polysemy of these three words). I would anticipate that this 
may make the sense distinctions at which I arrive truer, and less influenced by those 
proposed in the cognitive linguistic canon. In the context of the debate over the 
impact of close study of particular linguistic phenomena on a linguists’ intuitions (cf. 
Snyder 2000; Spencer 1973), I would predict that the distinctions I find meaningful 
in the examples of under, above and below would be most consistent with those of 
the participants. Instead, the opposite appears to be true. This outcome complicates 
the claim I have just mentioned, and serves to support the interpretation that focused 
attention on a polysemous word, instead of resulting in an unrealistic conception of 
its senses, actually coincides with intuitions which correspond to those of other 
native speakers. Over is quite unusual in the extent to which it has been studied in 
cognitive linguistics. In the absence of such intense focus on the polysemy of other 
words, it is difficult to test whether this is an outcome unique to over. It is therefore 
not possible to reach a firm conclusion about this, but it remains an interesting 
possibility, and one which encourages further close studies of other polysemous 
words.  
2.8.3 Lumping and splitting 
One of the key objections made in literature critical of cognitive linguistic accounts 
of polysemy is the finely-grained sense distinctions certain linguists propose (e.g., 
Tyler and Evans 2001, p. 761; Sandra and Rice 1995). This study indirectly tests 
whether this criticism is warranted. The data show that, on the one hand, a small 
minority of participants sorted the stimulus sentences into groups in a way that was 
very similar to my classification decisions. On the other, there was a large proportion 
of participants who sorted the cards rather differently to me. Inspection of the 
decisions participants at the high and low ends of the agreement scales made about 
whether examples should be “lumped” or “split” reveals predictable results at the 
high end: all participants with agreement scores of 0.9 or higher used all six preset 
groups. At the other end of the scale, looking at participants with whom I reached an 
agreement level of up to 0.6, the outcome was less predictable. Rather than being 
able to explain the weak agreement scores on these participants’ decisions to use a 
smaller number of groups, and therefore adopt a lumping approach that literature on 
the danger of linguists’ sense distinctions implies that naïve participants might take, 
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most participants at this end of the scale used all six groups, too. Of the nineteen 
participants with whom I had an agreement score below 0.6, only seven used fewer 
than six of the preset groups.  
 
On the whole, participants used an average of just under six groups to sort the 
sentences in each task. This suggests that the number of distinctions I presented in 
the task, and the number that I find to be meaningful within the stimuli, corresponds 
well to the number of distinctions that participants find meaningful. In the face of 
this consistency, we must seek an alternative explanation of the scarcity of very high 
agreement values. A possible explanation for this is that while participants 
recognised that there were six meaningful distinctions within the stimuli, some of the 
stimuli they believed to exemplify those distinctions were different to those which I 
believe to be exemplary. The close analysis given in section 2.7.2 confirms this.  
2.8.4 Linguists’ agreement with my intuitions 
Table 8, which shows kappa values of agreement between me and participants 
classified as linguists, contrasted with Table 7, containing agreement values between 
me and all non-linguist participants, reveals some interesting outcomes. It is not the 
case that linguists and I consistently reach higher levels of agreement. In fact, the 
opposite is true. In three of the four target words, non-linguists and I typically agree 
more than linguists and I do; below being the exception. Further, non-linguist 
participants have higher maximum kappa values in three of the four words, and in 
the case of under, the highest kappa value is the same as the highest kappa value 
scored by a linguist participant. However, the minimum kappa value between me and 
non-linguists is always lower than between me and linguists. On the whole, the data 
point to an unexpected conclusion that non-linguists and I tend to agree more about 
how the sentences should be categorised than linguists and I do. It should be noted, 
however, that the small number of linguists sampled makes this a tentative 
conclusion, but it is an interesting finding that warrants further study. 
 
These findings add further detail to the debate over the utility of linguists’ intuitions 
in the analysis of a particular linguistic phenomenon. In this case, the data offer an 
early suggestion that a group of participants with advanced knowledge of linguistics 
do not share a set of senses of over, under, above and below. This adds weight to the 
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argument against reliance on introspection as a methodology. If one linguist’s 
intuitions do not correspond to those of another linguist’s – and, as shown here, with 
multiple other linguists – what confidence can we have in the notion that intuition-
led analyses capture the reality of the particular phenomenon in the language and/or 
minds of other people? 
2.9 Questions raised 
It is clear that participants and I did not consistently and reliably agree with each 
other about whether a particular example of over, under, above and below constitutes 
an example of a particular sense. This suggests that my intuitions about the senses of 
these words may not neatly correspond to those of other speakers. However, this 
study cannot reveal whether the participants in my study share a set of senses of 
these words, and it is simply the case that those senses are different to mine, or 
whether individuals have different senses of these words. However, the fact that 
agreement values were so variant suggests that there may be individual differences in 
word senses. A variation on the task used in this study, in which participants are not 
given predetermined categories but are free to create their own, can shed light on this 
possibility. The next chapter describes a study that explicitly aims to understand 
whether the outcome found here is due to a mismatch between my senses and a set 
common to other speakers, or due to individual differences in word senses. 
2.10 Conclusions 
Analysis of the sorting decisions made by participants using both quantitative and 
qualitative approaches has revealed that there are tendencies to both agree with the 
sense distinctions I find meaningful within task stimuli, and disagree with them. 
Across the four words studied, there were cases in which participants sorted stimuli 
in very similar ways to me and to each other; this was particularly the case in the 
over task. But equally, there were cases in which participants disagreed with me, and 
with each other, over where some stimuli should be sorted. In the most extreme 
cases, participants agreed with each other more than they did with me, with the 
majority choosing to assign a sentence to a non-target category. The data presented 
here, analysed quantitatively and qualitatively, indicate that my intuitions about what 
the senses of four polysemous words are do not consistently and reliably correspond 
to those held by other native speakers of English, regardless of whether or not they 
too are linguistics experts. The aim of this chapter, to study the correspondence 
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between my intuitions and those held by others, has therefore been met, and the 
finding made here is an original contribution to knowledge. 
 
Some linguists (e.g., Tyler and Evans 2001, p. 761; Sandra and Rice 1995) have 
levelled criticism at highly fine-grained approaches to analysing the senses of a 
given polysemous word, therefore implicitly questioning whether finely-grained 
analyses are psychologically realistic. I judge that my intuitions about how the 
stimuli used in these tasks should be divided betray a tendency towards a fine-
grained analysis. In the face of criticism about finely-grained analyses, it is therefore 
interesting to note that participants used an average of just fewer than six groups to 
categorise the stimuli. Given that I divided the stimuli into six groups, it appears that 
participants and I, on the whole, have remarkably similar intuitions about what level 
of sense distinction within the stimuli is meaningful. This finding, in contrast with 
the variation in how well individual participants and I agreed about how the stimuli 
should be categorised, suggests that future critiques of intuition-led analyses of 
polysemous words should not be overly concerned with whether or not finely-
grained approaches are cognitively realistic – they appear to be – but about how well 
another speaker would agree that a given sentence is an example of a particular 
sense.  
 
At this point it can be concluded that participants and I differ in what constitutes 
examples of six senses of over, under, above and below. It is not possible to 
determine whether the senses held by participants are homogenous, and it is simply 
the case that I differ with them, or whether individuals have different senses of these 
words. However, given that participants (dis)agreed with me about how the 
sentences should be sorted to different degrees, it seems possible that this is due to 
the fact that some participants and I agree more about what the senses of these words 
are than others. This indicates individual differences in word senses, but needs 
further and more direct study. 
 
Uncovering variation in language is the source of interesting facts (Schütze 1996, p. 
9). The results of this sorting experiment support this idea, and has not only 
indicated that my senses of over, under, above and below do not always coincide 
with those of other speakers, but also hinted that there may be individual differences 
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in word senses more generally. The following chapter, which describes open 
sentence-sorting tasks, directly addresses this possibility. 
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Chapter 3 Experiment 2: An open sentence-
sorting task to test for individual differences 
in word senses 			
Data collected in the closed-sort tasks reported in Chapter 2 indicate that participants 
did not consistently agree with the sense distinctions I found to be meaningful in the 
uses of over, under, above and below used in those tasks. Moreover, disagreement 
with my sense distinctions, as manifested in the differences in the way participants 
and I sorted the stimuli, varied across participants, and across the four words tested. 
This first finding can be interpreted in two ways. First, it could be that my 
participants share a set of senses of the four words tested, and these senses are 
different to mine. Under this interpretation, variation might be explained on the basis 
that some participants were able to exploit the structured nature of the task to infer 
how the sentences “should” be sorted, rather than sorting them according to their 
own intuitions about similarities and differences in the meanings of the target words. 
The second explanation is that participants have different senses of these four words. 
The notion that there may be individual differences in word senses should not be 
particularly controversial, since it has been demonstrated that there are individual 
differences in other areas of language. However, studies of polysemy, and indeed 
dictionaries, implicitly assume no variation in word senses across individuals. This 
chapter explores the possibility that there are individual differences in word senses, 
and consists of two parts. The first part consists of a review of relevant literature that 
has addressed individual differences in language in general, and which has started to 
address, albeit indirectly, individual differences in word senses in particular. The 
second part reports an open sentence-sorting task that aims to study whether there 
are individual differences in word senses. As noted in Chapter 2, this thesis assumes 
that polysemous words are linguistic categories, and that they should therefore 
behave like categories. In other words, it should be possible to organise examples of 
polysemous words into groups according to some categorisation criterion. In this 
case, the criterion of interest is the meaning of the polysemous word. The chapter 
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closes by discussing the implications of the findings made, and identifying areas for 
further investigation.  
Part 1: Literature review 
3.1 Individual differences 
The proposition that not all members of a linguistic community acquire the same 
grammar is one that runs counter to mainstream, generative assumptions (both 
implicit and explicit) about linguistic competence. For example, the principles and 
parameters account assumes that humans are genetically endowed with principles 
(i.e., highly abstract universal rules), and that parameters are “switches” specifying 
the range of permissible variation within the principles. It is argued, for example, 
that X’ phrase structure, which states that an X-phrase (e.g., NP) will always contain 
an X (e.g., N) as its head. This is a principle that is argued to be genetically 
endowed. The position of the head in the phrase, however, is a parameter that varies 
across languages. For example, English is a head-initial language, whereas Japanese 
is a head-final language. It is claimed that exposure to the target language sets these 
parameters. Accordingly, it is assumed that all speakers in a given language 
community will ultimately acquire the same grammar. 
 
It has been demonstrated, however, that speakers within the same language 
community do not appear to acquire the same grammar, and that there is evidence of 
significant individual differences in language acquisition. Differences across 
individual children are not limited to particular areas of linguistic competence; they 
have been recorded in early phonology (Leonard 1980), joint-attention skills (Mundy 
and Gomes, 1998), lexical processing (Fernald and Marchman, 2012), the paths 
followed to reach multi-word speech (Pine and Lieven, 1993; Shore, 1995), 
vocabulary (Bates et al. 1995), syntax (Vasilyeva, Waterfall, and Huttenlocher, 
2008), and semantics (Rice 2003). 
 
Research in this area has also considered individual differences in language 
attainment amongst adults. In her review of a number of investigations of differences 
in linguistic attainment between high academically achieving and low academically 
achieving populations, Dąbrowska (2012) notes that while the more educated 
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participants typically performed at ceiling level – meaning that their responses are 
typically homogenous – participants who had completed less education showed 
much more variation in their responses to a range of linguistic stimuli. More 
recently, Divjak, Dąbrowska, and Arppe (2016) have argued that there is evidence 
that a single model of grammar cannot account for all attested usage of English, but 
that instead a very large number of grammars are compatible with actual use. 
 
Beyond individual differences in language acquisition and grammatical attainment, it 
has also been demonstrated that there are individual differences in the interpretation 
of ambiguous temporal metaphors. Duffy, Feist, and McCarthy (2014), for example, 
have observed differences in interpretation of McGlone and Harding's (1998) 
ambiguous statement The meeting originally scheduled for next Wednesday has been 
moved forward two days, noting that individuals with different personality types 
interpret the statement differently.  
3.2 Individual differences in polysemy and word senses 
While individual differences in language acquisition, adult attainment and beyond 
have firmly been firmly established in cognitive linguistic literature, scholars in the 
field have not, to my knowledge, studied the possibility that there may be individual 
differences in polysemy and word senses. This is despite the fact that one model of 
categorisation that has been used to account for polysemy, the exemplar model, 
implicitly predicts individual differences in categorisation decisions and categories. 
It has, however, been observed, albeit indirectly, in computational linguistics 
research. Specifically, scholars in word sense disambiguation research have found 
that agreement with “gold standards”, i.e., with expert judgments about which sense 
tag should be applied to each individual example of a polysemous word, varies 
across individuals.  
 
When asked to assign examples of a particular word into a predetermined category 
based on the meaning of that word, individual annotators agree with the gold 
standard to varying extents. An example of exceptionally high inter-annotator 
agreement is given in Snow et al.'s (2008) study, in which individuals recruited 
through Amazon Mechanical Turk were asked to classify examples of the word 
president. Annotators reached 100% consensus with the gold standard, though it 
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must be stated that this noun was to be classified into one of only three possible 
sense categories. An example at the opposite end of the scale comes from 
Passonneau, Baker, Fellbaum, and Ide's (2012) WSD study, which, when asked to 
use preset tags to annotate examples of normal, annotators agreed with each other 
worse than would be expected by chance. Within these two extremes. studies have 
demonstrated that more intermediate agreement is visible amongst annotators. For 
example, Bhardwaj, Passonneau, Salleb-Aouissi, and Ide (2010) found that 
agreement amongst six annotators ranged from "about 0.5 to 0.7 for nouns and 
adjectives, and about 0.37 to 0.46 for verbs" (p. 4), and Passonneau, Salleb-Aoussi, 
Bhardwaj, and Ide (2010) found that six annotators' decisions gave agreement scores 
ranging from 0.37 to 0.68. The fact that in these and similar tasks the annotators each 
undertake identical tasks indicates that there are differences in the extent to which 
individuals agree with each other in how the preset sense categories are used, and 
therefore they vary in how well they agree with the gold standard, i.e., with expert 
sense distinctions. Further, the extent of their agreement varies according to the word 
they are examining (Bhardwaj et al., 2010; Passonneau, Bhardwaj, Salleb-Aouissi, 
and Ide, 2012; Passonneau, Salleb-Aouissi, and Ide, 2009). In an effort to understand 
why the same individuals agree with the sense distinctions of some words better than 
they do others, it is suggested that a number of factors may be at play. Passonneau et 
al. (2009, p. 3) set out three factors, in addition to individual differences amongst 
annotators, which they judge to have some impact on agreement values, all of which 
seem reasonable and intuitive: 
 
"1. Greater specificity in the contexts of use leads to higher agreement 
2. More concrete senses give rise to higher agreement 
3. A sense inventory with closely-related senses (e.g., relatively lower 
average inter-sense similarity scores) gives rise to lower agreement.” 
 
In later work, the authors further explore the effect individual words have on inter-
annotator agreement, and suggest that words that can be found in contexts that are 
more open to subjective interpretation may explain some cases of disagreement; this 
likely ties in with the second factor, cited above. They suggest, for example, that the 
adjective fair is inherently more subjective than the adjective long, which describes a 
measurable physical quality. A later paper sharing some of the same authors also 
notes that the subjectivity of a word may be a product of different "perception[s] and 
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experience[s] of individuals", and give justice as an example of a word that derives 
its "meaning from cultural norms that may differ from community to community" 
(Bhardwaj et al., 2010, p. 2). 
 
These studies provide clear evidence in support of the notion that different people 
assign the same examples of a word to different sense categories, which is an early 
indication of individual differences in word senses. To a reader well versed in natural 
language processing literature, these findings will not come as a surprise. As 
Passonneau et al. (2009, p. 3) put it, "It is widely recognized that achieving high K 
[agreement] scores (or percent agreement between annotators) [...] is difficult for 
word sense annotation." It is later acknowledged that "variation in word sense 
annotation across annotators should be expected as a consequence of usage 
variation" (Passonneau et al., 2010, p. 1). Later still, it is noted that "In the 
lexicographic and linguistic literature, it is taken for granted that there will be 
differences in judgment across language users regarding word sense" (Passonneau, 
Bhardwaj, et al., 2012, p. 11). If these differences are taken for granted in the 
cognitive linguistic literature, this is not an assumption that is widely acknowledged; 
indeed, typical studies of polysemous words make no reference to the possibility that 
different speakers would judge a single example of a target word to be an example of 
different senses. It is clear, then, that in some branches of linguistic study word 
senses are understood as not being "discrete, atomic units that can be delimited and 
enumerated" (Bhardwaj et al., 2010, p. 2; cf. Erk, McCarthy, and Gaylord, 2009). 
Moreover, Bhardwaj et al. (2010, p. 2) believe that the division of word senses is a 
"somewhat artificial" enterprise, which in itself may explain why perfect agreement 
in human WSD is so unusual. Even the standards by which those orchestrating WSD 
studies should delineate the senses to be offered to annotators is the subject of 
disagreement  (Passonneau, Bhardwaj, et al. 2012); typically annotators can use only 
one sense label, despite evidence indicating that sense annotation is not necessarily 
an all-or-nothing affair, and that sense tags are graded in their applicability to 
example sentences (Erk, McCarthy, and Gaylord, 2009, p. 17). 
 
While these studies provide further evidence, consistent with the findings of 
Experiment 1, that there may indeed be individual differences in word senses, they 
primarily contribute to the ongoing debate over the traditional role of introspection 
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and authors' intuitions in cognitive linguistic research, and its role in the study of 
polysemy in particular. This link is perhaps best articulated by Carletta (1996, p. 1) 
in her research into measuring agreement using the Kappa statistic, in which she 
states that "researchers are beginning to require evidence that people besides the 
authors themselves can understand and make the judgments underlying the research 
reliably[, and that] if researchers can't even show that different people can agree 
about the judgments on which their research is based, then there is no chance of 
replicating the research results." The research presented here provides a rather stark 
insight into the problematic nature of positing word senses.  
3.2.1 Effective communication in the face of individual differences in word 
senses 
If individuals do have different senses of polysemous words, how is it that we 
manage to communicate effectively? A possible explanation has been offered by 
computational linguists Ide and Wilks (2007). They propose that humans 
disambiguate polysemous words by accessing a general, coarse sense which is 
progressively distinguished to isolate a sub-sense only if that sub-sense is needed for 
understanding. They further propose that human language comprehension can 
generally operate at the level of homograph. While this suggestion was not offered in 
the context of individual differences in word senses, it does offer a possible 
explanation of how humans can communicate in the face of such differences, should 
they exist. It seems feasible that, if individuals differ in how they categorise a set of 
sentences, as long as they agree that they can be collapsed into a broad, albeit 
perhaps less meaningful sense, they can understand each other. In that way, where 
individuals’ word senses don’t completely overlap, a “good enough” level of 
understanding can be achieved by accessing this coarse sense.  
3.3 Individual differences in word senses: conclusions 
Despite the fact that interest in and awareness of individual differences in language 
is growing, and that polysemy remains a topic of ongoing debate, research in 
cognitive linguistics has shown little engagement with the possibility that different 
people may have different senses of a polysemous word. Evidence from WSD 
research using a small number of human annotators suggests that there may be some 
inter-speaker variation in word sense boundaries. While larger-scale WSD research – 
research that depends on the crowd to undertake human WSD – is ongoing, to date it 
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has not adopted open-sort methods, which would see annotators creating their own 
sense categories for each word. This would give a fuller picture of the extent to 
which individuals’ senses overlap, and is the methodology the study presented in this 
chapter uses to address this particular issue. Until that point, poor inter-annotator 
agreement values in WSD studies can only indirectly indicate individual differences 
in word senses. 
 
If individual differences do exist in word senses, this would provide some support 
for a theoretical model of their representation. The radial models proposed by 
Brugman and Lakoff (2006 [1988]) and Tyler and Evans (2001) do not leave open 
the possibility that individuals may have different senses of a given word. In fact, the 
fact that they claim that over, for example, has a particular set of senses in itself 
suggests that the authors posit a model of word senses in which there are no 
individual differences. In contrast, a model based on exemplar theory can 
accommodate individual differences in word senses, on the grounds that categories 
are understood to comprise of tokens of previously-encountered exemplars that are 
organised according to the demands of a particular categorisation event. Where 
exposure to a given polysemous word varies, or where the exact characteristics that 
one attends to in a categorisation event vary, it seems conceivable that the linguistic 
categories speakers construct may also vary.  
 
The literature presented here motivate a study that improves upon the methodology 
adopted by scholars to date. The limitations of using closed-sort tasks, analogous to 
sense-tagging exercises used in WSD research, to study individual differences in 
word senses were identified in Chapter 2; in brief, a closed sort task does not reveal 
whether differences in levels of agreement with expert sense distinctions is the result 
of individual differences, or the result of all participants having a homogenous set of 
senses which differ to those of the expert, and it is simply the case that some 
participants used the sense boundaries indicated by the preset categories to guess at a 
“correct” sorting solution. The findings reported in Chapter 2, along with research to 
date on individual differences in language and word senses, motivate a direct study 
of differences in word senses. Specifically, it encourages the use of an open-sort 
task, in which participants create their own categories. 
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Part 2: Investigation 
3.4 Aims 
The aim of the study described in this chapter is to further investigate the possible 
explanation for the data presented in Chapter 2. That data allowed the interpretation 
that participants’ disagreement with my sense distinctions may be the result of 
individual differences in word senses. Since it requires participants to use a 
predetermined set of categories, a closed-sort task like the one used in that study 
cannot fully reveal the distinctions that individuals find meaningful. Only a task in 
which participants can construct their own categories, such as an open-sort task, can 
do this. This chapter therefore reports an open-sort task designed to specifically 
address the possibility that there are individual differences in word senses. If there 
are such differences, I anticipate that these would manifest themselves in the data in 
the form of imperfect inter-participant agreement scores, and qualitatively different 
categorisation behaviours.  
3.5 Data collection 
In this section, I outline the approach I took to gathering data to answer the question 
of whether there is evidence of individual differences in word senses. It then 
provides relevant information about the participants who completed the tasks. 
Thirdly, details of the stimuli used are provided, followed by detailed information 
about the task procedure. Finally, it introduces the statistical model and visualisation 
tool used to analyse the degree to which pairs of participants agreed about how the 
sentences should be sorted. 
3.5.1 Methodology 
A variation on the sentence-sorting task described in Chapter 2 was used in this 
study. Specifically, this study uses an open-sort task. In an open-sort task 
participants are simply given a set of stimulus sentences and are asked to sort them 
into groups of their own making. In this case, participants are expected to create 
groups on the basis of commonality of meaning of a capitalised target word. This 
task therefore differs from closed-sort tasks in that participants are free to choose 
their own groups, and are not distracted by the presence of preset groups. The groups 
participants create are understood to reflect individuals’ senses.  
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The value of open sort tasks – that they reveal individuals’ senses – comes at some 
cost. The lack of preset groups means that participants are required to think very 
closely about the meaning of a particular word in each sentence and decide whether a 
small variation in the meaning of a target word across two sentences justifies 
creating a new group. So while at face value the task seems quite straightforward, 
what participants are asked to do is actually quite demanding, and requires extended 
concentration while they engage in an unfamiliar activity. For this reason, it is 
important that the number of sentences given to participants is decided by balancing 
the need to provide a fair sample of the range of uses of the target word and the need 
to prevent the task from causing fatigue, which might be realised through sorting 
decisions that become decreasingly consistent as the task progresses. A related issue 
that encourages limiting the number of sentences each participant is given is 
semantic satiation (James 1962). Miller (1971) suggests that participants can sort up 
to 100 sentences at a time. Research using this methodology has used a range of 
quantities of stimulus sentences, from nine (Divjak and Gries, 2008) to 244 (Baker 
1999); other studies have used quantities that are perhaps more manageable but 
which offer some degree of variation (e.g., Rice et al., 1999; Rice, 1996, both of 
which saw participants sorting 50 examples of a given word). The present study sees 
participants sorting 100 sentences, each containing a particular target word.  
 
Most participants completed the task online, using the OptimalSort web-based 
sorting tool described in section 2.6.4. Two participants completed the task using 
printed cards, which were shuffled before the task commenced. 
3.5.2 Participants 
A total of 44 adult participants completed the task. Eight completed the task for over 
and above, seven for under, and 21 for below. All participants were aged 18 or older 
and spoke English as their first language. All had completed at least secondary 
education. The participants did not receive a reward for completing the task. 
Participants were recruited via word of mouth and Reddit Sample Size. 
 
The below task was undertaken after the other sorting tasks. A larger sample was 
recruited to allow me to assess whether the generally weak inter-participant 
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agreement observed in the first three tasks could be explained on the basis of the 
smaller sample size in these groups.  
3.5.3 Stimuli 
The task stimuli consisted of concordance lines extracted from the spoken and 
written sections of the British National Corpus (BNC) and transcripts of English-
speaking children's language on CHILDES (MacWhinney 2000). Additional 
sentences, used to add diversity to the sample extracted from corpora, were 
generated by the author and naïve contributors. Participants were given 100 
examples of each target word. 
 
Concordance lines were selected as stimuli on a partially-random basis. A random 
sample was extracted from the BNC. Due to the exploratory nature of this study, the 
stimulus concordance lines were selected to represent as broad a range of uses as 
possible. This entailed that where the sample included an excessive number of 
instances of what I judged to be the same sense, some of these examples were 
excluded. The stimuli were balanced for spatial and non-spatial uses. 
3.5.4 Procedure 
Participants received written instructions explaining how they should complete the 
sorting task. These instructions are presented in Appendix 3. They were asked to 
read through them and ask any questions if they were uncertain about the task. They 
could refer back to the instructions at any point. 
 
Participants were instructed to read each example sentence and focus on the 
capitalised target word to try to understand exactly what it meant in each context. 
They were told that they should put examples of each word into groups according to 
the meaning of the target word. They were told that the goal of the task was to create 
groups in which each member should have exactly the same meaning of the target 
word as every other member of the group. Once they had completed grouping the 
examples, participants were asked to label each group to describe, define or 
paraphrase the meaning of the target word. Until they confirmed that they had 
finished the task, participants were free to change the composition of the groups, 
moving examples in and out until they were satisfied with their groups.  
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Participants who completed the task in person sorted cards sized 5” x 3”, on which 
each example was printed in black ink. Participants who completed the task online 
used the web-based OptimalSort software described in section 2.6.4.1. Unlike in the 
experiment reported in Chapter 2, however, participants in this task were not 
presented with preset categories. In this case, therefore, sentences were presented in 
a column on the left side of the screen, with a large, blank sorting pane to the centre 
and right of the screen. Participants were advised to read all of the sentences, 
considering carefully what the target word, which was shown in full capitals, meant 
in each sentence. Afterwards, they were required to move each sentence into the 
sorting pane to create a group, after which further sentences could be dragged and 
dropped into it. Sentences could be dragged in and out of categories until the 
participant was satisfied with their sorting decisions. Once they were satisfied with 
their groups and had given each a label, they clicked a button to indicate that they 
had finished the tasks. The results were then stored and accessible in the back end of 
the programme. Participants were required to sort all of the stimuli before they could 
submit their responses. 
3.5.5 Statistical analysis 
Data collected in this task were statistically analysed for agreement using Morey and 
Agresti’s adjusted Rand (Morey and Agresti, 1984). Unlike Cohen’s kappa, the 
agreement statistic used in the closed-sort task, Morey and Agresti’s adjusted Rand 
is used to understand the level of agreement amongst pairs of participants who 
complete an open-sort task, i.e., when they are not given a set of groups into which 
stimuli are to be sorted. It does not require subjects to use the same number of 
groups. Like Cohen’s kappa, Morey and Agresti’s adjusted Rand is a magnitude 
statistic, and does not return significance values. Possible agreement values range 
from -1.0, representing total disagreement, through 0, reflecting chance agreement, 
to 1.0, representing perfect agreement.  
3.5.5.1 Interpreting	the	data	
Before we begin to look at the data generated in these tasks, I will explain how the 
data were analysed. Morey and Agresti’s adjusted Rand was used to calculate the 
degree of agreement between pairs of participants. A more qualitative approach was 
taken to analyse the similarity matrices produced, though they do offer some 
quantitative data. Similarity matrices record the percentage frequency with which 
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each pair of stimuli is sorted into the same group. Frequencies in the similarity 
matrices are therefore related to agreement: when all participants sort two stimuli 
into the same group, represented by a score of 100, they have reached complete 
agreement about how those two particular stimuli should be sorted. The OptimalSort 
algorithm produces similarity matrices automatically. Helpfully, it colour-codes the 
chart and uses increasingly dark tones to represent increasing frequency of pairing. 
Moreover, it organises the matrix such that pairs of sentences which are sorted 
together with a high degree of frequency are positioned next to or very close to each 
other. These two useful characteristics combine to produce a similarity matrix which 
can reveal groups of stimuli that participants typically sorted into the same group, 
and shows which pairs of sentences are rarely or never sorted into the same group. 
The matrices therefore reveal perceived similarity and difference in the meaning of 
the target word in each pair of sentences. 
 
 
Figure 32 below shows an annotated simplified example of a similarity matrix. The 
darker shades of green reveal three groups. In the first group are stimuli 1 to 3, in the 
second stimuli 4 to 7, and in the final group, stimuli 8 to 10. The first group has the 
highest degree of agreement, with each stimulus being put into the same group as the 
other two stimuli by all participants. The second group has a slightly weaker degree 
of agreement, with one member being paired with another member by 75% of the 
participants. The final group has a weaker level of agreement still. However, because 
stimuli 8, 9 and 10 are only rarely sorted into the same group as stimuli 1–7, they can 
be considered a distinct group.  
 
The lighter shades in the table suggest that there is some degree of overlap in 
membership across the three groups. Overlap is meant here to describe the fact that 
members of the strongest groups identified in the similarity matrix are judged by 
some participants to be members of other groups. This is shown in the percentage 
values outside of darkly-shaded triangles. For example, in Figure 29, stimulus 1 was 
sorted into the same group as stimulus 5 by 15% of the participants, and into the 
same group as stimulus 9 by 25% of the participants. However, because stimuli 1, 2 
and 3 were sorted together 100% of the time, and only much more infrequently with 
any of the other stimuli, they are considered to be a distinct group.   
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Figure 32 Simplified annotated example of a similarity matrix showing three groups 
 
The groups discussed in the following sections are those which have a good degree 
of agreement. 
 
So what can similarity matrices tell us about individual differences in word senses? 
If a similar matrix consists of groups of stimuli – in the context of this study, 
sentences – which have 100% agreement, that would indicate that the senses 
represented by the stimuli are agreed upon by all participants. If, as is in the case of 
the similarity matrix in Figure 29, there are cases where some pairs sentences are 
judged to use the target word in the same sense by some but not all participants, that 
would suggest that word senses are subject to individual differences. In this way, 
similarity matrices therefore allow an additional means of studying inter-participant 
agreement, complementary to agreement statistics. 
3.6 Results and discussion 
This section presents statistical and qualitative analyses performed on the sentence 
sorting data. It begins by presenting agreement values, showing how well 
participants agreed with each other. I then offer a qualitative analysis of the resultant 
similarity matrices. This qualitative analysis describes groups of sentences which are 
often grouped together, and includes my speculation on what the overarching 
meaning of those groups might be. Not all groups are as readily interpretable as each 
other, and for that reason I emphasise which groups are clear, and which are trickier 
to understand. The purpose of this is to establish whether there are particular groups 
Group 3 
Group 1 
Group	2	
A	 small	 number	 of	 participants	
sorted	stimuli	from	groups	1	and	
3	together	
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of sentences that are subject to good agreement. If there are, these may be tentatively 
understood as word senses that multiple speakers find meaningful. If, on the other 
hand, there is disagreement about how particular sentences should be sorted, i.e., 
some participants sort sentence x into the same category as sentences w, y and z, 
others categorise x into a category with sentences y, a, and b, while other sill 
categorise x with b, c and d, that would suggest that there is disagreement over what 
participants judge the target word in x to mean. We can tentatively interpret this 
outcome as evidence of individual differences in word meaning.  
 
I also study whether participants had a tendency to “lump” or “split” the stimuli into 
coarse or fine groups. This will shed some light on whether or not participants 
qualitatively differ in the level of granularity they find meaningful. In addition, I will 
identify whether or not participants create any “mixed” groups containing both 
spatial and non-spatial uses. Cognitive linguistic analyses of polysemous words 
consider spatial and non-spatial uses to be distinct from each other, if perhaps related 
by some cognitive principles (Tyler and Evans, 2001). If some but not all 
participants create these mixed groups, that would suggest that individuals differ in 
how meaningful they find the spatial/non-spatial distinction to be. Finally, in the 
case of the data for above and below, I also assess whether the data indicate whether 
participants judge TEXT USES of these words to have a spatial or non-spatial (e.g., 
temporal) meaning. 
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Quantitative analysis 
3.6.1 Did participants agree about how the sentences should be sorted? 	
Table 9 Pairwise agreement values calculated using Morey and Agresti's adjusted Rand 
Target word Mean  Min. Max. Range 
Over 0.39 0.22 0.66 0.44 
Under 0.65 0.35 0.84 0.49 
Above 0.31 0.13 0.55 0.42 
Below 0.37 0.01 0.90 0.89 
 
 
The agreement values shown in Table 9 reveal two interesting outcomes. First, if we 
examine the ‘Mean’ column, there is a range of agreement values across the four 
tasks: some minor, and some major. There is minor variation in mean agreement 
values across the tasks for over, above, and below: all hover between 0.3 and 0.4. 
However, the mean agreement value for the under task is substantially higher than 
the other three tasks, with participants reaching a mean agreement value of 0.65. 
Second, if we examine the ‘Min.’, ‘Max.’ and ‘Range columns, we can observe that 
the extent to which pairs of participants agree with each other is highly variant. For 
example, as highlighted in the red cell, one pair of participants completing the below 
task reached a level of agreement barely above chance, at 0.01. At the other end of 
the scale, as shown in the cell highlighted in green, one pair of participants who also 
completed the below task reached a very high level of agreement, achieving an 
agreement value of 0.90. While ranges in agreement values were observed in the 
other three tasks, they are particularly great in the below task. The possibility that the 
large sample size in the below task resulted in a larger range of agreement values 
was tested by splitting the sample into three random groups. Table 10 below 
confirms that this is not the case; the range of agreement values within each sub-
group is similar to those observed in the groups who completed the tasks for over, 
under and above. 
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Table 10 Pairwise agreement values for subgroups of participants who completed the below task, 
calculated using Morey and Agresti's adjusted Rand 
Below sub-
group 
Mean Min. Max. Range 
1 0.38 0.23 0.70 0.46 
2 0.56 0.30 0.81 0.51 
3 0.19 0.01 0.56 0.56 
 
As noted in section 2.6.5 the lowest acceptable level of inter-participant agreement is 
the subject of ongoing debate. In the case of WSD research proper, in which human 
annotations will be used to train a computer, a high degree of inter-annotator 
agreement is desirable.  If we accept 0.8 as the lowest acceptable level, after 
Neuendorf (2002), the ‘Mean’ column in Table 9 show that, on average, the extent to 
which participants agree with each other is unacceptably low. While the ‘Max.’ 
columns show pockets of good agreement in the tasks for under and below, on the 
whole agreement is really rather poor.  
 
Given that the aim of the present research is to investigate the psychological status of 
word senses, as opposed to isolating just what the senses of particular words are, the 
matter of a minimum level of acceptable agreement is somewhat moot. Instead, the 
scope of the project means that an open analysis of the data is possible, one which 
seeks to examine what happens when groups of individuals sort the stimuli into 
groups. However, agreement values remain interesting and useful sources of data, 
since they reveal variation in the extent of inter-participant agreement. Specifically, 
low agreement values might indicate individual differences in word senses. 
 
We can perhaps anticipate some inter-participant disagreement in a sorting task such 
as this. Disagreement has already been observed in WSD research, as noted earlier, 
and in Experiment 1. However, while some disagreement is certainly expected, the 
extent of disagreement observed amongst some pairs of participants pushes that 
expectation to the limit. In the case of some pairs of participants sorting examples of 
below, agreement is barely better than chance. Second, the range of agreement 
values noted across participants and across the four words suggests that agreement is 
highly variant. They complement the data gathered in a closed sort task by 
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Passonneau and her colleagues (2012, 2010) which found that agreement varied 
within, as well as across, parts of speech.  
 
At this stage, it is unclear what is behind the differences in agreement across the 
target words. One potential explanation is that the task was too demanding. Asking 
participants to carefully read and disambiguate 100 uses of a particular word while 
simultaneously keeping track of the categories they create is a very demanding task. 
It might be that the scale of the task caused fatigue, boredom, forgetting, semantic 
satiation, or a combination of these. 
3.6.2 How many sense groups did each participant create? 
 
Table 11 Number of sense groups created for each word 
Target word Mean Min. Max. 
Over 17 12 20 
Under 6 3 11 
Above 7 2 9 
Below 6 2 12 
 
As this table shows, participants varied in the number of sense groups they created; 
the ‘Mean’ column reveals variation across the four words, while the ‘Min.’ and 
‘Max.’ columns show variation across participants. Because this was an exploratory 
study, I did not aim to balance the range of senses (as I perceived them) represented 
across the four words, nor did I choose to balance the number of stimuli that 
exemplified each sense. Removing these kinds of structures should mean that 
participants’ responses are as authentic as possible, and influenced as little as 
possible by my own intuitions. 
 
The differences in the number of groups created provide some explanation for 
varying levels of pairwise agreement. Depending on the exact composition of two 
participants’ groups, the creation of more groups by one participant than the other 
might by default result in lower agreement than if they created the same number. 
Take, for example, a pair of participants who created five groups which had identical 
composition, and in addition participant A created one with a set of six sentences, 
which were split into two groups by participant B. The pair would achieve lower 
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agreement than if they were to use the same number of groups. Of course, this seems 
like an unlikely scenario, and it is more likely that participants will create groups that 
have some, but not complete, overlap. This will mean that differences in the number 
of sense groups that they create may not have the same effect on pairwise agreement 
scores across all pairs of participants. 
 
The difference in the number of groups hints at participants’ varying tendencies to 
seek out broad, generic senses amongst the stimulus sentences. A small number of 
groups created by a participant might therefore suggest that, when sorting the 
sentences, they look for uses of below, for example, that broadly share a meaning. 
This is not a watertight approach to the analysis of this data, though; as we will see 
in the following close analyses, participants who use a small number of groups do 
not necessarily only make broad distinctions. 
Qualitative analysis 
At this point, I direct your attention to the similarity matrices in Appendix 4.4 
3.6.3 Over 
3.6.3.1 Did	any	meaningful	senses	emerge	in	the	similarity	matrix?		
The table below lists the groups that emerge from the similarity matrix, and offers a 
suggestion – based on my interpretation of the underlying meaning of the target 
word in each constituent sentence – of the meaning of the sense used in each group. 
For ease of reference, an example sentence for each group is also provided. The 
following discussion will consider first the more clear-cut, easily-interpretable 
groups, before moving onto the groups that are trickier to understand. 
                                                
4 Due to the size of these files, they are best viewed on a computer screen. 
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Table 12 Groups detected in similarity matrix for over 
Colour on 
similarity 
matrix 
Group 
number 
Tentative definition Example sentence 
 
1 EXCHANGE James Roberts [q.v.], whose printing business 
he soon took OVER. 
 2 CONTRASTIVE 
POSITION 
Can we have it OVER here mum? 
 3 UNCLEAR The plane flew OVER the city 
 4 ARC Go up that one and jump OVER the other one 
 5 COVERING She pulled the covers OVER herself 
 6 FLIP Turn that steak OVER, it's burning! 
 7 FALL Why did you do that you nearly knocked me OVER then 
 8 DURING We’re going to go camping OVER the Easter holiday 
 
9 MORE THAN Council house rent arrears amounted to OVER 
£1m, though they are at long last being 
reduced. 
 
10 CONCERNING Afternoon session there was an equally 
irritable wrangle OVER a proposal to adopt a 
law on compliance with the 
 11 REPETITION I don’t want to have this fight all OVER again 
 12 COMPLETION I can’t believe the weekend is OVER already! 
 
Analysis of the similarity matrix reveals two interesting outcomes. On the one hand, 
the very light shading seen in some parts of the similarity matrix reveals some 
overlap in how sentences were sorted, indicating that participants differ from each 
other in what stimuli they consider to use over in an equivalent way, and what 
stimuli they consider to use over in a different way. This disagreement is reflected 
also in the pale shading within each triangular cluster of sentences. This latter 
observation indicates that the exact composition of the groups I shall propose here is 
rather uncertain, meaning that the senses I posit in this chapter are tentative. With 
that said, the similarity matrix does in some places reveal some groups that have a 
reasonable degree of agreement and coherence. Further, as demonstrated by the large 
areas of white space, occurring where no participant assigned a particular pair of 
sentences to the same category, some sentences are considered highly distinct from 
certain others.  
3.6.3.1.1 Clear	cases	
The first group, in the top right-hand corner, might be paraphrased as describing an 
exchange, or a change of hands. Its composition is not wholly agreed upon; for 
example, handing over its presidency in December next year and He said that’s half 
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the reason that Brian Tolbrook took over at Tettron ain’t it are grouped together 
only 50% of the time, while the latter sentence and James Roberts [q.v.], whose 
printing business he soon took OVER, are grouped together 100% of the time. On the 
whole, though, these three sentences are grouped together more frequently than with 
other stimuli, indicating that they are a distinct group. 
 
The second group, and one which is much larger, contains sentences that, on the 
whole, describe some kind of contrastive position. It has some pockets of very good 
agreement, but also some patches of weaker agreement. While most of the sentences 
describe contrastive position (e.g., Can you call her over here for a minute?, and We 
got a telephone over here), some seem less exemplary of this overarching schema; 
for example, We often walk over the fields seems, to my mind, to convey an “across” 
sense of over – of course, however, the findings presented in Chapter 2 demonstrated 
that my intuitions do not always neatly correspond to those of other speakers. This 
sentence, along with I ran over the bridge, are grouped with the sentences describing 
contrastive position perhaps by virtue of the fact that similarity matrices are 
constructed on the basis of pairwise grouping: these two examples are grouped more 
with Can you just run it over the road than with other sentences outside of this 
second group, which itself is grouped with the other sentences in the group more 
than sentences outside of the group. Their poor exemplariness manifests in the 
similarity matrix as low agreement values with most other stimuli in the group.  
 
The sixth group, another group capturing spatial relationships, can be best 
characterised as representing a FLIP sense of over, and is the subject of a good degree 
of internal agreement.  
 
The seventh group, also spatial in nature, represents a FALL sense of over. While it is 
a fairly discrete group in that sentences that are outside of the group are rarely 
matched with any of the component sentences, it is not a group that has particularly 
good levels of agreement. These facts suggest that while participants tend to agree 
that the sentences are dissimilar to sentences outside of the group, they do not fully 
agree about how similar the member sentences are to each other. 
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The ninth group, which captures a non-spatial sense of over, comprises sentences 
using over in a MORE THAN sense. Given the conventionality of using over to 
describe positions on numerical scales, it is surprising that this group does not have a 
particularly strong composition; certainly, there are pockets of excellent agreement, 
but the domain-specificity of this group encourages us to predict that participants 
would reach much better agreement about how its members should be sorted. This 
prediction is not realised, though. 
 
A much stronger group is the tenth cluster, which captures a CONCERNING sense of 
over. Its size – it comprises just four sentences – might explain its high level of 
agreement. However, in the face of the eleventh group (representing a REPETITION 
sense of over), which comprises just two members but has weaker agreement, it 
seems that we cannot chalk the strength of this group up to its diminutive size.  
 
The final group, representing a COMPLETION sense, is another group that has patchy 
agreement. On the one hand, They think it’s all over… it is now! and I can’t believe 
the weekend is over already! have a pairwise agreement of 100%, as do the pair I am 
so over him and It took him ages to get over the flu.  On the other, the pairwise 
agreement amongst these four sentences is much weaker. The reason for this might 
be that while all capture a sense of completion, they might be divided more finely to 
specify a COMPLETION + RECOVERY sense, represented by the latter two sentences. In 
the case of the former pair, a simple COMPLETION sense is invoked.  
3.6.3.1.2 Trickier	cases	
The composition of the third group is rather mixed, making any underlying meaning 
unclear. It includes examples which seem to use over in varying ways; for example, 
15 OVER 3 equals…?, The family portrait sits OVER the fireplace and The plane 
flew OVER the city. While within the middle of the triangular cluster there are darker 
patches, indicating a higher degree of agreement, the group as a whole seems rather 
uncertain. Indeed, some members are grouped together at a level lower than we can 
expect by chance.  
 
The fourth group is also somewhat mixed, with rather a lot of overlap with the fifth 
group. However, the group tends to capture an ARC sense of over, with sentences 
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describing atypical arcs (e.g., You almost ran over that rabbit!), partial arcs (Fall 
over the bridge) and full arcs (The quick brown fox jumped over the lazy dog). 
Collectively, these arcs are captured by the schematic illustration in Figure 33. In 
this figure, the dashed line indicates the optional aspect of the arc trajectory; for 
example, as in the partial arc described by Fall over the bridge. 
 
 
 
Figure 33 Illustration of the underlying spatial configuration captured by group 4, ARC.  
 
As noted, there is some overlap between the members of the fourth and fifth groups, 
the latter of which might be best described as representing a COVERING sense of over. 
An explanation for the overlap in membership of the fourth and fifth groups might 
be that the spatial configurations sentences in each group describe share a basic 
configuration: the extension of a figure over a ground. In the case of most of the 
sentences in the fourth group, that extension is specified further to describe an arc-
shaped movement, as illustrated in Figure 33. In the fifth group, the extension of the 
figure across the body of the ground is static and widespread, as illustrated in Figure 
34. 
 
 
Figure 34 Illustration of the underlying spatial configuration captured by sense group 5, 
COVERING 
 
There is mixed agreement over the composition of group eight. At the far end of the 
group it appears that the grouping of some sentences has a very good degree of 
agreement. For the most part, the sentences in the group use a DURING sense of over, 
for example Let me think about it over the course of the day. The sentence, Can you 
look over this report for me? (which I’ll describe for the moment as an example of 
the THROUGH sense of over) is rather distinct from the other sentences, but it is 
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perhaps less distinct than the sentence I mean that’s Suffolk all over isn’t it, really 
for you?. Both DURING and THROUGH senses capture a sense of motion through some 
domain; in the case of the sentences in this group, through the temporal domain, and 
through the domain of a body of text. They share common features: a start and end 
point, and an intermediate zone that is canonically navigated in a linear fashion. The 
figures below illustrate this commonality of meaning.  
 
 
 
 
Figure 36 Schematic illustration representing Can you look over this report for me? 
 
 
Figure 37 Schematic illustration representing examples in Figure 35 and Figure 36 
 
Figure 35 Schematic illustration representing Let me think about it over the course of the day 
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If we overlook the Suffolk sentence, perhaps we can rationalise the composition of 
this group. This sentence seems so at odds with the rest of the group that we may be 
better off considering this as an outsider; the lone member of an exceptionally small 
group that the similarity matrix, perhaps for technical reasons, cannot represent. 
3.6.3.2 Lumping	and	splitting	
Arising from criticism surrounding excessively fine-grained sense distinctions 
proposed in cognitive linguistic literature, a contentious issue within the literature on 
polysemy is that one person’s notions of what constitutes a distinct sense may be 
rather different from that of another person. In other words, there may be variations 
in number of senses a group of speakers find meaningful. So while one person may 
identify a large set of minutely distinct senses in a set of, say one hundred sentences, 
another may find five to be meaningfully distinct. The people occupying these polar 
positions are described as “splitters” and “lumpers”, respectively (e.g., Hanks, 2000). 
We can use the following sentences to illustrate these definitions: 
 
6. I can’t believe the weekend is over already! 
7. It took him ages to get over the flu. 
 
The decisions made by some of the participants in this study suggest that these 
sentences may be grouped separately, or together. Together they relate to the ceasing 
of some event: in example 6 it is a temporal event (the weekend), in example 7 it is a 
condition event (the flu). Example 6 can be further specified, though, to account for 
a sense of recovery that accompanies the ceasing of the event. It is a distinction that 
some, but not all, participants find sufficiently meaningful to license the creation of 
separate groups. 
 
Some participants demonstrated tendencies for both lumping and splitting, rather 
than adopting a single sorting strategy. For example, participant O6 separates 
examples of over that describe some form of temporality into three groups, labelled 
‘time’, ‘recover’ and ‘through’5. The ‘time’ group is interesting in that it conflates 
what I consider to be examples of three distinct senses: COMPLETION (e.g., I can’t 
believe the weekend is over already!), DURING (e.g., We’re going to go camping over 
                                                
5 Inverted commas are used to indicate the sense labels created by participants 
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the Easter holiday) and REPETITION (e.g., I don’t want to have this fight all over 
again). The ‘recover’ group captures the distinction identified in examples 6 and 7 
above. ‘Through’ comprises only one sentence, Let me think about it over the course 
of the day. It is unclear what makes this final sentence distinct from the sentences in 
the ‘time’ group. Beyond this subset, we can observe some lumping: when sorting 
spatial examples of over, the logic behind their decisions is not always clear. The 
fact that I find it difficult to follow the logic behind this participant’s sorting adds 
weight to the claim made in Chapter 2 that participants and I differ in what examples 
of over we consider to have equivalent meanings.  
 
The presence of fine distinctions contributes to the debate in cognitive linguistic 
literature over whether some linguists’ predilection for splitting is shared by naïve 
speakers (Sandra and Rice, 1995). Work by Cuyckens, Sandra, and Rice (1997) and 
Sandra and Rice (1995) considering the psychological reality of polysemy accounts 
made in cognitive linguistics has begun to shed light on naïve speakers’ tendencies 
to lump and split examples of polysemous words. In both sets of studies, the authors 
found evidence that participants did make some fine distinctions. The fact that 
individual participants – here and elsewhere in this study – use both splitting and 
lumping strategies adds detail to this issue: it is not the case that linguists split and 
participants lump; a single participant may split where a linguist would lump, and 
vice versa. 
 
While there is a tendency for participants to create large and seemingly 
undifferentiated groups of spatial sentences, not all participants adopted this 
approach. Participant O9 was unusual in their decision to split spatial uses on a very 
fine basis: they separated examples describing static versus dynamic relations, the 
presence of direction, and whether a fall was implicated. These are not distinctions 
that I would make, which provides further evidence in support of the conclusion that 
at least some of the senses of these words that I find to be meaningful are not shared 
by other speakers. There is clearly growing support for this interpretation, adding 
weight to the conclusions drawn in Chapter 2. 
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3.6.3.3 Did	people	distinguish	between	spatial	and	metaphorical	uses?	
Mixed sense groups – that is, groups which to my mind captured examples of over 
that describe both spatial scenes and non-spatial scenarios – were found in the 
groups created by all except one (O9) participants. The tendency for participants to 
create mixed groups suggests that the distinction between concrete and abstract 
scenarios is not necessarily the most meaningful one when deciding how a group of 
sentences should be sorted. Indeed, most of these participants (O1 is the exception) 
created multiple mixed groups – as many as three by some participants. The presence 
of multiple mixed groups rules out the possible explanation that spatial and non-
spatial sentences were grouped together accidentally and instead supports the 
interpretation that whether or not they describe spatial configurations is not the 
ultimate deciding factor when distinguishing between meanings. In the context of 
this study, it therefore seems that the meaningfulness of the difference between 
spatial and non-spatial uses varies between individuals.  
 
This idea seems rather controversial, given that the distinction between the concrete 
(i.e., spatial) and abstract (i.e., non-spatial) is arguably a fundamental one in 
theoretical treatments of polysemy in cognitive linguistics – and, indeed, in 
conceptual metaphor theory (Lakoff and Johnson, 1980). If the use of mixed sense 
groups was anomalous, and restricted to perhaps one participant, then we might 
overlook that decision as an anomaly. In the face of a general tendency to create at 
least one mixed sense group, though, this tendency must be acknowledged. The 
significance of this finding is discussed in more detail in section 3.7.3 below. 
3.6.4 Under 
3.6.4.1 Did	any	meaningful	senses	emerge	in	the	similarity	matrix?		
The matrix for under can be divided into two clear sections: the first, positioned at 
top-left part of the matrix, is a large, generally undifferentiated group of spatial uses. 
The second, positioned at the lower-right part, comprises a set of smaller groups of 
varying degrees of distinctness. The table below lists the groups that emerge from 
the similarity matrix, and provides a suggestion of what sense is used in each 
sentence in the groups. For ease of reference, an example sentence for each group is 
also provided. The following discussion will consider first the more clear-cut, easily-
interpretable groups, before moving onto the groups that are trickier to understand. 
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Table 13 Groups detected in similarity matrix for under 
Colour on 
similarity 
matrix 
Group 
number 
Tentative definition Example sentence 
 1 GENERIC SPATIAL 
CONFIGURATION 
She kicked him UNDER the table 
 2 LESS THAN She can only go on the ride if she’s UNDER 10 
 3 UNDER AUTHORITY/ 
COMMAND OF 
She’s got a whole team working her UNDER 
her now 
 
4 MIXED 
METAPHORICAL 
SENSE 
UNDER the terms of this new policy, we should 
get a refund 
 5 INTERNAL FORCE I was UNDER the impression she’d already quit 
 6 EXTERNAL FORCE Her workload is currently UNDER review 
	
3.6.4.1.1 Clear	cases	
As noted, the first group is very large, and in fact encompasses all spatial uses of 
under. On the whole, agreement that every sentence in the group should be sorted 
with every other sentence in the group is very high – for the most part, agreement is 
88% or higher. However, pockets of weaker agreement, at or a little over chance 
level, are observed. These two outcomes indicate that, by and large, most of the 
spatial sentences in the task are equally good exemplars of a spatial sense of under, 
though some are rather a lot less exemplary, which results in disagreement over 
where they should be sorted. We may therefore conclude that participants tend to 
agree that most of the examples of under in the stimuli in this group are similar in 
meaning to each other, but there are cases when participants’ judgments over 
similarity or equivalence diverge. 
 
The second significant group in the matrix displays a high degree of internal 
consistency, as represented by agreement values of 75% or higher, and a low degree 
of overlap with other groups. This second group captures a LESS THAN sense of 
under, in which each sentence describes a position on a numerical scale.  
 
The fifth group, comprising just two sentences, is a very discrete group representing 
an INTERNAL FORCE sense of under; in both of these examples, the speakers’ actions 
are shaped by the internal forces of their beliefs.  
 
The final group, and one which has mixed levels of internal agreement and rather a 
lot of overlap with other groups, can be described as representing a SUBJECT TO sense 
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of under. In each case, an abstract or concrete figure is subject to the external force 
of an abstract ground. One exception, perhaps, is the sentence moves are under way 
to establish a modern Socialist party. Under way is a specific collocation that does 
not seem to be quite as good an exemplar of a SUBJECT TO sense as other examples in 
the group. This is reflected in its weak membership: agreement that it should be 
paired with other members is rarely above chance level. 
3.6.4.1.2 Trickier	cases	
The third group tends towards representing an UNDER THE AUTHORITY/COMMAND OF 
sense. However, I booked it under my wife’s name does not quite fit with this 
definition, and therefore necessitates some caution in interpreting this group. A 
further issue in this group is that two sentences, He whispered the password under 
his breath and people have been living on the breadline and under the breadline, 
while positioned separately from the group in the similarity matrix, have strongest 
agreement with the other sentences in the group, compared with the rest of the 
sentences in the matrix. It is not clear why the algorithm behind the similarity matrix 
has positioned these stimuli away from the rest of the group.  
 
The fourth group also seems rather mixed, comprising sentences which use 
ACCORDING TO/COMPELLED BY (e.g., Under the new regulations, the students had to 
sign in each week), IN THE CLASS OF (I’m going to file that comment under “P” for 
pathetic) and a particular CONDITION sense, represented by I’m under his protection 
now. This makes it somewhat hard to argue that this group represents a particular 
sense.  
3.6.4.1.2.1 An	alternative	interpretation?	
The high degree of overlap between the final four groups in the similarity matrix 
encourages an alternative interpretation: perhaps the matrix comprises three groups: 
one representing a very generic spatial sense, one a well-defined numerical scale 
sense, and a final group capturing examples of under that describe power structures 
and their associated effects.  
 
If we were to posit the third large triangle as a single group, we must acknowledge 
that, within that, there are pockets of extreme proximity and similarity, within which 
sentences are very distinct from other members in the mega-group. However, there is 
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a meaningful overlap across most of the sentences. They generally use under to 
describe power structures or the effects thereof. People in positions of authority 
(such as those in I’m working under the direction of the area manager) are able to 
implement policies such as the one described in Under the old system, commission 
payments for transactions, and they can impose external forces such as those 
described in We’re under real pressure at the moment. Perhaps the sentences in the 
penultimate group, which represent an INTERNAL FORCE sense, are members of this 
mega-group by virtue of their relationship to the final, EXTERNAL FORCE group. This 
outcome suggests that the need for fine distinctions in effective communication may 
not be necessary; instead, broader groups encapsulating smaller sub-groups, may be 
sufficient. This is compatible with the argument made by Ide and Wilks (2007) 
concerning the coarse level of meaning humans and computers generally access in 
order to achieve successful understanding, an idea which is discussed in section 
4.1.1. 
3.6.4.2 Lumping	and	splitting	
Some degree of both lumping and splitting is observed in most of the participants’ 
sorting decisions. Participant U2 adopts a very fine-grained approach to identifying 
sense boundaries, particularly within the spatial domain. For example, they 
distinguish between sentences that use under to describe ‘covering’ relationships, 
uses describing general vertical configurations, usually without contact, a one-
member group labelled ‘behind’, in which a non-canonical horizontal configuration 
is described, and a final group labelled ‘through’, which captures sentences in which 
a figure passes under and out of a ground such as a bridge. The non-spatial groups do 
not show such fine-grained distinctions; while they create separate groups for 
‘control’, ‘governed by’ and ‘with’, some of their non-spatial groups seem to be 
more catch-all.  
 
Elsewhere in the group of participants, there is evidence of extreme lumping. For 
example, participant U5 makes just three distinctions, which capture spatial, non-
spatial and mixed sense-type (i.e., a mixture of both spatial and non-spatial) items. 
This approach means that they are classified almost by default as a lumper. On closer 
inspection, the spatial and non-spatial groups do indeed reveal what I would consider 
to be undifferentiated grouping. The creation of a mixed sense group indicates that 
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the participant feels that there is a meaningful distinction between the members of 
this group and members of the other two groups, and is not therefore solely 
concerned with a binary distinction between spatial and non-spatial meanings. 
Accordingly, it seems unjustified to casually classify the participant as a lumper. It 
would have been helpful to have spoken with the participant to understand why a 
third group was created; as it stands, we cannot know the dimension on which this 
participant splits items. 
 
As might be predicted from analysis of the similarity matrix, close analysis of 
individual participants’ sorting decisions shows that, when participants do allocate 
non-spatial sentences to a discrete group, this is achieved with most coherence and 
consistency when the sentences describe positions on numerical scales. Indeed, when 
participants make more than one distinction amongst non-spatial items, at least one 
of those distinctions is always made to separate these types of sentences from other 
non-spatial examples.  
3.6.4.3 Did	people	distinguish	between	spatial	and	metaphorical	uses?		
On the whole, participants generally distinguished between sentences that described 
spatial configurations and relationships, and those which did not. Across the eight 
participants, only one created a group that captured both spatial and non-spatial 
examples. This outcome suggests that the distinction between spatial and non-spatial 
senses of under is a highly salient one, meaningful to most – but not all – 
participants. 
 
The tendency for participants to create a single, seemingly undifferentiated group of 
all of the spatial uses of under (done so by five of the seven participants) suggests 
that amongst these participants, there was a sense that as long as the sentence at hand 
describes a spatial configuration, the use of under is equivalent in meaning to all 
other sentences describing spatial configurations. It is only in the case of participant 
U2 that we can observe finer distinctions at work: this participant seems to divide the 
stimulus sentences according to whether a ‘covering’, generic vertical, ‘through’ or 
‘behind’ relationship is described. 
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3.6.5 Above 
3.6.5.1 Did	any	meaningful	senses	emerge	in	the	similarity	matrix?		
As was the case in our analysis of the similarity matrix for under, we can divide the 
similarity matrix for above into two distinct sections. The first section, which takes 
up the majority of the top half of the matrix, comprises the majority of the spatial 
uses of above. The second, occupying the lower half of the matrix, is a set of more 
discrete groups representing spatial and non-spatial senses. The table below lists the 
groups that emerge from the similarity matrix, and provides a suggestion of what 
sense is used in each sentence in the groups. For ease of reference, an example 
sentence for each group is also provided. The following discussion will consider first 
the more clear-cut, easily-interpretable groups, before moving onto the groups that 
are trickier to understand. 
Table 14 Groups detected in similarity matrix for above 
Colour on 
similarity 
matrix 
Group 
number 
Tentative definition Example sentence 
 1 LOUDER THAN It’s really hard to hear you ABOVE the 
music 
 2 GENERAL SUPERIOR 
SPATIAL POSITION 
We never take from ABOVE the brow, 
just below 
 3 TEXT USE In summary, the detailed empirical word 
outlined ABOVE has enabled another 
general law 
 4 NUMERICAL SCALE Train fares have risen ABOVE inflation 
 5 ABOVE ALL Then ABOVE all we do need a very 
large membership 
 6 RANK/HIERARCHY The orders came from ABOVE 
3.6.5.1.1 Clear	cases	
The first group, which has an excellent degree of agreement and coherence, 
comprises sentences that use a sense of above to describe a figure sound that is (e.g., 
then, above the cracking of the fire, he did hear something), or is required to be (e.g., 
It’s really hard to hear you above the music), louder than a ground sound. While 
some participants matched members of this group with sentences from other groups, 
this was done rarely.  
 
The sense captured by the third group in the matrix referred to in this thesis as a 
TEXT USE sense of above (these uses will be discussed further in section 3.6.5.4). Its 
internal consistency and relative distinctiveness from other groups might be 
explained on the basis that participants will likely recognise the usages as belonging 
to the same modality, specifically, written text. It is also a sense which I would 
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anticipate that all readers of English encounter frequently, given that it is used across 
all forms of written media, from leaflets and forms to newspapers and books. 
Further, it has a very specific purpose: to direct the reader’s attention – be that 
mental or visual – back to a part of a preceding portion of the document. Perhaps 
these characteristics collectively allow participants to recognise the equivalence in 
meaning amongst the members of the group, and their distinctiveness from other 
sentences.  
 
The fourth group is varied in the extent to which participants agree that its members 
should be grouped together, but this does not prevent a sense emerging from the 
cluster. Each of the sentences describes a position on a numerical scale. One 
exception might be the sentence I know I’m pushing above my weight; this is a 
conventionalised collocation, but one which arguably takes its roots in the 
description of a numerical scale.  
 
The penultimate group in the similarity matrix enjoys a very high degree of 
agreement, which is likely the result of the fact that above is used in its member 
sentences as part of a particular collocation: above all.  
3.6.5.1.2 Trickier	cases	
It is unclear whether what I propose to be the second group is one group, or 
comprises a number of smaller groups. While there are certainly sets of sentences 
that arguably match each other better than with other sentences in the group, the 
group as a whole has so much internal agreement and overlap that making finer 
distinctions within the group may be an unnecessary and perhaps artificial 
interpretation. Instead, I propose that the sentences in this group reflect a generic and 
underspecified spatial sense of above in which a figure is located in a position 
superior to a ground. Note that this configuration need not be strictly vertical; as 
mysterious Glastonbury Tor, which towers above the flat landscape of the Somerset 
Levels demonstrates, as long as the figure is in a raised position, the configuration 
can be diagonal or vertical.  
 
The group of three sentences immediately below group 3 are sorted together with a 
good degree of agreement. Its position in the matrix, separate from other groups, 
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may encourage us to conclude that it does indeed represent a distinct sense. 
However, if we shift our view to the left of the matrix, we can see that the 
constituent sentences were sorted with some regularity with members of the large 
generic spatial group (group 2). The sentences in this group also describe spatial 
configurations, but what sets them apart is their specificity; the sentences each define 
the precise dimensions of the spatial scene described. Are these sentences members 
of a group that is distinct from the large, second group? Given that the items in this 
smaller group are sorted with some members of group 2 with a good degree of 
agreement, I would argue not. Certainly, they are considered less similar to some 
members of the large second group than others, as indicated by the paler shading 
than the dark cells that characterise much of group two. We might consider these to 
be “fringe” members of the group, and members by virtue of their similarity to some 
– but not all – members of the group.  
 
The final group arising from the sorting task shows patches of high agreement, but 
overall some disagreement over how similar certain members of the group are to 
certain other members. The result is a group with varying levels of pairwise 
agreement. There is evidence here that while I may take a splitting approach when 
categorising these sentences – I pick out distinctions between examples depicting a 
personal sense of superiority (exemplified by She likes to think she’s above all that 
silly gossip), a more objective sense of qualitative superiority (provide working 
conditions which are or above the average of its locality), and rank (I used to be his 
boss, but he works above me now) – these distinctions do not seem to be meaningful 
to the participants in this task. Instead, the groups in the matrix suggest that on the 
whole, participants find these examples to be similar in meaning, though not all 
equally similar. While I find the distinctions specified above meaningful, I can 
equally understand why these distinctions may be overlooked in favour of creating a 
single group. A person or object that is positioned above another in an organisational 
hierarchy or ranking table is expected to be considered superior to those persons or 
objects positioned lower. Ranks and hierarchies and superiority (self-regarded or 
otherwise) are therefore tied together, making a distinction perhaps less meaningful 
to some participants.  
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3.6.5.2 Lumping	and	splitting	
As we have seen in examinations of other words, participants in this task cannot 
always be described in terms of lumpers or splitters; some participants tend towards 
lumping sentences into large, seemingly undifferentiated groups, while others sort 
their sentences in ways that suggest both lumping and splitting tendencies. 
Participant A8 is a good example of a participant who demonstrates both tendencies. 
They created six groups for the sentences, comprising one spatial group, one non-
spatial group, and four mixed groups. The spatial group consists of sentences which 
almost exclusively describe two-dimensional relationships (e.g., The raven perched 
above the door). This factor of dimensionality is clearly an important one to this 
participant. However, other distinctions, such as the distance between figure and 
ground, or the degree of verticality in their relationship, are not of issue. Participant 
A2 adopts both approaches also; they create groups reflecting fine distinctions in 
non-spatial uses, to distinguish between relative loudness, importance, quality, and 
superiority/rank. In contrast, their spatial sentences are divided only according to 
whether they describe configurations with or without contact, and even this 
distinction seems to have been imperfectly executed. In contrast, participant A4 
adopts a lumping approach. They create two groups, labelled as ‘physical’ and 
‘metaphysical’, which would suggest that the participant is conscious of the 
distinction between the spatial and the abstract. However, this binary decision is 
imperfectly executed; one group consists of an undifferentiated collection of non-
spatial items, while the other is a mixed group of spatial and non-spatial items.  
3.6.5.3 Did	people	distinguish	between	spatial	and	metaphorical	uses?		
Mixed-sense groups were observed in the groups created by six of the eight 
participants. While most participants did use mixed-sense groups, they were 
relatively unusual occurrences; most participants created just one (one [A8] created 
four, and did not compensate for this heavy use of mixed-sense groups by creating 
more unmixed groups than other participants). One participant, A4, did not create 
any groups that exclusively captured spatial examples. Instead, the spatial items were 
captured within a group combining spatial, non-spatial and text use examples. This 
decision was unusual, though, and all other participants created at least one group to 
capture spatial examples, and another to capture non-spatial examples.  
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The presence of these mixed-sense groups in addition to unmixed groups of both 
spatial and non-spatial sentences therefore suggests that while participants are 
sensitive to the distinction between uses of above to describe spatial configurations 
and non-spatial phenomena, that distinction is not always the most important factor 
when deciding whether a set of examples of above are equivalent in meaning in all 
participants. 
3.6.5.4 Were	TEXT	USES	classified	as	examples	of	a	spatial	or	non-spatial	sense?	
Before this question is answered fully, it is necessary to explain how these uses were 
analysed. When analysing the sorting decisions each participant made, TEXT USES of 
above were checked to establish whether the labels participants gave the groups 
described the underlying meaning in spatial terms (for example, ‘underneath’, or 
‘further up’) or in another way (for example, ‘later in a document’, which has a 
temporal meaning). They were also studied to note whether they were sorted with 
spatial or non-spatial items. These observations shaped the way I will talk about how 
these particular uses were classified in the mind of the participant. When TEXT USES 
were sorted into a group with spatial items, or labelled in spatial terms, I classified 
them as representing a spatial sense group. Where they were sorted into a group with 
non-spatial items, or labelled in non-spatial terms, they were classified as a non-
spatial sense group. 
 
Close inspection of the labels participants used reveals interesting insights into what 
meaning above has in these uses in the mind of the participant. Participant A3 
grouped these sentences together under the label ‘below previous sentences’. In this 
label, the problem of establishing just what the nature of these uses are is captured: 
do they describe physical, spatial configurations, or abstract, temporal relationships? 
A3’s label indicates that, in this participant’s view, these uses reflect temporal and 
spatial configurations. I would agree with A3’s description of this group: this line of 
text is positioned in a lower location than, for example, the end of the last paragraph, 
but it is also encountered at a later time than the reader encounters that higher section 
of text. It is, therefore, a sense that is both spatial and temporal in nature. 
 
If A3 observed that these TEXT USES capture both the temporal and the spatial, it is 
not an observation that is evident in the responses made by other participants. By and 
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large, participants positioned these sentences in the domain of the non-spatial; three 
participants sorted them all using a temporal label, and two sorted them with other, 
non-spatial sentences. Only one participant, A7, sorted all of them with non-spatial 
items. The final participant, A8, split them into four groups and mixed them with 
both spatial and non-spatial items. 
 
The sorting and labelling decisions indicate that most participants in this task view at 
least some of the TEXT USES of above as capturing a temporal meaning. While their 
responses do not preclude the participants’ recognition of these examples as also 
capturing some spatial meaning, it is arguable that what sets them apart from other 
sentences in the task is that they describe a temporal relationship, and that if the 
participants recognise that a spatial configuration – i.e., the relative position of the 
referring and referent text – underlies this meaning, the fundamental spatiality of the 
example sentences is less salient, or is of less pertinence, than the temporal 
configuration the sentences describe. 
3.6.6 Below 
3.6.6.1 Did	any	meaningful	senses	emerge	in	the	similarity	matrix?		
The similarity matrix produced for the task reveals eight senses of varying degrees of 
distinctness. The table below lists the groups that emerge from the similarity matrix, 
and provides a suggestion of what sense is used in each sentence in the groups. For 
ease of reference, an example sentence for each group is also provided.  
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Table 15 Groups detected in similarity matrix for below 
Colour on 
similarity matrix 
Group 
number 
Tentative 
definition 
Example sentence 
 
1 
QUANTITATIVELY 
LESS THAN 
The loss is a little BELOW £3,200. 
 2 
QUALITATIVELY 
LESS THAN 
They were of BELOW average ability. 
 3 RANK 
BELOW the rank of sergeant, the pay is 
terrible. 
 4 TEXT USE 
Fill in BELOW all the tasks that you do in a 
typical day. 
 5 VANTAGE (3D) 
She looked out at the city BELOW like a 
living map. 
 6 LAYER (3D) 
They opened a shop BELOW the Redcar 
office. 
 7 LOWER THAN (2D) 
There was a large scratch BELOW the 
driver’s window. 
 8 GEOGRAPHICAL 
Anything BELOW the Watford Gap is the 
south. 
 
Unlike the preceding analyses of under, over and above, the groups that emerged in 
the task for below were all fairly uniform in their intelligibility. For that reason, only 
a short outline of the groups is presented here. 
 
The first group, at the top-left of the matrix, captures a QUANTITATIVELY LESS THAN 
sense of below, covering numerical values of any kind. The second represents a 
QUALITATIVELY LESS THAN sense, capturing sentences describing inferior positions 
on a qualitative scale. The third group captures examples that depict ranks in 
organisational hierarchies and ranking more generally. In combination, labelling this 
sense as RANK seems appropriate. The fourth group combines all sentences that use 
below to refer to the position of a piece of text.  
 
After this group begin the spatial senses proper; the fifth group can be best described 
as capturing sentences describing a VANTAGE-like perspective on three dimensions, 
in which the figure and ground are configured in a more diagonal arrangement. The 
sentences in the sixth group collectively describe LAYER-like configurations, while 
the seventh group captures two-dimensional spatial relationships best described by 
the term LOWER THAN. The final group captures a particular type of use of below, 
which is invoked to describe the position of a geographical figure in relation to a 
geographical ground.  
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While inspection of the similarity matrix allows these groups to be identified, they 
are not equally identifiable. In other words, some groups are more clearly 
distinguished from their neighbours than others. There is a notable distinction in the 
clarity of the groups that emerge from the non-spatial versus spatial sentences. Non-
spatial sentences cluster into more readily-defined groups than the spatial sentences, 
as can be seen in the light shading underneath the darker triangles that form below 
the non-spatial sentences. The shading of the triangle under the spatial sentences is 
much more inconsistent. It is only when one “zooms in” and looks at the values 
within the larger triangle that smaller triangles, representing more defined senses, 
emerge. 
3.6.6.2 Lumping	and	splitting	
Participants demonstrated tendencies for both lumping and splitting. For example, 
participant B1 created just five groups to capture the sentences presented. The non-
spatial sentences were split in two: the majority were in one undifferentiated group, 
indicating a tendency for lumping, but one sentence stood alone in a distinct group, 
indicating a tendency for splitting. This tendency is repeated in their sorting of 
spatial sentences: one group contains sentences describing all two-dimensional 
configurations, and the other contains all three-dimensional configurations. These 
are not distinctions that all participants find meaningful. However, the finer 
distinctions others found sufficiently meaningful to license more precise groups were 
apparently not meaningful to B1. We have, then, in this one participant a tendency to 
“lump” examples of below together without compromising acknowledgment of 
distinctions that they find meaningful. If the participant was a true lumper, it seems 
unlikely that the single-member non-spatial group would have been formed. Equally, 
the participant has taken care to attend to the dimensionality of the spatial scenes 
described in the stimulus sentences, and used this as a guide when deciding which 
sentences should be grouped together. Any other distinctions – distance between 
figure and ground, the nature of the figure and ground, for instance – are overlooked 
and are not considered sufficiently meaningful to license further groups. This is not 
an isolated case; other participants demonstrated that they were mindful of some fine 
distinctions, but not others. 
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3.6.6.3 Did	people	distinguish	between	spatial	and	metaphorical	uses?		
Amongst the 21 participants, mixed-sense groups were rare: only seven were 
created, and two of these were created by one participant (B20). In this way, below is 
therefore similar to under; participants who sorted examples of under created just 
one mixed-sense group between them. For the majority of participants in this task, 
then, it seems that the distinction between spatial and non-spatial uses of below was 
an important marker of difference, and thus acted as the fundamental factor when 
deciding whether or not sentences should be grouped together or split apart. 
However, as participant B20 in this task shows, and as has emerged throughout this 
chapter, the distinction between spatial and non-spatial meaning is not necessarily 
meaningful enough to divide the stimuli into finer groups.  
 
Close inspection of the sorting decisions made is a time-consuming task, but one 
which provides interesting insights. One particularly interesting decision made by 
participant B6 is their grouping of sentences that typically describe a change of 
position, whether that is abstract or physical. For example, they grouped together 
The value fell below that of the original investment and The crocodile sank below the 
surface. We can picture both scenarios in terms of levels: the level of the original 
investment on a numerical scale, and the level of the surface of the water, measured 
on a depth scale.  
3.6.6.4 Were	TEXT	USES	classified	as	examples	of	a	spatial	or	non-spatial	sense?	
In the preceding discussion of the results for above, it was observed that participants 
tended to describe TEXT USES of above in non-spatial – specifically, temporal – 
terms, or sort them only with sentences that used a non-spatial sense of above. Only 
one participant gave TEXT USES of above a spatial label. Given the relationship 
between TEXT USES of above and below, which differ only in that they are opposites, 
it seems reasonable to expect the same patterns to emerge in an analysis of how TEXT 
USES of below were sorted and labelled. 
 
The opposite pattern emerges when we look at how TEXT USES of below were sorted. 
No participant sorted TEXT USES only with non-spatial items, nor did any participant 
label these items in non-spatial terms. Instead, where TEXT USES were not considered 
a distinct group they were labelled in spatial terms, or sorted with spatial items. 
Accordingly, while these results do not rule out the possibility that participants may 
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also recognise the temporal nature of these text markers, taken at face value it seems 
that the spatial nature of these examples of below is more meaningful to these 
participants. This finding is consistent with the observation made in section 2.7.2.5. 
The significance of this contrasting outcome is considered in section 3.7.4 below. 
3.7 General discussion 
The aim of the study reported in this chapter was to investigate the possibility that 
there are individual differences in word senses, which was posited as a possible 
explanation of the results presented in Chapter 2. In that chapter, it was noted that 
participants did not reliably agree with me about how examples of over, under, 
above and below should be categorised when the categorisation criterion is the 
meaning of the word in context. It was speculated that this might be due to the fact 
that the senses I find meaningful differ from those of other native speakers, but that 
native speakers share a set of senses of these words. An alternative interpretation, 
that disagreement with my sense distinctions might be due to individual differences 
in word senses, was also proposed. This interpretation was supported by the fact that 
participants and I varied in the extent to which we (dis)agreed, suggesting that some 
participants and I may have at least some senses in common, while other participants 
and I might differ more extensively over what the senses of a given polysemous 
word are. In the face of this possible explanation, this study explicitly tested whether 
or not participants may have different word senses. This aim was achieved recruiting 
native speakers of English to complete an open sentence-sorting task. This type of 
task reveals which sentences participants judge to use the same sense of the target 
word, and which they judge to use different senses of that word.  
 
Statistical analyses carried out using Morey and Agresti’s adjusted Rand revealed 
variation in how well pairs of participants agreed about how the stimuli should be 
sorted. In the case of under and below, there were cases in which certain pairs of 
participants reached a level of agreement in excess of the 0.8 minimum Neuendorf 
(2002) recommends as reflecting an acceptable level of agreement. On the whole, 
however, mean agreement scores fell below that; in the case of over, above and 
below, mean agreement did not exceed 0.39. On the whole, the study revealed 
varying levels of agreement both across pairs of participants, and across the four 
words studied. Good agreement is taken to suggest that word senses are shared, and 
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poor agreement is taken to suggest that people assign different meanings to the 
stimuli, in turn suggesting that the senses they find meaningful differ. The data 
therefore suggest that, on the whole, there is considerable disagreement about what 
the meaning of the polysemous word in the context of each sentence is, indicating 
individual differences in word senses. 
 
Qualitative analyses were also carried out, addressing whether any clear senses could 
be identified using similarity matrices capturing all participants’ sorting decisions; 
whether or not there are material differences in the level of granularity participants 
apply when categorising the sentences; whether or not participants agree that there is 
a meaningful distinction between spatial and non-spatial uses of a polysemous word; 
and the semantic status of TEXT USES of above and below. These qualitative analyses 
are brought together in the sections below. 
3.7.1 Agreement about the senses of over, above, under and below 
Disagreement about how examples of over, under, above and below should be sorted 
suggest two key insights about the nature of word senses. First, the data indicate that 
participants do not agree what the senses of these words are. Qualitative support for 
this interpretation is presented in sections 3.6.4 to 3.6.6. If they did, we would expect 
much greater consistency in their sorting decisions, which would be reflected in 
clearer similarity matrices, more consistency in the number of groups created, and 
higher agreement values. Second, as reflected in Table 11, which shows differences 
in the number of groups each participant created, individuals appear to differ in the 
number of distinctions they make. Related to this finding is the observation that 
some participants attend more closely to minute variations in examples of these 
words than others do. 
 
This finding complicates the position of established analyses of these words, for 
example those by Tyler and Evans (2001) for over and Evans and Tyler (2005) for 
over, under, above and below. These studies, as well as other analyses of 
polysemous words that rely on the author’s intuitions, principled as they may claim 
them to be, seem incompatible with the finding that not only do participants fail to 
reliably agree with me, in my capacity as a linguist, about what the senses of these 
words are, but they also disagree with each other. In the case of Tyler and Evans’ 
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studies of these words, it seems that while the distinctions they propose seem logical 
and are distinguished using articulated decision principles, the distinctions they posit 
are unlikely to reliably converge with what non-linguists recognise to be meaningful.  
3.7.2 Lumping and splitting 
As shown in Table 11, there is considerable variation both across participants, and 
across the four words studied, about how many groups the sentences should be 
divided into. At this point, it is unclear what is behind participants’ differing 
judgments of the number of sense groups and agreement about how sentences should 
be grouped together. Ide and Wilks (2007) have proposed that finely-grained senses 
are only accessed when absolutely necessary for understanding. Unless a fine-
grained sense is needed for accurate disambiguation, a more coarsely-grained sense 
will suffice. The data shown in Table 11 above do not necessarily challenge this 
proposal, but do complicate it somewhat. If a participant uses few groups, this might 
indicate that the few distinctions that are used are all that are necessary to 
disambiguate successfully. A decision to create more groups may reflect 
participants’ belief that there are finer-grained distinctions that make meaningful 
delineations between uses. In terms of Ide and Wilks’ proposal, the number of 
distinctions participants ultimately feel the need to make in order for disambiguation 
to be successful therefore differs across individuals. 
 
However, how can we explain the difference in the number of groups created in the 
over task, compared with those created in the tasks for the other three words? 
Certainly, the range in the number of groups is similar to those observed in the data 
from the other three tasks, which provides support for the interpretation that 
individuals vary in the level of granularity they judge necessary to discriminate 
between senses. The minimum, maximum and mean numbers of groups, on the other 
hand, are very different. An explanation for this outcome might be that there is more 
semantic variation in the stimuli in the over task – and indeed, in how over is used in 
natural language. Certainly, the Oxford English Dictionary records more senses of 
over than it does the other three words. Perhaps the fine-grained senses of over 
cannot be easily collapsed into fewer coarser groups. The similarity matrix for over, 
when compared with those for under, above and below, supports this interpretation. 
As noted in section 3.6.4.1, there is a large amount of white space in the matrix, 
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which is created when no participant assigns a particular pair of sentences to the 
same group. This indicates that all of the participants found many possible sentence-
pairings to be inappropriate, suggesting that much of the stimuli were considered 
highly distinct from each other. This coincides with groups with generally rather 
strong membership. Between these two observations, it seems that groups are 
generally considered rather distinct from each other. It is only in the case of three 
groups, UNCLEAR, ARC and COVERING, that there is a more notable degree of overlap 
in group membership. The same cannot be said for the similarity matrices produced 
in the other three tasks. In those matrices, there is considerably less white space; in 
the case of below, there is none at all, showing that all sentences were paired 
together by at least one participant. While there are certainly distinct groups, as 
discussed in the qualitative analyses earlier in this chapter, there is also a 
considerable degree of overlap in group membership, which indicates that some 
groups may be collapsible into broader, coarser groups.  
 
On a somewhat different note, the results of these tasks indicate that notions of 
“lumpers” and “splitters” is a false dichotomy: individuals may be lumpers, they 
may be splitters, or they may be both. An empirical study of the polysemous words 
in, on and at by Sandra and Rice (1995) indicates that non-linguists do make use of 
some fine sense distinctions. However, it did not establish whether participants 
tended towards either fine-grained distinctions or broader classifications, or whether 
participants exhibited both sorting strategies. A similar study by Cuyckens et al. 
(1997) acknowledged the possibility that individuals may be sensitive to both broad 
and fine-grained distinctions, but in the absence of any data collected to examine this 
possibility, this remained a suggestion rather than a conclusion. To my knowledge, 
this possibility has not been addressed in polysemy literature. The significance of 
this gap in knowledge is highlighted by the fact that participants who sorted 
examples of these four words could not always be classified simply as lumpers or 
splitters. Instead, the data suggest that participants typically demonstrate both 
tendencies.  
3.7.3 The use of “mixed-sense” groups 
While at least one mixed-sense group – that is, a group comprised of sentences that I 
would judge to use both spatial senses and non-spatial senses of the target words – 
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was created in each of the four tasks, the tendency for participants to use such groups 
varied. Moreover, there was an unexpected pattern in the use of mixed-sense groups. 
On the one hand, most participants who sorted examples of over and above created 
mixed-sense groups. On the other, they were rare amongst the groups created for 
under and below. We might tentatively conclude from this outcome that the spatial 
vs. non-spatial distinction has varying degrees of semantic fundamentality across 
words and across participants.  
 
This outcome contrasts with similar empirical studies undertaken by Sandra and Rice 
(1995) and Cuyckens, Sandra, and Rice (1997). Those studies, which saw 
participants sorting examples of a number of prepositions, resulted in data 
suggesting that the major distinction between examples of these words was whether 
or not they describe spatial relations, an outcome which the authors conclude to 
indicate separate mental representations for spatial and non-spatial meanings of these 
prepositions. Perhaps due to the space limitations imposed on these publications, the 
authors do not describe any individual participants’ responses that suggest that this 
boundary was not always observed. However, such an outcome seems like an 
important one, worthy of at least brief mention, which suggests that a mixed-sense 
sorting strategy was not used. 
 
When we talk about the words over, under, above and below, we tend to describe 
them as spatial words, and we contrast their spatial senses with non-spatial senses. 
The results of this study suggest that while the spatial/non-spatial distinction is often 
a very meaningful one, some participants judge this distinction not to be sufficiently 
meaningful to license two groups, and that there is a more important aspect of their 
meaning that overshadows this distinction. Some participants seem to have, 
therefore, senses of these words which are sufficiently flexible to describe spatial 
and non-spatial domains. Existing work on the polysemy of spatial words – both 
theoretical (e.g., Tyler and Evans, 2001) and empirical (e.g., Cuyckens, Sandra, and 
Rice, 1997) – highlights the distinction of spatial and non-spatial senses, a 
distinction no doubt influenced by theories of metaphor which predict that concrete 
experience (in this case, spatial configurations and our real or imagined interactions 
with them) structure our understanding of abstract phenomena (in this case, non-
spatial meaning such as quantities and hierarchies) (e.g., Kövecses, 2002). That is 
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not to say that the relationship between spatial and non-spatial senses of these words 
is overlooked; on the contrary, it is explicitly argued that these non-spatial senses are 
understood on the basis of our experience with a particular spatial relationship. This 
position is illustrated particularly well in Tyler and Evans’ (2001, p. 746) semantic 
network of over.  
 
While research in polysemy acknowledges the relationship between concrete and 
abstract meanings, that is as far as it goes: there is a relationship, but the two 
domains remain distinct and are represented by distinct senses. In this task, we 
would expect this to manifest in the form of distinct spatial versus non-spatial 
groups. The data collected and presented are therefore difficult to reconcile with 
existing empirical research in the field, and existing theoretical accounts of the 
polysemy of spatial words, particularly those influenced by theories of metaphorical 
relations between concrete and abstract phenomena. These theories neither predict 
nor seem able to account for the transcendence of the spatial/non-spatial divide 
evident in participants’ senses. These data might be better accounted for in terms of 
an exemplar-based model of categorisation. This model assumes that the features or 
characteristics of stimuli exist in a multidimensional space, and that these 
characteristics are represented by axes. It predicts that when a particular 
characteristic acts as the variable by which stimuli are categorised, e.g., colour, the 
corresponding axis expands to reveal enhanced diversity in the shapes of the stimuli, 
resulting in the similarity of colour of the stimuli decreasing. At the same time, axes 
corresponding to irrelevant dimensions, e.g., shape, shrink, which results in the 
relative similarity of the shape of the stimuli increasing. 
 
While these data are clearly difficult to account for under existing accounts of 
polysemy, which borrow from prototype categorisation to explain the divisions and 
relations between uses, there is as yet insufficient evidence that an exemplar-based 
account of polysemy can better explain word sense representation. However, an 
early indication that this model may explain sense representation, taking into 
consideration the comments made above concerning the effect of the relevance of 
stimulus feature/characteristic axes, comes from participant O4’s creation of an 
‘instead of’ group, featuring the stimuli shown in Table 16. 
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Table 16 Members of participant O4's 'instead of' group 
Stimulus sentence 
Yeah can you turn that OVER please.  
I turn it OVER 
Turn that steak OVER, it's burning! 
They should have voted Labour OVER Lib Dem 
They live OVER the other side of the city 
Get those cars OVER there 
I think I'll sit OVER here 
I want that one OVER there 
bring the turning allowance of pelmet fabric OVER, and press with an iron to bond together 
 
In this case, the members of the group are judged to be distinct from other stimuli by 
virtue of the fact that they all share a characteristic of opposition. I offer here a crude 
suggestion of how an exemplar-based model of polysemy and word senses might 
explain the creation of this group. Given the shared notion of “opposition”, the 
axis/axes corresponding to the characteristic(s) of opposition expand to reveal the 
extent to which those characteristics are present in all of the stimuli. Irrelevant 
characteristics, such as the degree to which the stimuli described a spatial 
configuration, shrink, resulting in stimuli describing spatial and non-spatial scenarios 
becoming more similar to the point where they are indistinct from each other on that 
dimension.  
 
In summary, there appear to be individual differences in whether participants find 
the distinction between spatial and non-spatial uses of these words to be sufficiently 
meaningful to divide them into two groups, and tendencies for creating “mixed-
sense” groups varied across the four words studied.   
3.7.4 The temporal or spatial nature of TEXT USES of above and below 
We observed that participants who sorted examples of above typically sorted TEXT 
USE examples with sentences that were non-spatial in nature, or used labels that 
described temporal relations. In contrast, participants in the below task sorted TEXT 
USES with spatial items, or labelled their groups in spatial terms.  
 
This unexpected dichotomy might be explained through analysis of what states 
above and below in text contexts refer to. The use of above to refer to a statement 
made in a text certainly indicates its physical position. However, it also directs the 
  136 
reader’s attention to a temporal position and, more specifically, to a location in their 
own temporal experience. The opposite cannot be said of below. While above and 
below in this context both underspecify the precise spatial and temporal location of 
the referent text, that below locates the forthcoming text in the future means that the 
exact temporal position of the referent text is less likely to be known than when 
above is used. While the spatial and temporal positions above pinpoints are rather 
vague, the pinpoints have already been experienced. Our understanding of above in 
these contexts to capture a temporal meaning is therefore sound: assuming we have 
read the text from the beginning, in a linear fashion, we will have encountered the 
referent text, and so will have experienced it temporally as well as spatially. In 
contrast, when we encounter below in these contexts, we know that there is potential 
for us to encounter it at some point in time, but that we may not necessarily 
encounter it – we may give up reading before we encounter the referent text, for 
example. However, its spatial location remains regardless of our continued 
interaction with the text. This may justify our understanding of this sense of below as 
one which is fundamentally spatial in nature.  
 
In summary, there was an overarching tendency for participants to categorise TEXT 
USES of above in a manner which suggested they considered them to have a non-
spatial, and possibly temporal, meaning. In contrast, participants in the below task 
tended to categorise these examples in a manner which indicated that they judged 
this sense to describe a spatial meaning.  
3.8 Conclusions  
This study begins to add to our understanding of the nature of the senses of 
polysemous words, specifically, the degree to which native speakers of English agree 
with each other about which uses of over, under, above and below share a meaning, 
and which uses do not. Analysis of agreement values, calculated using Morey and 
Agresti’s adjusted Rand, suggest that participants fail to reliably agree with each 
other about how uses of these four words should be categorised when the 
categorisation criterion is the meaning of the word in context. Further evidence 
gathered from a more qualitative analysis supported this quantitative approach. 
Specifically, I observed that there were considerable differences in the number of 
groups individual participants created, indicating differences in the level of 
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granularity participants apply when considering whether examples of a given word 
are the same or different. I also observed differences in the use of “mixed-sense” 
groups, whereby some participants created groups containing what I judged to 
exemplify spatial and non-spatial uses of the target word. In contrast, analysis of 
how TEXT USES of above and below were classified revealed striking consensus about 
their meaning; while these uses of above were categorised in a manner suggesting 
that they have a temporal meaning, classification of these uses of below suggest that 
speakers judge them to have a spatial meaning. 
 
We have observed that the senses of the polysemous words over, under, above and 
below do not appear to be shared by all speakers. Inter-participant disagreement over 
what constitutes an example of a particular sense has been observed in computational 
linguistics research (e.g., Passonneau, Baker, Fellbaum, and Ide, 2012; Passonneau 
et al., 2010). In this study the extent to which pairs of participants agreed with each 
other varied tremendously from pair to pair, and across the four words. While some 
disagreement might be reasonably expected, the extent of disagreement we have 
seen, and the fact that this disagreement is itself variant, pushes that expectation to 
the limit. However, the scale of the task may be to blame for poor inter-participant 
agreement. After all, if the significant cognitive demands the task imposes caused 
inconsistent or incoherent sorting decisions within participants, we should not expect 
their sorting decisions to be consistent across participants. 
 
With this caveat, we can tentatively conclude that there may be individual 
differences in word senses. This outcome, paired with the findings reported in 
Chapter 2 concerning naïve participants’ agreement with my sense distinctions, 
encourages linguists intending to pursue an analysis of a polysemous word that relies 
in whole or in part on their intuitions to proceed with caution.  
 
This is an exciting outcome with theoretical and technological implications, and for 
this reason this conclusion demands further study. It was noted above that 
disagreement amongst participants may be a result of fatigue, boredom, or forgetting, 
as a result of the large scale of the task. To eliminate this possibility, a reduced and 
more structured iteration of the task, will be used to test further for individual 
differences in word senses.  This study will be reported in the next chapter. 
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My urging of a rigorous approach to testing this outcome comes from my 
recognition that the scale of the inter-participant differences reported here is not 
currently accounted for in theoretical treatments of polysemy, nor in technological 
approaches. Researchers in word sense disambiguation studying polysemy tend to 
focus on developing a gold standard inventory of word senses. Creating a gold 
standard is intended to allow machines to correctly disambiguate the language 
produced by any native speaker of the target language. In the face of data that 
suggests that people disagree with each other about what the senses of a given word 
are, it seems that an interesting line of research might be to establish whether tailored 
word sense inventories are desirable and feasible. Gold standard and tailored sense 
inventories have mutually exclusive trade-offs: a gold standard system would allow 
any example of text or spoken language to be disambiguated to an acceptable 
standard, but disambiguation may not be perfect. A hypothetical tailored sense 
inventory would be intended to reach 100% accuracy when disambiguating a target 
person’s spoken or written language, but, if individuals do differ in their sense 
distinctions, this algorithm would not achieve perfect accuracy with non-target 
individuals’ language. 
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Chapter 4 Experiment 3: Testing an 
exemplar model of word senses 			
The sentence sorting task reported in Chapter 3 found disagreement amongst 
participants over how examples of over, under, above and below should be 
categorised when the sole sorting criterion is their meaning. As noted in the 
concluding remarks, the large degree of disagreement might be explained in 
methodological terms; specifically, the large scale of the task might have resulted in 
one or a combination of fatigue, boredom, confusion or semantic satiation. This 
possibility is easily addressed by reducing the scale of the task. The study reported 
here achieves this. In addition, a minor refinement of the methodology allows other, 
equally interesting issues to be addressed. Specifically, it was noted that the 
individual differences that were observed in Experiment 2 could be accommodated if 
we assume an exemplar-theoretic representation system for word senses. 
Accordingly, this chapter offers a refinement of Experiment 2; the scale is smaller 
and the stimuli more structured. In addition, the study collects data which is intended 
to shed light on whether word senses are stored in memory. Finally, the study aims 
to assess whether a central prediction of the (Generalised) Context Model of 
Classification (Medin and Schaffer, 1978; Nosofsky, 1986), namely selective 
attention, is observed in categorisation decisions made in these sorting tasks. 
Following convention in cognitive linguistics, the GCM will henceforth be referred 
to as the exemplar model. 
 
Applying a model of categorisation developed in cognitive psychology to linguistic 
categorisation is not new in cognitive linguistics; after all, given the cognitive 
commitment, it makes perfect sense to assume that categorisation principles in other 
cognitive domains apply to linguistic categorisation. To date, linguistic 
categorisation accounts of polysemy have canonically assumed that a representation 
system inspired by Rosch and colleagues’ prototype model can account for their 
storage and organisation (Brugman and Lakoff, 2006 [1988]; Tyler and Evans, 
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2001). More recent accounts have moved away from that model, and considered 
whether the exemplar model, a theory compatible with usage-based accounts of 
language, can account for the representation of word senses (Gries 2015). 
 
This chapter is organised into two parts. The first part situates the study in a broader 
context and offers a critical review of research on word sense storage, contrasting 
exemplar- and prototype-theoretic accounts of word sense representation. Following 
my review of exemplar-theoretic accounts of word sense storage, I note that while 
exemplar theory has been drawn upon to account for word sense representation, to 
date this work has not tested the central prediction of exemplar theory – selective 
attention, which was introduced in section 1.9.2.1. While selective attention in 
linguistic categorisation has received relatively little focus, both selective attention 
and attention more generally have been the topic of study by linguists, and I dedicate 
some space in this literature review to introducing some work that has studied the 
relationship between (selective) attention and language. 
Part 1: Literature review 
4.1 Are word senses stored? 
The question of whether or not word senses are stored has been given three answers. 
The first is that they are not. According to Ruhl (1989), many ambiguous words have 
a single, underspecified meaning. Context is used to substantiate the meaning, 
resulting in ad-hoc senses that are created on the fly, as and when necessary. Word 
meaning is, in his view, a product of linguistic and extralinguistic context (p. vii), 
and is pragmatic rather than semantic (p. ix). The second answer, which Murphy 
(2007, p. 57) describes as the “logical opposite” of a monosemy account is that every 
sense is stored in memory. This account may be compatible with an exemplar-based 
model of word sense storage: by virtue of storing every instance of a particular word 
in an organised, multidimensional space, word senses on the most minute scale – 
down to single exemplar senses – are stored. The third answer is that some are, and 
some are not. Tyler and Evans (2001, p. 727) are proponents of this position, 
claiming that there is a distinction between senses that are stored in memory, versus 
those that are mere “interpretations” created on an ad hoc basis. 
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4.1.1 Exemplar-based accounts of word senses 
In line with this third, intermediate proposal, Murphy claims that “[p]olysemous 
senses will sometimes be explicitly represented and sometimes not, depending in 
part on how distant a given sense is from other, established senses” (2007, p. 65).  
This middle ground, “limited listings” proposal assumes that our encounters with a 
given word are mapped to a position in a multidimensional space. If a word is used 
in a similar way to how it has been encountered previously, it will be mapped to an 
already-known location in the space. If it is used in a novel way, a new mapping, to a 
previously-unencountered location, will be created. In this account, Murphy (2007) 
argues that two factors can cause multiple, distinct representations: frequency, and 
semantic distance – or similarity. However, he notes that these factors are related: if 
two uses of a given word are quite similar in meaning, they may initially be 
represented singly. However, if these similar uses are more frequent, the speaker is 
given more opportunities to establish what makes each use different, a process which 
can, over time, result in the separation of the two uses into distinct senses. In 
contrast, the more dissimilar two uses of a given word are, the fewer encounters one 
needs for the uses to be represented separately.  
 
However, if two uses – let us call them sub-senses here – of a given word are very 
similar and very frequent, then one might predict that their high frequency could also 
result in their confusability: as well as being given more opportunities to establish 
what makes the two sub-senses contrast, the speaker is given more opportunities to 
establish what makes them alike. Further, it seems likely that examples of sub-senses 
a and b, i.e., a1 and b1 will be differentially similar to one another than examples a2 
and b2 which in turn will be differentially similar to one another than examples a3 
and b3. In other words, examples of sub-senses a and b will vary in how much they 
differ; some examples of a and b will be very dissimilar, while some will be very 
similar. In terms of a semantic space, some will be very proximal, while others will 
be very distant. In the absence of a clear divide between examples of sub-senses a 
and b, we might expect that they would have a single representation, as illustrated in 
Figure 38. 
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Figure 38 Diagram illustrating a single representation resulting from differentially-similar 
exemplars of sub-senses a and b 
 
If these sub-senses are very frequent, then in order to create the two separate 
representations that Murphy predicts it is necessary for the more dissimilar pairs of 
examples to be much more frequent than the similar pairs. This is illustrated in 
Figure 39. 
 
Figure 39 Diagram illustrating two separate representations resulting from multiple dissimilar 
exemplars of sub-senses a and b 
 
Since we are talking here about the effect that similar pairs of examples of two sub-
senses have on the explicit representation of (sub-)senses, the notion that lots of 
dissimilar examples of pairs of sub-senses are necessary to support this aspect of the 
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proposal seems a little illogical. Rather than creating distinct senses, and assuming 
that word senses are represented in this “limited listings” manner, I would instead 
propose that frequent examples of similar sub-senses would result in a much broader, 
coarse-grained sense (encompassing a and b) which can, should the need arise, be 
inspected more closely to identify the finer distinctions separating a and b. This is 
illustrated in Figure 40. 
 
 
Figure 40 Diagram showing original single representation captured in Figure 38 (black outline), 
plus finer-grained separate representations that can be accessed as needed (grey and blue 
dashed outlines) 
 
This proposal is consistent with Ide and Wilks' (2007, p. 66) comments about the 
relative necessity of coarse- to fine-grained senses. They propose that “‘sense 
disambiguation’ is really a process of step-wise sense refinement that progressively 
distinguishes ‘sub-senses’ as needed for understanding” (my emphasis). In other 
words, when finely-grained senses are not necessary, they are not accessed. A 
multidimensional space model, in which sub-senses are represented, does allow fine 
distinctions to be accessed where necessary. 
 
There is a clear overlap between the language Murphy (2007) uses and the language 
used by proponents of exemplar models of categorisation. In both cases, exemplars – 
linguistic or otherwise – are located in a multidimensional space, in which the 
dimensions are properties held by the objects. The exemplar model, which has been 
  144 
shown to account well for categorisation of non-linguistic phenomena, appears to be 
compatible with an intuitive middle-ground account of sense enumeration along the 
lines Murphy proposes. Because the representation consists of exemplars, Murphy’s 
proposal also appears to be compatible with the usage-based account of language 
that cognitive linguists support. Under this model, differences in exposure to a given 
word may explain why humans may fail to agree with each other about what fine-
grained sense of a target word is used in a stimulus sentence. Applying this to 
computational linguistics, given that automated WSD algorithms are trained using 
vast corpora of language that may not necessarily match the exposure of the person 
who created the “gold standard” sense inventory, a model such as this may also 
explain why automated WSD does not result in perfect agreement. 
 
While Murphy’s use of particular terms suggests that his account may be compatible 
with an exemplar-theoretic model of word sense representation, other scholars 
explicitly align themselves with the exemplar model when describing the 
psychological status of word senses. For example, Gries (2010), in his discussion of 
the behavioral profile approach introduced by (Divjak 2003) explicitly claims that 
the model is compatible with exemplar theory (p. 340).  Of most relevance to the 
present research is that the model assumes that exemplars of a given word are tagged 
for particular information, and that this information corresponds to a dimension in a 
multidimensional psychological space. In this way, Gries and his colleagues’ 
approach undoubtedly aligns with the multidimensional space assumed in exemplar 
theory, and it certainly accommodates why exemplars of a category are more similar 
to each other than they are to exemplars of other categories.  
4.1.1.1 Attention	and	language	
While exemplar-theoretic models of word sense representation have been proposed, 
none, to my knowledge, discuss the effect of selective attention, a concept of central 
importance in exemplar theory that was introduced in section 1.9.2.1. Before 
reviewing the literature on selective attention in linguistic categorisation, I will first 
offer an overview of attention more generally, and note that while selective attention 
is generally overlooked in cognitive linguistics, attention has long been a topic of 
interest in the field. Its longstanding place in cognitive linguistic research may be 
explained on the grounds that attention is a domain-general cognitive function.  
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A simple example of seeing and hearing an ambulance while driving demonstrates 
the domain-general nature of attention: one can visually attend to the direction in 
which the ambulance is headed, and aurally attend to the sound of the siren, and the 
driver’s interpretation of the resultant visual and aural signals can allow them to 
determine whether it is headed toward or away from them, and alter their driving 
path accordingly. This example also indicates that attention is not equally 
distributed, but can be moved and refocused according to internal and external 
demands and influences. For example, when listening to a piece of music, one 
listener might listen closely to the lyrics, overlooking other aspects such as timbre or 
the bass line. In contrast, another, perhaps someone trying to learn how to recreate 
this piece of music themselves, might attend closely to the chords, ignoring all other 
aspects for now. The psychological processes captured by the umbrella term of 
attention are incorporated into cognitive accounts of a range of linguistic 
phenomena, from our initial acquisition of words, to how those words are organised 
in a sentence. At the start of our lives, attention – specifically, joint attention – is 
understood to play a pivotal role in our acquisition and development of language. 
Joint attention, in which two or more people “(1) attend to the same object, (2), 
know that the other does, and (3) know that the other knows” (Verhagen, 2015, p. 
283), is understood to be a crucial factor in language acquisition style and lexical 
development (e.g., Tomasello and Farrar, 1986; Tomasello and Todd, 1983). This 
ability to share, and indeed direct, attention provides an early foundation for 
successful communication, which Langacker (2001, p. 144) proposes to arise when a 
speaker and hearer direct and focus their attention in coordination, resulting in 
attention being directed to and focused on the same “conceived entity.” Once these 
first words are acquired and from that point onwards, linguists and psychologists 
propose that attention “appear(s) to constrain directly the use of linguistic structures 
during language production” (Myachykov, Tomlin and Posner, 2005, p. 351).  
 
The way we use language therefore reflects our general tendency to distribute 
attention unequally (Myachykov, Tomlin and Posner, 2005). For example, the way 
we talk about events reflects an equal balance of attention between agent and patient. 
As outlined by Myachykov et al. (2011. p. 99), a rich body of literature has 
demonstrated the impact that attention on either agent or patient in a transitive event 
has on a participant’s description of that scene; briefly, when participants initially 
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see an agent character, they almost always use the active voice to describe the event. 
When they see the patient character, use of the active voice declines, and the passive 
is chosen by some participants6. Likewise, the way we describe entities reflects the 
level of attention one pays to their features. As the two examples below indicate, the 
level of specificity in a description will be determined by the degree of attention the 
author (and/or reader) is likely to pay to the object. 
 
8. This is a 19th Century Victorian mahogany bookcase with a galleried 
rectangular top above open front of 3 adjustable shelves flanked by stiles 
mounted with corbels and raised on plinth base. (LoveAntiques 2017) 
9. White oak bookcase for sale in great condition small damage to top corner 
but an easy fix cost over 300 (Gumtree 2017) 
 
4.1.1.2 Selective	attention	in	language	and	linguistic	categorisation		
As the previous section demonstrated, attention and its relationship with language 
have been and continue to be an area of interest to cognitive linguists. This fact, 
alongside the fact that categorisation – including exemplar theories thereof – is also a 
central topic in cognitive linguistics, makes it all the more surprising that selective 
attention has received sparse attention by linguists, including those who explore 
exemplar-theoretic accounts of linguistic categorisation. In the following section, I 
will introduce some research that has examined the role that selective attention plays 
in language. The majority of this research considers selective attention out of 
categorisation contexts, and instead addresses the role that selective attention plays 
in normal and second language development. Following this, I will then move to 
address selective attention’s status in cognitive linguistics as an aspect of exemplar 
theory that is generally overlooked in exemplar-theoretic accounts of linguistic 
categorisation. Finally, I will introduce an example of research by Kalyan (2012) that 
has considered selective attention and its role in linguistic categorisation. This 
particular piece of research is especially important as it offers an answer to a 
question typically left unanswered: if categorisation depends on selective attention, 
exactly what aspect(s) of the object to be categorised should one attend to? His 
                                                
6 As research on languages other than English has demonstrated, however, attention is not the sole 
determinant of word order choice (Myachykov, Garrod, and Scheepers, 2011). 
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answer is offered as part of a wider study of differential acceptability of questions 
with long distance dependencies. 
4.1.1.2.1 Selective	attention	and	language	
As noted in the preceding section, selective attention and its role in linguistic 
categorisation have come under relatively little scrutiny, despite the growing 
currency of exemplar theory to account for linguistic categories. That said, a large 
body of work does exist to examine the role that selective attention plays in language 
more generally, and especially in the development of first and additional languages. 
Scholars and clinicians working with populations with specific language impairment 
(SLI) have observed that children with SLI demonstrate different attention abilities, 
indicating the importance of selective attention for language acquisition. Stevens, 
Sanders, and Neville (2006) observed in an ERP study that while typically 
developing children responded more positively to probes in attended stimuli than in 
unattended stimuli, children with SLI responded in a similar way to probes in 
attended and unattended stimuli. The fact that the two groups responded similarly to 
probes in unattended stimuli, but differently to probes in attended stimuli indicates 
that children with SLI show deficits in signal enhancement rather than distractor 
suppression. In other words, selective attention deficits in children with SLI do not 
appear to be caused by an inability to overlook distracting, irrelevant stimuli, but 
instead by an inability to enhance target, relevant stimuli. Likewise, selective 
attention has been proposed to play an important role in second language acquisition, 
due to the suggestion that L2 acquisition depends on the ability to consciously attend 
to the form of input (Robinson 1995). Indeed, Lively et al. (1993) has proposed that 
one cause of the difficulty of acquiring a second language is the fact that “retuning” 
one’s selective attention mechanisms, to allow one to attend to features of a stimulus 
that are irrelevant in the native language but which are relevant in the second 
language, is a difficult task.  
 
Elsewhere, research in adult language impairment has opened up debate on the 
direction of the relationship between selective attention and language. Lupyan and 
Mirman (2013) studied aphasic and matched control participants’ performance in 
low-dimensional and high-dimensional categorisation tasks. In low-dimensional 
tasks, stimuli shared one or few common features and were required to be organised 
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into narrow categories such as “things that are orange”. High-dimensional tasks 
featured stimuli that shared multiple features and were to be organised into broad 
categories such as “farm animals”. The authors proposed that low-dimensional 
categorisation requires greater cognitive control in that participants must attend to 
one or only a few features of an array of stimuli, and ignore others that might 
distinguish them. In this way, the selective attention demands created by low-
dimensional tasks were much greater than those presented by high-dimensional 
tasks. They further hypothesised that cognitive control resulting in successful low-
dimensional categorisation may be supported by language – in particular, naming 
abilities. The authors observed that aphasic participants performed significantly 
worse than matched controls in low-dimensional categorisation tasks, but not on 
high-dimensional categorisation tasks. This was found to be irrespective of the lesion 
site, indicating that rather than categorisation and naming impairments being jointly 
impaired by cognitive control mechanisms, naming ability supports low-dimensional 
categorisation. In other words, the authors propose that language may support 
selective attention.  
4.1.1.2.2 Selective	attention	and	linguistic	categorisation	
According to exemplar-theoretic accounts of categorisation, selective attention is 
what produces categories, formed of exemplars represented in a multidimensional 
space, and what facilitates accurate categorisation. By selectively attending to a 
particular feature of a stimulus, such as its colour, exemplars are reorganised in the 
space according to their colour. Red objects, for example, are located closely 
together, and separately from black objects. If, on the other hand, the same objects 
were being organised by their shape, black and red triangles, which in the first 
scenario were in different categories, will now find themselves in the same category, 
and separate from black and red circles. In this way, categories are inherently 
dynamic. This notion of dynamic categories logically entails that categories are not 
fixed representations. The possibility that categories are not fixed, but are created ad 
hoc, entails that any exemplar-theoretic model of word senses must acknowledge 
that word senses are also impermanent structures, and simply potential categories of 
exemplars. To my knowledge, this possibility has not been addressed or explored in 
cognitive linguistic work on word senses. The notion of word senses as potentials 
has, however, been alluded to in lexicographic literature. Kilgarriff, in his rejection 
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of word senses entirely, proposed that “word senses exist only relative to a task.” 
(1997, p. 1). While Kilgarriff does not position this statement in an exemplar-
theoretic context, his claim is compatible with the theory. 
 
Given the centrality of this effect to the exemplar model of categorisation, and the 
growing currency of exemplar-theoretic accounts of word sense representation, this 
is an important gap. It is somewhat surprising, though, that this gap exists to begin 
with. After all, observing selective attention effects in word senses would be a strong 
indicator that they are represented in a manner consistent with exemplar theory. 
There is evidence, however, that in some cases linguistic categorisation is treated 
separately from categorisation of other phenomena. For example, in her exemplar-
based account of the representation of constructions, Bybee (2006, p. 716), says that 
“In some versions of exemplar representation, exemplars are scattered randomly 
through space. Only when categorization of a new exemplar is necessary are they 
organized by similarity”. Bybee states here that in a categorisation task 
(experimental or real), the position of exemplars in space changes from random to 
organised; this is consistent with the account central to Medin and Schaffer and 
Nosofsky’s models. However, the notion that they are “randomly scattered” is at 
odds with the notion of a multidimensional space. Exemplars are located in a 
location corresponding to values on multiple dimensions, i.e., in a location that is 
anything but random. Afterwards, Bybee states that “Because linguistic 
categorisation takes place so often I propose that linguistic categories […] are more 
entrenched in the sense that frequently used categorisations have an impact on 
neurological organisation.” (p. 716). I take this to suggest that Bybee judges 
exemplar categories of linguistic phenomena, such as phonemes and constructions, 
to have a fixed location in an organised space, which is therefore not modulated by 
selective attention. Furthermore, categories, under this account, are understood as 
fixed representations. In this way, although advocating an exemplar-based account of 
linguistic categorisation, Bybee appears to treat linguistic categorisation separately 
from categorisation in general. This approach is not unique; in his overview7 of 
                                                
7 This overview evaluates three models of inflectional morphology based on exemplar models of 
categorisation: Albright and Hayes' (2003) Minimal Generalization Model, Daelemans et al.'s (2002) 
Memory-Based Learning model, and Skousen's (1989, 1992) Analogical Model. He observed that 
even incidental variables (i.e., features corresponding to dimensions in a multidimensional 
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computational models of inflectional morphology, Chandler (2010) notes that 
models that have incorporated “weak” versions of the generalized context model 
developed by Nosofsky (1986), in which feature weightings and therefore selective 
attention are removed, perform worse than models which do include some form of 
feature weighting. Elsewhere, a limited amount of research has studied – and found – 
selective attention effects in linguistic categorisation (Ellis, 2006; Francis and 
Nusbaum, 2002; Lively et al., 1993). 
 
It is unclear whether omission of selective attention and/or feature weighting from 
linguistic accounts of categorisation is intentional, or comes as a result of a 
misunderstanding of exemplar theory. However, within his overview, Chandler 
(2010) claims that accounts of exemplar categorisation in cognitive linguistic 
literature are fundamentally inaccurate, in that they claim that categories (rather than 
only exemplars of a potential category) are represented in the model; this is certainly 
true of Bybee’s proposal. He attributes this, in part, to Nosofsky’s (and presumably 
therefore also to Medin and Schaffer’s, 1978) invocation of a multidimensional 
space, stating that the proximity of exemplars in a psychological space like this is 
understood therefore to reflect relative similarity, and therefore category 
membership. “Clouds” of exemplars, to use Pierrehumbert's (2000) term, are 
therefore understood in cognitive linguistic literature to represent a category. 
Chandler takes exception to this, arguing that these clouds do not necessarily 
represent categories. I make no comment on this argument, but do challenge his 
claim that it is Nosofsky’s proposal of a multidimensional space that has resulted in 
inaccurate understanding of the nature of the exemplar model by cognitive linguists. 
Both Medin and Schaffer’s (1978) context theory of classification and Nosofsky’s 
(1986) generalized context model make absolutely plain the role of feature 
weightings and selective attention in categorisation decisions. In Medin and 
Schaffer’s (1978, p. 212) words,  
 
Selective attention can be represented by changes in the salience or 
similarity parameter for dimensions. That is, the similarity parameter of 
                                                                                                                                     
psychological space) associated and stored with exemplars have been demonstrated to significantly 
improve inflection choices. In light of this, and due to their absence in the Minimal Generalization 
Model, he ultimately concludes this model can be rejected (p. 406). 
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two cues along a dimension is less when that dimension is attended than 
when it is not.  
 
This assumption is designed to capture the consequences of active 
hypothesis testing. For example, if subjects were trying out the possibility 
that all red stimuli belong to Category A and all green stimuli to Category 
B, they might code much less information about other attributes such as 
size or form than otherwise. As a result, the effective similarity of two 
size or two form cues might be greater than usual, and the effective 
similarity of red and green would be expected to be less than otherwise. 
 
And in Nosofsky’s (1986, p. 41) words, 
 
It is assumed that [...] multidimensional perceptual representation 
underlies performance in both the identification and categorisation 
paradigms. However, a selective attention process is assumed to operate 
on this perceptual representation that can lead to systematic changes in 
the structure of the psychological space and associated changes in 
interstimulus similarity relations. […] Selective attention is modelled by 
differential weighting of the component dimensions in the psychological 
space[…]. In geometric terms, the weights act to stretch or shrink the 
psychological space along its coordinate axes. 
 
Selective attention in itself rules out the possibility that categories have fixed 
representations in these models. Given the clarity with which Medin and Schaffer 
(1978) and Nosofsky (1986) describe selective attention and feature weighting, I 
disagree with Chandler, and suggested instead that should a scholar opt to omit 
selective and attention and/or feature weighting, and therefore treat linguistic 
categorisation as a separate phenomenon, this is not the consequence of Chandler’s 
perceived lack of clarity about the long-term position of exemplars in a 
multidimensional space. 
 
If a scholar working within the cognitive linguistic framework does opt to omit 
selective attention from their account, this would be rather surprising. To do so 
would be to treat categorisation of linguistic versus other phenomena separately. 
This would be contrary to the cognitive commitment underpinning the cognitive 
linguistic framework: the commitment to explaining linguistic phenomena – in this 
case, linguistic categories – in terms of what we already know about cognition more 
generally – in this case, what we know about categorisation as a domain-general 
process. In the case of Bybee’s statement, that the frequency of linguistic categories 
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necessitates that they be treated separately and understood to have more fixed 
representations, we should note that categorisation is by necessity a continuous 
process. As a result, we perpetually encounter stimuli which we are then tasked with 
categorising. Treating linguistic categorisation separately on the grounds that 
linguistic categories are frequent is therefore somewhat problematic.  
 
Whether due to decisive omission or misunderstanding, to my knowledge, work that 
studies the prediction of selective attention effects in polysemy is absent. This leaves 
open an interesting opportunity to test this prediction empirically, and to assess 
whether a modified version of the exemplar model is necessary to accommodate 
linguistic categorisation. 
4.1.1.2.3 What	role	can	linguistic	applications	of	exemplar	theory	play	in	theory	
development?		
While exemplar-theoretic accounts of linguistic categorisation do not typically 
account for what role selective attention plays in categorisation decisions, there are 
exceptions, some of which were introduced briefly in the previous section. In this 
section I will introduce research by Kalyan (2012), who aims to account for 
differences in acceptability of questions with long-distance dependencies (LDD 
questions) in exemplar-theoretic terms; more specifically, he accounts for these 
differences in terms of selective attention. This piece of work is unusual not only for 
its foregrounding of the role of selective attention in exemplar-theoretic linguistic 
categories, but for the fact that it offers a suggestion to a question often left 
unanswered in exemplar theory research: how exactly does one determine what they 
should attend to in a categorisation event? He notes that when exemplar theory is 
invoked to account for linguistic categorisation, the feature(s) to which one should 
attend to decide whether a novel item is a member of a particular category are 
generally left unspecified; moreover, he notes the tendency for scholars to assume 
that similarity is invariant. In line with the notion in exemplar theory that 
categorisation is context-specific, Kalyan proposes that the feature(s) to which one 
should attend must be determined in the context of the specific categorisation event; 
in other words, when presented with the same stimulus on two different occasions, 
the features that one must attend to will vary according to what the categorisation 
goal is. Kalyan proceeds to propose that the features that one should attend to are 
typically those that tend to characterise the category features themselves; i.e., one 
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should attend to “necessary features” of the category. Kalyan’s answer to the 
question of what features one should attend to was provided following his aim to 
reconcile Dąbrowska's (2008) and Ambridge and Goldberg's (2008) ostensibly 
competing accounts of why some verb seems less acceptable than others in questions 
with long distance dependencies (LDD questions). He observes that Dąbrowska’s 
proposition that LDD questions featuring verbs of saying and thinking are considered 
more prototypical depending on how similar the main verb is to think or say. 
Ambridge and Goldberg, he notes, do not reach for a similarity-based explanation, 
and instead propose that the restriction of certain verbs arises from the potential 
incompatibility between the information structure properties of the verb and the 
construction (p. 543). Specifically, they propose that that the constituent forming the 
gap in a filler-gap construction must not be backgrounded, and instead must either be 
the topic of the non-gapped clause or within its potential focus domain. As a result, 
an LDD question is judged as more acceptable if its matrix verb is a “light” or 
“bridge” verb such as think or say, than if it is a manner-of-speaking verb such as 
mumble, or a factive verb such as notice, due to the fact that the complement clauses 
of manner-of-speaking and factive verbs are typically backgrounded, while the 
complement clauses of light or bridge verbs need not be. 
 
While Dąbrowska and Ambridge and Goldberg offer ostensibly competing accounts 
of why some verbs, but not others, are acceptable in LDD questions, Kalyan 
suggests that the two can be reconciled. He proposes that Ambridge and Goldberg’s 
proposition that acceptability results from information structural compatibility 
between construction and verb can be explained in similarity terms, if one considers 
that the acceptability of an LDD question is a function of how similar a matrix verb 
is to the matrix verbs that appear in attested LDD questions in terms of how far the 
verb foregrounds its complement clause. However, he notes that this account might 
be objected to on the grounds that in order to successfully judge the acceptability of 
an LDD question – or indeed produce an acceptable LDD question – one needs to 
know that its acceptability hinges on this very specific property of one component of 
the construction. He proposes that this knowledge may emerge through exposure to 
and usage of the construction, noting that the high frequency of think and say as the 
main verb in LDD questions, and the fact that both verbs strongly foreground their 
complement, allows speakers to gradually come to know that the acceptability of an 
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LDD question is likely to depend upon the degree to which the verb in the 
construction foregrounds its complement. 
 
As well as demonstrating the explanatory power of selective attention in 
categorisation decisions, Kalyan’s paper serves the demonstrate the important role 
that linguistic applications of theories of cognition more generally can play in 
developing those theories. Given the vast role that categorisation plays in language, 
the study of linguistic categories offers a rich testing ground for evaluating the 
credibility of categorisation theories, for testing their generalisability, and for 
developing them. 
4.1.2 Prototype-based models of sense storage 
Murphy’s model described in section 4.1.1 overlaps to some extent with exemplar-
based models of concept categorisation. Other models of sense representation draw 
on alternative accounts of categorisation. Perhaps the most studied alternatives are 
those which draw on the prototype categorisation model proposed by Rosch and her 
colleagues during the 1970s (e.g., Rosch and Mervis, 1975). Brugman and Lakoff 
propose radial categories of polysemous words and their senses, with “a central 
member and a network of links to other members”, and with “each noncentral 
member of the category [being] either a variant of the central member of ... a variant 
on a variant” (2006 [1988], p. 109). They argue in favour of a full-specification 
account of word sense storage, in which very finely-grained senses are stored. While 
they are finely-grained, they remain abstractions of particular instances of the target 
word. In their theory of Principled Polysemy, Tyler and Evans (2001) propose that a 
protoscene underpins a semantic network of polysemous word senses. The 
protoscene and senses are abstractions of particular instances of a given word, which 
are further specified through interpretation of the context in which they fall. They 
propose that some of these abstracted senses are stored in memory.  
 
These models overlap with the arguments Rosch makes about the fuzziness of 
categories, varying degrees of membership, and the fact that abstractions rather than 
exemplars are stored. However, the radial category and Principled Polysemy model 
differ from the prototype model in that the central sense in both cases is not an 
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abstraction of the entire category, but is instead a very basic schema which underpins 
all other senses, and from which those senses can extend.  
4.2 Sense storage: Conclusion 
There is no firm answer to the question of whether or not word senses have fixed 
representations stored in memory. On the one hand, some scholars argue that word 
meaning is highly abstract in nature, and that this abstract meaning is substantiated 
by sentential and environmental context to allow successful disambiguation and 
communication. On the other hand, other scholars have claimed that at least some 
senses are stored in memory. In the absence of any firm conclusions either way, 
further investigation is therefore needed. 
 
In addition, though, if we claim that word senses are stored, we must be able to 
explain, or at least hypothesise, how they are stored. Moreover, linguists operating 
under the cognitive commitment central to cognitive linguistics must offer an 
explanation that is compatible with what we know about other, non-linguistic 
categorisation. The linguistic categorisation of interest here – the categorisation of 
exemplars of polysemous words into senses – has been argued to be compatible with 
competing models of cognitive categorisation: exemplar-based models, and 
prototype-based models. While prototype-based models are commonplace in 
cognitive linguistic accounts of polysemy and word senses, studies that conclude that 
an exemplar-theoretic explanation is necessary are fewer in number. This fact is in 
contrast with the vast body of research that has been carried out on exemplar theory, 
and is at odds with the arguments suggesting that exemplar-theoretic models better 
account for categorisation observation than prototype-based models (Medin and 
Schaffer 1978; Murphy 2004, p. 103). It seems, therefore, that further research is 
necessary to understand whether word senses can be understood in exemplar-
theoretic terms. One interesting means of testing this is to investigate whether the 
central prediction of the exemplar model – selective attention – is observed in a 
linguistic categorisation experiment. This approach would serve to inform our 
understanding of how applicable the exemplar theory is to linguistic categorisation. 
Moreover, given that the prototype model does not predict selective attention, any 
observations of selective attention effects would challenge a prototype-theoretic 
account of word senses. Beyond that, this approach also offers the opportunity to test 
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Bybee’s proposal that linguistic categories are fixed, entrenched representations, and 
are not modulated by selective attention. 
Part 2: Investigation 
4.3 Aims 
4.3.1 Looking beyond individual differences 
While it was the sole purpose of the study reported in Chapter 3 to examine 
individual differences in word senses, sentence-sorting tasks are rather versatile. The 
research reported in this chapter therefore takes this opportunity to return to the 
matter of individual differences in word senses, before expanding beyond this topic 
to consider other aspects of the psychological status of word senses; namely whether 
or not there is evidence that they are stored in memory, and, if they are, whether their 
representation is compatible with the (generalised) context theory of classification 
developed by Medin and Schaffer (1978), and Nosofsky (1986), commonly referred 
to as the exemplar model. 
4.3.2 Are word senses stored in memory? 
Asking participants to complete the same sentence-sorting task twice, separated by a 
delay of two months, will address the matter of whether word senses are stored in 
memory. If participants agree how the sentences should be sorted with themselves 
better than with other participants, this will be taken as evidence that word senses are 
indeed stored. If there is no significant difference in how well participants agree with 
themselves versus how well they agree with other participants, or if there is variation 
in how well participants agree with themselves in comparison with how well they 
agree with other participants, this does not necessarily rule out the possibility that 
senses are stored. The exemplar model of categorisation argues that categorisation is 
task-based; i.e., we construct a category by adjusting the relative positions of known 
exemplars in a multidimensional space on an ad hoc basis. Given that the purpose of 
and instructions for the task will remain fixed each time participants complete it, it is 
not expected that the criterion/criteria participants use to categorise the stimuli will 
change. However, external factors such as different time constraints and changing 
interpretation of the instructions may result in changes in criteria, and consequently 
reduced consistency. 
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4.3.3 How are word senses stored in memory? 
The representation of word senses in memory is the topic of ongoing debate, as 
noted in section 4.1. Within research that argues in favour of sense storage there is 
disagreement over the manner in which they are stored. The cognitive linguistic 
literature has traditionally viewed word senses as being stored in memory in a 
prototype-like representation system (e.g., Brugman and Lakoff, 2006 [1988]; Tyler 
and Evans, 2001). However, more recent accounts such as those by Murphy (2007) 
and work on behavioural profiles (e.g., Gries and Divjak, 2009), introduce the 
possibility that word senses may be more akin to exemplar categories, consisting of 
every previously encountered token of a particular word. The study reported here 
investigates the suitability of modelling word senses in terms of exemplar categories 
by testing a prediction of the exemplar model of categorisation, namely the effect of 
selective attention.  
 
If we can view word senses as having an exemplar-like representation, we can expect 
to observe selective attention effects in a semantic categorisation task such as the 
sentence-sorting task used here. In the present study, I ask whether the presence of a 
highly distinctive difference in the meanings of the target words represented in the 
stimuli coincides with differences in sorting behaviours compared with how stimuli 
that do not feature this difference are sorted. Specifically, I will ask whether, when 
participants sort a set of sentences representing both spatial and non-spatial senses, 
they sort them differently to how a set of sentences representing either spatial or 
non-spatial senses are sorted.  
 
When participants sort sentences that represent a mixture of both spatial and non-
spatial senses, the presence of both sense types may create a contrast that serves to 
shrink other possible categorisation dimensions. Specifically, the presence of non-
spatial uses alongside spatial uses may cause participants to attend to this broad 
distinction first (i.e., they will decide whether the sentence is spatial or non-spatial), 
and possibly then to other characteristics, for example, whether the sentence 
describes a two- or three-dimensional configuration.  
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The goal of categorisation is accuracy (Nosofsky, 1986), as proven by the fact that 
failure to accurately categorise the exemplar pictured below may have fatal 
consequences. 
 
Figure 41 Lion, which may be a member of a number of categories such as ANIMALS ONE MAY 
SEE ON SAFARI, and PREDATORS (Wikipedia, 2016) 
 
If there is a very obvious attribute that divides the stimuli, attending only to this 
dimension allows for an easy yet accurate (if somewhat coarse) categorisation 
solution. Put simply, participants might adopt a categorisation strategy whereby the 
key distinction criterion is whether or not the target word has a spatial or non-spatial 
meaning; after that, they can pursue further categorisation distinctions if they judge 
that more refined groups exist amongst the stimuli. In contrast, participants who 
categorise examples representing a single type of sense, either spatial or non-spatial, 
will not have this advantage. They must seek out finer, less obvious distinctions 
within the stimuli.  
 
By randomly assigning participants to one of two conditions, the single sense-type 
condition, featuring only spatial, or only non-spatial senses, or the mixed sense-type 
condition, featuring a combination of spatial and non-spatial senses, I will be able to 
see whether there are systematic differences in the way sentences are sorted when 
the contrast of a different sense type is removed, as would be consistent with an 
exemplar account of word sense storage. Differences in sorting behaviours will be 
measured in terms of the number of groups participants in each condition create. An 
exemplar-theoretic account of word sense representation would predict that stimuli 
presented in both experimental conditions are sorted into fewer groups in the mixed 
sense-type condition than in the single sense-type condition.  
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4.3.4 What can networks tell us about word meaning? 
Collation of sorting data gathered from a task allows one not only to explore 
questions around individual differences and representation of word senses, but also 
how individual examples of a target word are semantically related to each other. 
Similarity matrices created automatically in OptimalSort provide the starting point 
for exploring such relationships, but they allow a rather surface-level analysis, and it 
is not possible to measure the significance of the matrix. In this study I investigate 
the utility of using network visualisations of sentence-sorting data to study word 
senses. 
 
Network analysis is conventionally associated with 
the study of complex systems and relationships 
therein. Outside of linguistics, they have been 
used, for example, to study social relationships, 
ecosystems, biological processes, and food webs 
(Newman 2012). Networks, an example of which 
is shown in Figure 42, consist of nodes, connected 
to each other by edges. For example, in a food 
web, nodes represent species in an ecosystem, 
while edges might represent predator-prey 
relations. Network visualisation algorithms can also produce communities, which 
Kauffman et al. (2014, n.p.) describe as “groups of nodes with dense intra-
community edges and sparse inter-community connections.” Communities therefore 
provide further detail about the structure of the network, and open up the possibility 
of finding previously unknown or unexpected modules (Blondel et al. 2008). In this 
research, nodes represent the stimulus sentences and edges represent a participant’s 
decision to categorise them into the same group. Good et al. (2010, p.1) note that 
identification of communities within a network might provide a “principled way to 
reduce or coarse-grain a system by dividing global heterogeneity into relatively 
homogenous substructures.” Following this, communities are understood to capture 
highly similar exemplars, and might be understood as senses.  
 
Associated with communities displayed in a network are modularity values, which 
quantify the reliability or significance of the communities identified by the 
Figure 42 Nodes, edges and 
communities in a network (Newman 
2012) 
  160 
algorithm. In other words, a modularity value is a measure of the overall quality of 
the network. Values range from -1 to 1. A “good” set of communities has an 
attendant modularity value that is closer to 1, and will feature groups that have more 
internal connections than would be expected at random. A “bad” set of communities 
has a modularity value closer to zero, reflecting no more connections between 
community members than we could expect by chance (Good et al. 2010, p.1). 
However, they recommend caution in the interpretation of modularity values. 
Elsewhere, it has been informally suggested that modularity values are taken lightly 
(Levallois 2013). A means of testing the reliability of modularity values is to assess 
whether they correlate with other measures of reliability. In this research, agreement 
between participants over how stimuli should be categorised is measured 
statistically, using Morey and Agresti’s adjusted Rand. This chapter will briefly ask 
whether or not there is a relationship between statistical agreement calculated for 
each task, and the modularity value of each associated network.  
4.4 Research questions 
In summary, the present chapter will explore the following questions in the manner 
described below: 
 
Is there evidence that word senses are stored in memory? 
This will be studied by assessing whether there is a significant difference between 
how similar an individual’s sorting decisions are in the two tasks (intra-participant 
agreement) and how similar each individual participant’s sorting decisions in the 
first task are with all other participants’ sorting decisions in the second task (inter-
participant agreement). I predict that if word senses do have some form of mental 
representation, participants will agree with themselves significantly better than with 
other participants, and that they will agree with themselves more often than with 
other participants. 
 
Are sentence-sorting decisions subject to selective attention effects? 
This will be measured by comparing the number of groups used to categorise stimuli 
that appear in both conditions. If an exemplar model can account for the 
representation of word senses, I predict that participants in the mixed sense-type 
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condition will sort the stimuli that appear in both conditions into significantly fewer 
groups than participants in the single sense-type condition do. 
 
Is there evidence that participants have different senses of the target words? 
This will be achieved by calculating the degree of agreement between participants, 
and by measuring the quality of communities identified by the network algorithm. 
These two sets of values will also be compared to assess whether they correlate with 
each other. 
4.5 Data collection 
In this section, I outline the approach I took to gathering data to answer the question 
of whether there is evidence of individual differences in word senses, and whether 
there is evidence of selective attention effects in the sentence-sorting tasks used. It 
then provides relevant information about the participants who completed the tasks. 
Thirdly, details of the materials used are provided, followed by detailed information 
about the task procedure. Finally, it specifies the statistical model and data 
visualisation tool used to analyse the data. 
4.5.1 Methodology 
The open-sort version of the sentence-sorting task, described fully in Chapter 3, was 
adopted here. All participants completed the task online using the OptimalSort 
system. Participants completed the same sorting task twice, separated by a period of 
two months. Participants were not made aware that the tasks were identical. 
4.5.2 Participants 
Following the study reported in Chapter 3, this research focuses on the decisions 
made by native speakers of English. In the present study, 205 native English 
speakers completed both parts of the study. Responses by participants whose native 
language was not English, or who did not complete both parts of the task, are not 
included in the following analysis. The sample represents a broad range of 
educational, geographical and occupational backgrounds. The majority (84%) of 
participants were born in a majority English-speaking country outside of the United 
Kingdom. Most (64%) had completed at least a bachelor’s level qualification, and 
the highest concentration of occupations was in the professions (40%). However, all 
educational backgrounds, from incomplete secondary school-level education to 
doctoral qualification were represented, as were the majority of the occupations 
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recognised by the International Standard Classification of Occupations, which was 
used to classify participants’ occupation responses.  
4.5.3 Stimuli 
The task stimuli consisted of 36 examples of one of over, under, above or below. 
Sentences were edited versions of extractions from the internet and from the spoken 
and written sections of the British National Corpus, edited to make the examples 
well-formed sentences. Where appropriate, the sentences were edited to reduce their 
length. By reducing their length, I could ensure that as many sentences as possible 
were visible on the screen at any one time.  
 
Three sets of stimuli were used for each of the four target words. One set, sorted by 
participants in the mixed sense-type condition, consisted of the mixture of spatial 
and non-spatial uses used in the closed-sort task reported in Chapter 2. Participants 
in one of the two single sense-type tasks either sorted a set consisting of sentences 
representing what I judged to be exclusively spatial senses of the target word, or 
those representing only non-spatial senses. The stimuli used can be found in 
Appendix 5. 
 
Stimuli in the single sense-type condition comprised the spatial or non-spatial uses 
used in the mixed sense-type condition, topped up with additional spatial or non-
spatial uses to make a total of 36 sentences. These sentences were selected and 
edited as described above. In total, the 36 sentences represented what I judged to be 
six examples of six distinct senses. The use of the same spatial or non-spatial uses as 
used in the mixed sense-type condition in the single sense-type condition was a 
conscious decision: it allows direct comparison of how the same stimuli are 
categorised in different conditions, thus revealing whether selective attention 
determines categorisation decisions. 
 
For all but the over, under and above tasks, the stimuli in the single sense-type 
condition tasks included six exemplars of three senses used as stimuli in the mixed 
sense-type task, i.e., exemplars of three non-spatial senses, or exemplars of three 
spatial senses. In the case of the below single sense-type task, the spatial stimuli 
included six exemplars of four senses used as stimuli in the mixed sense-type task. 
  163 
The stimuli used in the below non-spatial task comprised of two groups of six 
sentences from the mixed sense-type task stimuli. In all cases, these stimuli were 
topped up with new sentences to result in a total of 36 stimuli. The reason for this 
difference between the origins of the stimuli for the over, under, and above tasks on 
the one hand, and the below task on the other hand, is as follows. As noted in 
Experiment 1, I judge what I term TEXT USES of below, such as Fill in below all the 
tasks that you do in a typical day, to have a non-spatial, temporal meaning. However, 
as noted in Chapter 3, participants in an open-sort task reached a different 
conclusion, and appear to judge them to have a spatial meaning. Given that the 
purpose of the single sense-type task was to see how sorting decisions changed when 
a highly salient semantic contrast – the spatial/non-spatial distinction – was absent, I 
decided to recognise the TEXT USES as examples of a spatial sense, and no longer as a 
non-spatial sense, and included these uses in the spatial stimuli.  
4.5.4 Procedure 
Prior to starting the task, information about the task and how responses would be 
stored was presented on the screen. Participants were required to read and confirm 
that they understood this, and provide their informed consent to participate in the 
study. Participants were then shown written instructions about how to complete the 
task (see appendix 6 for a copy of these instructions). Briefly, participants were 
instructed to sort a set of sentences into one or more groups. They were explicitly 
instructed to sort sentences based on what the capitalised target word meant in each 
sentence. It was made clear that the goal of the task was to sort all of the sentences 
into groups in which the meaning of the capitalised target word was the same in each 
member of the group. The instructions disappeared when the participant moved the 
first sentence, but could be recalled at any time. 
 
After being presented with the task instructions, the task was revealed on the screen. 
Sentences were presented in a column on the left side of the screen, with a larger 
blank sorting pane to the centre and right of the screen. Participants were advised to 
read all of the sentences, considering carefully what the target word, which was 
shown in full capitals, meant in each sentence. Afterwards, they were required to 
move each sentence into the sorting pane to create a group, after which further 
sentences could be dragged and dropped into it. Sentences could be moved in and 
  164 
out of categories until the participant was satisfied with their sorting decisions. Once 
they were satisfied with their groups, participants were asked to give each group a 
label describing the meaning of the target word captured by the constituent 
sentences. Once they had completed this, they clicked a button to indicate that they 
had finished the tasks. The results were then stored and accessible in the back end of 
the programme. Participants were required to sort all of the stimuli before they could 
submit their responses. 
4.5.5 Statistical analysis 
Data collected in this task were statistically analysed for agreement using Morey and 
Agresti’s adjusted Rand (Morey and Agresti, 1984). As discussed in section 4.3.4, 
the data were also run through a network visualisation algorithm to create networks 
based on the sorting decisions, and to quantitatively measure the quality of the 
networks.  
4.6 Results and discussion 
4.6.1 Are word senses stored in memory? 
4.6.1.1 Do	participants	categorise	sentences	in	the	same	way	in	each	task?	
Table 17 shows the average extent of intra-participant agreement in each word and 
condition, along with the sample standard deviation revealing the extent of variation 
around the mean. The values therefore represent how well, on average, the 
participants in each word and condition agreed with themselves about how the 
stimuli should be sorted at time 1 and time 2 (hereafter T1 and T2). We can see some 
tendencies emerging: with the exception of the tasks for over, participants had 
highest intra-participant agreement when sorting stimuli that represented both spatial 
and non-spatial senses. In addition, with the exception of the tasks for below, 
participants changed their sorting decisions most when sorting spatial uses of these 
words.  
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Table 17 Descriptive statistics of intra-participant agreement values 
  Mean intra-participant agreement SD 
Above non-spatial 0.749 0.170 
Above mixed 0.773 0.205 
Above spatial 0.733 0.189 
Below non-spatial 0.581 0.198 
Below mixed 0.752 0.212 
Below spatial 0.685 0.151 
Over non-spatial 0.840 0.105 
Over mixed 0.832 0.093 
Over spatial 0.645 0.263 
Under non-spatial 0.561 0.180 
Under mixed 0.804 0.122 
Under spatial 0.504 0.256 
 
On the whole, a range of average intra-participant values are returned; from 0.504 
for under spatial, to 0.84 for over non-spatial. While we are not necessarily 
concerned with obtaining optimal agreement, but are interested in studying 
agreement levels for their own sake, it is interesting to note that only participants in 
the over non-spatial and under and over mixed sense-type tasks agreed with 
themselves to an extent that we can describe as acceptable, reaching an average 
intra-participant agreement score of at least 0.8 (Neuendorf, 2002, p. 3). The 
participants in the three above tasks are consistently just below this boundary, but 
amongst the other tasks agreement is classified, according to Neuendorf, as 
reflecting great disagreement. 
 
When participants are asked to complete two identical sentence-sorting tasks, there 
is, therefore, evidence of variation across the tasks in how well participants agree 
with themselves over how the stimuli should be sorted when there is a delay of two 
months between them. As well as that, though, there is variation within the sample of 
participants in each pair of tasks. At one extreme, there is low variation around the 
mean intra-participant agreement score for over mixed and over non-spatial, but very 
high variation in the over spatial and under spatial tasks. We can see, therefore, that 
it is not simply the case that participants’ sorting decisions remain differentially 
constant over time depending on the stimuli that they are sorting, but that there is 
sometimes very wide variation in how consistent participants’ sorting decisions are, 
regardless of the stimuli they are asked to sort. 
  166 
 
On the whole, then, there is variation in intra-participant agreement values between 
words, within words, and between participants. Of the twelve pairs of tasks, only 
three produce mean intra-participant agreement values in excess of the lower 
acceptable bound endorsed by Neuendorf (2002). The implications of this finding for 
the question of whether there is evidence that word senses are stored in memory are 
complex. On the one hand, the presence of some low mean intra-participant 
agreement scores indicates that participants do not reliably sort the same stimuli into 
the same groups when completing identical sorting tasks separated by a period of 
two months. Consistently high intra-participant agreement scores would give a firm 
indication that the categories participants produce, which I tentatively assume to 
represent word senses, are stored in memory. There is indeed evidence of very good 
agreement in some tasks. How is it that some pairs of tasks result in very high mean 
intra-participant agreement scores, and others very low scores? The presence of both 
high and low intra-participant agreement values, both within and across tasks, is 
difficult to explain under models which posit either zero word sense storage (Ruhl 
1989), or full storage of word senses (Tyler and Evans, 2001). An intermediate 
model in which word senses have some form of mental representation may explain 
these different findings. 
4.6.1.2 Do	participants	agree	with	themselves	more	than	they	do	with	other	
people?	
The previous section presented data that indicates that word senses are stored in 
some form in memory. This interpretation can be further tested. If word senses are 
stored, we would expect participants to have better agreement with themselves about 
how the stimuli should be sorted than with other participants, and that they should 
reach a higher level of consensus with few participants. This hypothesis is tested in 
two ways: first, a paired-samples t-test is used to study whether there is a significant 
difference between intra-participant agreement values and the mean inter-participant 
agreement value for each participant. Second, I examine how regularly participants’ 
intra-participant agreement scores rank higher than their inter-participant agreement 
scores. Given the uneven sample size in each task, inter- and intra-participant 
agreement scores were transformed into percentile ranks. 
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The results of the t-test indicate that, on the whole, participants agree with 
themselves significantly better than they do with other participants: t(204) = 12.516, 
p = .000, d = .75. Further, intra-participant agreement values typically ranked in at 
least the 75th percentile (M = 75.18, SD = 28.855). Taken together, these values 
strongly indicate that participants’ sorting decisions are more similar to their own 
than to those of other participants. 
 
If we consider this finding in conjunction with the findings that there is variation – 
and sometimes low levels – of intra-participant agreement, it is difficult to make firm 
conclusions concerning whether or not word senses are stored in memory. However, 
in and of themselves poor intra-participant agreement values do not rule out the 
possibility that word senses are stored in memory. In fact, the fact that high 
agreement values can be found in the means, and amongst individual participants, in 
addition to the finding that participants on the whole agree with themselves 
significantly better and more often than they do with other participants, indicates that 
they may indeed be stored in memory, though perhaps not in a fixed, permanent 
form. The exemplar model is able to account for both the low and high agreement 
scores found here. In the model, categorisation is task-based; as noted in section 
4.3.3, the multitude of dimensions on which a particular exemplar sits vary in their 
length according to the task at hand. The characteristics of the stimuli an individual 
participant selectively attends to in the first task might vary from those she attends to 
in the second task. Accordingly, the characteristics of the stimuli she attends to will 
vary, thus resulting in the length of the associated dimensions changing. When 
dimensions change, the proximity of exemplars will also change.  As a consequence, 
the categories she identifies will be different. 
 
I propose that so long as an individual participant selectively attends to the same 
characteristic in each task, and therefore adopts the same sorting strategy each time, 
they will construct categories that are very similar, simply because the task has 
remained the same. If, second time around, their sorting strategy changes, the task 
changes, resulting in changes to the categories they construct. The characteristics 
they selectively attend to, and therefore their sorting strategy may change for any 
number of reasons; they may wish to complete the task more quickly, they may 
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notice and attend to details in the stimuli that they had overlooked in the first task, or 
they may interpret the instructions differently.  
 
In summary, the presence of some high intra-participant agreement values indicates 
that word senses may be stored in memory, as long as we understand them as 
categories generated in response to task demands. This interpretation is consistent 
with Kilgarriff’s claim that “word senses only exist relative to a task.” (1997, p. 1). I 
interpret these data, therefore, in terms of the exemplar model, and argue that these 
findings provide early support for application of the model to account for the 
representation of polysemous word senses. The possibility that the exemplar model 
can account for word sense representation will be explored further in the following 
two sections.   
4.6.1.3 Interim	conclusions	
The fact that individuals vary in how consistent their sorting decisions are when they 
complete identical sentence-sorting tasks two months apart is difficult to explain, 
should we wish to propose that word senses are stored in some fixed and stable form 
in memory. Some participants display a very high degree of consistency in their 
sorting decisions, which suggests fixed representations. However, some participants 
made significant changes to their categorisations each time they complete the task, 
which suggests no representations. The fact that all but one participant’s sorting 
decisions were more consistent than would be expected by chance is promising, but 
not particularly meaningful. A cognitive model of word senses that posited that word 
senses are not stored in memory in any form would surely predict that, in a pair of 
sorting tasks such as these reported here, participants’ ability to recognise the 
similarity between pairs or groups of uses of a target word would not disappear 
altogether, thus forcing participants to categorise the stimuli on by their best guess. 
However, the intra-participant agreement values are often quite a way from chance 
level (i.e., an agreement value of 0), and a generous proportion (42%) have 
agreement scores of at least 0.8, which is reckoned as a sensible cut-off point for 
acceptable agreement (Neuendorf, 2002). Likewise, if word senses were not stored in 
any form, we should not expect individual participants to agree any better with 
themselves than they do with other participants. The opposite outcome was found, 
with participants agreeing with themselves significantly better than with other 
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participants, and with intra-participant values typically ranking in at least the 75th 
percentile.  
 
It appears instead, then, that word senses may have some form of representation in 
memory. As noted previously, the range of agreement values is accommodated by an 
exemplar-theoretic account of categorisation. However, further investigation is 
needed to assess whether, if word senses are stored in memory in any form, the 
exemplar model can best account for their representation. The following sections 
will address some of the explicit and implicit predictions of the model: that 
categorisation is inherently task-based, and therefore similarity of exemplars is 
decided relative to a task; and that categorisation of sentences is subject to individual 
differences. 
4.6.2 Are sentence-sorting decisions subject to selective attention effects? 
If principles of the exemplar model are applicable to the data collected in this study, 
there should be measurable differences in sorting decisions according to what broad 
semantic categories are represented in the stimuli. In this research, participants either 
categorised sentences which only used either spatial or non-spatial uses of the target 
word (i.e., the single sense-type condition), or they sorted stimuli which represented 
a combination of spatial and non-spatial uses (i.e., the mixed sense-type condition). 
In the mixed sense-type condition, there is a major semantic contrast that divides the 
stimuli into two distinct categories. I predict that when participants read the set of 
sentences prior to beginning to sort them, this distinction will be salient. 
Accordingly, I predict that the spatial/non-spatial distinction will at least be an initial 
categorisation criterion. In an exemplar model, because that major point of contrast 
exists, it should be the case that finer distinctions that might divide spatial uses and 
non-spatial uses into smaller groups are overlooked. In the absence of this major 
point of contrast, i.e., in the single sense-type condition, fine distinctions will not be 
overshadowed. As a result, where stimuli appear in both the single sense-type and 
mixed sense-type condition tasks, I predict that there will be more distinctions 
amongst these stimuli in the single sense-type condition.  
4.6.2.1 Number	of	groups	used	to	categorise	sentences	that	appear	in	single	and	
mixed	sense-type	conditions	
Table 18 below shows the mean number of groups created to categorise stimuli that 
appear in both task conditions. 
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Table 18 Mean number of groups used to categorise sentences that are found in both single 
sense-type and mixed sense-type task conditions 
Task Mean number of 
groups T1 
Mean number of 
groups T2 
Above spatial in single sense-type task 3.50 3.25 
Above spatial in mixed sense-type task 2.12 2.12 
Above non-spatial in single sense-type task 3.08 3.46 
Above non-spatial in mixed sense-type task 2.96 3.15 
Below spatial in single sense-type task 4.00 4.19 
Below spatial in mixed sense-type task 2.93 3.07 
Below non-spatial in single sense-type task 2.75 2.83 
Below non-spatial in mixed sense-type task 1.47 1.73 
Over spatial in single sense-type task 4.19 4.25 
Over spatial in mixed sense-type task 3.75 3.81 
Over non-spatial in single sense-type task 3.83 3.92 
Over non-spatial in mixed sense-type task 3.19 3.50 
Under spatial in single sense-type task 3.47 3.47 
Under spatial in mixed sense-type task 2.25 2.40 
Under non-spatial in single sense-type task 3.50 3.70 
Under non-spatial in mixed sense-type task 3.15 3.20 
 
An independent samples t-test measured whether the number of groups participants 
created to categorise stimuli that appeared in both task conditions was different. I 
predicted that participants would categorise the stimuli into more groups in the 
single sense-type task. This pattern was found. At T1, in the single sense-type tasks 
an average of 3.61 groups were used (SD = 1.14), versus an average of 2.71 groups 
(SD = 1.15) in the mixed sense-type tasks.  At T2, the sentences were sorted into an 
average of 3.7 groups (SD = 1.08) in the single sense-type condition, versus an 
average of 2.84 groups (SD = 1.12) in the mixed sense-type condition. This 
difference was significant at both T1 (t(280)=6.59, p = .000, d = .79) and T2 
(t(280)=6.46, p=.000, d= .77). 
 
These findings therefore indicate that the presence of a significant semantic contrast 
results in participants sorting stimuli into broader groups. Under an exemplar model, 
attention to the semantic contrast dividing the stimuli serves to shrink other potential 
dimensions corresponding to other characteristics that might be used to produce finer 
distinctions. To exemplify this, let us consider the distinctions in the same set of 
stimuli made by participant BMi9 in the mixed sense-type condition, and BS10 in 
the spatial condition, as shown in Table 19 below.  
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Table 19 Spatial sentences and categorisation decisions made by participants BMi9 and BS10 
Sentence Participant Category label used 
by Participant BMi9 
Participant  Category label used by Participant 
BS10 
BELOW the crags a well-built tunnel could be seen. BMi9 physically under BS10 physically under 
BELOW the front windows the extension was divided into two sections. BMi9 physically under BS10 vertically underneath on a flat surface 
Don't paint BELOW the windowsill. BMi9 physically under BS10 vertically underneath on a flat surface 
Fill in BELOW all the tasks that you do in a typical day. BMi9 lower on the page BS10 further along in the text 
Give us your fun verdict by dialling the numbers BELOW. BMi9 lower on the page BS10 further along in the text 
I called out to the people on the beach BELOW, but they didn't hear me. BMi9 physically under BS10 physically under 
I pinned my name badge BELOW the logo on my tshirt. BMi9 physically under BS10 vertically underneath on a flat surface 
In the situations listed BELOW identify what your information needs would 
be. 
BMi9 lower on the page BS10 further along in the text 
Instead of being up high the box was down BELOW. BMi9 physically under BS10 further along in the text 
It will be argued BELOW that economic reconstruction was a success.  BMi9 lower on the page BS10 further along in the text 
Look at the sentence BELOW, what does it say? BMi9 lower on the page BS10 further along in the text 
Serve with Sharp sauce (see BELOW). BMi9 lower on the page BS10 further along in the text 
She had a mole just BELOW her right eye. BMi9 physically under BS10 vertically underneath on a flat surface 
Tabith stood BELOW, watching him. BMi9 physically under BS10 geographically lower 
The campus was shrinking BELOW me into a collection of children's play 
houses. 
BMi9 physically under BS10 geographically lower 
The crocodile sank BELOW the surface. BMi9 physically under BS10 layer underneath 
The people in the flat BELOW wouldn't stop shouting. BMi9 physically under BS10 physically under 
The sleeves gradually get tighter and end BELOW the elbow. BMi9 physically under BS10 layer underneath 
The walk provides wonderful views of Mallerstang BELOW. BMi9 physically under BS10 physically under 
There are two iron rings on the wall BELOW the painting. BMi9 physically under BS10 vertically underneath on a flat surface 
They established an iron foundry in the valley BELOW the church in 1790. BMi9 physically under BS10 South 
We dredged BELOW the mud at the bottom of the river. BMi9 physically under BS10 layer underneath 
When we got BELOW the next layer the concentrations became stronger. BMi9 physically under BS10 layer underneath 
Your mates are down BELOW, watching you. BMi9 physically under BS10 geographically lower 
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This table shows that in the case of these two participants, stimuli that appear in both 
conditions are categorised very differently. Participant BMi9 uses just two categories 
to classify all 24 sentences, making a distinction between sentences that they label 
‘lower on the page’ (referred to elsewhere in this thesis as TEXT USES), and all other 
sentences, which are captured by a fairly catch-all ‘physically under’ label. In 
contrast, participant BS10 observes six distinctions within the group. They identify 
the same TEXT USE sentences (though include an additional sentence which BMi9 
classified elsewhere), but amongst the other sentences identify much finer 
distinctions.  
 
In this case, it appears that the presence of a spatial/non-spatial contrast made 
differences within spatial sentences and non-spatial sentences less salient. Assuming 
that the sentences and their categorisations can be modelled as occupying a 
multidimensional space, when this significant contrast is present, distinctions along 
other dimensions corresponding to characteristics that might otherwise be used to 
distinguish between exemplars shrinks, making exemplars which might otherwise be 
judge to differ along that dimension closer together, thus making them appear more 
similar along that dimension. In contrast, when that significant semantic difference is 
absent, as was the case in the single sense-type tasks, finer distinctions between the 
meanings of the target words can be detected.  
4.6.2.2 Interim	conclusions	
This study tested the hypothesis that when a significant semantic contrast is present 
amongst stimuli, participants will categorise stimuli into fewer groups than when 
that semantic contrast is absent. The data and subsequent statistical analysis strongly 
support this hypothesis. This finding corresponds to a central prediction of the 
exemplar model, which predicts that categorisation is task-based and categorisation 
decisions will vary according to the sorting parameter on which the categorisation 
strategy is based. The findings reported here can stand alone as evidence in support 
of the conclusion that word senses are stored in memory as potential categories of 
previously encountered exemplars. This conclusion is further supported by evidence 
noted earlier suggesting that word senses may be represented in some form in 
memory. These findings jointly allow the conclusion that word senses may be 
understood as potential categories of exemplars, in the way that exemplar 
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categorisation proponents argue that non-linguistic concepts are represented (Medin 
and Schaffer, 1978; Nosofsky, 1986). I therefore move away from the proposal made 
in other cognitive linguistic accounts of polysemy that polysemous words 
themselves are categories (e.g., Tyler and Evans, 2001; Brugman and Lakoff, 2006 
[1988], Taylor, 2003). I also conclude that the exemplar model appears to be able to 
account for their representation, rather than a prototype-based model advocated in 
previous research (e.g., Tyler and Evans, 2001; Brugman and Lakoff, 2006 [1988]). 
4.6.3 Individual differences in word senses 
4.6.3.1 Do	participants	agree	with	each	other	about	how	the	sentences	should	be	
sorted?	
If we base our judgment of the degree of inter-participant (dis)agreement in terms of 
Neuendorf’s (2002) argument that agreement values of less than 0.8 indicate great 
disagreement, the mean agreement values shown in Table 20 indicate that, on the 
whole, participants fail to reach an acceptable level of consensus about how the 
stimuli should be sorted.  
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Table 20 Descriptive statistics of inter-participant agreement values at time 1 and time 2 
Time 1 
  Mean SD Min. Max. Range 
Above non-spatial T1 0.614 0.159 0.202 1 0.798 
Above mixed T1 0.59 0.212 0.01 1 0.99 
Above spatial T1 0.619 0.132 0.349 0.919 0.571 
Below mixed T1 0.493 0.212 0.061 1 0.939 
Below spatial T1 0.517 0.131 0.216 0.814 0.598 
Below non-spatial T1 0.457 0.172 0.143 0.927 0.784 
Over non-spatial T1 0.735 0.156 0.379 1 0.621 
Over mixed T1 0.787 0.11 0.472 0.994 0.523 
Over spatial T1 0.495 0.196 0.002 0.872 0.87 
Under non-spatial T1 0.455 0.162 0.02 0.849 0.829 
Under mixed T1 0.629 0.151 0.315 1 0.685 
Under spatial T1 0.249 0.161 -0.022 0.698 0.72 
Time 2 
  Mean SD Min. Max. Range 
Above non-spatial T2 0.63 0.132 0.329 1 0.671 
Above mixed T2 0.653 0.166 0.195 1 0.805 
Above spatial T2 0.665 0.134 0.361 0.947 0.585 
Below mixed T2 0.446 0.194 -0.012 0.937 0.949 
Below spatial T2 0.524 0.133 0.253 0.881 0.628 
Below non-spatial T2 0.675 0.147 0.362 1 0.638 
Over non-spatial T2 0.767 0.13 0.447 1 0.553 
Over mixed T2 0.742 0.115 0.418 1 0.582 
Over spatial T2 0.45 0.217 -0.015 0.822 0.837 
Under non-spatial T2 0.466 0.147 0.161 0.896 0.735 
Under mixed T2 0.65 0.15 0.283 1 0.717 
Under spatial T2 0.246 0.156 -0.013 0.684 0.697 
 
Further, the standard deviations reveal that pairwise agreement values are, relative to 
the mean, really rather variant; indeed, there is also variation in how varied 
agreement is across the tasks. The ‘Min.’ and ‘Max.’ columns further demonstrate 
this variation. Let us look at an example, referring to the cell highlighted in red. In 
the case of the mixed sense-type task for below at T1, the mean agreement value is 
0.446, but there is a case in which a pair of participants completing this task achieve 
a much lower level of agreement – indeed, agreement lower than we would expect 
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by chance: -0.012. At the other end of the scale, in the same task one pair of 
participants achieved very close agreement in their sorting decisions, with an 
agreement score of 0.937, as shown in the cell highlighted in green. Indeed, at least 
one instance of perfect or near-perfect agreement is observed in the majority of the 
24 tasks. On the other hand, there are cases in which some pairs of participants reach 
agreement less than would be expected by chance. We therefore observe two striking 
outcomes. First, if we understand the categories participants create to classify the 
stimuli to reflect the senses they find meaningful, there is evidence of individual 
differences in word senses. Second, the degree to which pairs of participants agree 
with each other is variant, ranging from exceptionally high to exceptionally poor 
agreement. 
 
Differences in how the stimuli should be sorted in this task correspond to the 
differences observed in sorting decisions seen in Experiments 1 and 2. The 
possibility that different speakers have different senses of polysemous words was 
introduced in my analysis of the first, closed-sort study. At that point, poor 
agreement with my sense distinctions was taken to suggest that the senses that I find 
meaningful do not correspond to those held by other speakers. It was acknowledged, 
though, that it might simply have been the case that the participants in that study 
agreed upon the senses of those words, and simply disagreed with me. The results of 
this study and the open-sort tasks reported in Chapter 3 undermine this conclusion, 
and support the alternative interpretation that not only do participants disagree with 
my word senses, but that they also disagree with each other about which exemplars 
of these polysemous words share the same meaning. It was noted, however, that poor 
inter-participant agreement in Experiment 2 might have been the result of 
methodological issues. That task was on a very large scale, with participants sorting 
100 sentences. It was speculated that the scale of the task might have caused one or a 
combination of fatigue, boredom, confusion or semantic satiation. These factors may 
have resulted in sorting decisions that were not always consistent and coherent. 
Without sorting strategies that are executed systematically, we can expect nothing 
but weak agreement. This task addressed this possibility by reducing the scale of the 
task; unlike in Experiment 2, participants only sorted 36 stimuli. The stimuli were 
also edited to ensure that the sentence was well-formed and relatively compact. 
There was also additional structure imposed on the stimuli, in that I classified them 
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into six exemplars of what I judged to be six distinct senses. Such structure was not 
imposed in Experiment 2. Despite improvements to the structure of the stimuli and 
task design, poor average agreement values remain. The larger number of 
participants in this study compared with the open-sort study in Experiment 2 (205, 
versus 44), makes the interpretation that there are individual differences in word 
senses more robust. 
 
The findings complement existing work that has found individual differences in 
linguistic phenomena. For example, Dąbrowska and Street (2006) found evidence 
that correct interpretation of the passive construction is related to participants’ level 
of education. A range of research has found evidence of individual differences in 
milestones in and routes to language acquisition (Bates, Dale, and Thal, 1995). In a 
recent series of studies of interpretations of an ambiguous temporal metaphor, Duffy 
and colleagues have gathered evidence that individuals with different personality 
types, and different types of job, interpret metaphors differently (Duffy et al, 2014; 
Duffy and Feist, 2014; Duffy, 2015). The data gathered in this study provide further 
support for the notion that individuals differ not only in their linguistic ability, but 
also in their linguistic representations. 
4.6.3.2 What	can	networks	tell	us	about	individual	differences	in	word	senses?	
Network visualisations offer the potential for qualitative and quantitative analysis of 
sorting decisions across groups of participants. Qualitative analysis permits the study 
of communities that emerge in the network, and relationships (or absence thereof) 
between communities. Networks can also be studied quantitatively; of particular 
interest to this study is the potential for quantifying the “quality” of the network, 
based on the network’s modularity value. A network structure that perfectly 
represents every participant’s categorisation decisions will have a modularity value 
of 1. A network structure that corresponds less well to all participants’ decisions will 
have a lower modularity value. In this study, we might predict that networks with 
low modularity values will be generated using data which has low inter-participant 
agreement. The utility of modularity values has, however, been informally 
challenged (Levallois, 2013). Comparison of network quality against agreement 
values offers the chance to see whether or not modularity values are indeed useful. 
 
 177 
Table 21 shows the mean inter-participant agreement value for each task, along with 
the modularity value of the associated network. Networks generated for each task are 
provided in Appendix 7.8 These values show that the quality of networks produced 
was highly variant. Pearson’s r test was used to investigate whether there was a 
relationship between the extent of inter-participant agreement in each task and the 
quality of the associated network, as measured by its modularity score. This 
produced a strong and significant correlation (r = .953, p = .000). 
 
Table 21 Mean level of inter-participant agreement and modularity value of the network 
produced for each task 
  Mean agreement value Modularity score 
Above non-spatial T1 0.614 0.514 
Above non-spatial T2 0.630 0.537 
Above mixed T1 0.590 0.427 
Above mixed T2 0.653 0.483 
Above spatial T1 0.619 0.425 
Above spatial T2 0.665 0.456 
Below non-spatial T1 0.457 0.279 
Below non-spatial T2 0.675 0.484 
Below mixed T1 0.493 0.385 
Below mixed T2 0.446 0.355 
Below spatial T1 0.517 0.423 
Below spatial T2 0.524 0.452 
Over non-spatial T1 0.735 0.636 
Over non-spatial T2 0.767 0.674 
Over mixed T1 0.787 0.659 
Over mixed T2 0.742 0.642 
Over spatial T1 0.495 0.375 
Over spatial T2 0.450 0.317 
Under non-spatial T1 0.455 0.325 
Under non-spatial T2 0.466 0.371 
Under mixed T1 0.629 0.46 
Under mixed T2 0.650 0.432 
Under spatial T1 0.249 0.142 
Under spatial T2 0.246 0.159 
 
When based on the sentence-sorting data I have collected, network modularity 
values measure how accurately a network represents the groups all participants 
created; i.e., it tells us how well the network’s communities correspond to all of the 
                                                
8 Due to the size of these files, they are best viewed on a computer screen. 
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participants’ groups. The fact that modularity values and mean agreement scores 
correlate so strongly is therefore not particularly surprising; if participants make 
different sorting decisions, which is quantified by the agreement scores, a network 
will not be able to accurately represent every participants’ groups, but will instead 
produce something akin to an “average” of the groups all participants created. So 
while this outcome is not particularly remarkable, it does indicate that modularity 
values, in this study at least, are meaningful measures. Indeed, if we were to argue 
that acceptable agreement is represented by an agreement score of at least 0.8, as 
Neuendorf (2002) does, we might also argue that an acceptable modularity value is 
approximately 0.67. This relationship is an original contribution to knowledge about 
the meaningfulness of modularity values. 
 
Further research is necessary to investigate the utility of network visualisations of 
sentence-sorting data. It seems counterintuitive to attempt to glean information about 
the similarity of exemplars of polysemous words based on their positions in a low 
quality network; after all, these low quality networks fail to adequately represent the 
sorting decisions made by all participants. However, networks of both high and low 
quality may allow us to understand more about how, in the face of individual 
differences in word senses, communication nonetheless proceeds successfully. Let us 
return to Ide and Wilks' (2007) comment that coarse-grained senses may be the most 
useful level of meaning for successful disambiguation. It might be that smaller 
communities in high quality networks can be collapsed to form the coarse-grained 
senses that Ide and Wilks advocate. Equally, the larger, poorly-differentiated 
communities in low quality networks may be understood as coarse-grained senses. 
This idea is discussed in more detail in the following chapter. 
4.6.3.3 The	theoretical	implications	of	individual	differences	in	word	senses		
As discussed in sections 4.6.1.3 and 4.6.2.2, there is some evidence that word senses 
may indeed be stored in some form in memory, if we understand their storage in 
terms of an exemplar-theoretic categorisation system. The finding that individuals 
seem to disagree about which exemplars of a given word share the same meaning 
suggests that the semantic categories held by these participants, taken as word 
senses, is consistent with the exemplar model. The exemplar model predicts that 
categorisation is task-based, meaning that categories are structured in response to a 
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categorisation strategy determined by the characteristic the individual selectively 
attends to, such as categorisation by colour, shape, smell, and so on. While all 
participants received identical instructions, the crux of which specified that they 
should categorise the sentence according to the meaning of the capitalised target 
word, the strategies individual participants used to categorise the sentences is likely 
to be subject to some variation. Some participants were satisfied with broad, coarse 
categories, whereas others split the stimuli into smaller groups reflecting finer 
distinctions. Equally, participants may selectively attend to different aspects of the 
meaning of the target word. For instance, in the second above non-spatial task, 
participant AM18 classified together sentences that are judged by others to reflect 
positions on qualitative and quantitative scales. For this participant, the use of above 
to mark a position on a metaphorical scale was enough to categorise such exemplars 
as a member of the same category. In contrast, participant AM13 created a category 
for exemplars that used above to describe a position on a strictly numerical scale. 
Accordingly, if they judged a sentence to capture this meaning, it was assigned to 
this category. If it described the position on a metaphorical but not quantitative scale, 
it was assigned to a different category. 
 
In the previous sections I have argued that word senses are represented in memory in 
a way that is compatible with the exemplar model of categorisation. Uncovering 
individual differences in the sense categories participants created is unproblematic in 
this model. The model claims that categorisation is task based, meaning that if the 
task (as manifest by a particular sorting strategy or set thereof) is different across 
individuals, then the categories they create will likewise differ.  
4.6.3.4 Interim	conclusions	
Analysis of inter-participant agreement scores has revealed three key findings. First, 
the data have shown that pairs of participants’ sorting decisions are rarely identical, 
and that on the whole, there is widespread disagreement. Second, while average 
agreement values paint a fairly poor picture of how much consensus participants as 
groups reached, pairwise agreement values reveal instances of both perfect 
agreement and agreement lower than would be expected by chance. This indicates 
that some participants agree with each other more than others. These findings are 
compatible with all of the findings discussed concerning word sense storage, and the 
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exemplar model, which I have recommended as a model of word sense 
representation. Finally, by comparing the modularity value, or numerical “quality” 
value of networks produced using sentence-sorting data with mean agreement values 
for each associated task, the utility of the modularity score has been supported, and a 
suggestion for what might constitute an “acceptable” network solution has been 
offered. 
4.7 General discussion 
In this chapter I set out to answer three questions: 
 
1. Is there evidence that word senses are stored in memory? 
2. Are sentence-sorting decisions subject to selective attention effects? 
3. Is there evidence that participants have different senses of the target words? 
 
A set of twelve open sentence-sorting tasks, each completed by participants on two 
occasions separated by a delay of two months, was used to answer these questions. 
The magnitude of inter- and intra-participant agreement was calculated statistically 
using Morey and Agresti’s adjusted Rand. The study aimed to investigate not only 
whether word senses are stored, but whether their storage is compatible with the 
exemplar model that is gaining increasing currency in cognitive linguistics. The 
second question addresses a central prediction of the model, which states that 
categorisation is task-based, and that categories of stimuli will vary according to the 
categorisation criterion/criteria the categoriser selectively attends to. Under this 
account, categories are claimed to consist of previously-encountered exemplars. On 
this basis, in conjunction with the argument that categorisation is task-based, 
categorisation decisions are expected to display individual differences. 
 
Intra-participant agreement values were used to assess the degree of consensus 
participants reached with themselves about how the sentences should be categorised 
at each time point, and were compared with intra-participant agreement values, to 
assess how different these two sets of values were. A t-test showed that participants 
had significantly better agreement with themselves than with the other participants in 
the task, and when inter- and intra-participant agreement values were ranked, intra-
participant values typically ranked in at least the 75th percentile. It was predicted that 
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if word senses do have some form of representation in memory, then participants 
should agree with themselves better than they do with others. Both forms of analyses 
indicate that this is the case. 
 
While intra-participant agreement was typically found to be better than inter-
participant agreement, this was not always the case. Indeed, some participants agreed 
with themselves about how the sentences should be sorted less than would be 
expected by chance. On the other hand, some participants’ sorting decisions did not 
change at all. In sum, we observed variation in intra-participant agreement values 
that are difficult to explain in terms of an account in which word senses have fixed 
representations, à la Tyler and Evans (2001). Both this finding, of variation in intra-
participant agreement, and the significant tendency for participants to agree with 
themselves better than with other participants, can be accommodated if we 
understand word senses in exemplar-theoretic terms. Under this account, exemplars 
– in this case, individual sentences – are stored in memory. Their membership of a 
particular category, however, is not. Instead, categories are constructed on the fly in 
response to the demands of a categorisation task. In principle, given that the task 
instructions do not change, the demands of the task, which should determine the 
strategy the individual uses to categorise the stimuli, should not differ at each time 
point. However, external factors such as a difference in time constraints and 
differing attention to characteristics of the sentences might result in participants’ 
sorting strategies changing. In an exemplar model, this accounts for why some 
participants reached poor consensus with themselves between T1 and T2. 
 
This interpretation was checked by testing a central prediction of the exemplar 
theory of categorisation: that categorisation is task-specific and that the relative 
similarity of stimuli is a product of the criterion/criteria the individual selectively 
attends to when categorising them. This was tested by manipulating whether 
participants sorted stimuli representing a single type of sense – either spatial or non-
spatial – or a mix of both types of sense. I predicted that if word sense storage can be 
modelled in terms of the exemplar model of categorisation, stimuli that appear in 
both types of conditions would be categorised into more groups in the single sense-
type condition than the mixed sense-type condition. The number of groups 
participants used to categorise these recurring stimuli was measured and an 
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independent samples t-test was used to establish whether a significant difference was 
found. A highly significant difference in the predicted direction was found.  
 
Finally, inter-participant agreement values were calculated to establish how well 
participants agreed with each other over how the stimuli should be sorted. Across all 
24 tasks, a wide range of agreement both within and across tasks was observed. If we 
understand the groups participants create to represent word senses they find 
meaningful, this finding indicates that individual speakers do not necessarily share 
word senses. This finding is compatible with the exemplar model. 
4.7.1 An exemplar model of word sense representation 
This study aimed to study the mental representation of word senses by asking 
whether they are stored in memory. Since some form of non-temporary 
representation was indicated, a cognitively-realistic account of their storage was also 
pursued. Cognitive linguists adhere to a theoretical framework that emphasises the 
necessity of explaining linguistic phenomena in a manner that is compatible with 
what we know about cognition more generally. Cognitive linguistic literature on the 
representation of word senses in memory has traditionally argued in favour of their 
representation in a radial network model (e.g., Brugman and Lakoff, 2006 [1988]; 
Tyler and Evans, 2001), in a manner that draws on and is broadly consistent with the 
prototype model of categorisation developed by Rosch and her colleagues during the 
1970s (Rosch and Mervis, 1975; Rosch et al., 1976; Rosch, 1978). More recently, 
however, cognitive linguists (e.g., Divjak and Arppe, 2013; Gries, 2015) have 
considered whether an alternative model of word sense representation corresponds to 
empirical observations, specifically, a linguistic application of the (generalised) 
context model proposed by Medin and Schaffer in the late 1970s, and developed by 
these authors and Nosofsky from the 1980s onwards.  
 
Based on the data presented in this chapter, I argue that word senses might be best 
understood as potential categories of stored exemplars of polysemous words that are 
constructed as and when needed according to a relevant classification criterion. 
Under this account, senses consist of exemplars of a given polysemous word that are 
considered by the individual to have equivalence in meaning at the moment of 
disambiguation. This entails that word senses may, therefore, not be fixed 
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representations. Nonetheless, the potential for the categorisation of a set of 
exemplars into identical groups on several occasions is not ruled out, as long as the 
criterion/criteria for judging similarity and therefore constructing the category 
remains constant. I therefore argue for an exemplar model of word sense 
representation. 
 
The indication that word senses are potentials and do not have a fixed representation 
is not evidence in support of the monosemy position, which proposes that words 
have abstract, unitary meanings that are disambiguated on the fly (Ruhl, 1989). The 
finding that participants typically reach a level of agreement with themselves that is 
well above chance, and that they agree with themselves significantly better and more 
often than they do with other participants, is difficult to explain if we understand 
individual exemplars of polysemous words as disambiguated tokens which are 
discarded after they have served their communicative purpose.  
 
On the other hand, this proposal that word senses may be mere potentials, rather than 
having a fixed and stable representation, presents a challenge to existing models of 
word sense representation which draw on the prototype model. For instance, Tyler 
and Evans (2001) argue that word senses are “distinct meanings instantiated [by 
which they mean stored] in memory” (p. 746), and propose a distinction between 
senses of the polysemous word over that are stored in memory, and meanings that 
are “interpretations produced on-line” (p. 727) and which presumably do not have 
the fixed representational status that word senses do. The evidence gathered here is 
at odds with this aspect of Tyler and Evans’ theoretical model of word senses. 
 
Further, the data reported here are difficult to reconcile with a representation system 
based on the prototype model of categorisation. Unlike the exemplar model, the 
prototype model does not predict that categorisation decisions are determined by 
selective attention. The effects of selective attention were observed in this study: 
participants in the single sense-type condition appeared to categorise the stimuli 
systematically differently to how those in the mixed sense-type condition did. A 
prototype-based account of word sense representation cannot account for these 
effects, nor for selective attention more generally. While work grounded in prototype 
theory by Labov (1978) has proposed that categorisation decisions can be modulated 
 184 
by context, Labov’s proposal called for variable feature weighting, a requirement 
better aligned with exemplar theory, which specifically predicts that features have 
variable weights, than with prototype theory, which does not predict that weighting 
may vary. Selective attention dictates that categories – including linguistic categories 
– are potentials, constructed in response to a particular (set of) categorisation 
criterion/criteria. Accordingly, individual exemplars of a polysemous word can 
belong to a number of categories depending upon (a) who is doing the categorising, 
and (b) what characteristics the individual selectively attends to when distinguishing 
between exemplars. Gahl and Yu (2006) claim that “each exemplar may belong to 
many categories simultaneously” (p. 213). This claim entails that an individual 
exemplar is located in multiple positions in the same multidimensional space 
simultaneously. This is an interesting claim but one which lacks empirical support, 
and which would presumably depend on a potentially infinite number of 
multidimensional spaces containing copies of all exemplars. I counter that while 
simultaneous membership of multiple categories is not possible under an exemplar 
model, sequential variation in category membership is not only a more realistic 
claim, but also one which follows logically from Medin and Schaffer’s and 
Nosofsky’s claim of the role of selective attention in categorisation. It seems difficult 
to imagine a prototype-based account of word sense representation in which 
individual exemplars may belong to multiple categories because the prototype model 
claims that it allows for optimal cognitive economy without compromising 
informativeness. If an individual exemplar could belong to multiple categories, as 
was observed in this study, in order to account for the findings under a prototype-
based representation system one would need to posit a vast – potentially infinite – 
number of categories and prototypes. While the prototype model does not call for 
minimal storage, permitting a potentially infinite number of categories pushes 
storage demands to the opposite extreme. In this way, the balance between cognitive 
economy and informativeness, which the prototype model seeks to achieve, would 
be compromised.  
4.7.2 Theoretical and practical implications 
The findings in this chapter have certain theoretical and practical implications. They 
also raise a number of questions that might be the topic of further research. These are 
discussed below. 
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4.7.2.1 Theoretical	implications	
First and foremost, the findings of this study support an exemplar model of word 
sense representation. While an exemplar-theoretic account of word senses was hinted 
when discussing the finding that individuals agree with themselves better than they 
do with others about how stimuli should be sorted, and that there appear to be 
individual differences in word senses, the most significant support for this account 
came by testing the prediction that categorisation decisions are shaped by selective 
attention. This prediction was substantiated. 
 
By testing this particular aspect of the exemplar model of categorisation, this study 
extends exemplar-theoretic accounts of the storage of linguistic information. While 
there is a growing body of research examining the role of frequency and repetition 
(e.g., Bybee, 2002, 2006; Divjak and Arppe, 2013; Pierrehumbert, 2000), to my 
knowledge there is little research in linguistics generally, and none in semantics 
specifically, that addresses the central claim of Medin and Schaffer's (1978) and 
Nosofsky's (1986) exemplar model: that categorisation decisions are determined by 
selective attention. Finding support for this claim has weakened the case for a 
prototype-based model of word sense representation, and entails that word senses 
might not be understood as either fleeting entities constructed and then forgotten, nor 
as fixed representations, but might be better understood as something in between. I 
argue that an exemplar-theoretic account of word senses views senses as nothing 
more than potential categories comprising previously encountered exemplars, which 
may be recreated, but which do not have a fixed representational status. This finding 
offers a theoretical explanation and support for Kilgarriff’s claim in the 
lexicographic literature that “word senses exist only relative to a task.” (Kilgarriff, 
1997, p. 1).  
4.7.2.2 Practical	implications	
4.7.2.2.1 The	status	of	expert	intuitions	
Individuals appear to classify exemplars of polysemous words in different ways, 
despite receiving identical guidelines instructing them to categorise the stimuli only 
on the basis of the meaning of the target polysemous word. This presents a challenge 
to the intuition-based study of polysemy at a theoretical level, which has traditionally 
been the focus of research in cognitive linguistics, and at a practical level, which is 
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the focus of research in word sense disambiguation in computational linguistics. Put 
simply, these findings discourage an intuition-based analysis of polysemous words, 
and authors should explicitly acknowledge that the distinctions that they find 
meaningful might not be meaningful to other speakers. In the face of the findings 
presented here, I would argue that an intuition-based analysis of the senses of 
polysemous words is unlikely to prove generalisable or cognitively realistic. I 
recommend, on this basis, that analyses of the senses of polysemous words are 
informed by empirical evidence. I also respond to Talmy's claim that “introspection 
has the advantage over other methodologies in seemingly being the only one able to 
access [meaning] directly.” (2007, p. xiii). The fact that participants in this set of 
studies have produced groups of sentences that appear to follow some logical and 
non-random categorisation principles suggests that Talmy may indeed be correct 
here. However, his claim, which forms part of his larger argument over the utility of 
introspection and intuitions in linguistic research, does not account for the possibility 
– which has been realised in this study – that when an individual encounters a pair of 
examples of a polysemous word, the meaning(s) they access to interpret them may 
differ to those which another individual accesses. This finding entails that, while 
introspection may be a useful tool for understanding word meaning, meanings 
identified by introspection are subject to variation across individuals. Consequently, 
the use of introspection alone as a means of studying word meaning may produce 
results that do not faithfully represent meanings held by other speakers. This finding 
is compatible with and adds to existing literature that problematises the utility of 
expert intuitions in the description of linguistic – primarily syntactic – phenomena 
(Bradac et al., 1980; Dąbrowska, 2010; Gibbs, 2006; Gordon and Hendrick, 1997; 
Labov, 1972; Miller, 1962; Ross, 1979; Schütze, 1996; Schwarz-Friesel, 2012; 
Spencer, 1973). 
4.7.2.2.2 Automatic	word	sense	disambiguation	
Automatic word sense disambiguation is a necessary component of a successful 
artificial intelligence system. Human intuitions about word senses are harnessed to 
train an automated WSD algorithm, and to assess the disambiguation results. The 
development of an inventory of word senses has recently seen significant 
methodological development in the changing use of expert and naïve intuitions about 
where word sense boundaries lie. Specifically, word sense disambiguation research 
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increasingly recruits the “crowd”, groups of anonymous and naïve participants, to 
categorise exemplars of a given word to one or more predefined semantic categories. 
The findings of this study raise questions over the utility not only of expert 
intuitions, but the role of naïve intuitions in the development of a word sense 
inventory. If individuals have different senses of a given word – and if their 
decisions about what category an individual exemplar belongs to is not permanent, 
but subject to change depending on what the category options are – then how reliable 
are the decisions they make if the goal is to develop a “gold standard”?  
 
Based on the findings presented here, I argue that fine-grained decisions are not a 
particularly useful dataset, and that a fine-grained approach to word senses may 
never be fruitful, no matter how much training the algorithm receives, nor how many 
human participants (expert or otherwise) contribute to the training set and sense 
inventory. I would not, however, argue that good automated WSD algorithms based 
on an inventory compiled by human informants are impossible. Instead, I 
recommend that coarse-grained senses are more useful. I reach this conclusion based 
on the conflicting realities of both individual differences in word senses, as observed 
here, and nonetheless effective communication between individuals. I therefore offer 
an evidence-based argument compatible with Ide and Wilks' (2007) recommendation 
that computational WSD tasks do not use “the standard fine-grained division of 
senses”, but focus instead on “broad discriminations” (p. 47). I explore this in more 
detail in the following section. 
4.7.3 Questions raised 
4.7.3.1 Successful	communication	in	the	face	of	individual	differences	in	word	
senses	
If individual speakers’ senses of a given word do not overlap, how is successful 
communication achieved9? At face value it may seem problematic to posit an 
account of major individual differences in word senses. After all, if the meaning that 
a pair of individuals attributes to a single exemplar of a polysemous word differs, 
surely the meaning intended by the speaker will not map onto the listener’s 
interpretation. However, successful communication takes place between individuals 
with markedly different linguistic systems (e.g., children and their caregivers, L1 and 
                                                
9 As Ferreira et al. (2002) note, however, communication is not always successful. 
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L2 speakers), and when speech is disfluent (Ferreira et al. 2002). In a study that 
compared computational models’ and native speakers’ performance in their choice 
of six synonymous Russian try-verbs, Divjak et al. (2016, p. 27) proposed that 
multiple computational models of grammar can correspond to human usage. Indeed, 
they recommend that the pursuit of a “single ‘best’ model” of human grammar 
should be side-lined in favour of developing multiple models, representing 
individual variation in grammar. In a somewhat different explanation of successful 
communication in the face of individual differences in grammar, Ferreira et al. 
(2002) propose that successful sentence interpretation in normal communicative 
situations is based on a “good enough” model of sentence processing. Further, 
successful processing and interpretation is supported by contextual information. We 
might extend this argument to account for the incongruity between variation in word 
senses and (generally) successful communication. In the study reported here, 
participants were engaging in a disambiguation experiment rather than in a 
conversation that required disambiguation. This artificial scenario thus removes 
contextual information that a conversation in a might provide. In a natural 
communicative situation, under an exemplar model of word senses, it might be the 
case that context provides information and disambiguation/categorisation biases that 
serve to shrink or extend dimensions, thus resulting in different categorisation 
decisions than the ones observed here.  
 
This account assumes that successful disambiguation depends on finely-grained 
word senses. Computational linguists have claimed that, on the contrary, 
disambiguation beyond even the homograph-like level is rarely necessary for human 
and computer understanding, and that division of these very coarse senses into more 
finely-grained sub-senses is only done if successful communication depends on it 
(Ide and Wilks, 2007, p. 66). This is not incompatible with Ferreira et al.’s argument. 
Let us consider Ide and Wilks’s very coarse-grained senses, which have the potential 
to consist of more finely-grained senses. It seems feasible that the senses that emerge 
in the sorting task reported here might, at least by some participants, be collapsed 
into a smaller number of coarser senses. If we were to pair up two such participants 
in a conversational scenario, it is possible that these coarser senses might overlap. 
Let us take as an example the categorisation decisions made by participants BMi15 
and BMi16, in the first mixed sense-type task for below, looking specifically at the 
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category to which they assigned the sentence The sleeves gradually get tighter and 
end below the elbow. Participant BMi15 assigned it to a single-member group 
labelled ‘beyond, on a dimension which is implicitly downward’. Participant BMi16 
assigned that sentence to a group labelled ‘beyond’, along with three other sentences. 
The categorisation decisions, when adopting a fine-grained approach, therefore 
differ. However, it might be the case that both participants would agree that this 
sentence is an exemplar of a broader INFERIOR POSITION sense. Indeed, in the 
network visualisation that was produced using data from this task, this sentence was 
located in a seemingly catch-all, generic spatial cluster. If this sentence arose in 
conversation between BMi15 and BMi16, and if the success of the conversation 
depends on accessing a finely-grained sense, a mismatch in interpretation might 
occur. However, if accessing a broad sense allows for “good enough” interpretation, 
no mismatch will occur, since they both belong in the same broader, collapsed sense.  
 
As Divjak et al. (2016) observe, multiple computational models of grammar 
correspond to actual human behaviour. At face value, multiple models of word sense 
categories might be needed to explain the individual differences observed in this 
study. However, in the face of evidence which supports an exemplar-theoretic model 
of word sense representation, I would argue that no fixed model of word senses – 
multiple or otherwise – is cognitively real, given that actual disambiguation 
decisions are subject to not only external variation, but internal variation, too.  
4.7.3.2 Why	do	some	participants	agree	with	each	other	more	than	others?	
As noted previously, this study has shown that some pairs of participants reach a 
high – sometimes perfect – degree of consensus over how the stimuli should be 
categorised. The opposite extreme was observed too, with some pairs of participants 
reaching below-chance agreement. At this point, it is not clear what factors might 
explain these observations. Infrequent exposure to the words tested here might result 
in fewer opportunities to identify the characteristics of its meaning which are most 
important in establishing its meaning in context. For example, limited exposure to 
above in written contexts may result in a different categorisation decision for the 
exemplar It was refused for the above reasons to a participant with more exposure to 
written language. It is beyond the scope of this thesis to explore the reasons for 
differences in agreement across participants, but collection of demographic data 
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makes a study of the role of education and type of work in inter-participant 
(dis)agreement possible in future research. 
4.7.3.3 Why	do	some	participants	agree	with	themselves	more	than	with	others?	
Just as reasons for differences in inter-participant agreement are unclear at this point, 
so too are the reasons why some participants reached perfect consensus with 
themselves, and others agreed with themselves less than would be expected by 
chance. An exemplar model of word sense representation predicts that differences in 
sorting decisions are attributable to differences in sorting strategies; a participant 
may have had more time available to complete one of the tasks than the other, which 
might have changed how much detail they attended to in the meaning distinctions. 
Equally, a participant may have interpreted the instructions differently on each 
occasion. As was the case in observations of inter-participant agreement, intra-
participant (dis)agreement may also be determined by differences in education, and 
type of employment.  
4.7.3.4 What	can	networks	tell	us	about	word	meaning?	
Finally, the study has raised questions over the utility of network visualisations of 
sentence-sorting data in the study of word senses. When agreement amongst 
participants over how sentences should be categorised is high, high quality networks 
can be produced. The communities that emerge in these networks might be 
tentatively taken as representing word senses. The fact that the communities detected 
in these high quality networks have comprehensible and seemingly non-random 
membership encourages further study of the role they might play in understanding 
word senses and their interrelations. They may prove useful, for example, in 
identifying whether finely-grained senses can be collapsed into the larger, 
homograph-like sense that Ide and Wilks (2007) claim to generally be the most 
useful level of meaning for successful disambiguation. Further, the fact that I found a 
strong and significant correlation between mean inter-participant agreement values 
for each task, and the modularity value (which measures the quality of the network) 
of the resultant network gives further weight to using them in future research.  
4.8 Conclusions 
Using a set of open sentence-sorting tasks with a large sample of participants, and by 
performing statistical analyses on the resultant data, a significant body of evidence 
was gathered which collectively indicates that word senses have some form of 
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mental representation, and might be best understood as potential categories of stored 
exemplars of polysemous words. In brief: 
 
1. Participants agreed with themselves better than with other participants over 
how stimuli should be sorted. This was taken as evidence that word senses do 
have some form of mental representation. 
2. Sorting decisions differed according to the number of broad semantic 
categories represented by the sentences in the stimuli sets. This was taken as 
evidence that categorisation may be task-based and that decisions about the 
similarity of exemplar sentences may be affected by the characteristics of the 
meaning of the target word the individual selectively attends to.  
3. Individual differences in how sentences should be sorted were observed. On 
the basis that the groups participants created were taken as indicators of word 
senses, I argue that individuals may have different senses of polysemous 
words. 
 
Modelling linguistic phenomena in terms of the exemplar model is not a new 
approach in (cognitive) linguistics; for example, exemplar theory has been invoked 
to account for phonetic variation (Bybee 2002; Pierrehumbert 2000) and grammar 
(Bybee 2006). Equally, it has been recommended as a suitable means of modelling 
semantic phenomena, including polysemy (Gries 2015) and, in conjunction with 
varying abstraction models and prototype representations, near-synonymy (Divjak 
and Arppe, 2013). However, the findings made in this study build upon this literature 
by testing a claim central to the theory: that categorisation is task-based and that the 
category a particular exemplar is assigned to is a factor of the criterion/criteria that 
the categoriser selectively attends to. In this way, this study extends the literature on 
exemplar-theoretic accounts of linguistic categorisation and representation. This 
aspect of the study also provides support for, and a theoretical justification of 
Kilgarriff’s claim in the lexicographic literature that “word senses exist only relative 
to a task.” (1997, p.1). 
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Chapter 5 Discussion and conclusions 
Polysemy, the phenomenon whereby a word has a number of distinct but (arguably) 
related senses, is an issue that concerns a great number of researchers working both 
within and beyond the cognitive linguistics community. Indeed, scholars in the field 
have claimed that the study of polysemy is “rampant” (Cuyckens and Zawada, 2001, 
p. xv). However, there remains more to be said. This thesis aims to add to, and 
develop, our understanding of polysemy, and in particular, the senses of polysemous 
words. While polysemy is not a topic that is of unique interest to cognitive linguists, 
what distinguishes polysemy research in cognitive linguistics from work on this 
topic by scholars working within other theoretical frameworks is that an account of 
the psychological status of polysemous words is pursued. The motivation for this 
pursuit is cognitive linguists’ adherence to the cognitive commitment, i.e., that 
claims we make, and theories we develop, about the nature of language must be 
compatible with what we know about the brain and mind more generally.  
 
Polysemy, which entails a potential proliferation of individual word senses, is 
therefore an account of word meaning that is in conflict with monosemy. In contrast 
to polysemy, proponents (e.g., Ruhl, 1989) of the monosemy approach claim that 
words are ambiguous, with a unitary, underspecified meaning which is substantiated 
on an ad hoc basis using surrounding context, such as sentential and environmental 
context. Word meaning is therefore not, under a monosemy account, stored in 
memory. Theorists who support the polysemy approach claim that context does play 
a role in deciphering word meaning, but that context itself does not create this 
meaning. For example, Gibbs and Matlock (2001) propose that context facilitates the 
discrimination of word senses. 
5.1 Expert intuitions, and individual differences 
Amongst the vast literature on polysemy exist a number of analyses of polysemous 
words. The studies by Brugman and Lakoff (2006 [1988]) and Tyler and Evans 
(2001), both of which focus on over, are canonical examples of efforts to pin down 
the senses of this polyseme, and offer an account of the relationships between senses. 
These analyses are made on the basis of the authors’ intuitions. Certainly, Tyler and 
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Evans describe their route to isolating word senses as principled, and aim to offer a 
constrained set of senses. Of course, the role of intuition in the practice of 
identifying word meaning has a strong precedent; in his “idealized” account of how 
lexicographers identify word senses for publication in dictionaries, Kilgarriff (2007, 
p. 31) describes a highly intuition-led procedure. However, in the face of criticism, 
levelled in particular at syntacticians, over the status of intuition-based studies of 
linguistic phenomena, this approach is problematic. Moreover, there are growing 
calls amongst cognitive linguists to adopt empirical approaches to linguistic 
scholarship (e.g., Arppe and Järvikivi, 2007). For these reasons, the assumptions 
inherent in intuition-led analyses of polysemous words, namely that expert intuitions 
correspond to naïve speakers’ intuitions, and that word senses are shared by native 
speakers of a given language, require testing. This brings me to the first aim of the 
thesis: to study whether the sense distinctions that I, as an expert, are shared with 
naïve and expert participants who speak English as their native language. The second 
assumption, that word senses are shared by native speakers, is not unreasonable. If 
we didn’t agree on what the senses of a given word are, how would communication 
be successful? However, if we observe a non-native and native speaker of English in 
conversation, or witness communication between a parent and toddler, we will 
observe that in spite of the considerably different linguistic systems held by each 
speaker, communication can be successful. Moreover, individual differences have 
been observed in other areas of language, such as grammatical attainment (e.g., 
Street and Dąbrowska, 2010), language acquisition (e.g., Bates, Dale, and Thal, 
1995) and metaphor interpretation (Duffy 2015). Individual differences in word 
senses need not, therefore, present major problems to successful communication, and 
they would be compatible with what is already known about language. For this 
reason, the second aim of this thesis was to assess whether there is evidence that 
individuals do not reliably agree on the senses of polysemous words.   
5.2 Mental representations of word senses 
Certain polysemy theorists in cognitive linguistics propose that word senses have 
some form of fixed mental representation. In their account of the representation of 
the senses of the word over, Tyler and Evans (2001) argue that some – but not all – 
senses of polysemous words are stored in memory. They go on to propose that stored 
word senses are organised in a radial system, and bear some relation with a 
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prototypical sense. In this way, Tyler and Evans’ proposal borrows from the 
prototype theory of categorisation developed by Rosch and her colleagues during the 
1970s (Rosch and Mervis, 1975; Rosch et al., 1976; Rosch, 1978), in a way that is 
not uncommon in cognitive linguistics (for examples of linguistic applications of the 
principles of prototype theory, see Coleman and Kay, 1981; Evans and Tyler, 2005; 
Gilquin and McMichael, 2008; Ibarretxe-Antuñano, 2004; Ibbotson, Theakston, 
Lieven, and Tomasello, 2012; Ibbotson and Tomasello, 2009; Langacker, 1986; 
MacLaury, 1989, 1991; Rice, 1996). Certainly, elsewhere in cognitive linguistics 
scholars have argued that polysemous words are examples of categories (e.g. Taylor, 
2003). This motivates an account of the representation of word senses that is 
compatible with general models of categorisation.  
 
More recently, Divjak and Arppe (2013) have considered the representation of other 
semantic phenomena, this time near-synonymous Russian verbs of trying and 
thinking. Contrary to earlier work, which has favoured a prototype-based account of 
meaning representation, Divjak and Arppe conclude that a single representational 
model cannot account for their observations. Instead, they propose that meaning may 
be modelled in terms of a number of different types of representations, from full 
prototype to individual exemplars, and at different degrees of abstraction in between 
these two polar positions. Elsewhere, Gries (2015, p. 482) has described word senses 
in a manner akin to an exemplar-based model, using terms such as 
“multidimensional semantic space”, regions of which denote individual senses. 
Indeed, his collaborative work on behavioral profiles is compatible with an exemplar 
model (e.g., Gries and Divjak, 2009). Behavioral profiles describe a vast number of 
characteristics of an exemplar of a given word. These characteristics, when 
understood in exemplar-theoretic terms, correspond to the dimensions that shrink 
and expand in a categorisation task. A further example of an exemplar-oriented 
approach to word senses is Murphy’s (2007) “limited listing” approach. In his 
account, Murphy proposes that encounters with a polysemous word are mapped to a 
position in a multidimensional space. Gries (2015) notes that there is a growing 
consensus that word senses are represented in an exemplar-based form. This shift in 
focus away from prototype-oriented accounts of the representation of words senses, 
towards an exemplar-theoretic account, motivates the present study. 
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The exemplar model of categorisation (also known as the [generalized] context 
theory of classification learning [Medin and Schaffer, 1978; Nosofsky, 1986]) 
predicts that stimuli have perceptual features that can be modelled in a 
multidimensional space. Exemplars of a given concept, such as exemplars of a DOG, 
are tagged for relevant perceptual characteristics, such as colour, amount of fur, type 
of bark, and so on. Dimensions in the multidimensional space represent these 
characteristics, and the value of a given dimension for example, brown fur, is 
plotted. Exemplars that have similar values on a given set of dimensions are 
positioned more closely together than those that have different values on that set of 
dimensions. As a result, they are judged to be more similar. Of crucial importance in 
this theory is the argument that these dimensions are dynamic; they can shrink or 
extend depending on whether or not the characteristics they correspond to are the 
object of the selective attention of the categoriser. When a characteristic is 
selectively attended to, the associated dimension expands, thus revealing fine 
distinctions along it. Conversely, when a characteristic is irrelevant, its dimension 
shrinks, thereby hiding distinctions. 
 
The proposal that word senses are stored in memory is not a new one. Neither is the 
suggestion that they have an exemplar-based representation. However, to my 
knowledge, no research has tested this central prediction of the exemplar-based 
theory of categorisation – that categorisation judgments are determined by selective 
attention – in a study of polysemous words, or indeed any semantic phenomenon. 
While other linguists have predicted – and, where they have tested for them, found – 
selective attention effects in linguistic categorisation (Ellis, 2006; Francis and 
Nusbaum, 2002; Kalyan, 2012; Lively et al., 1993), others (e.g., Bybee, 2006), omit 
selective attention from accounts of linguistic categorisation, and therefore treat 
linguistic categories separately from categories of other phenomena. This brings me 
to the final two aims of this thesis. The research presented here empirically tests (1) 
whether there is evidence that word senses are stored in memory and, if they are, (2) 
whether they are represented in a manner consistent with what is already known 
about the exemplar theory of categorisation. To answer that, I ask whether linguistic 
categories – specifically, word senses – are subject to the selective attention effects 
that are a central component of the exemplar model. 
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5.3 Chapter structure 
This chapter draws the thesis to a close. It summarises the purpose and primary 
findings of each experiment, each of which concentrates on the polysemous words 
over, under, above and below, and discusses what these findings add to existing 
knowledge. It then discusses the collective implications of the findings of the three 
sets of experiments. It closes with some concluding remarks on the place of the 
findings reported here in the broader research landscape, and makes 
recommendations for further work, in light of questions raised during the course of 
the research. 
5.4 Chapter 2. Experiment 1: A closed sentence-sorting 
study to test the representativity of linguists’ intuitions 
about word senses 
Polysemy is a hot topic in cognitive linguistics, and a vast literature on polysemy 
exists. Brugman’s master’s thesis (1981), along with her later work with Lakoff 
(1988) initiated a body of research that examined the organisation of the senses of 
polysemous words, relative to each other, and relative to a prototypical sense. 
Briefly, they argue that polysemous words are radial categories, with senses 
connecting to a prototypical sense, or an intermediary sense. Tyler and Evans’ 
(2001) paper, which also studied over, has clear ties with Brugman and Lakoff’s 
original work. While in this seminal work they do not specifically describe the 
structure of the senses of polysemous words as radial, the diagrammatic 
representation of the senses of over (p. 746), is clearly inspired by the radial 
structure proposed by Brugman and Lakoff. In later, related work on the preposition 
in, Evans and Tyler (2004) confirm that they do indeed model polysemous words as 
radial categories, after Brugman and Lakoff. Tyler and Evan’s case study of over 
was developed in part in response to doubts raised about the cognitive reality of 
existing accounts of the representation of polysemous words. They state, for 
example, that Sandra and Rice (1995) claim that analyses of polysemous words were 
theretofore arbitrary and influenced by the analyst’s “preferences (or indeed 
imagination)” (p. 733). In response, Tyler and Evans develop a principled approach 
to the isolation of word senses and identification of the prototypical sense, 
represented by a “protoscene” (p. 735), and make claims as to the cognitive reality of 
the senses they identify, claiming that some are stored in long-term memory. 
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While Tyler and Evans’ efforts to develop a principled approach to isolating word 
senses and a protosense are valiant and represent a clear response to Sandra and 
Rice’s (1995) criticism over the role of the analyst’s intuitions, they are inherently 
flawed in that the approach they advocate also depends on intuitions and 
introspection. Certainly, in their methodology for identifying the primary sense, one 
aspect is objective: they state that an indicator of the primary sense is that which is 
attested earliest (p. 734). However, the other means by which they identify the 
primary senses, namely predominance in a network, relations to other prepositions, 
and grammatical predictions, is open to author bias in two ways. First, the author 
judges the predominance in the network, relations to other prepositions, and 
grammatical predictions, based on their intuitions. Second, the author decides what 
the senses are in the first place. Certainly, these senses are, according to Tyler and 
Evans, arrived at in a principled manner. Principled as that might be, their 
identification proceeds solely on the basis of intuitions. 
 
In light of existing research that questions the reality and utility of linguists’ 
intuitions in the study of other linguistic phenomena (Bradac et al., 1980; 
Dąbrowska, 2010; Gibbs, 2006; Gordon and Hendrick, 1997; Labov, 1972; Miller, 
1962; Ross, 1979; Schütze, 1996; Schwarz-Friesel, 2012; Spencer, 1973), I was 
unconvinced by the reality of the senses that Tyler and Evans propose. In response, 
and acknowledging the status of polysemous words as linguistic categories, I set out 
to determine whether, in a categorisation task analogous to those used in work by 
Cuyckens et al. (1997) and in computational linguistics (Bhala and Abirami, 2014), 
naïve and linguist participants would agree with the senses that I, as a trained linguist 
with particular expertise about the meanings of the words over, under, above and 
below, found meaningful. The results of the categorisation tasks, operationalized as 
sentence-sorting tasks, indicate that my intuitions about what the senses of four 
polysemous words are do not consistently and reliably correspond to those held by 
other native speakers of English, regardless of whether or not they too are linguistics 
experts. Two explanations of this outcome were identified. On the one hand, the 
participants in the study may have agreed what the senses of these four words are, 
and it is simply the case that these senses do not correspond to mine. On the other 
hand, individuals may have different senses of a given polysemous word. 
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An important outcome was that there were differences in the degree to which 
individual participants and I agreed about how the stimuli should be sorted. 
Variation in agreement between me and each participant problematises, but does not 
rule out, the interpretation that the participants had a homogenous set of senses they 
found meaningful within the stimuli, and that this set contrasted with mine. If 
participants agree about what the senses of a word are, they should (dis)agree with 
my sense distinctions to the same extent. This was not the case. This outcome could, 
however, be explained on the basis that the task was highly structured, and 
participants may have used this structure to infer the “correct” sorting solution. In 
this case, rather than categorising the stimuli in a way that corresponded to their 
intuitions about word meaning, participants were instead attempting to figure out 
what the final solution should look like, assuming that there was a “correct” 
outcome. Certainly, clues as to a possible solution were available: they may have 
correctly guessed that I judged each category to have six members, and the 
distinctions evident in the different group labels may have hinted at distinctions 
within the stimuli. 
5.5 Chapter 3. Experiment 2: An open sentence-sorting 
task to test for individual differences in word senses 
In light of the indication that participants agreed with me to different extents about 
what the senses of the words over, under, above and below are, an open sort task was 
devised to explicitly address the possibility that there are individual differences in 
word senses. 
 
Individual differences have been observed in a range of aspects of language 
acquisition (Bates, Dale and Thal, 1995), including early phonology (Leonard, 
1980), joint attention skills (Mundy and Gomes, 1998), lexical processing (Fernald 
and Marchman, 2012), the development of multiword speech (Pine and Lieven 1993; 
Shore, 1995), vocabulary (Bates et al, 1995), syntax (Vasilyeve et al., 2008) and 
semantics (Rice, 2003). Individual differences in adult language are the subject of 
growing attention. For example, Street and Dąbrowska have found evidence of 
individual differences in grammatical attainment and processing that appear to be 
based on differences in linguistic experience (Dąbrowska and Street, 2006; Street 
and Dąbrowska, 2010, 2014). Divjak et al. (2016, p. 27) have recently gathered data 
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suggesting that “a very large number of models” of grammar correspond to attested 
usage, thus providing further evidence that there are individual differences in 
grammar. In contrast, I am aware of no literature that directly investigates whether or 
not there are individual differences in word senses. Certainly, data from research in 
computational linguistics suggests that there may be individual differences. For 
example, word sense disambiguation research has shown that individuals “sense-tag” 
examples of polysemous words differently (e.g., Passonneau, Bhardwaj, Salleb-
Aouissi, and Ide, 2012). However, these findings were gathered in a manner 
analogous to the closed sorting task described above, meaning that they cannot 
conclusively establish that different people have different senses of a given word, 
since it may be the case instead that a sense inventory developed by an expert is 
simply different from a single set of senses that all other speakers find meaningful. 
 
I investigated whether or not there may be differences in word senses across 
individuals by asking naïve participants to complete a large-scale open-sort task. In 
this case, participants were required to create their own categories that captured 
examples of the target word with the same meaning. Inter-participant agreement was 
calculated with Morey and Agresti’s adjusted Rand, which returns a value ranging 
from -1, representing total disagreement, through 0 (chance agreement), to 1, 
representing perfect agreement. Using Neuendorf’s (2002, p. 3) recommended 0.8 
cut-off point for acceptable agreement, the results suggest that, on the whole, 
participants fail to agree with each other about how examples of a polysemous word 
should be categorised. If we understand the groups participants create to represent 
the senses they find meaningful, this indicates individual differences in word senses. 
Accordingly, the findings of the first, closed-sort experiment are explained. 
Participants failed to agree with me not because my word senses differed to 
participants’ word senses, and participants themselves agreed with each other about 
what the senses of these four words are. Instead, it seems more likely that they 
disagreed with me because individuals have different senses of polysemous words.  
 
I noted in that chapter that methodological concerns compromise the surety of this 
conclusion. The scale of the task was vast; participants were required to sort 100 
sentences that were unedited to make them well-formed. Participants therefore 
needed to read each sentence and make a judgment as to what the meaning of the 
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target word was. They then had to match up sentences which used the target word in 
the same sense. This is a difficult task, requiring participants to remember a 
potentially large number of senses and judge which sense a particular exemplar 
sentence corresponded to. The scale of this task may therefore have caused fatigue, 
boredom and semantic satiation, which may have resulted in categorisation decisions 
that lacked coherence and consistency. 
5.6 Chapter 4. Experiment 3: Testing an exemplar model 
of word senses 
The sentence-sorting task is highly versatile and this versatility was exploited to 
answer other interesting questions about word senses. Given the large scope of this 
series of this study, the following section will be divided into smaller subsections 
addressing (1) individual differences in word senses, (2) storage of word senses in 
memory, and (3) selective attention in linguistic categorisation judgments. The 
section will end with a brief conclusion summarizing the findings. 
5.6.1 Individual differences in word senses 
The possibility raised in Experiment 2 that individual speakers have different senses 
of polysemous words is an exciting one. It is both under-investigated and compatible 
with what we already know about individual differences in other aspects of 
language. However, methodological factors may explain the finding of poor inter-
participant agreement. To address this possibility, I devised a smaller sentence-
sorting task. Like the task just discussed, this too was an open-sort task, requiring 
participants to categorise sentences into groups of their own making. This time, 
however, the task was much smaller in scale, with just 36 sentences. Further, the 
stimuli were structured in that I judged them to represent six examples of six senses. 
These factors should limit fatigue and therefore produce more consistent and 
coherent sorting decisions. Inter-participant agreement values were highly varied 
across all 24 sorting tasks, reflecting varying degrees of (dis)agreement over how 
stimuli should be sorted. If we understand the categories of sentences produced by 
participants to reflect the senses they find meaningful, this outcome suggests that 
individuals do not necessarily share word senses.  
5.6.2 Storage of word senses in memory 
The task was also used to address an important theoretical issue that has been the 
focus of cognitive linguistic treatments of polysemy: the representation of word 
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senses. Accounts of the storage of, and relationships between word senses have 
traditionally invoked a prototype-based system, thus borrowing from Rosch and 
colleagues’ prototype model of categorisation (Rosch and Mervis, 1975; Rosch et 
al., 1976; Rosch, 1978). While the prototype model produced powerful explanations 
of observations such as typicality effects in categorisation decisions, other models 
have been proposed which can also account for typicality effects. Indeed, other 
models, specifically the exemplar model developed by Medin and Schaffer (1978) 
and Nosofsky (1986) better account for observations made in categorisation 
experiments than the prototype model (Medin and Schaffer 1978; Murphy 2004, p. 
103). Indeed, and while prototype-based approaches are favoured in the field, 
(cognitive) linguists have considered exemplar-theoretic models of linguistic 
representation to a limited extent (Chandler, 2015, p. 3). For example, the exemplar 
model has been adopted to account for other linguistic phenomena, such as 
constructions (Bybee, 2006) and phonology (Pierrehumbert 2000). However, 
canonical research in cognitive linguistics has assumed a prototype-based 
representation of polysemous words and their senses, and has argued that word 
senses are stored in long term memory (e.g., Brugman and Lakoff, 2006 [1988]; 
Tyler and Evans, 2001). 
 
Experiment 3 aimed to contribute to this literature by testing whether word senses 
are stored in memory. This was achieved by asking participants to complete an 
identical sentence-sorting task twice, divided by a period of two months. If word 
senses do have some form of mental representation, I predicted that participants 
would agree with themselves about how the stimuli should be sorted better and more 
often than with other participants. Specifically, I predicted that a single participants’ 
sorting decisions at T1 and T2 would show more agreement than between their 
sorting decisions at T1, and other participants’ sorting decisions at T2. The data 
revealed that participants agreed with themselves significantly better and more often 
than with other participants. However, it was also observed that participants varied 
in how well they agreed with themselves; it was not always the case that they agreed 
with themselves better than with others, and in individual participants the opposite 
was true. The fact that some participants seemed to make very similar – if not 
identical – sorting decisions while others made very different decisions is at odds 
with the fixed representation that scholars such as Tyler and Evans (2001) claim 
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word senses to have, and is difficult to explain under the prototype model typically 
invoked. Equally, however, extremely high agreement within some participants is 
difficult to explain under a monosemy account which claims that word senses are 
created ad hoc and do not have any form of mental representation. An alternative 
account may therefore be necessary, and it was predicted that the exemplar model 
may be able to account for both very good and very poor intra-participant agreement. 
5.6.3 Selective attention in linguistic categorisation decisions 
In order to assess whether word senses can be understood as categories of exemplars 
in a manner consistent with the exemplar theory, the experiment also tested for 
evidence of one of the predictions of the theory: selective attention. Selective 
attention, as defined and discussed in Chapters 1 and 4, is a central component of the 
exemplar theory of categorisation developed by Medin and Schaffer (1978) and 
Nosofsky (1986). It is therefore surprising that it has received little attention in 
linguistic applications. A very small number of scholars have tested for and observed 
selective attention effects in linguistic categorisation (Ellis, 2006; Francis and 
Nusbaum, 2002; Lively et al., 1993), and computational models of inflectional 
morphology that do not incorporate feature weightings, and therefore selective 
attention, perform worse than those that do (Chandler 2010). Likewise, a recent 
theoretical account of differential acceptability of verbs in questions with long-
distance dependences by Kalyan (2012) – a process that the author understands as a 
categorisation event – has reconciled seemingly opposing explanations of empirical 
findings by Ambridge and Goldberg (2008) and Dąbrowska (2004) by explaining the 
findings in terms of selective attention. However, by and large, linguistic 
applications of the exemplar theory have overlooked selective attention. Indeed, 
some literature proposes that linguistic categories are fixed entities, rather than 
dynamic groups of exemplars whose position in a multidimensional space – and 
therefore category membership – is modulated by selective attention (Bybee, 2006). 
In this way, it seems that some scholars advocate a more comprehensive application 
of the exemplar model to explaining linguistic phenomena, while others recommend 
incorporating only some aspects of the model. 
 
In the interest of adhering to the cognitive commitment, I aimed to study whether a 
special case of the model, such as that described by Bybee, is necessary to explain 
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linguistic categorisation. Specifically, I tested the applicability of the exemplar 
model to this example of linguistic categorisation by searching for the effect of 
selective attention in participants’ sorting decisions. This is a central aspect of both 
Medin and Schaffer’s (1978) and Nosofsky’s (1986) models, and one that Bybee 
proposes may not be present in linguistic categories due to their frequency. By 
testing whether selective attention was observable in this instance of linguistic 
categorisation, I could then answer the questions of whether word senses can be 
modelled as exemplar categories, and whether even highly frequent categories such 
as linguistic categories display selective attention effects, and are therefore dynamic 
and not the fixed entities that Bybee (and Tyler and Evans, 2001) appears to suggest 
that they are. I tested this by manipulating what type of stimuli participants were 
given. They were assigned to categorise one of three versions of stimuli: (1) a set of 
36 examples of spatial uses of the target word, (2) a set of 36 examples of non-
spatial examples, or (3) a set of both spatial and non-spatial examples. The first two 
versions of the task are labelled the “single sense-type” condition, and the third 
version the “mixed sense-type” condition. I predicted that the presence of both 
spatial and non-spatial meanings in the mixed sense-type condition would act as a 
highly salient semantic distinction within the stimuli. In line with the exemplar 
model, I then predicted that participants would selectively attend to this distinction. 
As a result, distinctions within these two broad groups, i.e., further distinctions 
within spatial examples, and non-spatial examples, would be less attended to, 
resulting in these distinctions being overlooked. I therefore predicted that stimuli that 
appeared in both the single and mixed sense-type conditions would be sorted into 
fewer, more coarse groups in the mixed sense-type condition, reflecting the fewer 
distinctions that participants would notice. This was shown to be the case. 
5.6.4 Conclusions 
The findings of this final study therefore provide evidence in support of the 
conclusion that word senses may be temporary and merely potential categories of 
exemplars of a polysemous word, and may be modelled in terms of the exemplar 
model developed by Medin and Schaffer (1978) and Nosofsky (1986). In this way, I 
move away from traditional linguistic categorisation accounts of polysemy, which 
propose that polysemous words are examples of linguistic categories (e.g., Tyler and 
Evans, 2001). The data gathered here suggest that senses themselves might be 
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(potential) categories. The study was not explicitly designed to test the possibility 
that polysemous words are not categories, and for that reason the status of words as 
categories cannot be conclusively ruled out. The data do not, however, provide 
support for the notion that polysemous words are categories. The study indicated that 
selective attention effects, predicted by the exemplar model to affect how individuals 
assign stimuli to a category, were observed at the level of senses. In other words, and 
continuing to make the assumption that the categories participants create reflect 
word senses, the senses they judged to be represented by the stimuli depended on 
what semantic features of the word in context they attended to. For example, in 
Experiment 3, participant BMi9 in the mixed sense-type condition for the below task 
uses two categories to classify a set of 24 sentences. They attend to a distinction 
between TEXT USES, and what they judge to be descriptions of ‘physical’ 
configurations. In contrast, participant BS10 in the single sense-type condition sorts 
the same sentences into six categories, therefore making much finer distinctions 
amongst the stimuli. In these examples, the participants are attending to different 
semantic features of the word in context, and it is these different features that license 
the creation of different categories. If it is polysemous words that are linguistic 
categories, that would entail that word senses are members of these categories. 
Consequently, we should not see selective attention effects at the level of word 
senses. On the contrary, we did observe this.  
 
The findings also serve to develop the line of work on linguistic applications of the 
exemplar model. Bybee (2006) has applied an adjusted version of a traditional 
exemplar model to describe the representation of constructions. Chandler (2010) 
notes that research on morphology and phonology has successfully modelled these 
linguistic phenomena in terms of an exemplar model, and that other, smaller-scale 
research has studied the application of the model to syntactic phenomena. He asks 
whether the models he describes can “scale up to a more extensive model of 
language” (p. 412). The findings presented in this thesis suggest that the exemplar 
model developed by Medin and Schaffer (1978) and Nosofsky (1986) has 
application to semantic phenomena also, thus indicating that the exemplar model can 
indeed scale up to model language more extensively. 
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5.7 General discussion 
As a whole, this thesis provides insights into particular aspects of the psychological 
status of the senses of polysemous words. Working within the cognitive linguistic 
framework, and making the theoretical and methodological assumption that word 
senses are linguistic categories, it set out to establish whether linguists’ intuitions 
about word senses correspond to those of naïve speakers and other linguists. It then 
aimed to assess whether the findings could be explained in terms of what we already 
know about language – i.e., that it is subject to individual differences – and finally, it 
aimed to test whether word senses and the observations made in this thesis are 
compatible with an exemplar-theoretic model of categorisation. The findings provide 
empirical support for the conclusion that naïve speakers’ and experts’ intuitions 
about what the senses of a given word are fail to coincide, which is explained by the 
further finding that individuals appear to have different senses of polysemous words. 
The data also indicates that word senses have some form of representation in 
memory, and that they can be modelled in terms of the (generalized) context model 
developed by Medin and Schaffer (1978) and Nosofsky (1986).  
 
The findings therefore present theoretical and methodological challenges to existing 
research. Cognitive linguistic treatments of polysemy have traditionally proceeded 
on the assumption that polysemous words are linguistic categories that can be 
modelled in a manner akin to the prototype model developed by Rosch and her 
colleagues (Rosch and Mervis, 1975; Rosch et al., 1976; Rosch, 1978). The findings 
made in this thesis are difficult to explain under a prototype-based account of word 
sense representation. What makes application of prototype theory to explain the 
findings reported here difficult is evidence that categorisation decisions are subject 
to selective attention effects. This means that a single stimulus can belong to more 
than one category depending on what characteristic(s) is being used to categorise it. 
Recall that, unlike the exemplar model, the prototype model neither predicts, not 
seems to be able to accommodate, selective attention effects and dynamic categories.  
 
Furthermore, close analyses of polysemous words, such as the canonical case studies 
of over by Brugman and Lakoff (2006 [1988]) and Tyler and Evans (2001) offer 
proposals as to what the senses, and central sense, of polysemous words are as they 
have been identified by the authors. The finding that expert intuitions about what the 
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senses of a polysemous word are do not always correspond to those of other native 
speakers, and the subsequent findings that indicated individual differences in word 
senses, leave the status of these analyses in doubt. They present methodological 
concerns and urge caution in the continued use of intuition as the means for 
determining the senses of a polysemous word. The reason for this caution is not only 
because of the finding that individuals appear to have different senses of polysemous 
words, but that the theory of their representation, i.e., a theory influenced by the 
prototype model, does not appear to fit the findings shown here. A prototype theory 
would allow an intuition-based analysis as long as it acknowledged that the 
intuitions were those only of the author, and that no commitment as to the reality of 
those senses in the minds of other speakers was made. However, the observations 
favour an account of sense representation akin to the exemplar model. In this model, 
categorisation decisions – i.e., what the sense an exemplar of a given word is – is 
subject not only to inter-speaker variation, but also intra-speaker variation; i.e., the 
same speaker may classify an exemplar of a polysemous word differently on 
different occasions. Accordingly, the decisions made by authors of existing analyses 
of polysemous words may, if asked to do the same again today, reach different 
conclusions.  
5.8 Original contributions to knowledge 
The aim of this thesis was to study the nature of word senses as examples of 
linguistic categories, and to focus in particular on certain aspects of their 
psychological status. It makes four primary original contributions to knowledge. 
 
The first original contribution to knowledge is the finding is that I failed to reliably 
agree with naïve and expert participants about how examples of polysemous words 
should be categorised. This is an original contribution to knowledge about the utility 
of expert intuitions in the analysis of word senses. It has practical implications in that 
it discourages finely-grained approaches to word sense distinctions. This may be of 
use to computational linguists aiming to develop a high quality automated word 
sense disambiguation algorithm. It problematises the status of existing intuition-
based analyses of polysemous words, such as those by Brugman and Lakoff (2006 
[1988]), Evans and Tyler (2005), Mahpeykar and Tyler (2011), Masi (2010), and 
Tyler and Evans (2001). It was speculated that while fine-grained senses identified 
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by individual speakers may not correspond to each other, coarse grained-senses 
might. 
 
It was further speculated that our disagreement was due to the possibility that the 
participants shared a set of senses that were different to mine. This was tested by 
explicitly assessing whether participants would agree with each other. In this way, I 
aimed to study whether there are individual differences in word senses. Evidence 
that participants did not reliably agree with each other over how examples of 
polysemous words should be sorted indicates that there may indeed be individual 
differences in word senses. This is an original contribution to knowledge about 
individual differences in language, and extends the scope of existing research on this 
topic by taking the issue of individual differences into the domain of semantics. The 
finding that there appear to be individual differences in word senses entails that, in 
the first experiment, participants and I disagreed not because my senses did not 
correspond to a set of senses shared by the participants, but simply because I, like the 
participants, are individuals with different notions of what constitutes a distinct sense 
of a given polysemous word. 
 
The thesis also aimed to investigate whether or not word senses are stored in 
memory. Statistical analyses of how well participants agreed with themselves over 
how a set of sentences should be sorted demonstrated that participants agree 
significantly better, and more often, than with other participants. However, the 
observation that some participants failed to agree with themselves better than with 
other participants allowed only a tentative conclusion that they are stored in memory, 
and it was instead suggested that they may have some form of representation, but 
perhaps not a fixed one. This is an original contribution to our knowledge about the 
storage of word senses. It suggests that polysemous word senses do not have a fixed 
representation, as suggested by Tyler and Evans (2001), but nor do they have no 
representation, as implied by the monosemy account in which words have a unitary 
meaning which is “fleshed out” in context (e.g., Ruhl, 1989; Vandergucht, Willems, 
and Decuypere, 2007). 
 
The exemplar theory of categorisation can account for both the finding that, by and 
large, participants agreed with themselves significantly better, and more often, than 
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with other participants, and the finding that some participants agree with other 
participants better than they do with themselves. This is accommodated by the fact 
that the exemplar theory predicts dynamic categories which are constructed in 
response to the particular demands of a given categorisation task. In exemplar-based 
models, in a categorisation task one or more categorisation criteria are selectively 
attended to. Differences among the stimuli in these criteria are more salient, and 
differences in irrelevant criteria are less salient. If a participant used different criteria 
to categorise the stimuli at T2 than they did at T1, their categorisation decisions will 
therefore differ. Given that the instructions given to participants were identical, it is 
not anticipated that the sorting criteria that participants selectively attend to should 
change dramatically between T1 and T2. While in general it seems that they did not, 
this was not always the case. I investigated whether or not the exemplar theory can 
account for the representation of word senses by testing one of the central 
predictions of the theory: that categorisation decisions are subject to selective 
attention. Significant selective attention effects were found. This is an original 
contribution to knowledge about how exemplar theory can be applied to linguistic 
categories. It extends existing work on exemplar-based approaches to linguistic 
categorisation by specifically testing for selective attention effects in semantic 
categorisation. This suggests that we do not need a special case of the exemplar 
model to account for word sense categories, contrary to Bybee’s (2006) proposal that 
linguistic categories are so frequent that they have entrenched representations that 
are not modulated by selective attention. 
 
These two findings, made using evidence gathered from a large sample of naïve 
participants, suggests that word senses have a non-fixed representation, and may be 
best understood as potential categories of exemplars in a manner compatible with the 
exemplar model of categorisation. In this way, when we saw evidence of poor intra-
participant agreement in Experiment 3, what we were witnessing might have been 
the dynamic character of linguistic categories. In describing senses as categories, I 
move away from accounts made by scholars such as Tyler and Evans (2001) and 
Brugman and Lakoff (2006 [1988]) that polysemous words are categories. 
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I therefore make four primary original contributions to knowledge and have achieved 
the aim of the thesis. Collectively, these make original contributions to knowledge 
about the psychological status of word senses. 
5.8.1 Secondary contributions 
In the course of making the primary contributions to knowledge described above, I 
have made two additional, secondary contributions. 
 
First, I have developed an original methodology for studying individual differences 
in word senses and for studying how they may be represented in the mind. This 
comprises sentence-sorting tasks in combination with appropriate statistical analyses 
and network visualisation. 
 
Second, I have offered an original insight into how we can interpret modularity 
values used to measure network quality. By finding a strong and significant 
correlation between modularity values and interpretable agreement magnitude 
values, I have concluded that a modularity value of approximately 0.67 or higher 
may be considered acceptable.	
5.9 Limitations 
In this thesis I have made claims about the representation of word senses in memory, 
arguing that there is evidence that they have a form of storage rather different to that 
which has been proposed elsewhere. Specifically, I argue that they have neither no 
mental representation, nor a fixed representation, but instead that they are potential 
categories of exemplars, and it is these exemplars that are stored in memory. I have 
reached this conclusion by assessing whether, when asked to categorise sentences 
exemplifying a particular polysemous word according to the meaning of that word, 
participants agree with themselves better than with other participants. I predicted that 
if word senses do have some form of non-fleeting mental representation, participants 
should agree with themselves significantly better, and more often, than with other 
participants. This was found to be the case.  
 
This is just one approach to studying the representation of word senses, and it is 
possible that other methodologies may reach different conclusions. These findings 
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therefore produce tentative conclusions that require further testing using alternative 
methodologies.  
 
The thesis aims to address only certain aspects of the psychological status of word 
senses: their storage, what theoretical models can and cannot account for their 
storage, and individual differences in word senses. There is much more that can be 
said about word senses, such as how we access word senses in context; what features 
of context are attended to when reorganizing the multidimensional space – and 
indeed, why those features are selectively attended to at the expense of others; how 
children acquire the senses of polysemous words; and if and how senses are related 
to each other. A large literature tackling these and other aspects of polysemy and 
word senses exists, and it is intended that this thesis contributes to this rich body of 
work.  
 
Finally, this thesis studies just four words, all of a closed class nature. At this point, 
it is therefore difficult to know whether the claims I have made about the 
psychological status of the senses of these words are generalisable to other words 
within and beyond the closed class.  
5.10 Future research 
The length of a doctorate, both temporal and spatial, necessitates that some 
interesting outcomes requiring further study, and avenues inviting exploration, are 
not pursued. I outline here some issues that I judge to be particularly worthy of 
attention in future research.  
5.10.1 Accounting for individual differences in word senses 
One of the primary findings reported in this thesis is that participants did not reliably 
agree with each other about how examples of a particular polysemous word should 
be categorised. This indicates that participants may have different senses of 
polysemous words. I have not determined why some participants agreed with each 
other more than with others. In a study of human word sense disambiguation using a 
method analogous to the closed sort task used in Experiment 1, Murray and Green 
(2004) found that individuals with different levels of lexical ability, as measured 
using a component of the Graduate Record Examinations (GRE), disagreed with 
each other more than with individuals with similar levels of lexical ability. We might 
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therefore predict that participants with different educational backgrounds will 
disagree with each other about what the senses of a given word are. However, in 
Murray and Green’s study, all participants were studying for a qualification of 
bachelor’s level or higher. This suggests that even within high educational 
attainment groups, variation exists. If differences are due to lexical ability, which 
may be a result of differences in exposure to language, we might predict that 
individuals in different occupations may disagree with each other more than those 
who are in similar occupations. For example, I would anticipate that a participant 
who is employed as a manual labourer may make different sorting decisions than a 
participant who is employed as a secretary, due to differences in the extent of 
language exposure across these two occupations. I predict that there would be 
particularly marked differences in exposure to written texts, which may influence 
different classification of TEXT USES of above and below. It is possible that the 
perceived meanings of these uses may differ according to differences in exposure to 
written English; while it was observed that TEXT USES of above appear to have a 
temporal meaning, and TEXT USES of below have a spatial meaning, perhaps 
individuals with different levels of exposure to written English will reach different 
conclusions. Differences in language variety may also exist: as was observed in 
section 2.7.2.2, there were systematic differences in how British English versus 
American English participants interpreted certain examples of over. This suggests 
that speakers of the same variety may agree with each other more than with speakers 
of other varieties, at least in the case of some usages.  
5.10.2 The use of network visualisations 
5.10.2.1 In	computational	linguistics	
In sections 4.3.4, 4.6.3.2, and 4.7.3.4 I briefly discussed the utility of network 
visualisations in the study of word senses. I noted that they can be studied 
qualitatively, to analyse community membership and relationships (and absence 
thereof) between communities. The “quality” of the network can be measured using 
the modularity value of the network; in the case of this research, this value represents 
how well the network reflects the categorisation decisions of all participants. I found 
a strong and significant relationship between the mean inter-participant agreement 
value for each task and the modularity value of each resultant network. This, and the 
fact that the communities identified by the algorithm had comprehensible and 
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seemingly non-random membership indicates that they may be a useful means of 
studying word senses and their inter-relations. Some networks produced in this 
research had very low modularity values, indicating that the communities within the 
network were not useful indicators of word senses. Future research may, however, 
make fruitful conclusions in the study of both high quality and poor quality 
networks. Ide and Wilks (2007) have argued that coarse-grained, homograph-like 
senses may be the most useful level of meaning for successful communication. It 
might be the case that smaller communities identified by network algorithms can be 
collapsed to form the coarse-grained senses that Ide and Wilks advocate. A line of 
research in word sense disambiguation might therefore involve the kind of open-sort 
tasks used in this study, producing data which is used to create network 
visualisations. The communities in these networks can then be collapsed into larger 
“mega-communities”, which are then labelled. These labels can be used to tag the 
member sentences of each mega-communities, which are in turn used as training 
materials for an automated WSD algorithm. If, when the algorithm is tested using 
novel material, the algorithm performs acceptably, that would suggest that networks 
are a useful tool for identifying appropriate word sense distinctions and tags for 
WSD algorithms. If we understand communities to reflect word senses, the fact that 
networks generated for some words had high modularity values, and therefore 
distinct, well-defined communities suggests that senses of some words are, likewise, 
distinct and well-defined. Equally, networks for some words had low modularity 
values and produced indistinct, undifferentiated communities, suggesting that senses 
of those words are also indistinct and poorly defined. Returning to Ide and Wilks’ 
comment about the utility of fine- versus coarse-grained senses in achieving 
successful communication, and in the face of high agreement values for some words 
and low agreement values for others, I wonder whether the level of coarseness in 
sense distinction necessary for successful communication varies across words. For 
example, we saw in Table 20 that participants in the under mixed task at T1 reached 
a mean agreement score of 0.249, whereas participants in the over mixed T1 task 
reached a mean agreement score of 0.787. If the participants in the over mixed T1 
task had used a similarly low number of groups, this might explain why agreement 
was so high. This was not the case; instead, the mean number of groups for this task 
was 6.8, versus 5.3 for the under mixed T1 task. Accordingly, it seems that 
participants can reach a very high degree of inter-participant agreement even when 
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they use finely-grained sense distinctions to categorise examples of over, but the 
same is not true of under. In terms of Ide and Wilks’ argument, it may be that 
accurate interpretation of a use of under depends on accessing a coarsely-grained 
sense, whereas to correctly interpret a use an over, a more finely-grained sense is 
accessed. Further investigation of this possibility is needed. Moreover, exactly why 
some polysemous words are categorised with better agreement than others promises 
to be an interesting topic of investigation.  
5.10.2.2 For	developing	theories	of	lexical	representations	
While it was not possible to use network visualisations in this particular study of 
selective attention effects in word sense disambiguation, nor to directly test whether 
or not word senses are stored in memory, I propose that they may yet prove to be a 
useful and highly versatile tool for studying lexical representations in cognitive 
linguistics. In the following section, I set out below three potential uses of network 
visualisations in this field. I do not claim that these represent the extent of 
opportunity for their use; instead, these are some potential uses that have emerged 
following the present research.  
5.10.2.2.1 Understanding	relationships	between	the	senses	of	polysemous	words	
Networks are used in canonical polysemy literature to describe the organisation of 
word senses; specifically, they are used to specify senses (represented by nodes) and 
the relationships between them (represented by edges) (e.g., Brugman and Lakoff, 
1988; Tyler and Evans, 2001). Their use is motivated by the notion that polysemous 
words have distinct but related senses; networks therefore provide an efficient means 
of specifying those relations. However, these networks are not uncontroversial; as 
Sandra and Rice (1995) noted, how well they correspond to mental representations is 
uncertain. One reason for this uncertainty is their provenance, as networks are 
typically constructed by the author(s) following their intuitions. 
  
Given their potential for illustrating the connections between what are claimed to be 
related senses, it seems that networks should indeed play a role in representing 
relations among word senses. Networks based on sentence-sorting data, such as 
those presented in Appendix 7 of this thesis, offer a solution to the objections made 
about the reality of sense relations that scholars have proposed: rather than being 
intuition-led, they are produced on the basis of data gathered from large samples of 
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naive participants who are not aware of the purpose of the task. Further, as they are 
based on categorisation data, and as those categories that participants create are 
assumed to reflect the mental representations underlying those categories, we can 
tentatively infer that good quality networks might too correspond with mental 
representations. In this way, networks produced using data from sentence-sorting 
tasks not only address Sandra and Rice’s valid methodological concerns, but they are 
also more likely to correspond to the mental representations underlying words and 
their senses.  
  
Throughout this thesis I have presented a body of evidence indicating that there may 
be individual differences in the way that people classify sentences featuring a 
common polysemous word; from this, I concluded that there is evidence of 
individual differences in word senses. Whether participants reach “acceptable” but 
not perfect agreement or not, we would expect a certain degree of disagreement over 
how pairs of sentences should be sorted. It is from such disagreement, represented in 
the network as inter-community edges, that we might be able to understand which 
senses are related to others. Let us take the network presented in Figure 43 as an 
example.10  
                                                
10 To view the network in full size, please see Appendix 7. 
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Figure 43 Network visualisation of sentence-sorting task for Below mixed sense-type task at T2 
 
This network is taken from the below mixed sense-type task at T2. If you attend 
closely to the three communities, represented in pink, green, and blue, you will note 
that, while they are distinct communities, there remain connections between 
individual nodes in pairs of communities. For example; the usage The campus was 
shrinking below me into a collection of children’s play houses is a member of the 
green community, which seems to capture a very generic spatial sense, and is also 
connected to nodes in the other two communities. These connections represent some 
participants’ decisions that the pair of sentences connected by an inter-community 
edge belongs in the same group. Their membership of different communities 
confirms that this was a decision made by the minority, but nonetheless, some still 
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made that judgment. Such judgments, that pairs of sentences that most participants 
think exemplify the distinct senses are judged by a minority group to exemplify the 
same sense, are what might allow us to use networks to identify connections between 
senses. If a sense were so distinct from other senses that no participant sorted any of 
its exemplars with exemplars of any other senses, it would manifest as a distinct 
network. But where the distinction between two senses is less clear, which may be 
the result of a relationship between those two senses, participants may make 
different decisions to each other, resulting in communities, reflecting senses, being 
connected. 
 
As well as showing what pairs of senses are related to each other, networks can also 
show the overall degree of relatedness of the senses of a polysemous word. Figure 43 
shows that, in this case, every community is related to every other community. If we 
understand communities to reflect senses, we can conclude from this network that 
the all three senses represented here are related to each other. However, if we 
consider the network in Figure 44, we see a different outcome. This network, created 
using data from the over non-spatial task at T2, reveals that while each sense appears 
to be related to at least one other sense, not all senses are related to every other sense. 
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Figure 44 Network visualisation of sentence-sorting data from the over non-spatial sense task at T2 
 
These two examples demonstrate the capacity networks based on sentence-sorting 
data have for providing support for the claim that underpins the theory of polysemy: 
that word senses are related to each other.  
5.10.2.2.2 Distinguishing	between	homonymous	forms	and	polysemous	senses	
Just as network visualisations of sentence-sorting data can reveal relationships 
among senses, they might also reveal which senses are unrelated to other senses. As 
noted above, the senses of polysemous words are related to each other, and in this 
way word senses differ from meanings of homonyms, which are unrelated. By 
examining networks to identify communities and connections between communities, 
there exists, therefore, the opportunity to use network visualisations of data from 
sentence-sorting tasks to establish not only which senses are related to each other, 
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and how, but to isolate meanings, which are represented in a network visualisation as 
a community forming a distinct network. Likewise, it may be possible to visualise 
whether any sets of distinct multi-community networks emerge from sentence-
sorting data, which could be taken to represent the senses of unrelated homonyms.  
  
An indication that such an outcome might be found comes from the network 
produced for the over mixed sense-type task at T2, shown in Figure 45. 
 
Figure 45 Network visualisation of sentence-sorting data from over mixed sense-type task at T2 
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A single visualisation of the sentence-sorting data produced three networks: a large 
network featuring three communities, and two additional, single-community 
networks. On the grounds that polysemous senses and homonymous meanings are 
broadly distinguished by whether or not they are related to each other, and given the 
degree of attention that has been paid to the polysemy of over over the last thirty 
years, it is quite surprising to note that two communities, taken to represent senses, 
are distinct from both each other and the third, larger network. This is an early 
indication that the single-community networks might not represent senses of the 
same polyseme as those in the larger network, but might instead reflect meanings of 
two homonymous forms of over. The possibility remains, however, that these two 
communities would be connected (at least by some degree of separation) to the other 
communities in the visualisation if they were connected to one or more intermediate 
communities. A very large-scale sorting task, representing as close to a 
representative sample of the uses of over as is conceivable in a sorting task, may 
shed further light on whether, by some degree, these distinct networks are ever 
connected to each other, or whether they are unrelated, in which case we may 
tentatively conclude that the unconnected community represents a homonymous 
meaning. 
5.10.2.2.3 Investigating	degrees	of	near-synonymy	
Near synonymy is the phenomenon whereby a single meaning, or two very similar 
meanings, is expressed using more than one word (Divjak 2010). Divjak observes 
that while what Cruse (2010) refers to as “cognitive synonyms” are selected 
according to expressive (e.g., stylistic) demands, near-synonyms are selected 
according to propositional demands. Take slice and chop, for example: while both 
words capture an action carried out using a knife, a sous chef might find herself 
surprised when instructed to slice the lettuce and chop the bread: an instruction to 
slice the bread and chop the lettuce would feel less semantically 
anomalous.  Understanding words as linguistic categories, if one were to ask 
participants to sort examples of pairs of polysemous near-synonyms according to 
their meaning, we could expect the data, when visualised using a network 
visualisation algorithm, to return at least two networks, with each network capturing 
examples of just one of the two synonyms. To my knowledge, while sorting tasks 
have been used in studies of near-synonymy (Divjak and Gries, 2008), network 
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visualisations of data gathered from sentence-sorting tasks using examples of near-
synonyms as stimuli have not been produced, meaning that this prediction remains 
untested.  
  
Just as network visualisations of sentence sorting data can reveal insights into the 
relationships – or lack thereof – between the senses of a polysemous word, they may 
also prove useful in revealing relationships between near-synonyms and their senses. 
While near-synonymy is a topic of contemporary research in cognitive linguistics 
(e.g., Divjak & Gries, 2008), to my knowledge, scholars have not yet addressed the 
possibility that near-synonyms may vary in how synonymous they are, depending on 
which sense of each synonym is being compared. For example, are under and below 
more synonymous in He felt warm under the blanket and The crocodile sank below 
the surface than in We're under real pressure and Don’t paint below the windowsill? 
Working again on the assumption that words and/or their senses are examples of 
linguistic categories, and that these categories can be observed in networks and 
communities, we might expect network visualisations of sorting data from a task 
involving senses of two near-synonyms to produce at least two networks: one for 
each near-synonym. However, given their similarity in meaning, we might find 
networks – and indeed communities – that feature both near-synonyms. By analysing 
the networks that emerge from a sorting task of this type, we can understand whether, 
while similar in meaning, pairs of near synonyms are sufficiently distinct to produce 
distinct networks. Alternatively, we might observe that this semantic similarity 
results in communities featuring one synonym that are connected to other 
communities featuring its synonym pair, or even communities featuring both near-
synonyms. Should we observe networks or communities featuring both near-
synonyms, by closely analysing what senses are represented by the pairs of 
connected mono-synonym communities, and/or what sense is represented by dual-
synonym communities, we can establish the (varying) degree to which a pair of near-
synonyms are synonymous. 
5.10.3 Selective attention in linguistic categorisation 
One of the principal findings of this thesis is that there appear to be selective 
attention effects in the particular case of linguistic categorisation that I examined. 
The narrow scope of the thesis means that I cannot assess whether selective attention 
 221 
is an effect general to all cases of linguistic categorisation. This will only be 
determined by work that aims to test for the presence of this effect in other linguistic 
categories, including other polysemous words.  
5.10.4 Word senses as linguistic categories 
Finally, the proposal that it is word senses, rather than words themselves, may be 
linguistic categories contradicts existing theoretical accounts of polysemy. Given 
that this novel suggestion is made following mere doctoral study, and in light of the 
fact that I did not explicitly set out to test the hypothesis that polysemous words are 
not categories, I recommend that this conclusion is tested further.  
5.11 Summary 
I close this thesis with a summary of its primary original findings, made using 
original data gathered by three sets of sentence-sorting tasks focusing on four words. 
First, it does not appear that my sense distinctions align with those of other speakers. 
This is explained by my second finding, that individuals appear to have different 
senses of polysemous words. Third, there is evidence that word senses may have 
some form of mental representation, but not in the fixed form previously advocated 
(e.g., Tyler and Evans, 2001). Finally, categorisation of exemplars of polysemous 
words appears to be subject to selective attention effects, allowing the tentative 
conclusions that senses are represented in a manner consistent with the exemplar 
model of categorisation, and that we may understand word senses as potential 
categories of exemplars. 
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Appendix 1: Experiment 1 task instructions 
It may not be immediately obvious, but many words we use have more than one 
meaning. I am interested in finding out the different meanings of the word [target 
word]. This word is typically understood as having a spatial meaning. A similar 
word like IN also has a spatial meaning, like this: 
(1) The ball is IN the bowl. 
But it also has other meanings, some of which might be spatial, like (2), or 
metaphorical, like (3): 
(2) She's sitting in the dark 
(3) Mary is IN love with John 
The purpose of these examples is to show you that a word as simple as IN can have 
lots of different meanings; some are obviously related, some take some thinking 
about before you can see a connection, while some might seem completely unrelated 
to others. 
Instructions 
Your task is to organise a list of sentences into up to six groups. 
On the next screen you'll see the sentences (on the left) and a set of six groups (on 
the right), each labelled with an example of [target word] being used in real life. 
Grouping them is easy: 
1. Read through all of the sentences and group labels, and think about what 
[target word] means in each. 
2. Drag one sentence at a time into one of the groups in the right, so that the 
meaning of [target word] in that sentence matches the meaning of [target 
word] in the group label. 
3. You are free to use as many of the given groups as you wish. 
If you change your mind about where a sentence should go, or if you drop a sentence 
into the wrong group, you can drag it and drop it into another group. 
When you've finished, click 'Finished' in the top-right corner. 
Appendix 2: Popular placement matrices 
  
Over 
 
  
Under 
 
  
Above 
 
  
Below 
 
  
Appendix 3: Experiment 2 task instructions 
It may not be immediately obvious, but many (or even most) words we use have 
more than one meaning.  I am interested in finding out the different meanings of the 
words [target words].  These words are typically understood as having a spatial 
meaning.  A similar word like in also has spatial meaning, like this: 
 
1. The ball is in the bowl 
 
But it also has other meanings, some of which might be spatial, like 2, or 
metaphorical, like 3. 
 
2. She’s sitting in the dark 
3. Mary is in love with John 
 
The purpose of these examples is to show you that a word as simple as in has lots of 
different meanings; some are obviously related, some take some thinking about 
before you can see a connection, while some seem completely unrelated to any 
others.   
 
It is now your task to read through all of the sentences on the left.  There are 100 
sentences to read.  Each of the sentences is a real usage.  Read through all of them 
first, then go back through them and group them on the basis of how the word in 
capitals is used - the groups should consist of examples in which the word is used in 
the same way.  For example, you might group these examples of on together: 
 
The cat sat on the table 
She's rolling around on the floor 
Her lunch box is on the chair 
 
But you might not include examples such as 
 
The picture is hanging on the wall 
She put the lead on the dog 
 
Some of your groups might have lots of examples; some might only have one or 
two.  There is no right answer in this task, I'm just trying to understand what 
distinctions you make when classifying different usages of each word.  When you're 
happy with each group, please write on a piece of card what you think makes each 
example in that group the same.  You might find it easier to say what word/phrase 
could be used instead of the capitalised word in all cards in the group. 
 
There is no time limit for this task. 
  
Appendix 4: Annotated similarity matrices 
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It’s really hard to hear you ABOVE the music
ABOVE us in the branches, dangled the flag of the National 
I’m looking down on them from ABOVE
She kept looking at a point just ABOVE my head
The island is located ABOVE the tropic of cancer
From the boat, we could see nothing but the sky ABOVE
On the hill, just ABOVE the station, there were some big 
Up ABOVE the streets and houses rainbow's flying high. Everyone 
A meteor has exploded ABOVE a small Welsh village
exploded in great clouds of flame and smoke six feet ABOVE the launch er area.
The stars ABOVE were partly obscured by clouds.
Short white plumes ABOVE deeply cut pale green foliage. 
There’s a shark swimming ABOVE a shoal of fish
if there is a concrete lintel ABOVE the window, as this
just below the heaters and ABOVE the heater
we never take from ABOVE the brow, just below, 
ABOVE them on a rock promontory of convenient geology
The satellite is to be deployed 22,300 miles ABOVE the equator
This can either be ABOVE or below the pool water level
So the site stands ABOVE the level of the road
then you had a a long plank in in ABOVE the chaff cutter, that was the most dangerous 
thing.
not more than twelve inches ABOVE the table 
to prevent the heading from standing well ABOVE the track. 
we've got a lamp ABOVE the he , the couch and we actually put on the infra-re 
I sat down on the toilet, looked up, they were all ABOVE the door
The shelf is fixed to the wall ABOVE the radiator
I’m going to hang a mirror ABOVE the fireplace
We’re putting a new sign ABOVE the door
 This site is elevated ABOVE the road. It may just mean that you might see 
The plane was cruising ABOVE the clouds
they were being observed from the window ABOVE by none other than the new Mayor 
The fitments will need to be placed well ABOVE and beyond the sides of the window to 
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The dictionaries are over there – ABOVE the history books
I’ve hung some mistletoe ABOVE the doorway
I have eyelashes growing ABOVE my lash line
There was a nice picture ABOVE the text.
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vapour from gold burning below, wafted into the flat ABOVE
The insulation layer is installed directly ABOVE the ceiling
There’s a layer of fat ABOVE the meat
The raven perched ABOVE the door.
Oh there was a a granary ABOVE barn
They’ve moved into the flat ABOVE the chip shop
reached through the right-hand lobby and faces west ABOVE the library.
mocking bird Sweeps at a moderate height ABOVE the densely flowering Suburban 
mysterious Glastonbury Tor, which towers ABOVE the flat landscape of the Somerset L
evels
A storm was gathering ABOVE the city
had the effect of bringing his name ABOVE that of D. H. Cooper ( Alliance) on the ballot 
one running Okapi '86, as described ABOVE, and the other running a system 
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Anything ABOVE zero degrees and the ice will melt
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Made at prices below par and two at prices ABOVE par
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Train fares have risen ABOVE inflation
You should bid ABOVE the asking price
forty percent ABOVE a hundred and fifty thousand pounds. 
so any fire growth over and ABOVE our list are based on the judgement panel that we a
re 
I'm below a but they, they're stupid because it was either ABOVE average or below ave
rage 
I know I’m pushing ABOVE my weight, but I have to try
The company’s earnings were ABOVE expectations
what costs were taken ABOVE the line in the first half in terms of 
candidates who have a surplus of votes over and ABOVE the quota 
five votes went to Bradford which brought him ABOVE McNarry 
automatic prohibition of mergers ABOVE a certain size are unlikely to be substantial
They are living just ABOVE the breadline
It was barbaric, foreign, and, ABOVE all, Russian.
And certainly I would, ABOVE all else, above all else, I would like to say to peopl 
Use your gumption as they say in Yorkshire and ABOVE all pay attention 
then ABOVE all we do need a very large membership. 
We have to offer support and, ABOVE all, we have to offer hope. Fascism does not begi
n wit 
ABOVE all, I look forward as the new Labour Party Treasurer 
Good, ABOVE average below average, they've been stupid, 
provide working conditions which are or ABOVE the average of its locality?
forced us all to examine all prejudices, to look ABOVE the sectional interests 
Renault 5 was considered to be only just ABOVE banger status
They are ABOVE us in the league.
She think she’s ABOVE the law
They think they’re ABOVE work like this, don’t they?
She likes to think she’s ABOVE all that silly gossip
You’ve just got to rise ABOVE it
We’re under serious pressure from ABOVE to get the job done
I used to be his boss, but he works ABOVE me now.
The orders came from ABOVE
Now that I work ABOVE her, we don’t talk so much
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had the effect of bringing his nam
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For the reasons outlined ABO
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Through the process described ABO
VE, both parties w
ill have a detailed understanding 
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In sum
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ary, the detailed em
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ork outlined ABO
VE has enabled another general law
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ith its hem
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The tow
n is 200m
 ABO
VE sea-level
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VE board, w
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I haven't had it ABO
VE er above about eight grand I think. That w
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VE 15 m
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VE zero degrees and the ice w
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If it's ABO
VE a hundred and tw
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The price of fuel has jum
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Train fares have risen ABO
VE inflation
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VE the asking price
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forty percent ABO
VE a hundred and fifty thousand pounds. 
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so any fire grow
th over and ABO
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I'm
 below
 a but they, they're stupid because it w
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VE average or below
 average 
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I know
 I’m
 pushing A
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pany’s earnings w
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VE expectations
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hat costs w
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candidates w
ho have a surplus of votes over and ABO
VE the quota 
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five votes w
ent to Bradford w
hich brought him
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VE M
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autom
atic prohibition of m
ergers ABO
VE a certain size are unlikely to be substantial
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They are living just ABO
VE the breadline
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It w
as barbaric, foreign, and, ABO
VE all, Russian.
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And certainly I w
ould, ABO
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ould like to say to peopl 
13
13
13
13
38
13
13
13
13
13
25
25
25
13
13
13
13
13
38
38
38
25
25
25
25
25
38
88
-
Use your gum
ption as they say in Yorkshire and ABO
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then ABO
VE all w
e do need a very large m
em
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W
e have to offer support and, ABO
VE all, w
e have to offer hope. Fascism
 does not begin w
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ABO
VE all, I look forw
ard as the new
 Labour Party Treasurer 
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Good, ABO
VE average below
 average, they've been stupid, 
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provide w
orking conditions w
hich are or ABO
VE the average of its locality?
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forced us all to exam
ine all prejudices, to look ABO
VE the sectional interests 
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Renault 5 w
as considered to be only just ABO
VE banger status
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They are ABO
VE us in the league.
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She think she’s A
BO
VE the law
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They think they’re A
BO
VE w
ork like this, don’t they?
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She likes to think she’s A
BO
VE all that silly gossip
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You’ve just got to rise A
BO
VE it
13
25
25
13
13
13
13
13
13
13
13
13
13
13
13
13
13
13
25
13
13
13
13
13
25
25
38
13
13
13
13
25
13
38
38
50
25
25
25
25
38
50
38
50
50
50
50
50
63
50
63
63
50
63
75
63
-
W
e’re under serious pressure from
 A
BO
VE to get the job done
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I used to be his boss, but he w
orks ABO
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e now
.
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VE
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N
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 that I w
ork A
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ill be argued B
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as a success.
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In the situations listed B
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I called out to the people on the beach B
E
LO
W
, but they didn't hear m
e.
9
9
9
9
9
9
9
4
4
4
4
4
9
9
9
4
4
4
9
9
9
4
4
9
9
4
4
9
9
4
9
4
0
0
4
9
4
9
4
4
9
9
14
0
9
9
19
19
23
23
23
23
28
28
66
66
66
76
90
95
95
95
T
he sea w
as far B
E
LO
W
 and the view
 terrific. 
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 the church in 1790. 
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 of the river.
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e found fossils B
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 the C
arboniferous Lim
estone.
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Fibrous roots grow
 B
E
LO
W
 the leaf-rosettes.
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ritish Library sinks 7 storeys B
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W
 ground.
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ou can do a tour of the caves B
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 the city.
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he people in the flat BE
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W
 w
ouldn't stop shouting.
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o iron rings on the w
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 the painting.
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indow
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I pinned m
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 the logo on m
y tshirt.
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 the front w
indow
s the extension w
as divided into tw
o sections.
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handing OVER its presidency in December next year
He said that's half the reason that Brian Tolbrook took OVER at Tettron ain't it?  
James Roberts [q.v.], whose printing business he soon took OVER. 
OVER you go
I’ll get OVER the other side
we'd just gone OVER to the shops 
Can you call her OVER here for a minute?
I'll go and get it her rain cover's OVER there, it's, ooh, where is it? 
OVER there. 
Geoff do you want to sit OVER here mum?  
We got a telephone OVER here
Can we have it OVER here mum?
I am coming OVER to his house today
Move them OVER a bit
Sarah’s come OVER the road Daddy.
The cops pulled me OVER
I think I'll sit OVER here
I want that one OVER there
Get those cars OVER there
bring the turning allowance of pelmet fabric OVER, and press with an iron to bond toge
ther
They live OVER the other side of the city
My sister keeps pulling it OVER
Can you just run it OVER the road?
I ran OVER the bridge
We often walk OVER the fields
He’s watching OVER me
We need to fix this problem now, I don’t want it hanging OVER me all weekend
The moon was beaming down OVER the city
There’s a helicopter hovering OVER my house
The buzzards soared silently OVER the dying man.
The plane flew OVER the city
OVER the doors leading to the bathroom and wardrobe are 
the engine mechanism of the bomb stopped right OVER our house.
The family portrait sits OVER the fireplace
15 OVER 3 equals...?
She felt satisfied with the power she now held OVER him.
Fall OVER the bridge
He got run OVER
You almost ran OVER that rabbit!
was shot as he climbed OVER the Wall near Checkpoint Charlie
Herons seem to be incapable of stepping OVER the deterrent. 
Go up that one and jump OVER the other one
The quick brown fox jumped OVER the lazy dog
You’ve got to jump OVER the fence before the dog catches you
I go OVER the handlebars
He just dribbled all OVER me!
That wine has just spilled all OVER the carpet
you get up and the fucking paper's all OVER the floor 
All OVER the floor
They keep slinging their towels OVER the bedroom door
All I saw were this pair of legs sticking OVER the desk and him going aaaaagh!
It’s got a blanket OVER it
She pulled the covers OVER herself
She put her hand OVER her mouth
They nailed a board OVER the hole in the ceiling
The protective goggles are designed to fit OVER glasses
You should apply foundation OVER concealer
There somebody going to be climbing all OVER us saying No no no, you can't use our te
a urn
The disappointment was written all OVER his face. 
Yeah can you turn that OVER please. 
I turn it OVER
Turn that steak OVER, it's burning!
the printed sheets are then turned OVER on the long axis
I nearly fell OVER our budgie then didn’t I?
the card may curl horizontally and fall OVER
Why did you do that you nearly knocked me OVER then
I was bowled OVER by that surprise!
Those kids are going to push me OVER the edge
I mean that's Suffolk all OVER isn't it, really for you? 
Can you look OVER this report for me?
Let me think about it OVER the course of the day
how much you think you've lowered your cost basis by  OVER a period 
of two and a half, three years
OVER the years the impact of new taxes have invariably been   
which will continue to concern us OVER the next few years
All tunnel designs OVER the past hundred years have capitalised on this  
OVER holiday period holidays 
We’re going to go camping OVER the Easter holiday
They should have voted Labour OVER Lib Dem
She's going get Aunty Iris' yeah. And if there's any OVER she might be able to get some 
other bits for it
So capitalism has to export it OVER its boundary  
which result from equipment layout and complexity OVER and above the question of di
ffering degrees of combustion
say you want to make it dead on then or just or just OVER
He was well OVER the legal bloodalcohol limit
There are OVER 200 species of mollusc living within a 25m radius of the average 
household
declared a profit before tax of just OVER three point one million pounds
They are also paying top officials 10% OVER the normal pay scales
Council house rent arrears amounted to OVER £1m, though they are at long last being r
educed.   
The exchange controls which had been strictly enforced for OVER forty years were rem
oved in 1979 
we felt that between us we'd got OVER twenty years' experience of working with childr
en
Merlin had miraculously prophesied this event OVER eight hundred years earlier
RussianTeleut clashes also occurred OVER trapping rights 
Let’s not fight OVER it
I puzzled OVER this. 
afternoon session there was an equally irritable wrangle OVER a proposal to adopt a la
w on compliance with the
OVER and OVER
I don’t want to have this fight all OVER again
They think it’s all OVER...it is now!
I can’t believe the weekend is OVER already!
I am so OVER him
It took him ages to get OVER the flu
handing O
VER its presidency in Decem
ber next year
He said that's half the reason that Brian Tolbrook took O
VER at Tettron ain't it?  
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UNDER the logo " The Happy Kids", designed by the NSPCC for   
leave their homes and fields to get UNDER cover of the walls of the fortresses
"You can't see anything, it's all UNDER the surface, she says.
an old fashioned er boiler in which you lit the fire UNDER 
I'll put it UNDER the grill. 
they come from under one chair and shoot UNDER another. 
Oh no, there's some more sheep sitting over there. Under th UNDER that tree that is left
Put them UNDER the you know in the erm airing cupboard. 
Well They can't put a worktop along that wall UNDER window cos it cuts the unit off.  
You won't  get all them UNDER the grill as well as the bacon
"Since 1983. UNDER a nearby tree, a group of children were having their
She danced her nights away UNDER crystal chandeliers 
Just outside the door, UNDER the window, was a yellow painted bench
UNDER your chair
what's UNDER there
they lives UNDER there
I'm frying the bread UNDER there before he turns on
I won't hide UNDER this Mummy
UNDER the chair
can't go UNDER it
I go hide my digger UNDER there
too big a going UNDER there
The Troll seldom came out from UNDER the bridge.
The ball is UNDER the car
Look who’s standing UNDER the mistletoe
They lay UNDER the stars
She kicked him UNDER the table
go UNDER the light
where others would never think to look -- UNDER dark leaves and on dry branches. 
Lachy held him UNDER the shoulders, Fiona by the ankles
tuck it right UNDER there
but I can put my head UNDER the water
Rinse the dish UNDER running water
She tucked the handbag UNDER her arm
They fitted a bomb UNDER his car
I'm hiding UNDER your bed
What's life like UNDER my new patio?
I hid UNDER the bed
it's going UNDER this bridge
and this go UNDER the bridge
the train can't go UNDER the bridge
Thomas the Tank is going UNDER the bridge
the animals go UNDER the bridge
The river ran UNDER the bridge
She slipped a note UNDER the door
buried him UNDER the garden
The growing roots UNDER the path had cracked the tarmac.
I’m wearing a vest UNDER this shirt
He felt warm UNDER the blanket
I’m not sure whether I’ll be able to wear a jumper UNDER this coat
You’ve been hiding people UNDER the floorboards, haven’t you?
They put a layer of some special material UNDER the carpet to make it more comfortable
Tucked UNDER his hairpiece was a £50 note, kept there for emergencies
sleeping UNDER my cover
The decorators found more wallpaper UNDER the layer they’d just removed
Remember that awful tattoo I had? It’s now hidden UNDER this new one, look!
I don’t like swimming in the river, god knows what’s UNDER your feet
You can cover dark circles UNDER your eyes with concealer
bit hot UNDER the collar. 
He whispered the password UNDER his breath
people have of living on on the breadline and UNDER the breadline.
So erm a single under eighteen or couple both UNDER eighteen twenty three pound nine
ty. 
adults and £3.50 for seniors (over 65) and juniors ( UNDER 18). 
rejected for a place in the Trinity House almshouse, being UNDER age.
I can run the 100m in UNDER 9 seconds. I just choose not to do so.
She can only go on the ride if she’s UNDER 10
He is UNDER 13 stone for the first time since his teens
That’s left me with UNDER £40 for the rest of the month
I’ve booked it UNDER my wife’s name
UNDER the names of these three departments . 
annually taxed under Labour because the truth is that even UNDER the Conservatives
water services in England and Wales UNDER properly controlled public authority. 
soldier, serving in 102 Battalion -- an ethnic Herero unit -- UNDER the South Africans. 
now two hundred and fifty Garrimperos work UNDER him. 
She’s got a whole team working her UNDER her now
Trembling visibly with fear UNDER the watchful eye of Mr Upadhyaya and the police
I’m working UNDER the direction of the area manager
I’m UNDER his protection now
the defendants deny they were UNDER any duty to offer any advice about financial 
UNDER the new regulations, the students had to sign in each week
got to be committed UNDER the mental health act before you're not sound enough  
we have chosen to operate potentially UNDER any Posix-compliant operating system
UNDER the old system, commission payments for transactions  
which provides that an action UNDER the Act may consist of or include a claim for damag
es   
UNDER Mr Gorbachev's policies of glasnost and perestroika, 
can also apply to emigrate to Britain UNDER very limited criteria
UNDER the terms of this new policy, we should get a refund
Other accords UNDER the peace process, chiefly the denial of support for  
they intended to file an explanation of their actions UNDER Article 51 of the UN Charter, 
Since there are few books indexed UNDER "swords", the "history of swords" searcher 
I’m going to file that comment UNDER ‘P’ for pathetic
I was UNDER the impression that she’d gone home
I was UNDER the impression she’d already quit
conference of Scotland on the question of intercommunion is UNDER discussion
Your application is now UNDER review
Her workload is currently UNDER review
We’re UNDER real pressure at the moment
moves are UNDER way to establish a modern Socialist party.
remember their hospital is UNDER threat. 
Something which is very much UNDER attack.
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13
13
13
13
25
13
13
25
13
25
13
13
13
13
13
63
-
annually taxed under Labour because the truth is that even U
N
DER the Conservatives
25
13
13
13
25
13
13
13
13
13
63
75
-
w
ater services in England and W
ales U
N
DER properly controlled public authority. 
25
13
13
13
25
13
13
13
13
13
63
75
88
-
soldier, serving in 102 Battalion -- an ethnic Herero unit -- U
N
DER the South Africans. 
25
25
13
13
13
13
38
13
13
13
13
13
50
63
75
75
-
now
 tw
o hundred and fifty G
arrim
peros w
ork U
N
DER him
. 
13
13
13
13
13
13
25
50
13
13
13
13
13
38
50
63
75
75
-
She’s got a w
hole team
 w
orking her U
N
D
ER her now
13
13
13
13
13
13
25
50
13
13
13
13
13
38
50
63
75
75
100
-
Trem
bling visibly w
ith fear U
N
DER the w
atchful eye of M
r U
padhyaya and the police
13
13
13
13
13
50
63
13
13
13
13
13
25
38
50
50
63
75
75
-
I’m
 w
orking U
N
D
ER the direction of the area m
anager
13
13
13
13
13
38
13
13
13
13
13
50
63
63
75
50
75
75
50
-
I’m
 U
N
D
ER his protection now
13
13
13
13
13
13
38
50
13
13
13
13
13
38
50
50
50
63
75
75
75
75
-
the defendants deny they w
ere U
N
DER any duty to offer any advice about financial 
13
13
13
13
13
38
13
13
13
13
13
25
38
50
38
50
50
50
50
50
63
-
U
N
DER the new
 regulations, the students had to sign in each w
eek
13
25
13
13
13
13
38
13
13
13
13
13
38
50
63
50
63
50
50
50
50
63
88
-
got to be com
m
itted U
N
DER the m
ental health act before you're not sound enough  
13
13
13
13
25
13
13
13
13
13
50
63
75
63
50
38
38
38
63
50
75
88
-
w
e have chosen to operate potentially U
N
DER any Posix-com
pliant operating system
13
13
13
13
25
13
13
13
13
13
50
63
75
63
50
38
38
38
63
50
75
88
100
-
U
N
DER the old system
, com
m
ission paym
ents for transactions  
13
13
13
13
25
13
13
13
13
13
50
63
75
63
50
38
38
38
63
50
75
88
100
100
-
w
hich provides that an action U
N
DER the Act m
ay consist of or include a claim
 for dam
ages   
13
13
13
13
25
13
13
13
13
13
50
63
75
63
50
38
38
38
63
50
75
88
100
100
100
-
U
N
DER M
r G
orbachev's policies of glasnost and perestroika, 
13
13
13
13
25
13
13
13
13
13
50
63
75
63
50
38
38
38
63
50
75
88
100
100
100
100
-
can also apply to em
igrate to Britain U
N
DER very lim
ited criteria
13
13
13
13
25
13
13
13
13
13
50
63
75
63
50
38
38
38
63
50
75
88
100
100
100
100
100
-
U
N
DER the term
s of this new
 policy, w
e should get a refund
13
13
13
13
25
13
13
13
13
13
50
63
75
63
50
38
38
38
63
50
75
88
100
100
100
100
100
100
-
O
ther accords U
N
DER the peace process, chiefly the denial of support for  
25
13
13
13
13
13
13
13
38
50
63
50
38
25
25
25
50
38
63
75
88
88
88
88
88
88
88
-
they intended to file an explanation of their actions U
N
DER Article 51 of the U
N
 Charter, 
25
13
13
13
13
13
13
13
38
50
63
50
38
25
25
25
50
38
63
75
88
88
88
88
88
88
88
100
-
Since there are few
 books indexed U
N
DER "sw
ords", the "history of sw
ords" searcher 
25
13
13
13
13
13
13
13
50
50
50
50
38
25
25
25
38
25
25
38
50
50
50
50
50
50
50
63
63
-
I’m
 going to file that com
m
ent U
N
D
ER ‘P’ for pathetic
25
13
13
13
13
13
13
13
50
50
50
50
38
25
25
25
38
25
38
50
63
63
63
63
63
63
63
75
75
88
-
I w
as U
N
D
ER the im
pression that she’d gone hom
e
13
13
13
25
38
13
13
13
13
13
13
25
25
38
38
25
38
38
50
38
25
25
25
25
25
25
25
38
38
25
25
-
I w
as U
N
D
ER the im
pression she’d already quit
13
13
13
25
38
13
13
13
13
13
13
25
25
38
38
25
38
38
50
38
25
25
25
25
25
25
25
38
38
25
25
100
-
conference of Scotland on the question of intercom
m
union is U
N
DER discussion
13
13
25
13
13
13
13
13
38
50
50
50
38
38
38
38
63
50
50
50
63
63
63
63
63
63
63
50
50
38
38
38
38
-
Your application is now
 U
N
DER review
13
13
13
25
13
13
13
13
13
38
50
50
50
38
38
38
50
63
63
50
50
63
63
63
63
63
63
63
50
50
38
38
38
38
88
-
Her w
orkload is currently U
N
DER review
13
13
13
25
13
13
13
13
13
38
50
50
50
38
38
38
50
63
63
50
50
63
63
63
63
63
63
63
50
50
38
38
38
38
88
100
-
W
e’re U
N
D
ER real pressure at the m
om
ent
13
13
13
13
38
50
13
13
13
13
13
25
38
38
38
50
50
50
75
50
75
63
63
50
50
50
50
50
50
50
38
38
25
25
38
38
63
75
75
-
m
oves are U
N
DER w
ay to establish a m
odern Socialist party.
13
13
13
25
38
25
13
13
13
25
25
25
38
38
38
50
25
50
38
38
25
25
25
25
25
25
25
38
38
38
38
50
50
50
63
63
63
-
rem
em
ber their hospital is U
N
DER threat. 
13
13
13
25
38
25
13
13
13
25
25
25
38
38
38
50
38
63
50
50
38
38
38
38
38
38
38
50
50
38
38
63
63
63
75
75
75
88
-
Som
ething w
hich is very m
uch U
N
DER attack.
13
13
13
25
38
25
13
13
13
25
25
25
38
38
38
50
38
63
50
50
38
38
38
38
38
38
38
50
50
38
38
63
63
63
75
75
75
88
100
-
Generic spatial configuration 
Less than 
U
nder authority/ 
com
m
and 
M
ixed m
etaphorical 
sense 
Internal force 
External 
force 
Appendix 5: Experiment 3 stimuli 
  
M
ixed sentences
Spatial sentences
N
on-spatial sentences
I'm
 w
earing a vest U
N
D
ER
 this shirt.
I'm
 w
earing a vest U
N
D
ER
 this shirt.
Y
ou can em
igrate to B
ritain U
N
D
ER
 lim
ited criteria.
Tracksuit bottom
s should not be w
orn U
N
D
ER
 school trousers.
Tracksuit bottom
s should not be w
orn U
N
D
ER
 school trousers.
H
e w
ill be com
m
itted U
N
D
ER
 the m
ental health act.
Should I w
ear a jum
per U
N
D
ER
 this coat?
Should I w
ear a jum
per U
N
D
ER
 this coat?
It w
ill be contested U
N
D
ER
 the C
orrupt Practices A
ct.
They got U
N
D
ER
 cover of the w
alls of the fortresses.
They got U
N
D
ER
 cover of the w
alls of the fortresses.
They w
ill file an explanation U
N
D
ER
 A
rticle 51 of the U
N
 C
harter.
R
inse the dish U
N
D
ER
 running w
ater.
R
inse the dish U
N
D
ER
 running w
ater.
U
N
D
ER
 the new
 regulations, the students m
ust sign in each w
eek.
They found m
ore w
allpaper U
N
D
ER
 the layer they'd rem
oved.
They found m
ore w
allpaper U
N
D
ER
 the layer they'd rem
oved.
The fridge can be exchanged U
N
D
ER
 the returns policy.
Y
ou can em
igrate to B
ritain U
N
D
ER
 lim
ited criteria.
I'm
 frying the bread U
N
D
ER
 there.
R
em
em
ber their hospital is U
N
D
ER
 threat.
H
e w
ill be com
m
itted U
N
D
ER
 the m
ental health act.
I'm
 hiding U
N
D
ER
 your bed.
This is som
ething w
hich is very m
uch U
N
D
ER
 attack.
It w
ill be contested U
N
D
ER
 the C
orrupt Practices A
ct.
The Troll seldom
 cam
e out from
 U
N
D
ER
 the bridge.
They deny they w
ere U
N
D
ER
 any duty to offer any advice.
They w
ill file an explanation U
N
D
ER
 A
rticle 51 of the U
N
 C
harter.
She kicked him
 U
N
D
ER
 the table.
W
e're U
N
D
ER
 real pressure at the m
om
ent.
U
N
D
ER
 the new
 regulations, the students m
ust sign in each w
eek.
They lay U
N
D
ER
 the stars.
Y
our application is now
 U
N
D
ER
 review
.
The fridge can be exchanged U
N
D
ER
 the returns policy.
C
over dark circles U
N
D
ER
 your eyes w
ith concealer.
The question of intercom
m
union is U
N
D
ER
 discussion.
R
em
em
ber their hospital is U
N
D
ER
 threat.
I'm
 sleeping U
N
D
ER
 m
y cover.
W
e'll be taxed U
N
D
ER
 the C
onservatives.
This is som
ething w
hich is very m
uch U
N
D
ER
 attack.
The grow
ing roots U
N
D
ER
 the path had cracked the tarm
ac.
I'm
 w
orking U
N
D
ER
 the direction of the area m
anager.
They deny they w
ere U
N
D
ER
 any duty to offer any advice.
They put m
aterial U
N
D
ER
 the carpet to m
ake it m
ore com
fortable.
250 G
arrim
peros w
ork U
N
D
ER
 him
.
W
e're U
N
D
ER
 real pressure at the m
om
ent.
They looked w
here others w
ouldn't think to - U
N
D
ER
 dark leaves.
She's got a w
hole team
 w
orking U
N
D
ER
 her now
.
Y
our application is now
 U
N
D
ER
 review
.
They'd been hiding people U
N
D
ER
 the floorboards.
H
e served in 102 B
attalion U
N
D
ER
 the South A
fricans.
The question of intercom
m
union is U
N
D
ER
 discussion.
H
e felt w
arm
 U
N
D
ER
 the blanket.
The A
ct w
as introduced U
N
D
ER
 the last President.
I'm
 frying the bread U
N
D
ER
 there.
The creatures m
ust adapt to life U
N
D
ER
 ice-covered w
ater.
A
labam
a has a population of just U
N
D
ER
 10,000 in 1810.
I'm
 hiding U
N
D
ER
 your bed.
B
arium
 m
etal is kept U
N
D
ER
 m
ineral oil to prevent a reaction.
A
rm
strong and A
ldrin returned it just U
N
D
ER
 a day later.
The Troll seldom
 cam
e out from
 U
N
D
ER
 the bridge.
O
ne third of the tow
n w
as U
N
D
ER
 w
ater.
3.1%
 households has children U
N
D
ER
 18 living w
ith them
.
She kicked him
 U
N
D
ER
 the table.
The U
-boats w
ill rem
ain U
N
D
ER
 the sea.
I brought the project in U
N
D
ER
 budget at £108,065
They lay U
N
D
ER
 the stars.
The A
pollo film
 collection had been stored U
N
D
ER
 liquid nitrogen.
She has just under 1 billion to spend.
C
over dark circles U
N
D
ER
 your eyes w
ith concealer.
H
arry rescued R
on from
 U
N
D
ER
 the lake.
M
ost salam
anders are U
N
D
ER
 15cm
 long.
I'm
 sleeping U
N
D
ER
 m
y cover.
The fabric extends from
 the ankle to U
N
D
ER
 the foot.
G
ray published m
ost of her w
ork U
N
D
ER
 a pseudonym
.
The grow
ing roots U
N
D
ER
 the path had cracked the tarm
ac.
The saddle slipped U
N
D
ER
 the horse's belly.
H
e enrolled U
N
D
ER
 the guise of B
obby Parker.
They put m
aterial U
N
D
ER
 the carpet to m
ake it m
ore com
fortable.
N
ylon straps pass U
N
D
ER
 the hull of the ship.
M
y account is U
N
D
ER
 m
y w
ife's nam
e.
They looked w
here others w
ouldn't think to - U
N
D
ER
 dark leaves.
N
eon lights U
N
D
ER
 the car give the car a distinctive appearance.
The com
pany produced a version U
N
D
ER
 the nam
e "Snatch".
They'd been hiding people U
N
D
ER
 the floorboards.
The rider's helm
et w
as tied U
N
D
ER
 her chin.
H
e w
as w
orking U
N
D
ER
 the assum
ed nam
e of C
. Lenning.
H
e felt w
arm
 U
N
D
ER
 the blanket.
There w
ere no stickers U
N
D
ER
 the bottom
 of the skateboard. 
H
e attended hospital U
N
D
ER
 the nam
e of G
raham
 Ferguson.
W
e'll be taxed U
N
D
ER
 the C
onservatives.
O
nly sm
all boats can pass U
N
D
ER
 the bridge.
She w
as w
orking U
N
D
ER
 the assum
ption she'd be fired.
I'm
 w
orking U
N
D
ER
 the direction of the area m
anager.
The note had been pushed U
N
D
ER
 the door.
W
e w
ere U
N
D
ER
 the im
pression the play w
as cancelled.
250 G
arrim
peros w
ork U
N
D
ER
 him
.
The river passes U
N
D
ER
 the Tunnel A
venue B
ridge.
The V
ice-C
hancellor w
as there U
N
D
ER
 a m
isapprehension.
She's got a w
hole team
 w
orking U
N
D
ER
 her now
.
The subw
ay line runs U
N
D
ER
 the overpass.
U
N
D
ER
 this reasoning, the court w
as right to affirm
 this verdict.
H
e served in 102 B
attalion U
N
D
ER
 the South A
fricans.
W
hen the sun sets it does not pass U
N
D
ER
 the Earth.
W
e tolerated his behaviour U
N
D
ER
 the belief that he w
as truly gifted.
The A
ct w
as introduced U
N
D
ER
 the last President.
The players w
ere forced to drive U
N
D
ER
 the bridge.
The people boarded the plane U
N
D
ER
 false pretenses.
M
ixed sentences
Spatial sentences
N
on-spatial sentences
There w
as a w
rangle O
V
ER
 a proposal to adopt a law
.
C
an you just run it O
V
ER
 the road?
There w
as a w
rangle O
V
ER
 a proposal to adopt a law
.
I puzzled O
V
ER
 this.
The cops pulled m
e O
V
ER
.
I puzzled O
V
ER
 this.
Let's not fight O
V
ER
 it.
I ran O
V
ER
 the bridge.
Let's not fight O
V
ER
 it.
C
lashes also occurred O
V
ER
 trapping rights.
Sarah's com
e O
V
ER
 the road D
addy.
C
lashes also occurred O
V
ER
 trapping rights.
W
e had som
e discussions O
V
ER
 w
here to place the boundaries.
The plane flew
 O
V
ER
 the city.
W
e had som
e discussions O
V
ER
 w
here to place the boundaries.
W
e'd fall out O
V
ER
 stupid things and not speak to each other.
H
e w
alked slow
ly O
V
ER
 the zebra-crossing.
W
e'd fall out O
V
ER
 stupid things and not speak to each other.
C
an you just run it O
V
ER
 the road?
Jum
p O
V
ER
 the other one.
H
e is handing O
V
ER
 his presidency.
The cops pulled m
e O
V
ER
.
H
erons seem
 to be incapable of stepping O
V
ER
 the deterrent.
That's half the reason that Brian Tolbrook took O
V
ER
 at Tettron.
I ran O
V
ER
 the bridge.
I go O
V
ER
 the handlebars.
H
e took O
V
ER
 the printing business.
Sarah's com
e O
V
ER
 the road D
addy.
The quick brow
n fox jum
ped O
V
ER
 the lazy dog.
I'll take O
V
ER
 the prim
ary agenda.
The plane flew
 O
V
ER
 the city.
H
e refused to return the balls kicked O
V
ER
 his fence.
I can't hand O
V
ER
 a long barrelled w
eapon to that officer.
H
e w
alked slow
ly O
V
ER
 the zebra-crossing.
They keep slinging their tow
els O
V
ER
 the bedroom
 door.
The plaintiff handed O
V
ER
 to Sam
uel R
evill the first note.
Jum
p O
V
ER
 the other one.
Bring pelm
et fabric O
V
ER
, and press w
ith an iron to bond together.
I rushed out before the show
 w
as O
V
ER
.
H
erons seem
 to be incapable of stepping O
V
ER
 the deterrent.
I turn it O
V
ER
.
I can't believe the w
eekend is O
V
ER
 already!
I go O
V
ER
 the handlebars.
The printed sheets are turned O
V
ER
 on the long axis.
H
is w
restling days are not O
V
ER
 yet.
The quick brow
n fox jum
ped O
V
ER
 the lazy dog.
Turn that steak O
V
ER
, it's burning!
T
hey think it's all O
V
E
R
…
it is now
!
H
e refused to return the balls kicked O
V
ER
 his fence.
Y
eah can you turn that O
V
ER
 please.
She w
ished the party w
as O
V
ER
.
They keep slinging their tow
els O
V
ER
 the bedroom
 door.
H
e saw
 a car flip O
V
ER
 and land upside dow
n in a hedge.
W
e hope Sunderland w
ill go up once the gam
e is O
V
ER
.
H
e is handing O
V
ER
 his presidency.
Jake w
atched as the pins tum
bled O
V
ER
.
O
V
ER
 the next 17 m
onths, he w
ould be im
prisoned in the cam
ps.
That's half the reason that Brian Tolbrook took O
V
ER
 at Tettron.
I w
ould alw
ays fall O
V
ER
 as a kid.
The ratios have varied O
V
ER
 the centuries.
H
e took O
V
ER
 the printing business.
It takes at least tw
o people to push O
V
ER
 a cow
.
O
V
ER
 its history, anthropology has developed a num
ber of related concepts.
I'll take O
V
ER
 the prim
ary agenda.
The w
orld contains physics to m
ake blocks topple O
V
ER
.
Lizards have been increasingly found in hom
es as pets O
V
ER
 the last few
 years.
I can't hand O
V
ER
 a long barrelled w
eapon to that officer.
A
n explosion caused the tree to fall O
V
ER
. 
The econom
y w
ould continue to decline O
V
ER
 a 24-m
onth period.
The plaintiff handed O
V
ER
 to Sam
uel R
evill the first note.
Equipm
ent on the set had been accidentally knocked O
V
ER
.
Preparation for the event extended O
V
ER
 the years 1859-1866.
I rushed out before the show
 w
as O
V
ER
.
This oil-producing region is spread O
V
ER
 m
uch of w
estern Pennsylvania.
R
esearch show
ed im
pacts of O
V
ER
 10%
.
I can't believe the w
eekend is O
V
ER
 already!
The grow
th develops O
V
ER
 the w
hole agar surface.
U
nion enlistm
ents increased by O
V
ER
 10,000.
H
is w
restling days are not O
V
ER
 yet.
The ranch extends O
V
ER
 m
uch of Pecos C
ounty.
A
m
azon has O
V
ER
 900,000 m
em
bers in its affiliate program
m
e.
T
hey think it's all O
V
E
R
…
it is now
!
The painting stretches O
V
ER
 500sq m
 of ceiling.
Factory w
orkers are paid just O
V
ER
 $12 per hour.
She w
ished the party w
as O
V
ER
.
The new
 design w
as actually spread O
V
ER
 tw
o stam
ps.
Pennies from
 H
eaven has raised w
ell O
V
ER
 $2 m
illion.
W
e hope Sunderland w
ill go up once the gam
e is O
V
ER
.
A
 piece of paper w
as pasted O
V
ER
 Som
erset's nam
e in the report.
The protest cost taxpayers O
V
ER
 a m
illion pounds.
Bring pelm
et fabric O
V
ER
, and press w
ith an iron to bond together.
O
rnate carvings are found O
V
ER
 the doorw
ay.
H
e tried to increase his control O
V
ER
 the landow
ners.
I turn it O
V
ER
.
A
 painting hangs O
V
ER
 the m
antel of the R
oosevelt R
oom
.
The com
m
ission had little pow
er O
V
ER
 netw
orks.
The printed sheets are turned O
V
ER
 on the long axis.
H
e played the banjo w
ith his hands O
V
ER
 his head.
H
e presided O
V
ER
 the lunar landings.
Turn that steak O
V
ER
, it's burning!
The inscriptions w
ere fixed O
V
ER
 the gatew
ay of the larger courtyard.
M
r Bush presided O
V
ER
 the first m
eeting of his new
 team
.
Y
eah can you turn that O
V
ER
 please.
O
V
ER
 the desk hangs a portrait of A
nton R
ubenstein.
There w
ere m
anifestations of R
om
an authority O
V
ER
 other churches.
H
e saw
 a car flip O
V
ER
 and land upside dow
n in a hedge.
D
rones w
ere spotted hovering O
V
ER
 the bom
b site.
M
arriage gave a couple rights O
V
ER
 each other.
M
ixed sentences
Spatial sentences
N
on-spatial sentences
C
ongress is som
ew
here B
ELO
W
 cockroaches and traffic jam
s in A
m
ericans' esteem
.
Tabith stood B
ELO
W
, w
atching him
.
C
ongress is som
ew
here B
ELO
W
 cockroaches and traffic jam
s in A
m
ericans' esteem
.
W
e m
ust set standards of achievem
ent B
ELO
W
 w
hich they m
ust not fall.
B
ELO
W
 the front w
indow
s the extension w
as divided into tw
o sections.
W
e m
ust set standards of achievem
ent B
ELO
W
 w
hich they m
ust not fall.
Y
ou w
ouldn't be doing the job if you w
ere B
ELO
W
 that level.
They established an iron foundry in the valley B
ELO
W
 the church in 1790.
Y
ou w
ouldn't be doing the job if you w
ere B
ELO
W
 that level.
Paul had perform
ed B
ELO
W
 expectation.
The w
alk provides w
onderful view
s of M
allerstang B
ELO
W
.
Paul had perform
ed B
ELO
W
 expectation.
H
e perform
ed B
ELO
W
 par last tim
e.
Y
our m
ates are dow
n B
ELO
W
, w
atching you.
H
e perform
ed B
ELO
W
 par last tim
e.
H
e is an unenthusiastic and B
ELO
W
 average soldier.
I called out to the people on the beach B
ELO
W
, but they didn't hear m
e.
H
e is an unenthusiastic and B
ELO
W
 average soldier.
Tabith stood B
ELO
W
, w
atching him
.
The people in the flat B
ELO
W
 w
ouldn't stop shouting.
The loss is a little B
ELO
W
 £3,200.
B
ELO
W
 the front w
indow
s the extension w
as divided into tw
o sections.
Instead of being up high the box w
as dow
n B
ELO
W
.
There's no level B
ELO
W
 w
hich the w
ages m
ay not fall.
They established an iron foundry in the valley B
ELO
W
 the church in 1790.
W
e dredged B
ELO
W
 the m
ud at the bottom
 of the river.
W
e brought in forty m
illion pounds B
ELO
W
 the target am
ount.
The w
alk provides w
onderful view
s of M
allerstand B
ELO
W
.
W
hen w
e got B
ELO
W
 the next layer the concentrations becam
e stronger.
H
e set a price B
ELO
W
 the existing supplier's 1994 prices.
Y
our m
ates are dow
n B
ELO
W
, w
atching you.
The cam
pus w
as shrinking B
ELO
W
 m
e into a collection of children's play houses.
There is a £20 surcharge on orders B
ELO
W
 £50.
I called out to the people on the beach B
ELO
W
, but they didn't hear m
e.
The crocodile sank B
ELO
W
 the surface.
The sales value w
as w
ell B
ELO
W
 target.
The people in the flat B
ELO
W
 w
ouldn't stop shouting.
She had a m
ole just B
ELO
W
 her right eye.
The city experiences m
ore than 60 days B
ELO
W
 0 degrees C
.
Instead of being up high the box w
as dow
n B
ELO
W
.
D
on't paint B
ELO
W
 the w
indow
sill.
The final tem
perature is B
ELO
W
 the starting value. 
W
e dredged B
ELO
W
 the m
ud at the bottom
 of the river.
B
ELO
W
 the crags a w
ell-built tunnel could be seen.
Liquids m
ay change to vapour at tem
peratures B
ELO
W
 their boiling points.
W
hen w
e got B
ELO
W
 the next layer the concentrations becam
e stronger.
I pinned m
y nam
e badge B
ELO
W
 the logo on m
y tshirt.
It is possible to supercool liquid w
ater to B
ELO
W
 the freezing point.
The cam
pus w
as shrinking B
ELO
W
 m
e into a collection of children's play houses.
There are tw
o iron rings on the w
all B
ELO
W
 the painting.
M
inim
um
 tem
peratures rarely fall B
ELO
W
 38 C
.
The crocodile sank B
ELO
W
 the surface.
The sleeves gradually get tighter and end B
ELO
W
 the elbow
.
Tem
peratures range from
 B
ELO
W
 -2 to over 30 C
.
She had a m
ole just B
ELO
W
 her right eye.
Fill in B
ELO
W
 all the tasks that you do in a typical day.
B
ELO
W
 him
 there w
as an adm
inistrative hierarchy.
D
on't paint B
ELO
W
 the w
indow
sill.
Look at the sentence B
ELO
W
, w
hat does it say?
B
ELO
W
 the nobility w
ere priests, physicians and engineers.
B
ELO
W
 the crags a w
ell-built tunnel could be seen.
G
ive us your fun verdict by dialling the num
bers B
ELO
W
.
Those B
ELO
W
 him
 in the feudal chain ow
ed nothing to Frederick.
I pinned m
y nam
e badge B
ELO
W
 the logo on m
y tshirt.
Serve w
ith Sharp sauce (see B
ELO
W
).
The principal relied on the support of those B
ELO
W
 her.
There are tw
o iron rings on the w
all B
ELO
W
 the painting.
In the situations listed B
ELO
W
 identify w
hat your inform
ation needs w
ould be.
The chief eunuch w
ould direct junior eunuchs B
ELO
W
 him
.
The sleeves gradually get tighter and end B
ELO
W
 the elbow
.
It w
ill be argued B
ELO
W
 that econom
ic reconstruction w
as a success. 
B
ELO
W
 the leader are num
erous clan or fam
ily chiefs.
The loss is a little B
ELO
W
 £3,200.
The bird is dark rusty-brow
n above and dark grey B
ELO
W
.
Tara B
row
n is in the year B
ELO
W
 the four m
ain characters.
There's no level B
ELO
W
 w
hich the w
ages m
ay not fall.
A
dults are light olive above, yellow
 B
ELO
W
, and have a black hood.
B
ob w
as in the year B
ELO
W
.
W
e brought in forty m
illion pounds B
ELO
W
 the target am
ount.
The fem
ale m
andarin duck is paler B
ELO
W
.
G
riff R
hys Jones w
as a year B
ELO
W
 him
, and in the sam
e class as C
harles Thom
son.
H
e set a price B
ELO
W
 the existing supplier's 1994 prices.
W
heatears are blue-grey above and w
hite B
ELO
W
.
They studied at Stockbridge H
igh and w
ere a year B
ELO
W
 the rest of their team
m
ates.
There is a £20 surcharge on orders B
ELO
W
 £50.
N
ightingales are generally buff to w
hite B
ELO
W
.
Y
ou'd never consider going out w
ith a boy from
 the year B
ELO
W
.
The sales value w
as w
ell B
ELO
W
 target.
They are dark green and shiny above, and rusty and hairy B
ELO
W
.
G
ee w
as in the year B
ELO
W
 Princess A
nne.
Fill in B
ELO
W
 all the tasks that you do in a typical day.
The house stood 300 yards B
ELO
W
 the county line.
It w
as B
ELO
W
 a G
entlew
om
an to w
rangle.
Look at the sentence B
ELO
W
, w
hat does it say?
A
ntarctica and A
ustralia are B
ELO
W
 the equator.
It is too far B
ELO
W
 contem
pt to be w
orth castigating.
G
ive us your fun verdict by dialling the num
bers B
ELO
W
.
A
nything B
ELO
W
 the W
atford G
ap is the south.
It is B
ELO
W
 her to say that.
Serve w
ith Sharp sauce (see B
ELO
W
).
M
y daughter once w
ent to the C
ook Islands B
ELO
W
 H
aw
aii.
I am
 B
ELO
W
 that kind of w
ork if nothing else.
In the situations listed B
ELO
W
 identify w
hat your inform
ation needs w
ould be.
Is South A
m
erica above or B
ELO
W
 the Tropic of C
ancer?
Such petty behavior is B
ELO
W
 m
e.
It w
ill be argued B
ELO
W
 that econom
ic reconstruction w
as a success. 
Fifteen m
iles B
ELO
W
 the border, you'll face a checkpoint.
G
ood students thought it w
as B
ELO
W
 them
, and not challenging enough.
M
ixed sentences
Spatial sentences
N
on-spatial sentences
They think they're A
BO
V
E w
ork like this.
There w
as a faint bruise A
BO
V
E her eyebrow
.
They think they're A
BO
V
E w
ork like this.
A
re they good, A
BO
V
E average, or below
 average?
I've hung som
e m
istletoe A
BO
V
E the doorw
ay.
A
re they good, A
BO
V
E average, or below
 average?
It w
as either A
BO
V
E average or below
 average.
The dictionaries are A
BO
V
E the history books.
It w
as either A
BO
V
E average or below
 average.
The R
enault 5 w
as just A
BO
V
E banger status.
She took the form
 of a m
erm
aid A
BO
V
E the w
aist.
The R
enault 5 w
as just A
BO
V
E banger status.
She's not A
BO
V
E silly gossip.
The shelf is fixed to the w
all A
BO
V
E the radiator.
She's not A
BO
V
E silly gossip.
I'm
 A
BO
V
E all that petty business.
Jam
es had an X
-shaped scar A
BO
V
E his nose.
I'm
 A
BO
V
E all that petty business.
A
nything A
BO
V
E zero degrees and the ice w
ill m
elt
The com
m
ents (listed A
BO
V
E) are w
orrying.
A
nything A
BO
V
E zero degrees and the ice w
ill m
elt
H
e has a surplus of votes over and A
BO
V
E the quota.
A
s described A
BO
V
E, this uses a new
 operating system
.
H
e has a surplus of votes over and A
BO
V
E the quota.
It w
as 40%
 A
BO
V
E £150.
It w
as refused for the A
BO
V
E reasons.
It w
as 40%
 A
BO
V
E £150.
The new
 estim
ate is 95,000 A
BO
V
E the original estim
ate.
The process, described A
BO
V
E, is clear to all.
The new
 estim
ate is 95,000 A
BO
V
E the original estim
ate.
The price of fuel has jum
ped A
BO
V
E $4 a gallon.
A
ll of the A
BO
V
E law
s have been passed in the last ten years.
The price of fuel has jum
ped A
BO
V
E $4 a gallon.
Train fares have risen A
BO
V
E inflation.
The A
BO
V
E constraints are not seen as insurm
ountable.
Train fares have risen A
BO
V
E inflation.
There w
as a faint bruise A
BO
V
E her eyebrow
.
This site is elevated A
BO
V
E the road.
I used to be his boss, but he w
orks A
BO
V
E m
e now
.
I've hung som
e m
istletoe A
BO
V
E the doorw
ay.
G
lastonbury Tor tow
ers A
BO
V
E the Som
erset Levels.
N
ow
 that I w
ork A
BO
V
E her, w
e don't talk so m
uch.
The dictionaries are A
BO
V
E the history books.
It w
as built on the hill, just A
BO
V
E the station.
The orders cam
e from
 A
BO
V
E.
The plane w
as cruising A
BO
V
E the clouds.
W
e had a great view
 from
 the cliff A
BO
V
E the cove.
There is a level of executives A
BO
V
E the vice president level.
The shelf is fixed to the w
all A
BO
V
E the radiator.
The tow
n is 200m
 A
BO
V
E sea-level.
A
BO
V
E private soldiers there are three types of officer.
The stars A
BO
V
E w
ere partly obscured by clouds.
W
e w
ere observed from
 the w
indow
 A
BO
V
E.
W
e're under serious pressure from
 A
BO
V
E to get the job done.
The com
m
ents (listed A
BO
V
E) are w
orrying.
The m
ale and fem
ale com
m
on poorw
ill are sim
ilar, both gray and black A
BO
V
E.
I heard their scream
ing faintly A
BO
V
E the roar of the M
artian's collapse.
A
s described A
BO
V
E, this uses a new
 operating system
.
The bird is dark rusty-brow
n A
BO
V
E and dark grey below
.
Tyrone shouted A
BO
V
E the noise.
It w
as refused for the A
BO
V
E reasons.
They are dark green and shiny A
BO
V
E, and rusty and hairy below
.
Y
ou m
ay hear them
 A
BO
V
E the shouts of battle.
The process, described A
BO
V
E, is clear to all.
A
dults are m
ainly golden-olive A
BO
V
E w
ith buff spots on the w
ings.
Som
etim
es you have to listen for it A
BO
V
E the yell of the crow
d.
A
ll of the A
BO
V
E law
s have been passed in the last ten years.
Their plum
age is green and yellow
 A
BO
V
E and yellow
 below
.
It w
as hard to hear anything A
BO
V
E the din of the restaurant.
The A
BO
V
E constraints are not seen as insurm
ountable.
Fem
ales and juveniles are brow
n A
BO
V
E w
ith brow
n barring below
.
I couldn't hear m
yself think A
BO
V
E the guys' chatter.
This site is elevated A
BO
V
E the road.
There is a cluster of coral pileups just A
BO
V
E the equator.
H
e w
as placed a year A
BO
V
E others of his age at school.
G
lastonbury Tor tow
ers A
BO
V
E the Som
erset Levels.
They w
ere all along up A
BO
V
E the A
rctic C
ircle.
The building houses all students from
 9th grade and A
BO
V
E.
It w
as built on the hill, just A
BO
V
E the station.
The tow
n of G
len D
ale is A
BO
V
E the M
ason-D
ixon line.
Each child is assigned a 'm
um
' or 'dad' in the year A
BO
V
E.
W
e had a great view
 from
 the cliff A
BO
V
E the cove.
They travelled to the islets A
BO
V
E H
aw
aii.
Singh w
as in the year group team
 tw
o years A
BO
V
E his ow
n.
The tow
n is 200m
 A
BO
V
E sea-level.
The ship m
ade regular runs across the A
rtic C
ircle A
BO
V
E the N
orth Sea.
Entry to the school in year 1 and A
BO
V
E begins w
ith a 'Taster D
ay'.
W
e w
ere observed from
 the w
indow
 A
BO
V
E.
The plant's distribution extends just A
BO
V
E the border into A
rizona.
A
 girl from
 the year A
BO
V
E m
e got a V
W
 bug.
I used to be his boss, but he w
orks A
BO
V
E m
e now
.
The stars A
BO
V
E w
ere partly obscured by clouds.
I think the quality I prize A
BO
V
E all others is curiosity.
N
ow
 that I w
ork A
BO
V
E her, w
e don't talk so m
uch.
The plane w
as cruising A
BO
V
E the clouds.
She valued reason A
BO
V
E any other hum
an virtue.
The orders cam
e from
 A
BO
V
E.
This m
odel w
as designed to attack enem
y aircraft up to 5km
 A
BO
V
E the launching aircraft.
H
e desired A
BO
V
E all else to restore the political heritage of his fam
ily.
There is a level of executives A
BO
V
E the vice president level.
They w
ere m
ercilessly bom
bed from
 A
BO
V
E by the Italian air force.
H
e felt A
BO
V
E anything that his w
ork w
as an evolving process.
A
BO
V
E private soldiers there are three types of officer.
It positions itself on a tree lim
b high A
BO
V
E the forest floor.
She desperately w
orships beauty A
BO
V
E anything else.
W
e're under serious pressure from
 A
BO
V
E to get the job done.
The alien appeared to m
ove through the cham
ber A
BO
V
E the audience.
"A
pple of m
y eye" refers to som
eone that one cherishes A
BO
V
E all others.
Appendix	6:	Experiment	3	task	instructions	
Changes to the OptimalSort system mean that, at the time this experiment was 
undertaken, only short instructions could be presented. 
 
Your task is to organise a list of sentences into groups according to the meaning of 
the word [target word]. The goal is to end up with groups in which the meaning of 
[target word] is the same in all sentences in the group. Grouping them is easy: 
Step 1 
Read through all of the sentences and think about what [target word] means in each 
one. 
Step 2 
Drag a sentence into the blank space on the right to create a group. 
Step 3 
Drag other sentences into that group so that the meaning of [target word] is the 
same in all of the sentences in the group. 
Make more groups by dropping sentences in unused spaces. 
Step 4 
Give each group a name that describes the meaning of [target word] in that group. 
Create as many or as few groups as you need, with as many or as few members as 
you wish. You can move sentences into other groups if you change your mind. 
When you're done click "Finished" at the top right. Have fun! 
 
  
Appendix 7: Network visualisations of Experiment 3 sentence-
sorting data 
 
  
I've hung some mistletoe ABOVE the doorway.
The dictionaries are ABOVE the history books.
There was a faint bruise ABOVE her eyebrow.
The shelf is fixed to the wall ABOVE the radiator.
The plane was cruising ABOVE the clouds.
The stars ABOVE were partly obscured by clouds.
We had a great view from the cliff ABOVE the cove.
We were observed from the window ABOVE.
This site is elevated ABOVE the road.
It was built on the hill, just ABOVE the station.
Glastonbury Tor towers ABOVE the Somerset Levels.
The town is 200m ABOVE sea-level.
Anything ABOVE zero degrees and the ice will melt
He has a surplus of votes over and ABOVE the quota.
It was 40% ABOVE Â£150.
The new estimate is 95,000 ABOVE the original estimate.
The price of fuel has jumped ABOVE $4 a gallon.
Train fares have risen ABOVE inflation.
Are they good, ABOVE average, or below average?
It was either ABOVE average or below average.
The Renault 5 was just ABOVE banger status.
I used to be his boss, but he works ABOVE me now.
Now that I work ABOVE her, we don't talk so much.
There is a level of executives ABOVE the vice president level.
ABOVE private soldiers there are three types of officer.
The orders came from ABOVE.
We're under serious pressure from ABOVE to get the job done.
They think they're ABOVE work like this.
She's not ABOVE silly gossip.
I'm ABOVE all that petty business.
The comments (listed ABOVE) are worrying.
As described ABOVE, this uses a new operating system.
It was refused for the ABOVE reasons.
The process, described ABOVE, is clear to all.
All of the ABOVE laws have been passed in the last ten years.
The ABOVE constraints are not seen as insurmountable.
The comments (listed ABOVE) are worrying.
The process, described ABOVE, is clear to all.
As described ABOVE, this uses a new operating system.
It was refused for the ABOVE reasons.
All of the ABOVE laws have been passed in the last ten years.
The ABOVE constraints are not seen as insurmountable.
The town is 200m ABOVE sea-level.
This site is elevated ABOVE the road.
Glastonbury Tor towers ABOVE the Somerset Levels.
It was built on the hill, just ABOVE the station.
We had a great view from the cliff ABOVE the cove.
We were observed from the window ABOVE.
The stars ABOVE were partly obscured by clouds.
The plane was cruising ABOVE the clouds.
There was a faint bruise ABOVE her eyebrow.
The dictionaries are ABOVE the history books.
The shelf is fixed to the wall ABOVE the radiator.
I've hung some mistletoe ABOVE the doorway.
Anything ABOVE zero degrees and the ice will melt
It was 40% ABOVE Â£150.
The new estimate is 95,000 ABOVE the original estimate.
The price of fuel has jumped ABOVE $4 a gallon.
He has a surplus of votes over and ABOVE the quota.
Train fares have risen ABOVE inflation.
It was either ABOVE average or below average.
Are they good, ABOVE average, or below average?
The Renault 5 was just ABOVE banger status.
I used to be his boss, but he works ABOVE me now.
There is a level of executives ABOVE the vice president level.
ABOVE private soldiers there are three types of officer.
Now that I work ABOVE her, we don't talk so much.
The orders came from ABOVE.
We're under serious pressure from ABOVE to get the job done.
She's not ABOVE silly gossip.
I'm ABOVE all that petty business.
They think they're ABOVE work like this.
Tyrone shouted ABOVE the noise.
I couldn't hear myself think ABOVE the guys' chatter.
I heard their screaming faintly ABOVE the roar of the Martian's collapse.
You may hear them ABOVE the shouts of battle.
Sometimes you have to listen for it ABOVE the yell of the crowd.
It was hard to hear anything ABOVE the din of the restaurant.
He has a surplus of votes over and ABOVE the quota.
The new estimate is 95,000 ABOVE the original estimate.
The price of fuel has jumped ABOVE $4 a gallon.
Anything ABOVE zero degrees and the ice will melt
It was 40% ABOVE Â£150.
Train fares have risen ABOVE inflation.
Are they good, ABOVE average, or below average?
It was either ABOVE average or below average.
Each child is assigned a 'mum' or 'dad' in the year ABOVE.
Singh was in the year group team two years ABOVE his own.
Entry to the school in year 1 and ABOVE begins with a 'Taster Day'.
He was placed a year ABOVE others of his age at school.
The building houses all students from 9th grade and ABOVE.
A girl from the year ABOVE me got a VW bug.
I used to be his boss, but he works ABOVE me now.
Now that I work ABOVE her, we don't talk so much.
There is a level of executives ABOVE the vice president level.
ABOVE private soldiers there are three types of officer.
We're under serious pressure from ABOVE to get the job done.
The orders came from ABOVE.
The Renault 5 was just ABOVE banger status.
She desperately worships beauty ABOVE anything else.
I think the quality I prize ABOVE all others is curiosity.
She valued reason ABOVE any other human virtue.
He desired ABOVE all else to restore the political heritage of his family.
"Apple of my eye" refers to someone that one cherishes ABOVE all others.
He felt ABOVE anything that his work was an evolving process.
They think they're ABOVE work like this.
She's not ABOVE silly gossip.
I'm ABOVE all that petty business.
She desperately worships beauty ABOVE anything else.
"Apple of my eye" refers to someone that one cherishes ABOVE all others.
I think the quality I prize ABOVE all others is curiosity.
She valued reason ABOVE any other human virtue.
He desired ABOVE all else to restore the political heritage of his family.
He felt ABOVE anything that his work was an evolving process.
They think they're ABOVE work like this.
She's not ABOVE silly gossip.
I'm ABOVE all that petty business.
The Renault 5 was just ABOVE banger status.
Are they good, ABOVE average, or below average?
It was either ABOVE average or below average.
Anything ABOVE zero degrees and the ice will melt
It was 40% ABOVE Â£150.
The price of fuel has jumped ABOVE $4 a gallon.
The new estimate is 95,000 ABOVE the original estimate.
He has a surplus of votes over and ABOVE the quota.
Train fares have risen ABOVE inflation.
Entry to the school in year 1 and ABOVE begins with a 'Taster Day'.
He was placed a year ABOVE others of his age at school.
The building houses all students from 9th grade and ABOVE.
Each child is assigned a 'mum' or 'dad' in the year ABOVE.
Singh was in the year group team two years ABOVE his own.
A girl from the year ABOVE me got a VW bug.
ABOVE private soldiers there are three types of officer.
I used to be his boss, but he works ABOVE me now.
Now that I work ABOVE her, we don't talk so much.
There is a level of executives ABOVE the vice president level.
The orders came from ABOVE.
We're under serious pressure from ABOVE to get the job done.
I heard their screaming faintly ABOVE the roar of the Martian's collapse.
Tyrone shouted ABOVE the noise.
You may hear them ABOVE the shouts of battle.
Sometimes you have to listen for it ABOVE the yell of the crowd.
It was hard to hear anything ABOVE the din of the restaurant.
I couldn't hear myself think ABOVE the guys' chatter.
The male and female common poorwill are similar, both gray and black ABOVE.
The bird is dark rusty-brown ABOVE and dark grey below.
They are dark green and shiny ABOVE, and rusty and hairy below.
Adults are mainly golden-olive ABOVE with buff spots on the wings.
Their plumage is green and yellow ABOVE and yellow below.
Females and juveniles are brown ABOVE with brown barring below.
She took the form of a mermaid ABOVE the waist.
There was a faint bruise ABOVE her eyebrow.
James had an X-shaped scar ABOVE his nose.
I've hung some mistletoe ABOVE the doorway.
The shelf is fixed to the wall ABOVE the radiator.
The alien appeared to move through the chamber ABOVE the audience.
This site is elevated ABOVE the road.
The plane was cruising ABOVE the clouds.
This model was designed to attack enemy aircraft up to 5km ABOVE the launching aircraft.
It positions itself on a tree limb high ABOVE the forest floor.
We had a great view from the cliff ABOVE the cove.
The dictionaries are ABOVE the history books.
We were observed from the window ABOVE.
The stars ABOVE were partly obscured by clouds.
They were mercilessly bombed from ABOVE by the Italian air force.
Glastonbury Tor towers ABOVE the Somerset Levels.
The town is 200m ABOVE sea-level.
It was built on the hill, just ABOVE the station.
There is a cluster of coral pileups just ABOVE the equator.
They were all along up ABOVE the Arctic Circle.
The town of Glen Dale is ABOVE the Mason-Dixon line.
They travelled to the islets ABOVE Hawaii.
The ship made regular runs across the Artic Circle ABOVE the North Sea.
The plant's distribution extends just ABOVE the border into Arizona.
It positions itself on a tree limb high ABOVE the forest floor.
The alien appeared to move through the chamber ABOVE the audience.
The plane was cruising ABOVE the clouds.
This model was designed to attack enemy aircraft up to 5km ABOVE the launching aircraft.
They were mercilessly bombed from ABOVE by the Italian air force.
I've hung some mistletoe ABOVE the doorway.
The shelf is fixed to the wall ABOVE the radiator.
This site is elevated ABOVE the road.
Glastonbury Tor towers ABOVE the Somerset Levels.
We had a great view from the cliff ABOVE the cove.
We were observed from the window ABOVE.
It was built on the hill, just ABOVE the station.
The town is 200m ABOVE sea-level.
The dictionaries are ABOVE the history books.
The stars ABOVE were partly obscured by clouds.
There was a faint bruise ABOVE her eyebrow.
James had an X-shaped scar ABOVE his nose.
She took the form of a mermaid ABOVE the waist.
The male and female common poorwill are similar, both gray and black ABOVE.
The bird is dark rusty-brown ABOVE and dark grey below.
Adults are mainly golden-olive ABOVE with buff spots on the wings.
Their plumage is green and yellow ABOVE and yellow below.
Females and juveniles are brown ABOVE with brown barring below.
They are dark green and shiny ABOVE, and rusty and hairy below.
There is a cluster of coral pileups just ABOVE the equator.
They were all along up ABOVE the Arctic Circle.
The town of Glen Dale is ABOVE the Mason-Dixon line.
They travelled to the islets ABOVE Hawaii.
The ship made regular runs across the Artic Circle ABOVE the North Sea.
The plant's distribution extends just ABOVE the border into Arizona.
The comments (listed ABOVE) are worrying.
As described ABOVE, this uses a new operating system.
It was refused for the ABOVE reasons.
The process, described ABOVE, is clear to all.
All of the ABOVE laws have been passed in the last ten years.
The ABOVE constraints are not seen as insurmountable.
We dredged BELOW the mud at the bottom of the river.
When we got BELOW the next layer the concentrations became stronger.
The crocodile sank BELOW the surface.
BELOW the crags a well-built tunnel could be seen.
The campus was shrinking BELOW me into a collection of children's play houses.
Your mates are down BELOW, watching you.
The walk provides wonderful views of Mallerstang BELOW.
I called out to the people on the beach BELOW, but they didn't hear me.
Tabith stood BELOW, watching him.
Instead of being up high the box was down BELOW.
She had a mole just BELOW her right eye.
Don't paint BELOW the windowsill.
I pinned my name badge BELOW the logo on my tshirt.
There are two iron rings on the wall BELOW the painting.
BELOW the front windows the extension was divided into two sections.
The sleeves gradually get tighter and end BELOW the elbow.
They established an iron foundry in the valley BELOW the church in 1790.
The people in the flat BELOW wouldn't stop shouting.
Fill in BELOW all the tasks that you do in a typical day.
Look at the sentence BELOW, what does it say?
Give us your fun verdict by dialling the numbers BELOW.
Serve with Sharp sauce (see BELOW).
In the situations listed BELOW identify what your information needs would be.
It will be argued BELOW that economic reconstruction was a success. 
The loss is a little BELOW ï¿½3,200.
We brought in forty million pounds BELOW the target amount.
There is a ï¿½20 surcharge on orders BELOW ï¿½50.
He set a price BELOW the existing supplier's 1994 prices.
The sales value was well BELOW target.
There's no level BELOW which the wages may not fall.
We must set standards of achievement BELOW which they must not fall.
Congress is somewhere BELOW cockroaches and traffic jams in Americans' esteem.
You wouldn't be doing the job if you were BELOW that level.
Paul had performed BELOW expectation.
He performed BELOW par last time.
He is an unenthusiastic and BELOW average soldier.
The loss is a little BELOW 3,200.
We brought in forty million pounds BELOW the target amount.
He set a price BELOW the existing supplier's 1994 prices.
There is a 20 surcharge on orders BELOW 50.
The sales value was well BELOW target.
There's no level BELOW which the wages may not fall.
We must set standards of achievement BELOW which they must not fall.
Paul had performed BELOW expectation.
He is an unenthusiastic and BELOW average soldier.
He performed BELOW par last time.
You wouldn't be doing the job if you were BELOW that level.
Congress is somewhere BELOW cockroaches and traffic jams in Americans' esteem.
She had a mole just BELOW her right eye.
I pinned my name badge BELOW the logo on my tshirt.
There are two iron rings on the wall BELOW the painting.
BELOW the front windows the extension was divided into two sections.
Don't paint BELOW the windowsill.
The sleeves gradually get tighter and end BELOW the elbow.
BELOW the crags a well-built tunnel could be seen.
They established an iron foundry in the valley BELOW the church in 1790.
I called out to the people on the beach BELOW, but they didn't hear me.
The walk provides wonderful views of Mallerstang BELOW.
Tabith stood BELOW, watching him.
Your mates are down BELOW, watching you.
The campus was shrinking BELOW me into a collection of children's play houses.
Instead of being up high the box was down BELOW.
The people in the flat BELOW wouldn't stop shouting.
We dredged BELOW the mud at the bottom of the river.
When we got BELOW the next layer the concentrations became stronger.
The crocodile sank BELOW the surface.
Look at the sentence BELOW, what does it say?
Give us your fun verdict by dialling the numbers BELOW.
It will be argued BELOW that economic reconstruction was a success. 
Fill in BELOW all the tasks that you do in a typical day.
In the situations listed BELOW identify what your information needs would be.
Serve with Sharp sauce (see BELOW).
Such petty behavior is BELOW me.
Good students thought it was BELOW them, and not challenging enough.
It was BELOW a Gentlewoman to wrangle.
I am BELOW that kind of work if nothing else.
It is too far BELOW contempt to be worth castigating.
It is BELOW her to say that.
Congress is somewhere BELOW cockroaches and traffic jams in Americans' esteem.
BELOW the nobility were priests, physicians and engineers.
The chief eunuch would direct junior eunuchs BELOW him.
BELOW him there was an administrative hierarchy.
Those BELOW him in the feudal chain owed nothing to Frederick.
The principal relied on the support of those BELOW her.
BELOW the leader are numerous clan or family chiefs.
You wouldn't be doing the job if you were BELOW that level.
Paul had performed BELOW expectation.
He performed BELOW par last time.
He is an unenthusiastic and BELOW average soldier.
The sales value was well BELOW target.
The loss is a little BELOW ï¿½3,200.
We brought in forty million pounds BELOW the target amount.
He set a price BELOW the existing supplier's 1994 prices.
There is a ï¿½20 surcharge on orders BELOW ï¿½50.
The city experiences more than 60 days BELOW 0 degrees C.
The final temperature is BELOW the starting value. 
Liquids may change to vapour at temperatures BELOW their boiling points.
It is possible to supercool liquid water to BELOW the freezing point.
Minimum temperatures rarely fall BELOW 38 C.
Temperatures range from BELOW -2 to over 30 C.
There's no level BELOW which the wages may not fall.
We must set standards of achievement BELOW which they must not fall.
They studied at Stockbridge High and were a year BELOW the rest of their teammates.
Tara Brown is in the year BELOW the four main characters.
Griff Rhys Jones was a year BELOW him, and in the same class as Charles Thomson.
You'd never consider going out with a boy from the year BELOW.
Gee was in the year BELOW Princess Anne.
Bob was in the year BELOW.
Such petty behavior is BELOW me.
Good students thought it was BELOW them, and not challenging enough.
It was BELOW a Gentlewoman to wrangle.
It is BELOW her to say that.
I am BELOW that kind of work if nothing else.
It is too far BELOW contempt to be worth castigating.
Paul had performed BELOW expectation.
We must set standards of achievement BELOW which they must not fall.
He is an unenthusiastic and BELOW average soldier.
He performed BELOW par last time.
The loss is a little BELOW Â£3,200.
We brought in forty million pounds BELOW the target amount.
He set a price BELOW the existing supplier's 1994 prices.
There is a Â£20 surcharge on orders BELOW Â£50.
The city experiences more than 60 days BELOW 0 degrees C.
The final temperature is BELOW the starting value. 
Liquids may change to vapour at temperatures BELOW their boiling points.
It is possible to supercool liquid water to BELOW the freezing point.
Minimum temperatures rarely fall BELOW 38 C.
Temperatures range from BELOW -2 to over 30 C.
The sales value was well BELOW target.
There's no level BELOW which the wages may not fall.
You wouldn't be doing the job if you were BELOW that level.
BELOW him there was an administrative hierarchy.
BELOW the nobility were priests, physicians and engineers.
The principal relied on the support of those BELOW her.
The chief eunuch would direct junior eunuchs BELOW him.
BELOW the leader are numerous clan or family chiefs.
Those BELOW him in the feudal chain owed nothing to Frederick.
Tara Brown is in the year BELOW the four main characters.
Bob was in the year BELOW.
Griff Rhys Jones was a year BELOW him, and in the same class as Charles Thomson.
They studied at Stockbridge High and were a year BELOW the rest of their teammates.
You'd never consider going out with a boy from the year BELOW.
Gee was in the year BELOW Princess Anne.
Congress is somewhere BELOW cockroaches and traffic jams in Americans' esteem.
Serve with Sharp sauce (see BELOW).
It will be argued BELOW that economic reconstruction was a success. 
Fill in BELOW all the tasks that you do in a typical day.
Look at the sentence BELOW, what does it say?
In the situations listed BELOW identify what your information needs would be.
Give us your fun verdict by dialling the numbers BELOW.
Instead of being up high the box was down BELOW.
I called out to the people on the beach BELOW, but they didn't hear me.
Tabith stood BELOW, watching him.
Your mates are down BELOW, watching you.
The walk provides wonderful views of Mallerstang BELOW.
They established an iron foundry in the valley BELOW the church in 1790.
BELOW the crags a well-built tunnel could be seen.
There are two iron rings on the wall BELOW the painting.
I pinned my name badge BELOW the logo on my tshirt.
She had a mole just BELOW her right eye.
Don't paint BELOW the windowsill.
BELOW the front windows the extension was divided into two sections.
We dredged BELOW the mud at the bottom of the river.
When we got BELOW the next layer the concentrations became stronger.
The crocodile sank BELOW the surface.
The campus was shrinking BELOW me into a collection of children's play houses.
The people in the flat BELOW wouldn't stop shouting.
The bird is dark rusty-brown above and dark grey BELOW.
Adults are light olive above, yellow BELOW, and have a black hood.
The female mandarin duck is paler BELOW.
Wheatears are blue-grey above and white BELOW.
Nightingales are generally buff to white BELOW.
They are dark green and shiny above, and rusty and hairy BELOW.
The sleeves gradually get tighter and end BELOW the elbow.
The house stood 300 yards BELOW the county line.
Anything BELOW the Watford Gap is the south.
My daughter once went to the Cook Islands BELOW Hawaii.
Fifteen miles BELOW the border, you'll face a checkpoint.
Antarctica and Australia are BELOW the equator.
Is South America above or BELOW the Tropic of Cancer?
Fill in BELOW all the tasks that you do in a typical day.
Look at the sentence BELOW, what does it say?
Serve with Sharp sauce (see BELOW).
In the situations listed BELOW identify what your information needs would be.
It will be argued BELOW that economic reconstruction was a success. 
Give us your fun verdict by dialling the numbers BELOW.
The sleeves gradually get tighter and end BELOW the elbow.
I pinned my name badge BELOW the logo on my tshirt.
She had a mole just BELOW her right eye.
There are two iron rings on the wall BELOW the painting.
Don't paint BELOW the windowsill.
BELOW the front windows the extension was divided into two sections.
The people in the flat BELOW wouldn't stop shouting.
Tabith stood BELOW, watching him.
Your mates are down BELOW, watching you.
I called out to the people on the beach BELOW, but they didn't hear me.
The walk provides wonderful views of Mallerstang BELOW.
They established an iron foundry in the valley BELOW the church in 1790.
BELOW the crags a well-built tunnel could be seen.
The campus was shrinking BELOW me into a collection of children's play houses.
We dredged BELOW the mud at the bottom of the river.
When we got BELOW the next layer the concentrations became stronger.
The crocodile sank BELOW the surface.
Instead of being up high the box was down BELOW.
The bird is dark rusty-brown above and dark grey BELOW.
Wheatears are blue-grey above and white BELOW.
They are dark green and shiny above, and rusty and hairy BELOW.
The female mandarin duck is paler BELOW.
Nightingales are generally buff to white BELOW.
Adults are light olive above, yellow BELOW, and have a black hood.
The house stood 300 yards BELOW the county line.
Anything BELOW the Watford Gap is the south.
Fifteen miles BELOW the border, you'll face a checkpoint.
My daughter once went to the Cook Islands BELOW Hawaii.
Antarctica and Australia are BELOW the equator.
Is South America above or BELOW the Tropic of Cancer?
The plane flew OVER the city.
Jump OVER the other one.
The quick brown fox jumped OVER the lazy dog.
He refused to return the balls kicked OVER his fence.
I go OVER the handlebars.
Herons seem to be incapable of stepping OVER the deterrent.
They keep slinging their towels OVER the bedroom door.
I ran OVER the bridge.
He walked slowly OVER the zebra-crossing.
Can you just run it OVER the road?
Sarah's come OVER the road Daddy.
Bring pelmet fabric OVER, and press with an iron to bond together.
The cops pulled me OVER.
I turn it OVER.
Yeah can you turn that OVER please.
The printed sheets are turned OVER on the long axis.
Turn that steak OVER, it's burning!
He saw a car flip OVER and land upside down in a hedge.
That's half the reason that Brian Tolbrook took OVER at Tettron.
He took OVER the printing business.
I'll take OVER the primary agenda.
He is handing OVER his presidency.
I can't hand OVER a long barrelled weapon to that officer.
The plaintiff handed OVER to Samuel Revill the first note.
There was a wrangle OVER a proposal to adopt a law.
I puzzled OVER this.
Let's not fight OVER it.
Clashes also occurred OVER trapping rights.
We had some discussions OVER where to place the boundaries.
We'd fall out OVER stupid things and not speak to each other.
The printed sheets are turned OVER on the long axis.
Turn that steak OVER, it's burning!
He saw a car flip OVER and land upside down in a hedge.
Yeah can you turn that OVER please.
I turn it OVER.
Bring pelmet fabric OVER, and press with an iron to bond together.
The plaintiff handed OVER to Samuel Revill the first note.
I can't hand OVER a long barrelled weapon to that officer.
He is handing OVER his presidency.
That's half the reason that Brian Tolbrook took OVER at Tettron.
He took OVER the printing business.
I'll take OVER the primary agenda.
The cops pulled me OVER.
Sarah's come OVER the road Daddy.
Can you just run it OVER the road?
I ran OVER the bridge.
He walked slowly OVER the zebra-crossing.
Herons seem to be incapable of stepping OVER the deterrent.
The quick brown fox jumped OVER the lazy dog.
Jump OVER the other one.
The plane flew OVER the city.
They keep slinging their towels OVER the bedroom door.
I go OVER the handlebars.
He refused to return the balls kicked OVER his fence.
OVER the next 17 months, he would be imprisoned in the camps.
OVER its history, anthropology has developed a number of related concepts.
The ratios have varied OVER the centuries.
Preparation for the event extended OVER the years 1859-1866.
Lizards have been increasingly found in homes as pets OVER the last few years.
The economy would continue to decline OVER a 24-month period.
Research showed impacts of OVER 10%.
Union enlistments increased by OVER 10,000.
Amazon has OVER 900,000 members in its affiliate programme.
Factory workers are paid just OVER $12 per hour.
Pennies from Heaven has raised well OVER $2 million.
The protest cost taxpayers OVER a million pounds.
I rushed out before the show was OVER.
She wished the party was OVER.
We hope Sunderland will go up once the game is OVER.
I can't believe the weekend is OVER already!
His wrestling days are not OVER yet.
They think it's all OVERï¿½ï¿½_it is now!
We'd fall out OVER stupid things and not speak to each other.
Clashes also occurred OVER trapping rights.
Let's not fight OVER it.
There was a wrangle OVER a proposal to adopt a law.
I puzzled OVER this.
We had some discussions OVER where to place the boundaries.
Marriage gave a couple rights OVER each other.
The commission had little power OVER networks.
He tried to increase his control OVER the landowners.
There were manifestations of Roman authority OVER other churches.
Mr Bush presided OVER the first meeting of his new team.
He presided OVER the lunar landings.
That's half the reason that Brian Tolbrook took OVER at Tettron.
I'll take OVER the primary agenda.
He took OVER the printing business.
The plaintiff handed OVER to Samuel Revill the first note.
I can't hand OVER a long barrelled weapon to that officer.
He is handing OVER his presidency.
The ratios have varied OVER the centuries.
Lizards have been increasingly found in homes as pets OVER the last few years.
OVER the next 17 months, he would be imprisoned in the camps.
The economy would continue to decline OVER a 24-month period.
OVER its history, anthropology has developed a number of related concepts.
Preparation for the event extended OVER the years 1859-1866.
Research showed impacts of OVER 10%.
Union enlistments increased by OVER 10,000.
Amazon has OVER 900,000 members in its affiliate programme.
Factory workers are paid just OVER $12 per hour.
Pennies from Heaven has raised well OVER $2 million.
The protest cost taxpayers OVER a million pounds.
They think it's all OVERâ€¦it is now!
We hope Sunderland will go up once the game is OVER.
I can't believe the weekend is OVER already!
His wrestling days are not OVER yet.
I rushed out before the show was OVER.
She wished the party was OVER.
Let's not fight OVER it.
We'd fall out OVER stupid things and not speak to each other.
Clashes also occurred OVER trapping rights.
There was a wrangle OVER a proposal to adopt a law.
We had some discussions OVER where to place the boundaries.
I puzzled OVER this.
Marriage gave a couple rights OVER each other.
There were manifestations of Roman authority OVER other churches.
The commission had little power OVER networks.
He tried to increase his control OVER the landowners.
He presided OVER the lunar landings.
Mr Bush presided OVER the first meeting of his new team.
That's half the reason that Brian Tolbrook took OVER at Tettron.
He took OVER the printing business.
I'll take OVER the primary agenda.
He is handing OVER his presidency.
I can't hand OVER a long barrelled weapon to that officer.
The plaintiff handed OVER to Samuel Revill the first note.
An explosion caused the tree to fall OVER. 
Equipment on the set had been accidentally knocked OVER.
Jake watched as the pins tumbled OVER.
The world contains physics to make blocks topple OVER.
I would always fall OVER as a kid.
It takes at least two people to push OVER a cow.
I turn it OVER.
The printed sheets are turned OVER on the long axis.
Turn that steak OVER, it's burning!
Yeah can you turn that OVER please.
He saw a car flip OVER and land upside down in a hedge.
The cops pulled me OVER.
Bring pelmet fabric OVER, and press with an iron to bond together.
Sarah's come OVER the road Daddy.
Can you just run it OVER the road?
I ran OVER the bridge.
He walked slowly OVER the zebra-crossing.
Herons seem to be incapable of stepping OVER the deterrent.
The quick brown fox jumped OVER the lazy dog.
He refused to return the balls kicked OVER his fence.
Jump OVER the other one.
I go OVER the handlebars.
The plane flew OVER the city.
Drones were spotted hovering OVER the bomb site.
He played the banjo with his hands OVER his head.
Ornate carvings are found OVER the doorway.
A painting hangs OVER the mantel of the Roosevelt Room.
The inscriptions were fixed OVER the gateway of the larger courtyard.
OVER the desk hangs a portrait of Anton Rubenstein.
They keep slinging their towels OVER the bedroom door.
A piece of paper was pasted OVER Somerset's name in the report.
The growth develops OVER the whole agar surface.
This oil-producing region is spread OVER much of western Pennsylvania.
The painting stretches OVER 500sq m of ceiling.
The ranch extends OVER much of Pecos County.
The new design was actually spread OVER two stamps.
I turn it OVER.
Turn that steak OVER, it's burning!
Yeah can you turn that OVER please.
He saw a car flip OVER and land upside down in a hedge.
The printed sheets are turned OVER on the long axis.
Jake watched as the pins tumbled OVER.
It takes at least two people to push OVER a cow.
The world contains physics to make blocks topple OVER.
An explosion caused the tree to fall OVER. 
I would always fall OVER as a kid.
Equipment on the set had been accidentally knocked OVER.
The cops pulled me OVER.
Bring pelmet fabric OVER, and press with an iron to bond together.
A piece of paper was pasted OVER Somerset's name in the report.
Drones were spotted hovering OVER the bomb site.
He played the banjo with his hands OVER his head.
Ornate carvings are found OVER the doorway.
The inscriptions were fixed OVER the gateway of the larger courtyard.
A painting hangs OVER the mantel of the Roosevelt Room.
OVER the desk hangs a portrait of Anton Rubenstein.
The plane flew OVER the city.
Jump OVER the other one.
Herons seem to be incapable of stepping OVER the deterrent.
I go OVER the handlebars.
He refused to return the balls kicked OVER his fence.
The quick brown fox jumped OVER the lazy dog.
They keep slinging their towels OVER the bedroom door.
He walked slowly OVER the zebra-crossing.
Sarah's come OVER the road Daddy.
I ran OVER the bridge.
Can you just run it OVER the road?
The ranch extends OVER much of Pecos County.
This oil-producing region is spread OVER much of western Pennsylvania.
The growth develops OVER the whole agar surface.
The new design was actually spread OVER two stamps.
The painting stretches OVER 500sq m of ceiling.
I'm wearing a vest UNDER this shirt.
Tracksuit bottoms should not be worn UNDER school trousers.
Should I wear a jumper UNDER this coat?
They found more wallpaper UNDER the layer they'd removed.
I'm sleeping UNDER my cover.
He felt warm UNDER the blanket.
The growing roots UNDER the path had cracked the tarmac.
I'm hiding UNDER your bed.
She kicked him UNDER the table.
The Troll seldom came out from UNDER the bridge.
They'd been hiding people UNDER the floorboards.
They put material UNDER the carpet to make it more comfortable.
They looked where others wouldn't think to - UNDER dark leaves.
I'm frying the bread UNDER there.
They lay UNDER the stars.
Cover dark circles UNDER your eyes with concealer.
Rinse the dish UNDER running water.
They got UNDER cover of the walls of the fortresses.
Remember their hospital is UNDER threat.
This is something which is very much UNDER attack.
Your application is now UNDER review.
The question of intercommunion is UNDER discussion.
We're UNDER real pressure at the moment.
They deny they were UNDER any duty to offer any advice.
He will be committed UNDER the mental health act.
It will be contested UNDER the Corrupt Practices Act.
They will file an explanation UNDER Article 51 of the UN Charter.
UNDER the new regulations, the students must sign in each week.
The fridge can be exchanged UNDER the returns policy.
You can emigrate to Britain UNDER limited criteria.
The Act was introduced UNDER the last President.
We'll be taxed UNDER the Conservatives.
250 Garrimperos work UNDER him.
She's got a whole team working UNDER her now.
He served in 102 Battalion UNDER the South Africans.
I'm working UNDER the direction of the area manager.
I'm wearing a vest UNDER this shirt.
Tracksuit bottoms should not be worn UNDER school trousers.
Should I wear a jumper UNDER this coat?
They found more wallpaper UNDER the layer they'd removed.
He felt warm UNDER the blanket.
I'm sleeping UNDER my cover.
The growing roots UNDER the path had cracked the tarmac.
I'm frying the bread UNDER there.
I'm hiding UNDER your bed.
The Troll seldom came out from UNDER the bridge.
She kicked him UNDER the table.
They lay UNDER the stars.
They'd been hiding people UNDER the floorboards.
They looked where others wouldn't think to - UNDER dark leaves.
Cover dark circles UNDER your eyes with concealer.
They put material UNDER the carpet to make it more comfortable.
Rinse the dish UNDER running water.
They got UNDER cover of the walls of the fortresses.
This is something which is very much UNDER attack.
Remember their hospital is UNDER threat.
Your application is now UNDER review.
The question of intercommunion is UNDER discussion.
We're UNDER real pressure at the moment.
They deny they were UNDER any duty to offer any advice.
You can emigrate to Britain UNDER limited criteria.
He will be committed UNDER the mental health act.
It will be contested UNDER the Corrupt Practices Act.
They will file an explanation UNDER Article 51 of the UN Charter.
The fridge can be exchanged UNDER the returns policy.
UNDER the new regulations, the students must sign in each week.
We'll be taxed UNDER the Conservatives.
The Act was introduced UNDER the last President.
250 Garrimperos work UNDER him.
She's got a whole team working UNDER her now.
He served in 102 Battalion UNDER the South Africans.
I'm working UNDER the direction of the area manager.
Armstrong and Aldrin returned it just UNDER a day later.Most salamanders are UNDER 15cm long.
Alabama had a population of just UNDER 10,000 in 1810.
3.1% of households have children UNDER 18 living with them.
I brought the project in UNDER budget at 108,065She has just UNDER 1 billion to spend.
250 Garrimperos work UNDER him.
She's got a whole team working UNDER her now.
He served in 102 Battalion UNDER the South Africans.
I'm working UNDER the direction of the area manager.
We'll be taxed UNDER the Conservatives.
The Act was introduced UNDER the last President.
It will be contested UNDER the Corrupt Practices Act.
The fridge can be exchanged UNDER the returns policy.
You can emigrate to Britain UNDER limited criteria.
UNDER the new regulations, the students must sign in each week.
They will file an explanation UNDER Article 51 of the UN Charter.
He will be committed UNDER the mental health act.
UNDER this reasoning, the court was right to affirm this verdict.
We tolerated his behaviour UNDER the belief that he was truly gifted.
The Vice-Chancellor was there UNDER a misapprehension.
We were UNDER the impression the play was cancelled.
She was working UNDER the assumption she'd be fired.
The people boarded the plane UNDER false pretenses.
Gray published most of her work UNDER a pseudonym.
He was working UNDER the assumed name of C. Lenning.
He attended hospital UNDER the name of Graham Ferguson.
The company produced a version UNDER the name "Snatch".
My account is UNDER my wife's name.
He enrolled UNDER the guise of Bobby Parker.
They deny they were UNDER any duty to offer any advice.
We're UNDER real pressure at the moment.
Remember their hospital is UNDER threat.
This is something which is very much UNDER attack.
Your application is now UNDER review.
The question of intercommunion is UNDER discussion.
3.1% of households have children UNDER 18 living with them.
Most salamanders are UNDER 15cm long.
Alabama had a population of just UNDER 10,000 in 1810.
Armstrong and Aldrin returned it just UNDER a day later.
I brought the project in UNDER budget at £108,065
She has just UNDER £1 billion to spend.
250 Garrimperos work UNDER him.
She's got a whole team working UNDER her now.
I'm working UNDER the direction of the area manager.
He served in 102 Battalion UNDER the South Africans.
We'll be taxed UNDER the Conservatives.
The Act was introduced UNDER the last President.
UNDER the new regulations, the students must sign in each week.
He will be committed UNDER the mental health act.
It will be contested UNDER the Corrupt Practices Act.
The fridge can be exchanged UNDER the returns policy.
They will file an explanation UNDER Article 51 of the UN Charter.
You can emigrate to Britain UNDER limited criteria.
UNDER this reasoning, the court was right to affirm this verdict.
The Vice-Chancellor was there UNDER a misapprehension.
We tolerated his behaviour UNDER the belief that he was truly gifted.
We were UNDER the impression the play was cancelled.
She was working UNDER the assumption she'd be fired.
The people boarded the plane UNDER false pretenses.
Gray published most of her work UNDER a pseudonym.
He was working UNDER the assumed name of C. Lenning.
He attended hospital UNDER the name of Graham Ferguson.
The company produced a version UNDER the name "Snatch".
He enrolled UNDER the guise of Bobby Parker.
My account is UNDER my wife's name.
This is something which is very much UNDER attack.
Remember their hospital is UNDER threat.
We're UNDER real pressure at the moment.
Your application is now UNDER review.
The question of intercommunion is UNDER discussion.
They deny they were UNDER any duty to offer any advice.
I'm wearing a vest UNDER this shirt.
Tracksuit bottoms should not be worn UNDER school trousers.
Should I wear a jumper UNDER this coat?
They found more wallpaper UNDER the layer they'd removed.
They put material UNDER the carpet to make it more comfortable.
They'd been hiding people UNDER the floorboards.
I'm hiding UNDER your bed.
The Troll seldom came out from UNDER the bridge.
They lay UNDER the stars.
I'm sleeping UNDER my cover.
He felt warm UNDER the blanket.
They looked where others wouldn't think to - UNDER dark leaves.
The growing roots UNDER the path had cracked the tarmac.
She kicked him UNDER the table.
The rider's helmet was tied UNDER her chin.
Nylon straps pass UNDER the hull of the ship.
When the sun sets it does not pass UNDER the Earth.The saddle slipped UNDER the horse's belly.
The fabric extends from the ankle to UNDER the foot.
Neon lights UNDER the car give the car a distinctive appearance.
There were no stickers UNDER the bottom of the skateboard. 
Cover dark circles UNDER your eyes with concealer.
I'm frying the bread UNDER there.
The players were forced to drive UNDER the bridge.
The subway line runs UNDER the overpass.
Only small boats can pass UNDER the bridge.
The river passes UNDER the Tunnel Avenue Bridge.
The note had been pushed UNDER the door.
Rinse the dish UNDER running water.
The U-boats will remain UNDER the sea.
Harry rescued Ron from UNDER the lake.
The creatures must adapt to life UNDER ice-covered water.
One third of the town was UNDER water.
Barium metal is kept UNDER mineral oil to prevent a reaction.
The Apollo film collection had been stored UNDER liquid nitrogen.
They got UNDER cover of the walls of the fortresses.
I'm wearing a vest UNDER this shirt.
Should I wear a jumper UNDER this coat?
Tracksuit bottoms should not be worn UNDER school trousers.
They found more wallpaper UNDER the layer they'd removed.
They put material UNDER the carpet to make it more comfortable.
I'm hiding UNDER your bed.
The Troll seldom came out from UNDER the bridge.
Only small boats can pass UNDER the bridge.
The river passes UNDER the Tunnel Avenue Bridge.
The subway line runs UNDER the overpass.
The players were forced to drive UNDER the bridge.
The note had been pushed UNDER the door.
She kicked him UNDER the table.
They lay UNDER the stars.
They'd been hiding people UNDER the floorboards.
I'm sleeping UNDER my cover.
He felt warm UNDER the blanket.
The growing roots UNDER the path had cracked the tarmac.
Cover dark circles UNDER your eyes with concealer.
The rider's helmet was tied UNDER her chin.
The fabric extends from the ankle to UNDER the foot.
The saddle slipped UNDER the horse's belly.
There were no stickers UNDER the bottom of the skateboard. 
Neon lights UNDER the car give the car a distinctive appearance.
I'm frying the bread UNDER there.
They looked where others wouldn't think to - UNDER dark leaves.
When the sun sets it does not pass UNDER the Earth.
Nylon straps pass UNDER the hull of the ship.
Rinse the dish UNDER running water.
One third of the town was UNDER water.
The U-boats will remain UNDER the sea.
Harry rescued Ron from UNDER the lake.
The creatures must adapt to life UNDER ice-covered water.
Barium metal is kept UNDER mineral oil to prevent a reaction.
The Apollo film collection had been stored UNDER liquid nitrogen.
They got UNDER cover of the walls of the fortresses.
